UNEG
United Nations Evaluation Group

UNEG Evaluation of the Pilot Initiative for Delivering as One

Evaluability Assessment Report on Tanzania

December 2008

UNEG Evaluability Assessment Team for Tanzania:

Segbedzi Norgbey, UNEP

Lucien Back, UNICEF

Janie Eriksen, Consultant

Sheila Reed, Consultant

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
DaO	Delivering as One UN
DPG	Development Partners Group
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GoT	Government of Tanzania
HLCP	High-level Committee on Programmes
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
JSC	Joint Government-United Nations Steering Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MKUKUTA	Kiswahili acronym of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
MKUZA	Kiswahili acronym of the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan
NRA	Non-resident Agency
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMT	Operations Management Team
RBM	Results-based Management
RC	Resident Coordinator
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound
TCPR	Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team

UNCMT	United Nations Country Management Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIC	United Nations Information Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSAC	UN Civil Society Advisory Committee
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USD	United States Dollars
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

1.   The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) conducted an assessment of the evaluability of the 'Delivering as One United Nations' (DaO) pilot initiative in Tanzania from 3-7 March 2008. The purpose of the evaluability mission was to assess the design processes to date, evaluate the strategic framework and framework for Monitoring and Evaluating (M&E) of the pilot initiative, and suggest ways to improve the quality of design of the pilot to facilitate effective evaluation of both processes and results and impact at a later stage.

2.   The main elements of the method comprised a review of key documents and group meetings with the United Nations Country Management Team (UNCMT)[1], Government of Tanzania (GoT) officials, bilateral and multilateral development partners, and representatives of civil society. There were some challenges to scheduling meetings due to the busy agendas of UN staff as well as the formation of a new government and accompanying rotation of staff.

Main findings

3.   Tanzania asked to be pilot country for the DaO initiative in late 2006. The pilot was officially launched in January 2007. The strategic intent of the pilot is, under the aegis of 'Delivering as One'[2], to provide a substantial and integrated response to national priorities as formulated in Vision 2025[3] and the 2006 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) known as MKUKUTA/MKUZA[4]. The key pillars of the NSGRP include the following: growth and reduction of income poverty; quality of life and social well being, with particular focus on social services for the poorest and the most vulnerable groups; and good governance and accountability.

4.   A Joint Government/UN Steering Committee (JSC) was established in April 2007 to provide overall guidance to the pilot process in terms of policy, programme design, resource mobilization, M&E, strategic partnership and communication. The JSC consists of representatives of the GoT, participating UN organizations and a member of the Development Partners Group (DPG). It is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and the UN Resident Coordinator (RC).

5.   In addition to being aligned with the MKUKUTA/MKUZA, the One Programme strives to comply fully with the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), which stipulates the desired relationship between the government and development partners as well as with its source of inspiration, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. These represent a commitment to improve aid effectiveness -- specifically ownership, alignment, harmonization and mutual accountability in a more results-based manner - to which Tanzania adheres.

---

[1] In Tanzania, the UN Country Team is referred to as the UN Country Management Team.

[2] One Programme, One Budgetary Framework, One Leader, One Office and One Communications.

[3] This plan was developed in 1999.

[4] Swahili acronyms for the NSGRP for the mainland and Zanzibar respectively.

6. The One Programme addresses gaps considered essential to meeting national development goals. In addition, it aims at enabling the UN system to develop and implement joint programmes and facilitate harmonization of efforts. Under the joint GoT and UN partnership and GoT leadership, the pilot represents an attempt to move away from agency-specific projects to a programme and sector-wide approach in line with GoT policies and priorities. The Programme also pays attention to the UN capacity development role in the areas of disaster preparedness and transition from relief to development. Humanitarian interventions are not included in this first One Programme.

7. A key feature of the Tanzania pilot is the creation of joint programmes[5]. The One Programme covers six programmatic areas which, in addition to MKUKUTA/MKUZA, are drawn from the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2007-2010 as well as the Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs) of four Ex-Com agencies and Country Programme or equivalent programming instruments of specialized agencies. The joint programmes are considered the means for defining joint work plans, joint budgets, common results, a clear division of labour and shared accountability.

8. The UNCMT is composed of 18 resident agencies: FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNIC, UNICEF, ICTR, UNIDO, WFP, and WHO, plus the World Bank and IMF[6]. The UNIFEM and UNEP Tanzania programmes are managed from Nairobi, Kenya. IOM maintains an observer status[7]. The RC position maintains its own office with six staff members. Three non-resident agencies (NRAs) are currently engaged in the DaO process in Tanzania. These are UNEP, OHCHR and IAEA.

9. All joint programme documents had been finalized by 6 March 2008. More than USD million had been allocated and was ready to be disbursed at the time of the mission in early March. Among the gains from the planning processes are greater involvement of and 'cross-fertilization' among agencies to identify and address solutions to pressing problems. The *One Fund* was put in place in October 2007. The Memorandum of Understanding establishes the role of the Managing Agent, appointed by each Joint Programme Working Group. The Managing Agent assumes full programmatic accountability for the results of the joint programme. The total funding requirement of the One Programme is estimated to be USD 74 million (37 percent of UNDAF funding requirements). Currently, USD 44 million is available from the existing funding arrangements. Thus USD 30) million needs to be covered by the One UN Fund.

---

[5] So far, seven joint programmes have been formulated: Joint Programme 1 Wealth creation, employment and economic empowerment (ILO, UNDP, FAO, UNIDO, WFP, IFAD and UN-HABITAT); Joint Programme 2 Reduction of maternal and newborn mortality (UNFPA, WHO and UNICEF); Joint Programme 3 Support to national response to HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNDP); Joint Programme 4 Capacity strengthening for development management (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA); Joint Programme 5 Capacity building support to Zanzibar (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO, FAO); Joint Programme 6.1 Managing transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development in northwestern Tanzania (UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNEP); and Joint Programme 6.2 Strengthening national disaster preparedness and response capacity (WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, FAO).

[6] These organizations are spelled out in full in the list of Acronyms and Abbreviations.

[7] UNDG database 2007.

10. The RC shares annual consolidated financial and narrative progress reports with the participating UN organizations, the Joint Steering Committee and the donors. The RC liaises with the Ministry of Finance at the level of the Deputy Permanent Secretary. The role of the RC is well accepted by stakeholders and the strong leadership currently provided has been a significant asset to the DaO. Since UNCMT members are not obliged to comply with the DaO, the RC's influence is, therefore, seen as critical for motivating and providing leadership to the group.

11. The *One Office* is meant to improve the efficiency of the UN system at the country level by reducing transaction costs, pooling support services and simplifying and harmonizing procedures. The Operations Management Team (OMT) has established a work plan that sets out objectives for unifying procedures for finance, human resources, procurement, and information and communications technology. The concrete outputs expected before the end of 2008 include the following: One Office for UN staff in Zanzibar and in the northwestern region, One Information and Communications Technology plan and a common accounts system.

12. Headway has been made in realizing the One UN in Tanzania. The design of the pilot appears comprehensive in its coverage of the basic parameters and fully coherent and consistent as regards national ownership, involvement of national and international stakeholders, and inclusiveness of UN stakeholders. The observations in this report aim to further enhance the quality of the design and hence the evaluability of the pilot.

13. The strategic intent is largely shared among stakeholders, although with differences in accentuation. Further strength could be achieved through formulation of a vision statement to describe the unique contribution of the UN system to national capacity development and in the context of other forms of external assistance.

14. The vision statement should provide the common logic to which the joint programmes would be linked. The programme logic would make the One Programme more evaluable. The degree to which various components of the DaO are aligned with national priorities and systems will inform future evaluations' inquiries into relevance, effectiveness and coherence. Part of the challenge in this respect is linked to the need for greater capacity at government levels to participate in the planning and execution of programmes.

15. The vision statement and the programme logic should, to the greatest possible extent, be shared by all UN organizations working in the country. However, this does not mean that all activities conducted by UN organizations need to be included in the One Programme (or the UNDAF).

16. The One Programme M&E Framework comprises 60 indicators that combine the Paris Declaration indicator targets with common services and change management targets. While useful for a future process evaluation, some work is required to bring the indicators in line with basic principles of Results-based Management (RBM), that is, a formulation that would make them SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). This would constitute a full-fledged M&E framework that would enhance the evaluability of the DaO pilot. The indicators should capture the full range of factors and effects that may be important to the experience, including positive and negative side-effects. They should transcend mere 'success criteria', which seem to be more linked to the stated secondary purpose, which is public relations.

17.   The joint programme M&E plans, which focus on development results, provide more substantive objectives and indicators allowing for an assessment of relevance and effectiveness. However, the formulation of these indicators is not sufficiently SMART. The number of indicators should be limited to avoid a need for tremendous resources in data collection. During its review, the RBM Task Force should select only key indicators to measure performance of the joint programme outcomes and results and those indicators should be pitched at the outcome level.

18.   The GoT, with the support of UNEG, is required to evaluate the pilots and share experiences. It is urgent that independent and credible M&E counterparts be identified as soon as possible, for example those who have been involved in the Independent Monitoring Group. It is also necessary to establish a separate joint M&E Working Group to coordinate the evaluation of the DaO pilot in Tanzania.

A. Introduction

19.   At the request of the Chief Executives Board, the UNEG initiated an assessment of the evaluability of the DaO initiative in the eight pilot countries of Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam. UNEG anticipated completion of the evaluability study by the end of March 2008. However, the process has been delayed due, *inter alia,* to requests by some RCs and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) to postpone missions because of specific country circumstances. This report is the result of the evaluability assessment conducted in Tanzania.

Mission dates and composition

20.   The evaluability assessment in Tanzania was conducted from 3-7 March 2008. The mission team was composed of Lucien Back and Segbedzi Norgbey, representing UNEG, and two consultants Janie Eriksen and Sheila Reed.

Objectives and purpose of the mission

21.   The purpose of the evaluability mission was to assess the design, processes undertaken to date, strategic frameworks, and M&E aspects of the pilot initiative. The mission also sought to provide lessons learned and advice for improving the quality of planning of the DaO pilot that would make it possible to effectively evaluate both the processes and results and impact at a later stage[8]. Specifically, the following parameters were assessed:

   a. Strategic intent of DaO in Tanzania.

   b. Quality of the design of the DaO pilot for the achievement of results.

   c. Initial appraisal of processes for the optimal involvement of relevant national and international stakeholders, including the GoT; civil society; the private sector; UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies; and external aid agencies.

   d. Existence of adequate sources of information to assess the achievement of results and indicators as well as of the required M&E systems.

   e. National ownership and leadership in the evaluation process, identification of independent and credible evaluators in pilot countries who can be involved in the evaluation of process and results of the DaO pilots at a later stage.

