# UNSF 2019-2022 –Libya

Evaluation Report October 2021

**Prepared by: Rania Fazah & Kathleen White**

# Contents

# Acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AFPs | Agencies, Funds and Programmes |
| CF | Cooperation Framework |
| COVID-19 | Coronavirus Disease 2019 |
| CP | Cooperating Partners |
| CPD | Country Programme Document |
| CS | Conflict Sensitivity |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration |
| DTM | Displacement Tracking Matrix |
| EPR | Emergency Preparedness and Response |
| EU | European Union |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations |
| GEEW | Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment |
| GNA | Government of National Accord |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| HDP | Humanitarian-Development-Peace |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agriculture Development |
| IFC | International Follow-up Committee |
| IHL | International Humanitarian Law |
| IHRL | International Human Rights Law |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organisation |
| IO | International Organisation |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| IP | Implementing partner |
| JCA | Joint Country Assessment |
| JMC | 5+5 Joint Military Committee |
| JP | Joint Programming |
| JSC | Joint Steering Committee to advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration |
| JTCC | Joint Technical Cooperation Committee |
| LNA | Libyan National Army |
| LPDF | Libyan Political Dialogue Forum |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MoE | Ministry of Education |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MoLG | Ministry of Local Governance |
| MoSA | Ministry of Social Affairs |

| MSNA | Multi-Sector Needs Assessment |
|---|---|
| MVA | Mobile Vulnerability Assessment |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NWoW | New Way of Working |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| QNA | Quick Needs Assessment |
| RG | Results Group |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SOC | Serious Organised Crime |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| STACO | Sheikh Taher Azzawi Charity Organisation |
| SWG | Sub Working Group |
| TOC | Theory of Change |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN Women | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDS | United Nations Development System |
| UNDSS | United Nations Department for Safety and Security |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHABITAT | United nations United Nations programme for Human settlements |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSF | United Nations Strategic Framework |
| UNSMIL | United Nations Support Mission in Libya |
| USA | The United States of America |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WG | Working Group |
| WPS | Women, Peace and Security |

# 1.    Executive Summary

This document presents the main findings of an evaluation conducted to review the United Nations (UN) Strategic Framework (SF) for Libya (2019-2022). The UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) in Libya commissioned the review, which was delivered from June through September 2021. This independent evaluation aimed to inform the next, overarching UN Cooperation Framework (CF) for Libya and support accountability to UNSF stakeholders in Libya and abroad.

The authors conducted the evaluation using a mixed methods approach that included participative, qualitative and quantitative research and analysis. The authors consulted 64 interlocutors from 44 bodies[1] and a reviewed over 60 documents.  The UN Country Team (UNCT) reviewed the preliminary findings in August 2021, which were refined through additional feedback, before finalisation.

This report is organized around the following sections:

Section 1 summarises overall conclusions and recommendations, which are elaborated and supported with further analysis in the main body of the report.

Section 2 provides the background, purpose and scope of the evaluation, along with its methodology.

Section 3 explains key findings on the UNSF's relevance to the Libyan context, effectiveness (progress toward outcomes), and contributions to sustainable and transformative change.

Section 4 explains identified lessons learnt with respect to cooperation and coordination across the UN system, under the UNSF.

Section 5 details overall conclusions from the evaluation.

Section 6 provides specific, detailed recommendations to the UNCT, to enhance cooperation under the new UNCF for Libya, encourage mutual accountability, and strengthen the relevance, effectiveness and sustainable and transformative impact of UN support delivered to the people of Libya, migrants and refugees.

The Annexes provide more information on data collection tools, documents reviewed and consultations.  Conclusions

---

[1] Eight donor agencies of four countries; 20 Libyan governmental stakeholders, including three municipalities; 14 UNCT members; two civil society organisations (CSOs).

The 2019-2022 UNSF presented a comprehensive and ambitious framework of collaboration with the Libyan government.[2] It had several strengths. UNSF development brought the UNCT, UNSMIL and OCHA together, after a four-year period of separate programming. The aim to unify effort around three, interlinked and cross-sectoral themes is in line with the "New Way of Working" (NWoW). The UNCT implemented joint reporting and began to pilot of HDP nexus working practices in Sabha. During the period of implementation, the UNCT delivered impactful support along several tracks of the Berlin Process and the Basic Services Pillar of the UNSF.

The challenging and volatile nature of Libya's multi-layered crisis since 2011, and particularly between 2019 and 2020 prompted the UNCT to rapidly adapt and respond to large-scale needs for humanitarian assistance. These responses included important support to multiple sectors, assisting a wide base of people with vulnerabilities and extending regional outreach to the East and South. The UNCT exercised flexibility and adaptability by providing life-saving assistance, helping Libyans and other populations of concern access basic services, during this period of upheaval.