---

[8] See Terms of Reference in Annex 1.

Method and programme of the mission

22.   This report draws on a review of key documents and group meetings with UNCMT representatives, GoT officials, bilateral and multilateral development partners, and civil society representatives. The Terms of Reference for this study and a list of interviewees are included in Annexes 1 and 2 respectively. The mission began and concluded with presentations to the UNCMT. A briefing and round table discussion was held with the Ministry of Finance and Planning and a number of line ministries. The team also met the Civil Society Advisory Committee and met twice with the UN RBM Group. Two members of the team visited Zanzibar and met with officials from the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and civil society stakeholders.

Limitations

23.   The mission took place during a time when the RC Office was under high demand due to missions, workshops and the like. Furthermore, agencies had spent the week prior to the mission with a consultancy group commissioned to facilitate change management and UN skills profiling. As a result of competing priorities, the UNCMT faced some difficulties in accommodating yet another mission. Despite these constraints, the RC Office, Heads of agencies and staff did their utmost to meet with the team.

24.   The mission also coincided with a major restructuring of key ministries following the formation of a new government in mid February. This caused some uncertainty as to which government appointments should be made.

25.   A further challenge was that donors were not available for individual meetings. Instead, they were met with as a group, which may have limited comments that might have been shared in an individualized setting.

Acknowledgements

26.   The team is grateful to the staff of the RC Office for their support in scheduling appointments and for sharing their perspectives. The team thanks Oscar Fernandez Taranco, the RC and Gianluca Rampolla, Senior Advisor to the RC, for accommodating the team, despite their hectic schedules. Special thanks are due to Petra Karamagi and Connie Affonso for their hard work in setting up the agenda and seeing that the team got to the meetings. The team expresses its sincere gratitude to the GoT staff, members of the UNCMT, UN organization staff, members of civil society and donor representatives who shared their time with us and contributed to this assessment.

B. History, context and scope of DaO in Tanzania

Development context and history of DaO

27.   With a population of 37 million, a gross national income per capita of USD 330 and status as a Least Developed Country, Tanzania faces significant development challenges with regard to stemming poverty, increasing livelihood opportunities and stimulating growth. In 2001, 36 percent of Tanzanians lived below the national basic needs poverty line, a decrease from 39 percent in 1992. The incidence of poverty in rural areas decreased from 41 percent to 39 percent between 1992 and 2001. An acceleration in economic growth was seen from 2.5 percent in 1994 to 6.8 percent in 2005. In Zanzibar, gross domestic product increased from 3.6 percent in 2000 to 6.5 percent in 2004. There are indications in Tanzania that all children are enrolled in primary school, mortality has declined for children under 5 years of age and HIV/AIDS prevalence among the adult population has stabilized at approximately 7.3 percent[9].

28.   The NSGRP (known as MKUKUTA under its Kiswahili acronym) and the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (known as MKUZA) call for interventions to ensure that benefits at the macro-level are translated into the micro-level. The strategy prioritizes private-sector led growth combined with social-sector development. The national strategies have been costed and implementation facilitated by a strategic budget allocation system. Capacity building to reinforce weak political and administrative structures are part of the government's renewed emphasis on demand-led development. Participation by all stakeholders in policy dialogue has been broadened and is becoming more institutionalized. The quality of exchanges has improved and sector-level stakeholders have been more involved[10].

29.   On the humanitarian side, Tanzania hosts approximately 280,000 refugees from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the northwestern regions. The number of refugees has decreased from a peak of 500,000 in 2003 and is expected to decline further in 2008[11].

The UN Development system and other forms of External Aid

30.   Tanzania is an aid dependent country. Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Tanzania has risen from approximately 6 percent of gross domestic product in 2001 to more than 12 percent. In 2005 and 2006, aid represented more than 40 percent of public expenditure. In response to years of donor practices and aid modalities that undermined national ownership and leadership by being supply-driven with project implementation structures operating in parallel with government structures, Tanzania today is one of the pioneer countries in articulating and implementing aid harmonization and alignment processes.

---

[9] Compiled from the UNDAF 2007-2010, 'The United Republic of Tanzania – The Government's Statement on the UNDAF' and 'Overall Development Challenges', pp10-11.

[10] Wangwe S, 'Capacity Development for Mutual and Domestic Accountability: Reflections on the Tanzanian Experience', p 4.

[11] Ibid.

31.   Tanzania adheres to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness commitments to improve aid effectiveness, specifically ownership, alignment, harmonization and mutual accountability components in a more results-based manner. These commitments play an important role in efforts to streamline engagements with development partners. The Paris Declaration principles were further integrated in the JAST, which is a medium-term plan and agreement between the government and 18 development partners, including the United Nations, for managing development cooperation based on four priority areas for immediate action: a) increasing aid predictability; b) integrating external resources in the government budget and Exchequer system; c) harmonizing and rationalizing government and development partner processes; and d) strengthening capacity for external resource management and aid coordination. In December 2006, the GoT and 18 development partners, including the UN system, signed the JAST Memorandum of Understanding[12]. The UN system in collaboration with the GoT played an important role in facilitating the JAST process.

32.   Tanzania's long-term vision is set out in its 1999 national development plan, Vision 2025. This is backed by the NSGRP 2006-2010, which lays out detailed goals, operational targets and strategies to meet the long-term objectives identified in Vision 2025. Vision 2025 is based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which Tanzania aims to meet in 2010. An increasing volume of aid is channelled through the budget support modality, as well as sectoral programmes and basket funding. Sector basket funding has been implemented in health, primary education, agriculture, local government reform, public service reform, public financial management reform and legal sector reform[13].

33.   The DPG, whose monthly meetings are co-chaired by the RC and a rotating bilateral partner, is the coordinating body for Tanzania's 35 bilateral and multilateral development partners[14]. General budgetary support, the Tanzanian authorities' preferred aid modality, is provided by 14 development partners[15], an increase from 5 development partners in 2000, based on a common performance assessment framework and joint annual review processes. A central element in the development architecture is the application of *Lead, Active,* and *Delegating Partner* concepts within a coherent division of labour across the DPG that is expected to substantially reduce the transaction burden on the government and provide for greater coherence. Development partners are increasingly using government treasury, procurement and financial management systems.

34.   UN system efforts to support Tanzania in fulfilling its international obligations and implementing national priorities have been ongoing, and the UN reform started before the High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence recommendations on DaO. In mid-2004, the UNCMT conducted a Joint

---

[12] The UN Resident Coordinator signed on behalf of the entire UNCT.

[13] Wangwe S, 'Capacity Development for Mutual and Domestic Accountability: Reflections on the Tanzanian Experience', p 11.

[14] The DPG includes: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations (UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, IFAD, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, WFP, UNHCR, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, UN-Habitat), African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

[15] African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, EC, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Word Bank.

Strategic Review to assess the effectiveness of UN support to the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan/Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan in order to give direction to the next UNDAF for 2007-2010. The DPG completed the preparation of a results-based Joint Programme Document in 2006, which is a framework to support harmonized programmatic efforts to achieve development outcomes, given the JAST aid environment. The UN participated in the development of the Joint Programme Document to ensure that the UNDAF was incorporated in the document as an annex reflecting UN programmatic priorities

35.   In addition to the DPG, UN representatives participate in high-level policy discussions at the quarterly Development Cooperation Forum, at which the RC plays a leading role. The UN system is also supporting the strengthening of the Public Expenditure Review process.

36.   Although MKUZA and the mainland's MKUKUTA poverty reduction plans are complementary, the efforts to harmonize aid management systems on the mainland with those on Zanzibar are still in their early stages. The Government of Zanzibar has expressed strong interest in implementing these practices and is seeking to introduce the union-wide principles of the JAST in Zanzibar. It is expected that over the next two to three years, new work under JAST will see a convergence of the principles of harmonization and aid effectiveness on both the mainland and in Zanzibar.

37.   Thus, the UN reform in Tanzania is being carried out within the context of the larger aid effectiveness agenda thus focusing both on aid harmonization and on enabling UN organizations to 'Deliver as One'.

Conceptualization of DaO and the relationship of the DaO pilot with UNDAF

38.   The current second generation UNDAF 2007-2010 represents the business plan of 18 UN resident agencies plus UNIFEM. In July 2006, the GoT and UN organizations signed the UNDAF. The UNCMT decided to rely on the analytical work underpinning the MKUKUTA and MKUZA and therefore, no separate Common Country Assessment was undertaken.

39.   The preparation of the UNDAF was highly iterative, aligning support to the three key pillars of the outcomes based on the MKUKUTA/MKUZA: a) growth and reduction of income poverty; b) quality of life and social well being, with particular focus on social services for the poorest and the most vulnerable groups; and c) good governance and accountability. It includes the UN response to humanitarian concerns with a specific focus on the transitional phase in the refugee hosting area of northwestern Tanzania. The UNDAF document lists the expected outputs, the role of partners and the resource mobilization targets for each cluster and for each outcome.

40.   Tanzania asked to be a pilot DaO country in late 2006 and the One UN process officially started in January 2007. The DaO pilot in Tanzania draws from the processes and documents described earlier, including the MKUKUTA/MKUZA, JAST, and the UNDAF 2007-2010. In addition, it builds upon the CPAPs of four Ex-Com agencies and Country Programme or equivalent programming instruments of

specialized agencies. DaO represents approximately 37 percent of planned UNDAF outcomes. However, specialized agencies continue to implement activities that may not be included in the UNDAF[16].

DaO management mechanisms

41.   A *Joint Government-UN Steering Committee* (JSC) was established in April 2007 to provide overall guidance in terms of policy, programme design, resource mobilization, M&E, strategic partnership and communication. The JSC consists of representatives of GoT, participating UN organizations and a member of the DPG. It is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and the RC.

42.   A *Medium-Term Strategy* for the One Programme beyond 2008 was prepared, reviewed and agreed upon at the last UNCMT retreat in December 2007. By June 2008, the Joint Task Force and the Joint Steering Committee will propose and decide on new strategic areas for expansion of the One Programme.

43.   A supporting *Joint Government-UN Task Force* was established in early 2007 to prepare a roadmap to guide the implementation process of the One UN pilot, prepare a draft of the One Programme and make recommendations on the One Budgetary framework, One Leader and One Office concepts. The Joint Task Force prepares quarterly progress reports and is undertaking preparatory work on the evaluation of the One Programme in order to provide technical recommendations to the JSC on future expansion. It is co-chaired by the GoT and has as many as 15 members including representatives of Zanzibar and the UNCMT.