Yet UNSF full implementation faced some impediments that are not entirely explained by contextual challenges—though these contextual challenges contributed. Overall, the evaluation found a disconnect between the ambitions laid out in the UNSF and what was realistically achievable over two years timeframe (the original timeframe of UNSF). The UNSF intended to "bridge" the UN system's work—using "post-crisis and recovery" programming—to move from a "focus on humanitarian assistance [...] and political efforts", in 2018, to "development-oriented program support", by 2021.[3] However, this ambition was based on the assumption (underpinning the UNSF but also shared across the international community) that Libya was in a transition period in 2018/19, moving toward sustainable development. This starting point did not adequately reflect the fragility of the situation on the ground. Libya was (and remains) characterized by unpredictable crisis cycles, at national and local levels. In brief, the complex interdependencies among dimensions of Libya's crisis have created "wicked problems" that are difficult to manage and overcome. The conclusions below are particularly relevant as the UNCT prepares its next strategic framework for Libya because many of the conditions are similar. Despite positive changes in some areas, Libya today remains fragile: many of the "wicked problems" are still present. The extent of

---

[2] Libya does not have a national development plan (NDP). As described in the UNSF, the UNCT saw the UNSF development process as an opportunity to advocate for, and reinvigorate earlier steps toward, the creation of an NDP oriented around the Sustainable Development Goals. Perhaps for these reasons, the UNSF lays out: i) a comprehensive, multi-dimensional diagnostic of pressing needs and structural and institutional weaknesses driving Libya's fragility, and ii) priorities that could be pursued to address them, aligned with the logic of a developmental approach. Further findings on the relevance of a developmental approach in the Libyan context are explained below.

[3] UNSF, p. 2.

its current "transition" will again only be evident with the benefit of hindsight. With this ongoing "context uncertainty" in mind—conclusions and the recommendations linked to them aim to promote learning that could assist the UNCT in navigating uncertainty going forward.

**First, a greater emphasis on periodic lessons learned from previous UN work in Libya would have strengthened the UNSF and may have supported the retention of institutional knowledge across the UNCT.** Libya's uncertain context necessitates trial and error. The UNSF process would have benefitted from more emphasis on learning and adaptation at all steps, including some reflection in the document on how learning was accounted for.

 A key lesson learned is that there are limits to what the UN system can influence. For example, the UN-mediated 2015 Skhirat agreement did not unify Libyan state institutions. The resulting operational context made UNSF implementation difficult, and the UNCT reported it could do little to influence the situation. The UNSF notes that some "risks fall [sic] beyond the direct influence of the UNSF[4] but the UNSF theory of change (TOC) could have clarified what more incremental changes the UNCT could influence in a high-risk environment. Linked to this, another key lesson learned is that developmental logic (including principles like "sustainability") may not always fit dynamics on the ground.

That said, unpredictable dynamics (not only inside Libya, but also in the region and globally) can create *both* periods of renewed crisis *and* unexpected peacebuilding opportunities. Recent UNCT experience in Libya offers a strong example. Ultimately, the conditions that led to the Berlin Process, October 2020 ceasefire, Inter-Libyan Dialogue, and formation of the interim Government of National Unity could not be deliberately engineered. The UNCT however was in a good position to support these efforts, thanks to hard-won relationships and its demonstrated ability to deliver certain types of support.

As this example illustrates, navigating uncertainty is partly about positioning the UNCT to be in the right place, at the right time, with appropriate evidence to put in the right people's hands when those opportunities for positive change unexpectedly arise.[5] This may be a less ambitious starting point than "institutional reform", but it more accurately reflects how major shifts in policy or behaviour tend to happen, and what "actor-centred" change looks like in practice.

Lessons learned were also not compiled on the level of access; many UN agencies have been working remotely from Tunisia since 2014, the UNCT's limited access in Libya has been a constraint

---

[4] UNSF, p. 46.

[5] While there are different ways to "do" HDP nexus programming, this might be one way of thinking about the overall purpose: supporting Libyan partners to early identify stability risks and helping create incentives for decision-makers to act earlier to prevent these risks from materialising, and/or undermining longer-term, transformative, and sustainable change.

to delivering impact. The evaluation observed that the current UNSF makes no mention of the UNCT's limited access; rather, the UNSF lists an assumption that UN access *will improve 2019-2020*. The UNSF thus does not discuss lessons learned from five years' experience of working from Tunisia (Egypt, Lebanon, or Morocco), with respect to how this impacts UNCT delivery. It's also not clear in the UNSF how the UNCT intended to deliver at sub-national level, navigating different conditions in the West, East and South or dealing with rival governments. **These lessons learned should have clearly informed the 2019-2021 UNSF and the level of ambition set within it – and how so should have been explained.**

**Second, having operational plans in place that "expect the unexpected" can help the UNCT mitigate risks (by "programming for" assumptions, plan for worst-case scenarios), and set and meet managed expectations**.[6] The UNSF includes a lot of information, at a high level, which may have been useful at clarifying various crisis components, as an initial stab at creating a common evidence base. However, without an operational plan, key information about what was negotiated with the Libyan government (who, what, where, when, how, why) is not explained. This means that the UNSF was launched without clarity among key stakeholders for how the framework would be implemented in a joined-up way (i.e. joint program*ming*: coordinated planning, implementation, monitoring, learning).

Coordination and oversight (of "joint or agency-specific work plans and / or project documents") was expected to happen via the Joint Technical Cooperating Committee (JTCC), the UNSF joint governance mechanism with the GNA. While the principle of joint planning/coordination through structures like the JTCC aligns with UN guidelines (and the later-published UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework guidance)[7] *in the Libyan context*, this choice surfaced a risk with high likelihood and high impact. (The risk had materialised under the previous UNSF.[8]) The

---

[6] *Managed* expectations are a negotiated compromise between the Government of Libya and UNCT. Both parties should have clarified not only what will be done, but also what will not be done.

[7] "84. Where possible, results groups are aligned with and feed into existing Government-led working structures, such as sector working groups, clusters, etc. This enables UN coherence in both representation and contributions to external mechanisms. If equivalent Government-led groups do not exist, results groups should incorporate relevant national and international partners, and be cochaired with relevant Government counterparts.

85. Under the leadership of the RC, results groups develop UN joint workplans to operationalize the Cooperation Framework, identify opportunities for closer inter-agency collaboration (e.g., through joint programmes), collectively monitor and report on progress towards joint outputs, and provide periodic inputs to update the UN CCA. UNCTs are encouraged to establish working mechanisms such as thematic groups or advisory capacity to mainstream Cooperation Framework Guiding Principles across the work of results groups." UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FRAMEWORK - Internal Guidance (2019), p. 25.

[8] The JTCC builds from experience with the preceding Libya Sector Working Groups (SWGs), associated with the transitional government that preceded the GNA, during the period of the 2013-2014 UNSF. See United Nations Country Team in Libya Strategic Framework 2013-2014 (September 2021), p. 31. The JTCC was designed to improve on some past challenges, highlighted in, e.g.: Draft report of Coordination Consultant, "International Coordination Structure in Libya: Assessment and Recommendations", 14 January 2013. https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/LBY/Coordination%20Consultant%20Report.doc

risk was that government-led working groups would not meet, and Libyan authorities would not regularly participate in some parallel UN-led working groups.[9] Access to and close engagement with the Libyan authorities was challenging at the outset (given many, competing priorities and challenging security). This became even more difficult with the outbreak of major conflict, which made the JTCC go dormant. Momentum moved toward decentralized support to municipalities to aid basic service delivery.

The risk that this would happen was difficult to mitigate, but there are some explanations for why this set-up was vulnerable and the UNCT faced coordination and implementation challenges. In line with UN Security Council Resolution 2259 (2015), the UNSF was a framework for supporting *the GNA*; conspicuously absent from the TOC is the assumption that *a broad range of Libyan stakeholders* would cooperate with the UNCT. As some AFPs reportedly acknowledged at the time, this simply was not "a given", in a context where rival governments were vying for influence over a divided population. The realities on the ground were apparent when the UNSF was written, and even with government unification, the UNCT will likely face similar challenges for the next CF.[10] While it is again difficult to ensure all Libyan stakeholders actively support the next CF, it is important to acknowledge that political imperatives (the request to support the GNA as the "legitimate government during 2019 period", and now the support to the GNU - the unified transitional government and winners of forthcoming elections) sometimes fuel a dynamic of finger-pointing (whose fault is it when the policy doesn't work in implementation?). It may not be possible to avoid some trade-offs. However, at the very least, scenario planning, including perhaps the articulation of "action standards" (what is expected of the Libyan authorities and UNCT when early warning signs appear, or different scenarios materialise?) might help with "expecting the unexpected".

**Third, even within the UN system, the practice and process of collaboration was not fully embedded during UNSF implementation**. This was due in part to three related factors: the UNSF presented a wide focus, in general terms; did not include meaningful prioritisation; and did not fully acknowledge the UN's limitations in a challenging operating environment[11] including in-country presence. It should be emphasized that this challenging operating environment was characterized by two parallel government structures in the East and West of the country, which required the UNCT to constantly adapt operations to the reality on the ground. Furthermore, the

---

[9] Draft report of Coordination Consultant, Op. Cit.
[10] Given that Libyan government and society remains fragmented; the UN's access is limited in key places (e.g. in the South and East); and there are some mismatched expectations about what the UNCT/Libyan government should be doing (e.g. financially, or in terms of reconstruction).
[11] For example, it would have been valuable to explain what the UN would *not* attempt to do on a two-year time horizon.

existence of multiple layers of UN coordination, planning, reporting mechanisms and documents outside of the UNSF (including UNSEF, HRP, AFP workplans, humanitarian WGs and SWGs, etc.) may have contributed a certain level of confusion and thus negatively impacted both prioritization of issues and (ironically) holistic coordination itself. These three elements—strategic focus, prioritisation and clear understanding of capability in the context—are essential as a realistic foundation for a two-year intervention strategy, in stabilization environments[12]. Each is discussed in turn next.

Regarding **strategic focus,** the evaluation findings suggest several weaknesses in the way the UNSF was designed (i.e. at policymaking level) and prepped for implementation (i.e. at operational level). The UNSF assumed a level of stability, government capacity, and a level of engagement with governance institutions,[13] that did not always match reality on the ground. Strategic focus, in this case, would have required more precise and realistic ambition—orienting UNCT capacities toward more delineated stabilization goals, in the nearer term.[14] When the goalposts moved significantly during implementation, the UNSF theory of change (TOC) and results framework could have been formally revisited at an earlier date—possibly when the first one-year extension was granted.[15]

For the future, the evaluators recommend a leaner document, which focuses on i) a testable TOC, ii) the results framework, and iii) most importantly, the *underlying collaboration process*, through which various stakeholders contribute from their comparative advantages.