44.   To ensure the involvement of civil society in the reform process, regular consultations have been held with the newly established *UN-Civil Society Advisory Committee*, representing 12 civil society organizations

45.   Two UN system internal committees have been tasked with planning for the One Office and supporting implementation of the One UN programme activities. The *OMT,* tasked with planning for the One Office including one set of management practices, has developed a *One Office Work Plan* (February 2008). The *Inter-Agency Programme Committee* follows up on 'internal' organizational requirements to support UN organizations that have taken on lead roles in the implementation of the one UN programme activities.

46.   The *Communications Group* has developed a communications strategy targeting key stakeholders.

---

[16] A good example cited during the mission is the leprosy programme supported by WHO. Examples of development activities that are relevant, but sometimes not excluded in the UNDAF, are for example technical assistance provided by UN organizations like ICAO (civil aviation) or WTO (tourism).

Relationship with national policies and planning

47.   Both the UNDAF and the One Programme provide a substantial integrated response to the national priorities formulated in the MKUKUTA and MKUZA. Furthermore, the One Programme strives to be compliant with the JAST emphasis on harmonization and use of national systems. The One Programme addresses gaps that were considered essential to meet national development goals. It was furthermore a strategic decision to focus on areas in which the UN system could develop and implement joint programmes and, in this way, facilitate harmonization of efforts. Under the joint GoT-UN partnership and GoT leadership, the pilot represents an attempt to depart from an approach that relied on multiple, agency-specific projects to a programme and sector-wide approach in line with GoT policies and priorities.

Size of the One Programme, its characteristics and importance relative to other forms of external aid

48.   Total net ODA to Tanzania in 2004 was USD 1.75 billion, which accounted for 16 percent of gross national income and 40 percent of public expenditure. The total funding requirement for the One Programme is estimated to be USD 71.3 million for the period 2007-2008 (including overhead costs). This is approximately 37 percent of the UNDAF budget projections.

49.   The proportion of aid-using programme-based approaches (and thus common procedures) was 55 percent in 2005[17]. Although development partners are increasingly providing resources through general and sectoral budget support mechanisms, further increasing the proportion of programme-based approaches and reducing project aid with parallel project implementation units remains a challenge. The One Fund will, as a funding criteria, have national execution in line with GoT and JAST objectives for aid to use national budget execution systems.

Participation of national and international stakeholders in the DaO pilot

50.   Government ownership and partnership are central to UN reform at the country level. The GoT has provided guidance and political support throughout the pilot process. Steps have also been taken to engage civil society in the process. However, the platform for consultation with civil society was formed after the DaO Document was signed.

UNCMT composition and relation with specialized and NRAs

51.   The UNCMT is composed of 18 resident agencies: FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNIC, UNICEF, ICTR, UNIDO, WFP, and WHO, plus the World Bank and IMF. The UNIFEM and UNEP Tanzania programmes are managed from Nairobi,

---

[17] Preliminary data from 2008 Paris Declaration Survey shows that this figure currently stands at 71 percent.

Kenya. IOM maintains observer status[18]. The RC position maintains its own office with eight staff members.

52.   Although there are numerous NRAs in relation to Tanzania, only three are considered relevant to the Tanzanian context. These are UNEP, OHCHR and IAEA.

---

[18] UNDG database 2007.

C. Assessment of the substantive design of the DaO pilot

National ownership and leadership in the design

53.   Tanzania asked to be a pilot country through the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro, who is now the UN Deputy Secretary-General. The GoT, particularly through the Ministry of Finance (the RC Office counterpart), highly values the opportunity to lead the process towards a One UN in Tanzania. Government staff expect the DaO benefits to include reducing time spent in meeting various actors, eliminating duplication, optimizing use of funds for the benefit of the citizens, and enhancing the use of government systems in line with Paris Declaration and JAST principles.

54.   A number of government officials felt that they had been consulted adequately by the RC Office and UNCMT during the DaO design phase and that their suggestions were acted upon. They felt part of the planning process and had confidence in it. Some expressed concern that, in general, line ministry are not well informed about the United Nations and its functions. While the central level was well informed regarding the DaO, information was not effectively transferred to the regions and districts, where the joint programmes would largely be implemented. This sometimes resulted in regions and districts being excluding from the joint programme planning during early stages of design and inappropriate requests by the regions and districts for UN assistance. Some stakeholders thought that beneficiaries should also have had a voice in the designs. There was also concern that the specialized agencies may see less impact and become less accessible as advisors, which was viewed as a possible disadvantage to development. Many were concerned that decisions regarding programmes may become more difficult than dealing with individual agencies.

55.   Some line ministries place great value on their traditional links with specialized agencies, which should not be lost when developing the One UN. They also emphasized that they would like to maintain direct access to resources of the UN system for project activities that may not be considered priorities by central ministries in the national budget (including general budget support) or sector-wide approaches.

Responsiveness to specific needs and priorities of the country

56.   The UNDAF and the DaO joint programmes are broadly responsive to national needs and priorities as set forth in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA. GoT officials expressed confidence that government priorities are at the forefront of the DaO and that transparency had been practiced in development of the strategy.

57.   Given the normative role of the UN system, the mandates of the UN organizations are generally broader than the needs covered in the UNDAF and government priorities. UN organizations may sometimes meet needs from regional and global resources. Line ministries and agencies maintain direct links as platforms for identification, discussion and follow up on needs and priorities of the national entities. Some agencies expressed concern about the need to incorporate cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and environmental concerns, which may not be highlighted as government priorities and are also under-addressed in the UNDAF and the DaO.

Articulation of strategic intent

58.   Discussions, interviews and documents reviewed show that the strategic intent of delivering as One UN is generally appreciated and shared by the UNCMT, the GoT and development partners, although there are differences in emphasis among and within the various stakeholders. The common platform is the final concept paper of the UNCT on 'One United Nations in Tanzania', which was agreed upon on 23 February 2007. It describes the vision for the overall reform process of the UN presence in Tanzania.

59.   The One Programme supports GoT strategies to promote growth and reduce poverty; improve quality of life and social well being, particularly for the poorest and most vulnerable; and promote good governance and accountability. Nevertheless, the One Programme would benefit from an overarching vision that is expressed in a vision statement that will tie the separate programmes and initiatives together and inspire commitment to the concept of DaO. A vision would be useful in clearly distinguishing the One Programme from the UNDAF, which is mainly a framework.

60.   Currently, it is not clear whether or not the stakeholders have one vision. The degree to which some want to retain their separate programmes outside of DaO pilot is not obvious. It is also not clear whether they believe that the scope of the DaO pilot needs to be broadened and individual agency initiatives brought into the DaO. A vision statement would describe the unique role and contribution of the UN system based on its comparative advantage and added value in the context of national capacity development and other forms of external assistance.

Quality of the design of the pilot

61.   The evaluability mission found that the UNCMT has come a long way in designing a One UN approach aligned with national priorities and based on prioritization of what the UN has to offer to Tanzania. The UNCMT has shown a high level of commitment and functions as one management team under the aegis of "Delivering as One"[19]. DaO is realized on four platforms: "One Programme", "One Budgetary Framework", "One Leader" and "One Office". The Joint Government/UN Steering Committee chaired by Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Finance, provides guidance for DaO.

One Programme

62.   The CPAPs were approved by the Executive Boards of the ExCom agencies shortly before the launch of the DaO. The One Programme was created within the UNDAF. The One Programme covers approximately 37 percent of the UNDAF projections. The Programme was officially launched on 10 October 2007 and is a two-year (2007-2008) initiative aiming to deliver results in line with the UN system's comparative advantage. The Programme reflects the move 'upstream' to policy advisory services building on experience gained through community-based work. Equally, the One Programme will pay attention to the UN capacity development role in the area of disaster preparedness and the

---

[19] During the mission's visit, the UNCMT decided to replace the slogan 'Working as One' with 'Delivering as One'.

transitional issues to development that derive from continued support on humanitarian issues. The UNCT has agreed that humanitarian interventions *per se* will not be included in this first One Programme.

63.   The One Programme covers six programmatic areas drawn from UNDAF 2007-2010, which are addressed through seven joint programmes. The specific areas of interventions were chosen with a view to facilitate the development and implementation of joint programmes. The joint programmes are considered the means by which joint work plans, joint budgets, common results, clear division of labour and shared accountability can be defined. As such, they require close collaboration between the participating agencies throughout the entire programming cycle. The seven joint programmes are described in the following paragraphs.

64.   **Joint Programme 1 - Wealth creation, employment and economic empowerment (FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO, WFP**): This programme aims to increase access to sustainable income opportunities, productive employment and food security in rural and urban areas. The expected outputs are: strengthened institutional capacity to implement the national employment creation programme and make employment and incomes central to national policies; strengthened capacity of line ministries, departments and agencies, local government authorities, and other stakeholders to monitor and manage food and nutrition security; and increased and equitable opportunities for decent work and rural livelihoods with improvement in agro productivity, product quality and market access.

65.   **Joint Programme 2 - Reduction of maternal and newborn mortality (UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO**): The goal of this programme is increased and equitable access to comprehensive reproductive and child health interventions. The expected outputs include: increased budget allocation and resource mobilization for maternal and newborn health; improved information management for maternal, newborn and child health; improved health systems for delivery of maternal and newborn care with a focus on Dodoma region; and improved policies and practices to promote maternal and newborn health.

66.   **Joint Programme 3 - Support to national response to HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA**): This programme focuses on joint UN support to the national AIDS response in four strategic areas: prevention; care, treatment and support; impact mitigation; and enabling environment. The joint programme will increase access to: sustainable income opportunities, productive employment and food security in rural and urban areas; quality basic social services for all by focusing on the poor and most vulnerable; and democratic structures, systems of good governance, rule of law and the application of human rights, with a particular focus on the poor and vulnerable groups.

67.   **Joint Programme 4 - Capacity strengthening for development management (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF**): The goal of this programme is to strengthen national ownership and government leadership of the development agenda through support in three strategic areas: knowledge generation, analysis, and use; planning, budgeting and reporting; and M&E and communication. The joint programme will support national priorities. The participating agencies will pilot innovative modalities for joint planning, implementation, reporting, M&E, and capacity development in knowledge generation, data analysis and use.

68. **Joint Programme 5 - Capacity building support to Zanzibar[20] (UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO and FAO):** This joint programme aims to support government institutions in Zanzibar that face significant capacity challenges, with the aim of improving both capacity and service delivery. The objectives are increased access to: sustainable income opportunities, productive employment and food security in rural and urban areas; quality basic social services for all by focusing on the poor and most vulnerable; and democratic structures, systems of good governance as well as the rule of law and the application of human rights, with a particular focus on the poor and vulnerable groups.