A major strength of the UNCT's approach was the move to complement top-down coordination with a pilot for *area-based coordination and collaboration* (the HDP nexus working pilot group for Sabha). Such forums are likely a critical mechanism to support earlier identification of, and response to, stability risks and urgent needs on the ground. HDP nexus working group members felt it also improved conflict sensitivity in Sabha. The pilot experience generated several important lessons learned.

---

[12] By "stabilization context", the authors mean a situation where the public's priorities may include protection of life and livelihoods, preventing further/rapid deterioration in quality of life, representation of their interests by legitimate government, creating conditions for violence reduction, peacefully resolving political and social conflict, reconciliation, and inclusive and equitable access to opportunity. The authors do not take a position on the use of this or other terminology to describe these situations. They do not assume that these situations only arise in conflict affected places; many social groups have the above priorities in contexts that are generally regarded as stable. Other definitions of "stabilization contexts" exist.

[13] The UNCT was limited in the extent to which it could engage with governance institutions (including those not formally recognised by the international community—at least during 2019) in the East and South.

[14] It would also be beneficial to articulate the causal logic linking these goals, to the longer-term transformations stated in the UNSF theories of change, more clearly.

[15] The evaluators acknowledge the difficult and uncertain circumstances at that time, including COVID-19, and commend the UNCT's investment in a results framework update, currently underway.

On the **prioritisation** aspect, the UNSF priorities are multiple, broad, and, as some evaluation respondents noted, "generational" reforms. When the framework was launched, it lacked an operational plan (e.g. the Joint Work Plan envisaged for later development, currently being developed in 2021). Hence, it appears there may not have been a common understanding across the UNCT about sequencing and dependencies. For example, overall, the UNSF emphasises the "development" aspect of the HDP nexus—though peace is a precondition for many of the developmental goals it describes.

Given the challenging circumstances during 2019 - 2021, the UNCT did, in fact, reprioritise effort in ways that were well justified and impactful to respond to the changing context:

- In 2019 and 2020, the conflict escalation and global COVID-19 pandemic severely compromised basic functions of Libya's public administration. The pandemic threatened to cause Libya's health and education systems to collapse, particularly in already-vulnerable parts of the country (Fezzan[16]). The UNCT provided life-saving assistance to help Libyans and other populations of concern in Libya to access basic services (UNSF Pillar 3).
- From mid-2020 through 2021, a military stalemate, conflict fatigue and other political and economic factors in Libya and among the Libyan people encouraged several breakthroughs for mediation and peacebuilding. The UNCT shifted much of its support under the UNSF governance (Pillar 1) and economic (Pillar 2) components to the relevant tracks of the Berlin Process and Libyan peace process.

Still, as noted earlier, lessons and recommendations for future UN Country Frameworks have not been well documented in UNSF reporting. Individuals across the UN system in Libya, and key Libyan and international partners, have rich insights at a much more granular level than could be captured in this evaluation. It would be invaluable to document these lessons within a new country framework.

Regarding **capability in this context**, the evaluators note that the UNCT will face many of the same contextual constraints that it faced under the previous two UNSFs. As noted, several mechanisms and processes laid out in the UNSF (decision-making mechanisms, joint monitoring, and learning systems) hibernated when many of the assumptions underpinning the UNSF were invalidated by the recrudescent conflict, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and other factors. While it is hoped that recrudescent conflict will not reoccur, it is very possible that another shock will happen, with systemic impact. The UN's access inside Libya is uneven: the number of local staff recruits across the country is very limited, and international staff members' movements

---

[16] The health system indeed has collapsed here during periods.

outside UN bases (e.g. in Tripoli) are highly restricted. The UN has little footprint in the East and South, which relates to the restricted list of actors with whom the UN could engage, before government unification in spring 2021. Most UNCT members work largely from Tunis, while some (particularly those serving non-resident agencies) operate from Egypt, Rome, Geneva and elsewhere. Despite that, some UNCT presence remains essential and active; some AFPs who have a footprint in Libya showed acceptable levels of agility to respond to the quick changes and emerging needs resulting from the conflict, and COVID-19.

Some of these constraints could be eased with measures like recruiting more local staff and—at coordination level—enhancing the capacity of the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) to strengthen joint working practices. Broader UN and international experience in stabilization contexts suggests that strategic frameworks function well only when their governance and management systems enable frequent review and adaptation of the strategy with national partner buy-in. Yet this was not possible in Libya between 2019 and 2021. Hence, it may be necessary to set realistic aims and targets for coordination and what specific, coherent outcomes coordination is supposed to produce for Libyans, migrants, and refugees. If the Libyan government is unable to actively participate at some levels of strategy review and adaptation, it will be even more important to ensure every effort has been made to inform and engage those government actors to the extent possible.

Finally, lessons learned from this UNSF suggest it is important set more realistic and specific, incremental goals to support Libya's stabilization over a two-year period, and to report transparently on achievements. Given these challenging contextual and operational circumstances, it was both unrealistic and unreasonable to expect the UNCT to meet many of the targets laid out in the results framework or indeed other performance criteria the UNSF outlines on cross-cutting issues, principles, and approaches.[17] Annual reporting would benefit from including a full accounting of how the UNCT adapted, what was achieved, and what specific ambitions were no longer possible.