69. **Joint Programme 6.1 - Managing transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development in northwestern Tanzania (UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF):** This joint programme covers the Kigoma and Kagera regions, with special emphasis on the four districts that are still hosting active refugee camps. The joint programme is structured around three main clusters: governance for enhanced human security; improved social sectors (including health and education); and wealth creation (including energy and environment). The programme also aims to facilitate the orderly and constructive transfer of humanitarian assets whilst strengthening stakeholders' capacity to manage the remaining humanitarian assets for delivering public services, in order to enhance use of sites and skills for nearby communities and northwestern Tanzania.

70. **Joint Programme 6.2 - Strengthening national disaster preparedness and response capacity (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP)**: This joint programme seeks to strengthen national disaster preparedness and response capacity in three key areas: disaster risk assessment; disaster preparedness planning and early warning mechanisms on all administrative levels; building response capacities. Support will be targeted through Disaster Management Departments (both on the mainland and Zanzibar).

71. The One Programme will be realized by implementing joint programmes[21] that are complemented by new modalities, such as a pooled facility for technical assistance that is managed by the government. Each joint programme has a UN organization as Managing Agent, responsible for the overall management of the programme and accountable for development results. For each activity, national partners are pinpointed, together with an estimate of the resources required.

72. After 2008, the One Programme will expand to include more joint programmatic activities and individual agency interventions that build on the achieved results of the first phase and the ongoing reprioritization of UN activities in the field. Over time, the One Programme is expected to replace the need for a UNDAF and individual agency country plans.

73. Conceptually, the One Programme remains a framework that is composed of seven joint programmes. Joint programmes were selected and formulated with the One Programme in mind according to a number of key principles, including the combination of four priority areas of the UN contribution (policy and advocacy, normative and technical support, capacity development and civil society partnerships), inexpensive but high-impact initiatives, and a clear added value of joint implementation. However, there was considerable pressure to plan the programmes and gain consensus within a short

---

[20] The entire One UN Zanzibar programme has been made a joint programme.

[21] Few independent joint programmes (such as the Education Sector Management Information System and the Human Security Programme) are already in place and will be used to inform the pilot.

time, which may have been a constraint to establishing greater cross connections between result areas. For example, several interviewees working on the joint programmes noted that gender and environment needed to be stronger as cross-cutting themes.

74.   In order to create a comprehensive and coherent One Programme, further efforts will have to be made to create synergies between programmes and ensure that participating agencies are using their complementary expertise in the best way possible. The RBM Task Force is currently working to strengthen the indicators. However, all components of the results planning matrices might be revisited at the end of 2008 as should exercises such as logframe development activities used to strengthen the programmes and to identify relevance and effectiveness and capture possible risks and side effects.

One Budgetary Framework/One Fund

75.   The One Budgetary Framework was presented to the Joint Steering Committee[22] in September 2007, covering the first 18-month implementation phase (from July 2007 to December 2008). The Budgetary Framework presents the total UN investment in Tanzania divided into UNDAF and non-UNDAF budgets.

76.   In October 2007, all UN organizations signed the One Fund Memorandum of Understanding[23], Letter of Agreement and the Terms of Reference, thus putting the One Fund in place. The Memorandum of Understanding establishes the role of the Managing Agent, appointed by each Joint Programme Working Group. The Managing Agent assumes full programmatic accountability for the results of the joint programme and is central to managing resources: those that it executes directly, those that are transferred to national partners and are channelled to them through the Managing Agent, those that are allocated to participating UN organizations for their execution through technical assistance, and those that are disbursed to the participating UN organizations upon instruction of the Managing Agents. Furthermore it was agreed that Managing Agents and participating UN organizations shall be entitled to deduct their indirect costs on contributions received in accordance with a 7 percent overhead formula[24].

77.   The total funding requirement of the One Programme is estimated to be USD 74 million (37 percent of UNDAF funding requirements). The USD 74 million is broken up as follows: USD 71.3 million for the implementation of the joint programmes; USD 2 million for the Joint Work Plan in the areas of operations and change management, in order to harmonize operational processes, procedures and systems among the various UN organizations; and USD 700,000 for the One UN

---

[22] The Joint Steering Committee will determine the allocation of funds on the basis of the following agreed criteria: eligibility in terms of alignment to national priorities, capacity to deliver the programme and presence of a detailed planning for programme implementation.

[23] The Memorandum of Understanding was signed also by UNEP (NRA).

[24] Indirect general costs of the Managing Agent will be 7 percent for the funds passed through from the Administrative Agent (UNDP) for which the Managing Agent manages implementation. Indirect costs of the participating UN organizations will be 7 percent for the funds passed through from the Administrative Agent for which the participating UN organizations directly implement activities.

Communication Strategy. USD 44 million is already available from the existing funding arrangements. USD 30 million needs thus to be covered by the One UN Fund.

78.   Resource mobilization has been successful. The funding gap of USD 30 million has been fully covered by resources provided by Canada, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. The first allocation of resources from the One Fund has been agreed upon by the UNCMT.

One Leader

79.   The RC is the One Leader, responsible for ensuring implementation of the One Programme and ensuring effective and coherent dialogue with partners and the wider public. Significant progress has been made in the past year to support the capacity of the RC to adapt to the increased workload and responsibilities. A Senior Advisor, an Operations Advisor and a Communication Advisor have been recruited, and a NRA Coordination Analyst was appointed in October 2007. Following a request by the UN resident agencies for a firewall between the RC function and the function of the Resident Representative of UNDP, a UNDP Country Director was appointed and a delegation of authority signed.

80.   The RC provides strategic guidance to the One Programme and is accountable for overall management and utilization of the One Fund. The RC shares annual consolidated financial and narrative progress reports with the participating UN organizations, the Joint Steering Committee and the donors. The RC liaises with the Ministry of Finance at the level of the Deputy Permanent Secretary. The role of the RC is well accepted by stakeholders and the strong leadership currently provided has been a significant asset to the DaO. Since UNCMT members are not obligated to comply with the DaO, the RC's influence is seen as critical for motivating and providing leadership to the group.

81.   A Code of Conduct has been developed for the UNCMT and was approved in January 2008. The Code reinforces the RC's role as the main interlocutor for all common matters with the government. Country representatives of the individual agencies will continue to collaborate with the government in line with their mandates through the sector ministries and other stakeholders.

One Office

82.   The One Office is meant to improve the efficiency of the UN system at the country level by reducing transaction costs, pooling support services, and simplifying and harmonizing procedures. The OMT has established a work plan that sets objectives for unifying procedures for finance, human resources, procurement, and information and communications technology. The concrete outputs expected before the end of 2008 includes One Office for UN staff in Zanzibar and in the northwestern region[25], One Information and Communications Technology platform, and a common systems account. The system-wide Capacity Needs Assessment results were available in the week of 10 March.

83.   The OMT is undertaking a feasibility study on cost-benefit for common premises. Although some members of the UNCMT envision a One UN House established in Dar es Salaam during the next five

---

[25] Since 2006, a joint office has been shared by WFP, UNIDO, FAO, UNICEF and UNDP in Kigoma.

years, others feel that this achievement will occur later. In the short term, the OMT will explore ways of promoting a virtual One Office by establishing inter-agency teams that work on the development and implementation of joint programmes and pool senior advisory support. A comprehensive UN intranet, pivotal to the functioning of the virtual teams, has been set up.

84.   Joint premises will soon be a reality in the sub-offices in Zanzibar. In Zanzibar, the United Nations signed a two-year lease agreement with the government for joint office space. FAO, ILO, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNDP and WHO will soon be sharing the new premises. In northwestern Tanzania, joint offices shared by six agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO and WFP) have been in existence since 2006. In Dar es Salaam, the move by UNDP to new premises accommodates UNAIDS, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO, UNIC and UNV.

85.   Tanzania is starting to pilot the concept of functional clustering. The focus is on moving towards co-location of resource centres, sharing procurement practices, and creating emergency coordination groups. There is also an ongoing discussion regarding common information technology solutions and human resources exchanges, with an increase use of joint contracting for security, travel and printing. (See also the discussion on transaction costs below).

One Communication Strategy

86.   The One Programme is supported by a Communication Strategy with a two-fold purpose of promoting speaking with one voice and maintaining a continuous and systematic process of sharing information on DaO. The proposed budget for 2007-2008 is USD 700,000.

87.   Enhancement of the One UN website is a priority in the strategy. However, in contrast to a comprehensive intranet, the One UN website does not include anything but a short general description of the initiative. A joint GoT-UN press briefing on the UN pilot was held on 16 August 2007 to officially inform the general public about the pilot initiative. Simultaneously, two essay competitions were initiated in August 2007[26]. Moreover, from August to November, a research company conducted a survey on knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of the United Nations in Tanzania among various stakeholder groups.

M&E systems

88.   The Joint Steering Committee is tasked with monitoring progress towards achieving DaO pilot results, guided by the strategic leadership of the RC. On November 2007, the UNCMT drafted an M&E Calendar covering the next four years. Simultaneously, the RC Office proposed a Timeline and Action Plan (with M&E focal points).

89.   An RBM Task Force composed of M&E officers from UN organizations has been created by the UNCMT. The RBM group is responsible for developing and refining the M&E Framework and the One UN joint programme M&E Matrices.

---

[26] While the first competition was open to UN clubs and focused on local perceptions of the One UN, the second one was for secondary school students only and focused on the prevention of HIV/AIDS.

90.   An M&E plan, consisting of 'A One UN M&E Framework and Success Criteria' and a 'One UN Joint Programmes and M&E Matrices'[27] has been developed to facilitate monitoring and subsequent evaluation of the pilot. While the overall M&E Framework focuses on process indicators related to a system used by the GoT to measure the implementation of the Paris Declaration (enriched with indicators that are particularly relevant to the UN contribution), the matrices for the joint programmes contain more substantive objectives and indicators that allow for an assessment of relevance and effectiveness.

91.   The purpose of the M&E Framework comprising 60 indicators is to "track process results towards enhanced aid effectiveness and the strengthening of UN's normative role through the implementation of the pilot". While useful for a future process evaluation, some work is required to bring the indicators in line with basic principles of RBM, that is, a formulation that would make them SMART. This would constitute a full-fledged M&E Framework that would enhance the evaluability of the DaO pilot. The indicators should capture the full range of factors and effects that may be important to the experience, including positive and negative side-effects. They should transcend mere 'success criteria', which seem to be more linked to the stated secondary purpose, which is public relations.

92.   Another challenge of the M&E Framework is that some of the proxy indicators are simplistic and easy to reach[28]. This limits its credibility and usefulness not only for public relations purposes, but also (and more importantly) as a tool to measure the performance of DaO.

93.   The joint programme M&E plans need more clarity and better use of terms. The RC Office has issued clear guidelines for revising the joint programme M&E matrices, which cite areas that require strengthening. These include making indicators SMART and identifying baselines. Indicators should be reasonable in number so as to avoid the need for a tremendous amount of resources in data collection. During its review, the RBM Task Force should select only key and critical indicators to measure performance of the joint programme outcomes and results, and those indicators should be pitched at the outcome level. A consultant hired by UNICEF has recently begun to help strengthen the M&E system.