---

[17] For example, the UNSF encouraged programmatic focus on sustainable capacity development (in government institutions, communities, etc.). This guidance is understandable when sustainability is an option. However, a minimum level of predictability is required to enable sustainability (e.g. rule of law, order, etc.). (See N. Stockton, Humanitarianism Bound: Coherence and Catastrophe in the Congo 1998-2002, unpublished study on behalf of OCHA, 2003. p. 47.) Fundamentally, these were not the conditions Libya was experiencing from 2013—2021. UNSF could have been strengthened wit a clearer direction on how the UNCT and UNSMIL, in particular, could leverage collective capabilities (in line with UNSMIL's and each AFP's comparative advantages) to create preconditions for sustainability.

## Table 1 Summary of findings from the evaluation

| Finding |
|---|
| **Relevance to Libyan Context** |
| 1. Libya lacks a "National Development Plan". In the absence of national consensus on development goals, it is challenging to develop a strategic framework for the UNCT |
| 2. The UNSF provides guiding direction, via impact, outcome and output statements that are broad and ambitious. It is not evident that UNCT had a clear plan for how to leverage various agencies' capabilities in a stabilization context, or what concretely was meant by "HDP nexus" in Libya. |
| 3. The complex interdependencies among dimensions of Libya's crisis create "wicked problems", which the broader evidence base suggests cannot be tackled effectively by taking "institutional reform" as the starting point. |
| 4. The UNSF should have been seen as fundamentally a process tool and been designed expressly to promote a feasible and proportionate level of (meaningful) coordination and joint programming. |
| 5. The multi-dimensional crisis has affected governmental actors' motivation, opportunity, and capability to carry out basic functions. As a result, it has been difficult for UNCT to support the government to target action where needs are greatest. |
| 6. The UNSF appears to have assumed a level of government capacity that does not match the reality of where Libya was in 2017/2018, or indeed is today. |
| 7. From April 2019 to January 2021, the UNCT mostly focused on responding to humanitarian needs and delivering basic services to the most vulnerable, under the Basic Services pillar of the UNSF. These needs were indeed the most pressing during a period of major armed conflict and a pandemic-related public health emergency. |
| 8. All interlocutors confirmed the need for Humanitarian - Development – Peacebuilding, however few could clearly respond on how to coordinate activities along the three Nexus Pillars. |
| **Effectiveness** |
| 9. The UNCT has delivered indispensable support under the basic services pillar, though outcome-level monitoring has been hampered by the lack of evidence and data available. It is thus difficult to independently assess to what extent, UNCT has delivered assistance to the most vulnerable people as a priority |
| 10. The UNSF clearly articulates what cross-cutting principles and issues are, and the joint programming delivered by several agencies suggests that there is an attempt to mainstream these approaches. |

| |
|---|
| 11.      Libya lacks a proper evidence base, on which programmes and interventions can be built and adapted, based on learning. The <u>need for an evidence-base </u>was consistently mentioned by stakeholders as an urgent priority. |
| 12.      <u>Coordination and communication can be improved in Libya in general</u>: across the UN system and amongst all international and local partners working on the themes addressed in the UNSF. <u>Coordination under the UNSF was also difficult</u>, as it lacks an operational plan; the foreseen Joint Work Plan is only now under development. |
| 13.  <u>E</u>ngagement with Libyan decision-makers also remained weak in UNSF implementation, for several reasons outside the UNCT's control. It would be very helpful to have non-Resident agencies assess their remote working constraints clearly in the next UNSF/CF. |
| 14.      The <u>UNCT found ways to programme with national stakeholders, despite the challenges</u>. At the same time, some Libyan stakeholders expressed frustration through their perception that <u>international partners sometimes prefer to "work around" authorities, without adequate consultation.</u> |
| 15.      The evaluation identified a <u>drift between government entities and local civil society organizations</u> |
| 16.      Coordination with UNSMIL around <u>advocacy and communication with national stakeholders</u> appears to be an area for improvement. |
| **Sustainability and Transformative Change** |
| 17.      It would have been helpful if the UNSF provided <u>more guidance on expectations regarding "sustainable capacity building of Libyan government institutions", in the current operating context.</u> |
| 18.      Overall, the evaluation found <u>limited evidence on which to judge the sustainability of results</u> delivered under the 2019-2022 UNSF – with more evidence of work on resilience. |
| 19.      The <u>UN system has promoted and supported important steps that may promote transformative change in Libya</u>, but it is too early to tell. As ever in fragile contexts, sustainability is a long-term process. |
| 20.      Libyans are currently defining the shape of the governing institutions, including by running municipal and national elections, which means that <u>ambitions for capacity building must be well targeted and realistic</u>, to avoid inefficient approaches. |

## 1.1.    Recommendations

The below set of forward-looking and actionable recommendations are logically linked to the evaluation findings and conclusions; many cut across several findings and incorporate lessons learned to improve the strategies, implementation mechanisms, and management of the next strategic country framework.

1.      The UNCT should significantly *reduce the document size* of the next cooperation framework (CF) and *focus on the theory of change and the results framework*. These are linked considerations. Both will help ensure that the next CF reflects and enables the UNCT's *results focus*. A lean document, focused on a) results, b) how and why the UNCT can contribute, and c) how the UNCT will test and understand what is working or not, will help decision-making at all levels. These are the core of what is needed to aid adaptation in a dynamic context.

2.      The UNCT should enhance strategic focus and prioritization in the next CF.

3.      The UNCT should build from the good progress on defining an HDP nexus approach for Libya, by ensuring this definition and lessons learned / guidance for operationalizing the approach (e.g. through area-based planning) are included in the next CF.

4.      The UNCT should ensure the next strategic cooperation framework includes operational plans / operational planning tools to reflect Joint Programing. While not a silver bullet, they are an important component of useful and functional strategic frameworks.

5.      The UNCT and (where applicable) implementing partners should ensure all interventions are grounded in strong needs assessments and thorough analysis of Libyan government buy-in. All interventions should have clear and achievable results by making outcome statements as SMART as possible for a two-year strategic framework[18]. The Sabha nexus strategy experience provides good lessons learned for how "wicked problems" might be broken down into more manageable increments with clearer results and local-level buy-in, though the evaluators recognize that this remains challenging at national level.

6.      The UNCT should integrate periodic risk analysis, scenario definition and contingency planning exercises into programmes' planning and implementation. Scenario planning would support action on early warning signs may be another useful tool and can potentially build from those already done through other actors such as the Peaceful Change Initiative conflict sensitivity forum.  A more systemic thinking to risk analysis and planning has a range of benefits, including shared expertise and various AFPs' specialised insight on risks, joint financing appeals, leveraging everyone's comparative advantages to plan for better mitigation and management which can be resource efficient and effective. The pandemic showed us that vulnerability in one sector (health, hydrocarbons) can create risk / drive crisis in another (economic, agricultural). Risk assessment, contingency and scenario planning that pools UNCT would be very beneficial despite the existence of different rules and procedures amongst the AFPs (E.g. contingencies for a resident agency will be different from those for a non-resident agency.)

---

[18] There are some good ideas in the OCHA April 2018 guidance on how to develop collective outcomes that operationalize the NWoW

7.	The UN should increase the capacity of the Resident Coordinator's Office to provide support, coordination, follow up, M&E, and outreach to donors uniquely in its areas of comparative advantage. More staff would be beneficial.

8.	The Libyan government, UNCT and donors should set realistic aims and targets for coordination and *what specific, coherent outcomes* coordination is supposed to produce *for Libyans, migrants, and refugees*. Prioritise the "institutionalisation" of feasible and proportionate mechanisms to support these aims.

9.	The UNCT should work across regions and sectors in an agile mode, where sector/location-related teams both share information and coordinate interventions, and closely plan and implement integrated approaches. Building from the Sabha nexus strategy experience, area-based planning groups may make it more feasible to do meaningful and effective "cooperative analysis and coordinated implementation".

10. The UNCT should adopt a system building approach to support and build the capacities and practices around data collection and analysis for relevant authorities (a national statistical system including the Bureau of Statistics and other agencies).

11. The RCO should consider whether more detail could be provided on results indicators and lessons learned in annual reporting, which may require more support from the UNCT's M&E working group.

12. UNCT should continue to champion right based approaches and gender equalities, however, UNSF for the next two years should consider including managed expectations about a generational perceptions and attitudes reform and ensure no harm when working on issues that have negative perceptions. For gender mainstreaming, it remains unequivocally sensitive which stipulates the need to address issues from the Libyan women's perspective and include granular priorities that are affecting Libyan women's lives.

## 2.	Introduction

The 2019-2022 UNSF is a publicly available, high-level framework, intended to guide the UN Country Team's (UNCT) joint strategy in Libya. Its desired impact is to support Libya to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) laid out in the 2030 Agenda—considering governmental priorities, challenges, and opportunities, specific to the Libyan context. Overall, the UNSF:

- Sets the UNCT's strategic focus (an impact statement and three, strategic outcomes, or "Results Groups", linked to selected SDG targets, and in particular, SDG 16[19]).
- Includes principles, recommendations, and guidelines for approaching outcomes and cross-cutting themes.
- States expected results and how performance will be measured.
- Lays out an understanding of how the UNCT's work links to other UN- and non-UN-specific efforts, such as the UN integrated political mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and UN humanitarian response (OCHA).
- Sets out a management set-up, intended to clarify and support integrated working, within the UNCT and with the other UN entities and actors laid out above.

The UNSF for Libya drew on data and analyses from the Joint Common Assessment (JCA) by the UNCT, UNSMIL and the World Bank in 2018. It was originally planned to cover the period of 2019-2020. As an overarching programmatic vehicle, the UNSF aimed to ensure UN-internal aid coordination and coherence among UN resident and non-resident agencies operating in Libya. Moreover, it embraced the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus framework. The nexus framework seeks to enable the UN's development actors (hereafter, "Agencies, Funds and Programmes", AFPs), subsumed under the UNCT Libya, to closely coordinate with and leverage the comparative advantages of political (UNSMIL) and humanitarian actors (OCHA), in support of the UNCT's developmental approach.

The UNSF was developed through a participative process, starting from late 2017. The process included consultations among the UNCT members in Libya and a group of Libyan officials. The UNSF focused on "recovery and post-crisis programming" to develop "resilience, recovery and institutional capacity building" and enhance political efforts. The Libyan government endorsed the UNSF in 2019.