94.   It is not apparent which government partners can work with the RBM Task Force to monitor and evaluate the pilot. In line with the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) 2007 resolution[29] pilot countries should evaluate and share their experiences with support from UNEG. A joint government and UN working group could harmonize outcome expectations and their corresponding indicators. The possibility of establishing such a working group was discussed between the UNEG mission and the

---

[27] The joint matrices were in developed July 2007 and the Overall Framework & Success Criteria prepared in December 2007.

[28] For example, there are only two indicators for a major objective like the promotion of gender equality and gender mainstreaming in national planning processes: the implementation by 10 agencies of a UN gender action plan; and mainstreaming of gender in four joint programmes with disaggregated data by sex. These are not sufficient indicators for gender mainstreaming in *national* planning processes.

[29] General Assembly resolution 62/208, Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) Undertaken by the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations Resolution adopted by the General Assembly December 2007 encouraging the Secretary-General to support programme pilot countries to evaluate and exchange their experiences with the support of UNEG.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. They also explored how national evaluators could be mobilized to take the lead in a future evaluation of the DaO pilot.

95.   While some national research institutions and universities seem to have a strong capacity[30], their role in providing support for the evaluation of the DaO pilots, required by the TCPR[31], has to be further explored. In addition, DaO M&E needs to be strengthened. Government partners and independent and credible national experts to carry out the evaluation need to be identified.

96.   Last, Joint Programme 4, which has an M&E component, should address the issue of M&E capacity strengthening of national partners. It mainly focuses on monitoring basic social and economic data and not on data related to the performance of government agencies or the UN system. While performing a useful function, the joint programme is not meant to specifically strengthen capacities that will be required for the evaluation of the DaO pilot.

---

[30] For example, the Economic and Social Research Foundation, University of Dar Es Salaam, the work of which was highly appreciated by the Independent Monitoring Group.

[31] General Assembly resolution 62/208.

D. Initial assessment of the DaO processes and implementation

National ownership and leadership in the DaO processes

97.   The GoT has a tradition dating back to the early 1990s of exercising strong national ownership and leadership in the development process and in its relationship with development partners. The GoT relationship with the UN system was no exception to this pattern. With the DaO emphasis on the One Programme and the One Budget, the role and authority of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in the relationship with the UN system and the importance of consultative mechanisms, such as the Joint Steering Committee and the Joint Task Force, might be strengthened.

98.   The UN Civil Society Advisory Committee (UNSCAC) was created in 2007 to enhance participation of civil society designing the One Programme. Its existence emphasizes the importance of civil society organizations' contributions to UN policy work. The UNSCAC has produced reviews of UNDAF and the DaO (the latter just completed). Members regard these achievements as very positive in promoting their ownership. However, the DaO Document was signed before the UNSCAC comments were received.

99.   In order to promote greater inclusiveness, efforts should be made to better integrate the views of civil society in the design of frameworks and programmes. Challenges exist for improving capacity in civil society, particularly to better understand aid architecture and the specific role of the UN system, since the United Nations is often perceived as a donor or aid agency, which does not reflect its diversity.

100.   In terms of the leadership and ownership of all national actors, including the private sector, parliamentarians, and beneficiaries groups, there does not appear to be a platform, apart from UNSCAC, where national groups can meet. In the spirit of having a common vision and in view of the need to direct all initiatives towards objectives and results, more exchange of information and discussions may be helpful.

Inclusiveness of UN stakeholders, notably specialized agencies and NRAs

101.   A major challenge for the DaO is the need to balance requirements related to more focus and coherence with ensuring full access to the broad range of mandates, resources and expertise available through the UN system, notably those of the specialized agencies and the NRAs. As the One Programme is primarily defined by joint programmes, it will not be easy to include activities that do not comply with the Programme. The institutional mechanism for defining One Programme activities need to take this into consideration.

102.   The specialized agencies in Tanzania are FAO, IAEA, IFAD, ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO and WHO. The IAEA is an NRA, and IFAD is not participating in the DaO. Tanzania has expressed a special interest in cooperating with the following NRAs: IAEA, OHCHR and UNEP.

103.   Specialized agencies indicated that the DaO in Tanzania has brought UN organizations closer together, enriched their output, and created opportunities for agencies to promote development, particularly those with few resources at the country level outside of the DaO or the UNDAF. Staff from other agencies generally support the inclusion of specialized agencies in the DaO, highlighting their unique experience and contributions. However, there remains some concern over the sparse financial resources that some specialized agencies are able to contribute. Specialized agencies are at times required to defend and promote their mandate even if not in high demand by national stakeholders. Some specialized agencies are limited with regard to staff size and delegated positions, and their participation in the DaO may stretch the available staff and resources. Those who are assigned as Managing Agents or Lead Agencies may require support for staffing to take on the additional responsibilities.

104.   In general, all specialized agencies had been involved in joint programmes and projects prior to the DaO pilot. Some government counterparts expressed concern that the DaO may result in a distancing from the advisory services provided by the specialized agencies. Some agencies are addressing this concern and elaborating on the benefits of the DaO to their clients. Not all of the specialized agencies have been included in the DaO to the degree that they would like, some due to mandates that fall outside the UNDAF and national priorities.

105.   An NRA Coordination Analyst was appointed in the RC Office in October 2007. This position indicates the RC's commitment to ensuring that NRA concerns are addressed, that they are well informed, and that the government is sensitized to NRA mandates and their participation in the planning processes. UNEP participates as a member of the UNCMT and contributes to the Joint Programme 6.1 while the IAEA does not and conducts separate activities. However, IAEA has contributed to dialogue, capacity assessments and surveys relevant to the DaO. In general, the NRAs suffer from a limited voice in the DaO processes and the RC Office needs to be mindful of their potential contributions. Striking the right balance between inclusiveness and obtaining results remains a challenge. The RC Office system has demonstrated commitment to facilitating a participatory, collegial and accountable approach in this respect.

Relationship with other forms of external aid

106.   The RC is co-sharing the DPG, entailing linkages to the larger aid environment. Other linkages to the larger aid environment were also established through UN system support to the JAST process, through the participation of a donor representative in the JSC, and in line ministries' participation in the Joint Programme Working Groups.

107.   The Evaluability Team met with an informal group of donors who are supporting the DaO and watching the progress through frequent meetings with the RC Office. These donors would like to see results in the near term, particularly regarding the UN administrative and human resources system. Some donors clearly expected gains in operational efficiency, for example through a reduction in human resources, some referring to their own agency downsizing as a means of cost savings. The donors urge more effort be made toward strengthening government capacity for procurement and financial control. Improvements in this area have been seen in that UN organizations that formerly would not do so are now using national procurement systems. A mapping of donors' policies and special programmes, both supportive and non-supportive of DaO, could provide insights for shaping information packages for

stakeholders for information and resource mobilization. This could be done as part of the resource mobilization effort for the One Programme.

108.   Meanwhile, some donors continue to earmark funds rather than contribute to the One Fund. This could work against the objectives of the DaO and fragment efforts. Among donors not supporting the DaO, more information is required to raise awareness of the issues, to allay skepticism, and to inform them of the rationale of the design and the DaO process. In this regard, a strong vision statement would help to indicate greater cohesiveness and coherence in the DaO. Most non-DaO donors are in contact with the RC through the DPG, so efforts to build upon those relationships may result in greater inclusion of donors in support of the DaO.

Support from UNDG and UN organizations Headquarters

109.   In general, all agencies received inconsistent support from their Headquarters and regional offices. The process of planning the DaO would have benefited substantially from more guidance from Headquarters level. Essentially, the UNCMT in Tanzania had to create its own roadmap and build a common understanding. Headquarters seemed removed from the DaO processes. They may need education about the processes, as may donors and other stakeholders at Headquarters locations.

110.   Alignment at the Headquarters level is critical to support the DaO. This would result in agreed, clear and consistent messages to the country offices and donors. The heavy workload at the country level is increased when there are mixed messages, imposed constraints or delayed communications from Headquarters. Where there is alignment and harmonization at the Headquarters level, the programmes have progressed quickly. In relation to HIV/AIDS, Headquarters determined a global division of labour for HIV/AIDS aimed at reducing duplication and pinpointing leadership, but this is not clear for other sectors. In the area of communications, there is a strong support from the Secretary-General and the Chair of the UNDG.

111.   Sustaining the momentum of UN reform at the country level will require critical support from executive-level decision makers at regional and Headquarters bases for more flexible operational procedures and a pool of funds that can be drawn upon to support the pilot. Headquarters need to agree to an increased delegated authority in order to allow decision making to run at the same speed as the process. Substantial bottlenecks are presented by the administrative and financial procedures, such as harmonizing cost recovery percentages applied by UN organizations, and the use of different audit frameworks, procurement, information technology and the like. Simplification and harmonization at Headquarters level in these areas has so far made little progress.

112.   The human resources situation also requires Headquarters attention and a detailed analysis of what has to be accomplished to implement the DaO. The day-to-day needs for programme support are critical if the intended results are to be achieved. More support is needed for basic administration of programmes, for example, where agencies and the government have their own systems for logging data and where there are joint systems. Training for staff would help to streamline data entry. There is also the persistent problem of high staff turnover, which requires time and resources to train new staff.

113.   In order to evaluate support from Headquarters, a mapping exercise should take place to prioritize and track key decisions that Headquarters have to make, whether these decisions were timely, and if not, where and why the delays occurred. The processes and resources required to harmonize systems could be

charted to facilitate judgment on what is feasible and desirable. Some of this mapping may take place at Headquarters level.

Joint programmes

114.   The degree to which the joint programmes have involved government counterparts varies with the programme. Government involvement, particularly at regional and district levels, needed strengthening during the planning processes. One challenge was the need for greater capacity at these levels of government. Another challenge was the increased staff time needed to gain consensus among central UN organizations and government agencies, which took precedence and was particularly UN-driven. These lessons should be recognized as DaO initiatives are replicated.

115.   Many staff felt that measurement of delivery is too focused on disbursement of funds rather than results and that strong sector and joint programme leadership will be critical to drive partners toward the planned results. In this regard, government coordination at ministerial, district and regional levels must be strong to oversee the implementation and documentation of progress and results. Some ministerial staff were concerned that these coordination positions were not clearly established.

Assessment of progress in the implementation of the five Ones

One Programme

116.   The One Programme is defined by a common institutional framework, funding, communication strategy, and M&E framework. The One Programme in Tanzania takes as its building blocks the UNDAF II, the CPAPs of Executive Committee Agencies, the country strategic priorities of specialized agencies, and the joint programmes being developed along specific themes. The joint programme modality was chosen to support the delivery of the One Programme because it includes joint work plans, joint budgets, common results, division of labour and shared accountability. It includes achievable results for the period 2007-2008, realized as far as possible through the implementation of joint programmes (spanning a period longer than the pilot phase), and complemented by agency-specific work and by working through new modalities, such as a pooled facility managed by government. As a pilot, the One Programme is a subset of the larger UN focus on delivering UNDAF results for 2007-2008 and will continue to be evaluated with the government.

117.   All joint programme documents were finalized as of 6 March 2008. The funds are about to be disbursed. The planning phases have resulted in perceived progress in the regions, particularly those such as the northwestern regions (covering Kigoma and Kagera Regions) where the regional and district national actors have been closely involved in the designs. Among the gains are greater involvement of and 'cross-fertilization' among agencies to address pressing problems such as in refugee hosting areas in northwestern Tanzania by supporting the capacity of host communities and local government. Greater participation of a broader range of UN organizations in supporting the Joint Programme 6.1 is evidence of this development as well as the recent posting of a UNDP staff in the region. The development of the Joint Programme 6.1 was a difficult task due to the remoteness of the region and the theme of the programme, moving from humanitarian assistance to development, and area that is difficult to define.

118.   The Joint Programme 3 Support to National Response to HIV/AIDS agencies have already issued two progress reports listing the lessons and best practices accumulated during the planning phase. The development of one HIV/AIDS programme document that explains the joint approach has helped the government to see what all agencies are doing. Some think this has improved the national vision to respond to the pandemic. The DaO has promoted collaboration between UN organizations and national actors who work on HIV/AIDS issues, such as religious leaders.

119.   Under the Joint Programme 6.2, formerly coordinated management efforts are now merging into one programme. The handling of the Rift Valley fever outbreak in February 2007 was coordinated by UNDP and helped the government by consolidating assistance and communications. Although emergencies in Tanzania are usually small, there is likely to be a UN situation room to coordinate with the government on national and regional crises. The major challenge in management of emergencies is to unite the operations of each agency, similar to the issue of uniting agencies under the DaO. The Emergency Operations Group, which has been working since 2005, has emerged as a success despite resistance from some members.

120.   In Zanzibar, substantial progress has been made. The Joint Programme and annual work plans have been developed, costed and approved by the Zanzibar Programme Management Committee and the JSC. The work has been done jointly by UNDP and beneficiary ministries coordinated by Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs.

One Budgetary Framework/One Fund

121.   With all of the agreements in place, funds are about to be disbursed. The use and distribution of funds may be an area that will be a decisive test of the DaO. Through a message issued by the RC, the agencies have been urged to channel funds through government systems as much as possible. It will be important to ensure that decentralized levels in the regions and districts also receive the needed funds. The next allocation of 25 percent of funds will be contingent on performance. The DaO in Tanzania has shown that the One Fund can mobilize the resources required to make the One pilot truly "one".

122.   In Zanzibar, 75 percent of the estimated cost for the Zanzibar Joint Programme has been mobilized. Memorandums of Understanding have been signed with the agencies. An agreement has been reached to open a joint account under the management of the Zanzibar Programme Management Committee.

One Leader

123.   Although the One Leader as a personage is generally well accepted by stakeholders in Tanzania, the concept of the One Leader needs more clarification and agreement as per the accountability of the Heads of agencies to their organization's senior management and governing boards. The RC's function is perceived by many to be synonymous with the leader of UNDP, which can be addressed through communication. The delegation of authority to the UNDP Country Director is strictly enforced and works well.

124.   Because Tanzania is a DaO pilot, it has seen an increase in the number of missions to the country (each of which needs to be serviced). The RC Office continues to receive more requests for its services,

including through this report. This may be a testimony to its success, but the institutional implications should be carefully monitored through regular review of job descriptions, skills needed, and functions of the office for the future.

One Office

125.   The OMT is moving expeditiously to implement its work plan and trying to remove obstacles to the achievement of the goals, particularly for the One Office in Zanzibar and the northwestern regions, finances, procurement and information technology by the end of 2008. The occupation of the government-designated joint office in Zanzibar was delayed respecting the need for consensus building in finding solutions to overcome some agencies' reticence to move. These concerns have now been addressed through discussions and the One Office in Zanzibar will soon become reality. The experience of establishing the Zanzibar office is expected to inform exploration of options for the One Office on the mainland.

One Communication

126.   The UN Communications Group has moved rapidly achieved significant outreach, mainly with advocacy messages among the public and private sector and transfers of information to the media. Emphasis has been on partnerships with Tanzanian entities, including training the media on technical services offered by UN organizations so they are equipped to report on them. Tanzanians seem strongly motivated, for example, there are very active UN Youth Clubs.

127.   The Communications Group has conducted surveys including an extensive Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice Survey and is working on putting the results into practical application. Emphasis may need to be placed on UN staff skills to enable them to portray the United Nations to the media. This will require more targeted briefings.

128.   Government staff, particularly in regions and districts, may require more orientation. It will be critical for the success of the DaO that the government is able to take responsibility for disseminating messages to its staff and the public regarding UN reform and services and measuring the behaviour changes at all levels. This will likely mean strengthening objectives and indicators in the Communications action plan under Strategic Objective 5 - to strengthen the GoT's leadership.

Change management

129.   There is general consensus that the changes required for the DaO could have been managed better, particularly at the Headquarters level. The inconsistent messages among Headquarters of different organizations and reluctance on the part of some has resulted in confusion that has to be sorted out at the country level. More written agreements, support for implementation of those agreements, and guidelines from Headquarters are required. Some felt that the United Nations is not in a position to advise the government when its own priorities are not clear.

130.   A key question concerns the large number of resident UN organizations resident in Tanzania, as well as concerned NRAs, and which ones are needed in realization of the DaO. The UN reform is concerned with mandate overlaps as well as 'mission creep', which is prompted by the agencies' quest for

funds. There does not seem to be a system or set of guidelines that can effectively assess which agencies should be present in the country or contribute to development and which should not. The government should play a key role and needs to be empowered to do so, by instituting a systematic mechanism for assessing the comparative advantage of development partners. The GoT seems to see this as its role and is considering the implications. It could be supported in this endeavour by the RC Office representing the whole UN system.

131.   The DaO pilot is often referred to as a challenge in terms of requiring a change in the mind-set staff. The high momentum created among staff in this respect needs to sustained. As the reform process gathers further momentum, there is an onus on capacity development that should be targeted to realize a joint understanding of the new aid modalities prevailing in Tanzania and the special role of the UN system in this respect, with staff in the role of driver of change in collaboration with GoT. Although a great deal of trust building has been achieved, there is more to be done to reach the level of trust needed among all partners.

132.   With regard to staffing and skill development, a capacity needs assessment conducted by an independent consultancy company is completed. The results will be disseminated shortly.

Investment and transaction costs

133.   After one year, there are many DaO practices that are routine among the UNCMT and results are already seen in terms of savings of partner agency time and implementation of joint activities.

134.   Critically, the RC Office is under significant pressure from the donors and the government, who have high expectations regarding enhancing efficiency and increasing use of government systems. It is difficult to measure increases in efficiency. Savings may be measured in actual monetary costs but the transaction costs in terms of staff time, overtime and extra transport may increase. Opportunity costs of RC Office staff time spent on the DaO are very difficult to assess. For example, the one premises for common services will result in savings (currently the government pays USD 750,000 for services and the United Nations pays USD 1.25 million). The transaction costs to reduce these amounts are being covered internally by the United Nations but they should be subtracted against the savings.

135.   The objectives for reducing costs suffer from a lack of adequate understanding of 'cost' in the UN system. There is a need to better define which costs can benefit from economies of scale, for example in the areas of procurement, transport, information technology and security. It still needs to be demonstrated in which areas pooling resources and services could produce monetary savings that could reasonably be ploughed into programming. The RC Office may require special assistance for cost accounting. A Task Force has been working to define the substantive parameters for calculating transaction costs, which will facilitate reporting.

E. Identification of national resources to support a future evaluation

Existence of independent and credible evaluation institutions

136.   The government, in consultation with the UN RBM Task Force, has agreed to consider several national groups or individuals as possibilities for working with the UNEG on the process evaluation in 2009 and the outcome evaluation in 2010. Possible groups include the Economic and Social Research Foundation, the Economic Research Bureau, ESRI Training and Education (a global organization), as well as the newly formed National Evaluation Association and independent national consultants who were formerly with the Independent Monitoring Group.

137.   The Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs confirmed the importance of the process evaluation in 2009 to assess progress and help steer the DaO toward the desired outcomes. It is important to identify the national evaluators as soon as possible to allow the relationships and preparations needed to be put into place. The development of the National Evaluation Association may be furthered by their involvement in and discussion of the DaO evaluability issues.

Key documents reflecting the substantive design and pilot processes

138.   DaO in Tanzania is well documented. The following are key documents that reflect the national context as well as the substantive design of the pilot and the pilot processes:

a.   Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) 2006;

b.   UNDAF 2007-2010;

c.   Joint Programme Plans (seven) and M&E results and resources matrices;

d.   Joint Programme Work Plan 2007-2008;

e.   Operations Management Plan, One Office Tanzania, 20 February 2008;

f.   Stocktaking Report on UN Reform, Tanzania 2007;

g.   UN Tanzania, Criteria for allocation of One UN Fund Resources, November 2007; and

h.   Guidelines for Application of the Criteria for Allocation of One UN Fund Resources (when the One Fund is not adequately financed).

139.   Documents relevant to the M&E system include:

a.   One UN M&E Framework and Success Criteria;

b.   UNDAF 2007-2010 Cluster Results Matrices and Changes;

c.   Details of Selected Indicators Corresponding to UNDAF M&E Table 3;

d.   UNCMT Calendar of Support to M&E Systems Tanzania 2007-2011;

e.   UNCMT Calendar of Internal M&E Activities 2007-2011;

f.   Education Sector-wide Management Information System and Sub-sectoral EMIS Development and Implementation;

g.   Summary of Government Data Sources at National Level;

h.   Guidelines for the Revision of the Joint Programme Results and Joint Programme M&E Matrices;

i.   Concept Note for the Preparation of the UNDAF M&E Framework, the One UN M&E Framework & Success Criteria and the M&E Calendar; and

j.   Paris Declaration Baseline Indicators.