As detailed in the next section, the implementation of the UNSF has been highly constrained, due to contextual developments and Libya's deeply rooted structural issues. The UNSF was therefore extended once, until the end of 2021, then for an additional period of 12 months, until 2022. The UNCT is updating the result framework, taking into consideration i) progress under the four tracks of the Berlin Process (military, political, economy and human rights), and ii) the UN development

---

[19] Overall, the SF is linked to SDG 16 as a general goal to which all Outcome pillars will contribute. While all SDGs and almost all targets are at least to some extent addressed through the SF, the focused SDGs in terms of agency support to related SDG targets are SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 5 (Gender Equality), closely followed by SDGs 4 (Quality Education), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), 1 (No Poverty) and 17 (Global Partnerships).

system (UNDS) reform process. The UNCT Libya plans to continuously develop planned results until the end of 2022, as well as introduce changes in the way the UNSF is managed and monitored.

## 2.1. Context

Libya is in its tenth year of instability and conflict, following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Successive Libyan governments have struggled to assert control over the country, while rival political parties and myriad armed militias compete for influence, assets and strategic territorial control.

Under the **Libyan Political Agreement** ("Skhirat agreement") signed in December 2015, the UN had been supporting a process of national consultations and dialogue during 2018-2019, leading up to the Libya National Conference, on 14 April 2019. However, these efforts were obstructed, when ten days before the conference, General Khalifa Haftar began an assault on Tripoli.

As the conflict in the capital intensified, political will among conflicting parties to compromise resurged amidst increasing international involvement in the conflict and the growing risk of regional escalation. In response, an international conference was convened on 19 January 2020 – later known as the **Berlin Process**. The conference aimed to solidify a fragile, mid-January truce and create an enabling international environment for a Libyan solution to the conflict.

The Berlin Process resulted in participants' support to (i) implement a cease fire, (ii) convene international actors to support an arms embargo, (iii) restart an intra-Libyan dialogue on peace and reconciliation, using the framework of the Skhirat agreement, (iv) implement several security sectors, economic, and financial reforms, and (v) respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). UNSMIL was tasked with implementing the conclusions through a new **International Follow-up Committee** (IFC) made up of nations participating in the Process. To support the ceasefire, the **5+5 Joint Military Commission** (JMC) was formed, composed of officers from the Government of National Accord (**GNA**) and Libyan National Army (**LNA**); however, the ceasefire did not hold.

In May 2020, GNA-backed forces, with military support from foreign allies, pushed the LNA forces (and their foreign military allies) out of Tripoli. The front line moved to Central Libya, producing a stalemate by June 2020. The 5+5 JMC subsequently signed a formal ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020. The agreement calls for, among other points, the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters, the cataloguing of armed groups in Libya in anticipation of eventual demobilization and disarmament, and the establishment of a joint security room, to oversee the resolution of any ceasefire infringements.

With a new ceasefire in place, UNSMIL continued advancing the Berlin Process by initiating the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (**LPDF).** The LPDF brought together 74 delegates selected by the rival national assemblies, as well as a several UN-selected independents, representing a range of the country's political and tribal factions. In November 2020, the LPDF endorsed a Roadmap to form a unified government. It also nominated an interim government to lead the transition period, until elections are held in December 2021. The proposed transition government, led by Prime Minister Dbeibeh and head of the Presidency Council Menfi, was unanimously endorsed by 132 members of the House of Representatives in March 2021, during a meeting between house members from both the Tripoli and Tobruk-based governments.[20] A peaceful transfer of power to the interim government has so far held, with a swearing-in ceremony of the new government taking place in Tobruk and complimented by transfer ceremonies in Tripoli and Benghazi. [21]

The establishment of a unified Libyan government – known as the Government of National Unity (**GNU**) – is an achievement. While the political and security situation remains fragile, the current, stabler environment may provide an opening for significant advancements in peacebuilding, humanitarian relief, and development in the country. However, recent progress may stall or reverse, if several risks are not carefully managed.

First, there are still "legitimacy" issues surrounding the interim government—a non-elected body. Elections are not a cure-all, but Libyans expect to exercise their democratic right to vote and expect to see their interests and communities represented in decision-making. Second, Libya's fragmented and highly localised security and governance crises provide ample space for national, regional, and local actors to derail current progress. The ceasefire's credibility could collapse, if any of Libya's many, fragmented armed groups or national and international actors do not respect its terms. The continuous supply of weapons to former GNA and LNA forces is a serious risk. The summer of 2021 saw tensions increase between rival armed coalitions (such as recent security policy disagreements between the 5+5 JMC and the Presidential Council) and between parliament and the GNU (with the Speaker of the House threatening a "no confidence vote" against PM Dbeibeh in late August).

At the regional and municipal level, armed groups in the West that were previously unified against the LNA threat have returned to vying for dominance since the withdrawal of the LNA and allied forces from Tripoli in June 2020. The situation in the south of the country, which has historically been marginalized, remains volatile due to multiple actors such as cross borders Chadian FACT group, and ISIS affiliated groups. While the security situation in the eastern region has remained

[20] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/222-libya-turns-page
[21] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/222-libya-turns-page

relatively calm, sporadic clashes continue to occur and there are regular reports of kidnappings, forced disappearances and targeted killings.