Identification of stakeholders to be consulted during a future evaluation

140.   The following stakeholder groups are considered relevant:

a.   Ministry of Finance and Planning: Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Finance, individuals involved in budget formulation and those working in the Aid Coordination Unit, individuals who prepare the investment budget, Director/Head of National Statistical Office;

b.   Other counterpart national ministries: Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health;

c.   Bilateral and multilateral development partners;

d.   Local government authorities in locations where activities are implemented;

e.   Selected principal beneficiary groups;

f.   RC and RC Office staff;

g.   Heads of Agencies and staff of resident participating UN organizations;

h.   NRA representatives and local staff;

i.   Co-chairs and members of UNDAF Theme Groups;

j.   Co-chairs and members of M&E, Gender and Human Rights Task Forces;

k.   Chair and members of UN Communications Group;

l.   Co-chairs and members of OMT;

m. UN Policy Advisors;

n. Representatives of UN organization staff associations;

o. Non-governmental organization/private sector partners, parliamentarians; and

p. Focal points at agency Headquarters.

F. Overall evaluability of the Tanzania DaO pilot

141.   The UNCMT, under the leadership of the RC and supported by the RC Office, has made major headway in realizing the One UN in Tanzania. There is compelling evidence of the high level of effort and degree of commitment among UN staff in supporting the DaO as well as among government and civil society organization representatives. The basic management structures and mechanism have been put in place and steps taken to further build capacity to 'Deliver as One' in implementing the five Ones.

142.   The strategic intent is to a large degree understood and shared among GoT, development partners, and UNMCT stakeholders, although various groups and individuals tend to accentuate different aspects of the reform process. What is lacking is a common vision statement and a cohesive programme logic that would distinguish the One Programme from a mere framework, such as the UNDAF. The vision statement should describe the unique contribution of the UN system to national capacity development and in the context of other forms of external assistance. The vision statement should provide the common logic to which the joint programmes would be linked. The programme logic would make the One Programme more evaluable than the UNDAF.

143.   The vision statement and the programme logic should, to the greatest possible extent, be shared by all UN organizations working in the country. However, this should not mean that all activities conducted by these UN organizations need be included in the One Programme (or the UNDAF). As much as the synergy among contributions of different UN organizations in a One Programme and subjacent joint programmes can enhance their relevance and effectiveness, the DaO approach should not become a straightjacket, which would deprive the country of a variety of interventions that may not be considered a priority by the government but still reflect needs in specific sectors or at decentralized levels. A strength of the UN system has traditionally been that it operates outside central planning mechanisms or general budget support. This comparative advantage should not be lost in the DaO process. Such views were conveyed by several members of the UNCMT and were not perceived contradictory to the DaO approach.

144.   The DaO pilot in Tanzania is taking a practical approach given the approval of the UNDAF and the CPAPs just prior to the initiation of the pilot. The considerable work that went into the UNDAF and the JAST are addressed and make strong connections between national priorities and UN comparative advantages. The degree to which various components of the DaO are aligned with national priorities and systems will inform future evaluations' inquiries into relevance, effectiveness and coherence. One challenge is the need for greater capacity at government levels to participate in the planning and execution of programmes. Capacity building needs are likely to increase as national development frameworks impose the need for greater capacity to align activities with outcome and as the general budget support share of ODA increases. Capacity assessment of the various actors, including non-state actors, need to inform capacity building efforts.

145.   Further work needs to be accomplished in aligning operational systems with planning and budget cycles at national levels. Some work has already been done in this respect, but poses tremendous challenges as the national budget year runs from 1 July to 30 June.

146.   In preparation for the next UNDAF and One Programme, consideration could be given to improving alignment with national priorities based on assessment of the national capacity and capacity building needs as well as the full spectrum of comparative advantages of the UNCMT members, (rather

than retro-fitting) whilst bearing in mind the normative role of the UN system. Consideration could also be given to further define working modalities and inclusion of agencies who, for various reasons, are not currently participating in One Programme.

147.   The One Programme M&E Framework comprises 60 indicators that combine the Paris Declaration indicator targets with common services and change management targets. While useful for a future process evaluation, some work is required to bring the indicators in line with basic principles of RBM, that is a formulation that would make them SMART. This would constitute a full-fledged M&E Framework that would enhance the evaluability of the DaO pilot. The indicators should capture the full range of factors and effects that may be important to the experience, including positive and negative side-effects. They should transcend mere success criteria, which seem to be more linked to the stated secondary purpose, which is public relations.

148.   The joint programme M&E plans provide more substantive objectives and indicators allowing for an assessment of relevance and effectiveness. However, the formulation of these indicators is not sufficiently SMART. The number of indicators should be limited to avoid the need for a tremendous amount of resources in data collection. During its review, the RBM Task Force should select only key and critical indicators to measure performance of the joint programme outcomes and results, and those indicators should be pitched at the outcome level.

149.   The GoT, with the support of UNEG, is required to evaluate the pilots and share experiences. It is urgent that independent and credible M&E counterparts be identified as soon as possible, for example those that have been involved in the Independent Monitoring Group. It is also necessary to establish a separate joint M&E Working Group that could coordinate the evaluation of the DaO pilot in Tanzania.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

UNEG Evaluation of DaO UN Pilots

Terms of reference for evaluability study in eight DaO Pilot Countries

(January -March 2008)

Background

In November 2006, the Secretary-General's High-level panel on UN System-wide coherence published the report 'Delivering as One'. It put forward a comprehensive set of recommendations including the establishment of One UN pilot initiatives at the country level, with One Leader, One Programme, One Budget, and where appropriate, One Office. The recommendations were largely grounded in General Assembly resolution 59/250 adopted in 2004, which provided guidance for joint offices and a rationalization of UN country presence.

The recommendations to establish pilots at the country level were met with great interest in the UN system, and by the end of December 2006, eight governments had expressed interest in joining this initiative. By February 2007, eight countries had asked the UNDP Administrator in his capacity of chair of the UNDG to support their pilot initiatives: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

Following discussions by the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) on 20-21 March 2007, the Chief Executives Board, in its meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 20 April 2007, called on UNEG to undertake an evaluation of the pilots that would focus on design and progress, to be followed at a later date by an evaluation of results and impact[1].

To this end, UNEG established a management group to oversee the design and implementation of the evaluation, co-chaired by the heads of the evaluation services of UNICEF and FAO[2]. A comprehensive process of consultations was initiated that resulted in the basic design of the evaluation. Main elements of the design were, as a first step, an evaluability study to be reported in March 2008 covering country and UN systemic mechanisms put in place for implementing the reforms. A second step would be a process evaluation of the pilot experience to be accomplished by September 2009. The last step would be an evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilot experience, for delivery to the HLCP by September 2011.

---

[1] Exact phrasing "called upon UNEG to urgently establish the substantive parameters and process for the evaluation of pilots, and requested to be kept fully informed of progress".

[2] A DaO evaluation interim manager/coordinator was appointed as from 1 January 2008 who is a senior staff member of the Evaluation Office of UNICEF.

At its meeting on 20-21 September 2007, the HLCP endorsed the overall evaluation in its report to the Chief Executives Board as well as the first step, an assessment of the evaluability of the Delivering as One Initiative by March 2008. This study would assess the process to date, plans, targets and tools. The study would provide lessons and independent advice to country teams to improve the quality of their planning. UNEG agreed that "the evaluability study to be completed in March 2008 would be substantive and would examine both the scope of the plans drawn up by country teams and criteria such as those indicated by members of the HLCP (including, inclusivity, diversity, openness of the process and how the single programme corresponded to national priorities)". This same meeting stressed the need for timely feedback from evaluation for management decision making on the future of Delivering as One.

The evaluability studies to be conducted by UNEG will benefit from a separate initiative launched by the Deputy Secretary-General to request governments of the eight pilot countries to provide additional information on the anticipated benefits and impact on national ownership so far. These assessments by governments will be complemented by a 'stocktaking' exercise to be conducted by the chair of the UNDG with UNCTs and organizations overseeing the pilots.

The new resolution of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2007 encourages the Secretary-General to support programme country pilots countries to evaluate and exchange their experiences with the support of UNEG. The emphasis is hence on UN system support to the evaluation by the programme countries themselves. In addition, the resolution calls for an independent evaluation of lessons learned from these efforts for consideration of Member States, without prejudice to a future inter-governmental decision.

The self-assessments of the DaO pilots by the governments of the eight countries are now fully mandated by the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review and provide an important frame of reference for the UNEG evaluability studies. On the one hand, the UNEG evaluation process will closely follow these self-assessments and possible exchanges of experiences among DaO pilot countries. On the other hand, emerging findings of the UNEG evaluability studies can be brought to the attention of DaO pilot countries and contribute to the self-assessments.

Evaluation of the DaO Programme and pilots (2007-2011)

The main elements of the evaluation design include the following:

a) An evaluability study to be carried out at the country and UN systemic levels, that is, a technical assessment of design of the pilots and mechanisms put in place for implementing the reforms (mission reports are to be made available as soon as possible and the synthesis report is due in March 2008)[3].

b) In 2009, a synthesis of the self-assessments done by the pilots during 2008 and a UN systemic process evaluation of the pilot initiative for delivery to the HLCP (the synthesis

---

[3] Due to a delay in the start-up of the DaO evaluation process and constraints to the planning of country visits the overall study is not likely to be completed before the end of April 2008.

report is due in September 2009 and will contribute to the preparation of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review[4] of 2010).

    c)   An overall evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilot experience, for submission to the HLCP (due in September 2010/2011).

First step: Conduct of evaluability studies (January-March 2008)

The evaluability study of the Delivering as One of each of the pilots and as a whole is a technical assessment of the basic parameters that will make it possible to fully evaluate at a later stage both the results of the programmes and of the pilots, and of the processes that will lead to these results. These parameters comprise:

    a)   Quality of the design for the achievement of results, that is, the existence of clear objectives and indicators to measure results at a later stage.

    b)   Initial appraisal of processes for the optimal involvement of relevant national and international stakeholders (including the governments of recipient countries; civil society; the private sector; UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies; and external aid agencies).

    c)   Existence of adequate sources of information to assess the achievement of results and indicators as well as of the required processes.

    d)   National ownership and leadership in the evaluation process, identification of independent and credible evaluators in pilot countries who can be involved in the evaluation of process and results of the Delivering as One pilots at a later stage.

The purposes and objectives of the evaluability study include the following:

    a)   Support governments and other stakeholders in the pilot countries as well UNCTs and the UN development system in identifying strengths and weaknesses in the design of their respective Delivering as One initiatives to inform immediate corrective measures, monitor progress and enable self-assessments.

    b)   Allow governments, other stakeholders as well as the UNCT and the UN development system to receive immediate feedback on processes for the involvement of relevant and international stakeholders.

    c)   Allow stakeholders to establish baselines and progress measurement during the implementation of the pilots for the assessment of results achievement.

    d)   Allow governments, other stakeholders, and the UN development system as well as UNEG to identify national evaluators in pilot countries.

---

[4] The Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review was undertaken by the Economic & Social Committee of the United Nations.

e) Allow UNEG to compile information from all eight pilot countries and to synthesize information as part of a comprehensive evaluability study that will facilitate the planning of subsequent stages of the overall evaluation.

Conduct of evaluability study field missions to pilot countries (January-March 2008)

The field missions to pilot countries will take place within a very short timeframe (January-March 2008). Due to time constraints, some will have to take place in parallel.

The field missions to pilot countries will be consultative of the national government, other national and external stakeholders, all members of the UNCT and, where possible, NRAs and funding agencies.

The mission will begin its work with a series of briefings on the UNEG evaluation and will hold wind-up sessions to share its main findings and conclusions with the main stakeholders in line with purposes and objectives described above.

The reports of the missions will be provided to the UNEG coordinator within 10 days of the completion of the country visit (period to be adjusted where country visits are organized back-to-back). The reports will be structured around the parameters of the evaluability study described above. UNEG will share the reports with concerned stakeholders as soon as possible.

Requests from UNCTs to address weaknesses and shortcomings in the design and process of the Delivering as One will be shared with appropriate support mechanisms, for example UNDGO.

Conduct of the evaluability study of the UN system support to Delivering as One (January-March 2008)

Measures taken by the UN organizations to support the Delivering as One initiative will be mapped. The evaluations done by UN organizations in order to distill lessons and best practices will be reviewed. The information gathered will enable UNEG to prepare the evaluation design of the process evaluation to be conducted during 2008-2009 on the readiness of the whole UN system to support the Delivering as One Initiative.

The report to be submitted in March 2008 will cover the adequacy of the scope of the plans drawn by the UNCTs and the UN system as a whole. It will include the criteria indicated by HLCP (for example, response to national needs and priorities, inclusiveness, diversity and openness of the process).

Annex 1.a Mission checklist and coverage of the reports of the field missions

A. Basic facts—history, context and scope of the DaO pilot

a. What was the pre-pilot situation with respect to CCA, UNDAF and the RC system?

b. When and how was the DaO pilot conceptualized and how has it been implemented? Which national stakeholders are involved in the process (government, civil society, private sector)?

c. What are the priorities of the government concerning DaO?

d. What has changed since the pilot started? What has been the progress in the implementation of the 'Ones'?

e. What organizations are members of the UNCT? What is the role of NRAs?

f. What is the size of the UN programme, its main characteristics and its relative importance to the country (taking into account ODA, South-South cooperation, etc.)?

B. Assessment of the substantive design of the DaO pilot (4-5 pages)

a. What is the vision of the government and other national partners concerning DaO and what are specific expectations?

b. To what extent does the UN system respond to specific needs and priorities of the country? How 'tailor-made' is the UN contribution?

c. What is the relationship of the DaO pilot with national development plans and strategies (including poverty reduction strategy papers, sector-wide approaches, and national plans related to internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs)?

d. To what extent is there a strategic intent for the totality of the contribution of the UN development system?

e. What is the relationship of the DaO pilot with other forms of external aid (e.g., budget support)?

f. How 'SMART' (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time bound) are the objectives and indicators of the DaO pilot?

g. How adequate is the M&E system?

h. What other parameters need to be taken into consideration to assess the design of the DaO pilot?

C. Initial assessment of the DaO pilot processes and implementation (4-5 pages)

a. To the extent that is there a formal agreement between the government and the UN development system concerning the objectives, the plan, and at what level in government decisions are being taken, what are the scope and main features of that agreement?

b. What is the process in place at the national level to plan and develop the pilot concerning, for example, interaction between various parts and levels of government and the UN system, interaction of the UN system with other national stakeholders (civil society, private sector), and interaction between the UN system and other external aid agencies?

c. How does the UN system interact with other forms of external aid (OECD-DAC and South/South)? How is the UN system perceived by other partners?

d. How are needs and priorities of the countries reflected? What needs to be responded to by NRAs of the UN development system?

e. How is joint programming conducted (CCA/UNDAF)? What is the importance of joint programmes?

f. What support has there been to the process from UNDG, UNDGO and from UN regional teams and Headquarters?

g. What has been the progress in the implementation of the Ones (One Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Framework, One Office)?

h. To what extent do the support systems (for example, financial and administrative procedures, human resources, information technology, procurement) support the DaO?

i. How can the cost of the DaO pilot be assessed? How is the cost perceived by different stakeholders?

j. What are the basic parameters that need to guide an ulterior evaluation of process?

D. Assessment of the adequacy of sources of information

a. What are the key documents that guide the DaO pilot (government policies and strategies, UN programme documents, budgetary frameworks, documents of individual UN organizations, etc.)?

b. What national and international stakeholders need to be interviewed for a full-fledged process evaluation?

c. What other methods (apart from document review and interviews) should be considered to allow for greater triangulation and objectivity of information (e.g., field visits, surveys)?

Note: The mission will also contact national institutions and individuals that are specialized in evaluation and that can potentially play a role in subsequent stages of the evaluation process.

Annex 1.b Views of stakeholders on the start-up process

The mission will meet with representatives of government, the UN system and other major stakeholders, including donors and seek their views on the following.

Objectives and strategic intent of the One UN pilots and the coordinated or joint programme:

    a.   Are all agencies and the government well aware of the objectives and strategic intent?

    b.   Do all agencies and the government agree on what the objectives of the pilot are?

    c.   If not, what are the divergent views?

    d.   Do all partners fully subscribe to the objectives?

With respect to plan(s) for achieving the objectives of the pilot, the coordinated or joint programme, budget and relationship to the government and UN priorities:

    a.   Are all partners fully aware of the content and the implications?

    b.   Do all partners subscribe to the plans, budgets, etc.?

    c.   If any, what are the divergences of view?

One Leader:

    a.   How is this working in practice?

Participation and process:

    a.   What is the level of participation as viewed by each of the stakeholders, for their own participation and for the participation of others?

    b.   What is the level of satisfaction of each of the stakeholders with the system in place for development of concepts and plans and for decision making?

Support:

    a.   What is the level of satisfaction with the central UN system guidance, support with tools and methods, and monitoring and reporting requirements?

    b.   Individual agencies of the UN system?

    c.   How do concerned government departments view their roles in the pilot?

Annex 2: People consulted

Government of Tanzania

Ashe A. Abdulla, Executive Director, Zanzibar Aids Commission

Kimwaga M. Ali, M&E Coordiator, ZAC

Amina M. Ameir, M&E Officer, ZAC

J.J. R. Buretta, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

Anthony P. Chamange, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives

Abdikh Faki, Deputy PS NOFEA

Gharib S. Gharib, Data Base Manager, ZAC

Hamed R.H Hikmany, Commissioner for National Planning, Sector Development and Poverty Reduction, MOFEA-ZNZ

Mohd Juma, Planning Officer, Aid Coordination MOFEA-ZNZ

Noel Kaganda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

Ramadhani Mussa Khijjah, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

J.J Makame, Assistant, MOFEA-ZNZ

Joyce K. G. Mapunjo, Ministry of Interior

Mrs. Massenga, Director of Teachers Education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training

Lena Mfalila, Reproductive Health, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare

Khatib Morid, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

David H. Mwakyusa, M.D., Minister, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare

Gaudens J. Mwende, MITM

J. Naftal, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

Hamid S. Nassor, Faith-based Organizations, ZAC

Margaret Z. Ndaba, Principal Economist, Development Assistance and International Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives

Richards Kes Ngiro, Policy and Planning Officer, TACAIDS

Mr. Ngirwa, TACAIDS, Department of Policy and Planning

Khamis. M. Omar, Principal Secretary, MOFEA-ZNZ

Blasi A. Selelu, Ministry of Lands

A. K. Shaaku, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Zanzibar

Amina H. Shabam, Deputy Principal Secretary, MOFEA, ZNZ

Ameir H. Sheha, Commissioner for External Finance, MOFEA-ZNZ

M.G. Wemenge, Prime Minister's Office

Civil society

Fatma Alloo, Coordinator of Tanzania Media Women's Association

Siham Ahmed, Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA)

Nebron Muwallagenda, Policy Forum

Samuel Wangwe, Professor, Independent Consultant

United Nations

Andre Antonelli, UNIDO

Luc Barriere-Constantin, UNAIDS

Mohamed Belhocine, M.D., WHO Representative

Fatma Bilal, Liason Officer, UNFPA, Zanzibar

Catriona Byrne, Programme Officer, HIV/AIDS

Mia Bulow-Olsen, Communications Specialist, RC Office

Tim Curtis, Programme Specialist, UNESCO Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania

Yacoub El Hillo, Representative, UNHCR

Sheila Grudem, Deputy Country Director, WFP

Nicola K. Jones, Representative UNFPA

Ibrahim Koroma, Head of Office, UNDP/Zanzibar

Heimo Laakkonen, UNICEF Representative

Donna Loveridge, M&E Consultant, UNICEF

Amon Manyangna, Deputy Representative, UNDP

Angus Miller, Operations Advisor, RC Office

Elizabeth Mlanga, Operations Officer, UNFPA

Esther Muia, M.D. Deputy Representative UNFPA

Christopher Mwaijonga, Assistant Representative, UNFPA

Usia Nkhoma-Ledama, UNIC

Inuss Noormahomed, Liason Officer, WHO-ZNZ

Alain Noudehou, UNDP Country Director

Hendrica Okondo, Country Programme Manager, UNIFEM

Ismail Omer, Country Director, Acting, WFP

Gianluca Rampolla, Senior Advisor, RC Office

Fatma Mohammed Rashid, Liason Officer ILO, Zanzibar

Fraancois Rumeci, Head, UNICEF-ZNZ

Kumbwaeli Salewi, ILO

Jurgen Schwettman, Director, ILO Kenya, Somalia and Uganda

Louise L. Setshwaelo, FAO Representative

Mwiru Sima, M&E Officer, UNFPA

Abheet J. Solomon, UNICEF

Timothy Takon, UNICEF, Chair RBM Working Group

Oscar Fernandez Taranco, RC, RC Office

Joachim von Bonin, Programme Specialist, Human Security and UN Coordination

Betty Wabunoha, OMT, UNDP

Development Partners

Tim Clarke, Head of Commission, EU

Simon Gill, Deputy Head, UK Department for International Development

Vic Heard, Deputy, UK Permanent Mission to Rome

Valerie Roberts, UK Department for International Development

Satu Sanitala, Embassy of Finland

Reid Sirrs, Head of Cooperation, Canadian High Commission

Kjersti Tronsdal, Embassy of Norway

Martine Van Dooren, Belgium Permanent Mission to Rome

Pamela White, Director, USAID

Note: The mission will also contact national institutions and individuals that are specialized in evaluation and that can potentially play a role in subsequent stages of the evaluation process.