Moreover, the LPDF has not reached a consensus surrounding the legal framework for 2021 elections, failing to come to an agreement in August. While key questions remain unanswered as to what the election will seek to achieve, who will be allowed to participate, and what form the process will take, it is unclear if and for how long security and political conditions will remain favorable.

Meanwhile, the **humanitarian situation** has steadily deteriorated throughout 2020 and 2021 due to the armed conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and plummeting economic prospects[22]. According to the 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 1.3 million people need humanitarian assistance, including more than 580,000 migrants and refugees – as Libya has remained both a destination for migrants and a major transit country for people attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Europe.  The situation was exacerbated by the continuing spread of COVID-19 in Libya, while basic services - including the electricity, water, and particularly health system - are fragmented, dysfunctional, and collapsed in several areas of the country.

Libya lacks a national development plan, and coordination amongst government institutions remains weak. The UNCT hoped that the SF implementation could be strategically guided by medium to long-term governmental priorities, as per the Coordination Framework for International Cooperation for Libya. This framework went dormant during the armed conflict.

The UN's planning and implementation to achieve development objectives were also negatively impacted by the presence of rival governance structures across the country. Supporting the GNA was a political imperative for UNAPFs, and it was not until 2019 that this position began to change post April 2019 conflict.

Government unification notwithstanding, the country continues to endure multiple divides, deep fragmentation, and limitations in national and sub-national governance capabilities. Already weak institutional capacities, exacerbated by the conflict and political split, contributed to the deterioration of public services nation-wide, the further recession of the limited state presence in the south, and the worsening economic vulnerability at macro- and household-level. The striking deterioration in quality of daily life fuelled socio-economic and political grievances, which fed into the conflict—while various parties blamed each other--and hampered prospects for medium- and long-term recovery.

---

[22] Poor economic conditions had been exacerbated by the blockage of the oil sector, which was lifted after the signing of the ceasefire agreement on October 2020

With the political and security situation seemingly improving, it seems that the Libya context today exhibits somewhat similar characteristics to those that were present in 2018, during the formulation of the UNSF. With the upcoming formulation of the UNCF on the horizon, this evaluation thus provides an opportunity to examine how the UNSF's design and implementation responded to those challenges.

## 2.2. Purpose and scope

This evaluation has two overall purposes. The first was to generate evidence and lessons learned from the 2019-2022 UNSF, to inform the next overarching UN Cooperation Framework (CF) for Libya, as well as UN agencies' related Libya Country Programmes. The second was to support greater UNCT accountability to SF stakeholders, which include the UN's partners and donors, and people across Libya.

To serve these overall purposes, the evaluation had five specific objectives:

1.      Assess if/how the UNSF's strategic directions, goals, and guiding principles (such as those underpinning the HDP nexus framework) were relevant in the Libyan context.
2.      Assess progress towards the SF outcomes and causal relationships, including the factors that hindered or enabled the UNCT's results achievement.
3.      Assess whether results have contributed to transformative change and whether results are sustainable.
4.      Identify lessons learned to improve the strategic orientation, implementation mechanisms, and management of the next CF.
5.      Generate a set of clear, forward-looking and actionable recommendations, logically linked to the findings and conclusions.

In line with its purpose and specific objectives, the evaluation scope covered not only an analysis of the UNCT programmatic contributions to UNSF outcomes, but also an examination of the overall UNSF process. Thus, the evaluators also were asked to assess the UNSF overall design, implementation, and monitoring, against the strategic intent laid out in the UNSF document.

## 2.3. Methodology

This evaluation adopted a utilization-focused approach, as stipulated by Michael Quinn Patton, "to navigating complex issues and situations, which involve dealing with uncertainty, turbulence, non-linearity, emergence and unpredictability," which all apply to the context of Libya. The evaluation considered the UNSF for Libya as an overall framework that "provides guidance for navigating such complexity". Hence the evaluation considered well that navigational process is working. The

evaluation considered the strategic framework to present a set of high-level guidelines that act as Principles. Hence the evaluation examined: "(1) whether these guidelines/principles are clear, meaningful, and actionable, to all (UN, agencies, national government bodies, and implementing partners) and if so, (2) whether they are being followed and, if so, (3) whether they lead to the desired results, and the extent to which the UNSF is mainstreaming human rights, gender sensitivity, conflict sensitivity, and accountability to affected populations."

### 2.3.1 Data Collection Methods and Tools

The evaluation used mixed methods to evaluate the workings of the UNSF in a participatory approach. The evaluation team ensures primary data is collected from the interventions of direct and indirect stakeholders.

The evaluation took place remotely between June and August 2021, as per the request of the Assistant Secretary-General/Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. Due to COVID-19-related travel constraints, this evaluation was a fully virtual effort carried out by a team of two consultants. All interviews and discussion were conducted via Microsoft Teams, Zoom or WhatsApp.

The main tools and methods the evaluation used are:

1- **Literature review:** of main UNSF documentation, a selection of UNCT needs assessment and annual reports along with a wide literature base of around 60 documents. The desk review spread throughout the progression of the evaluation. The desk review answered descriptive questions and captured statistical data. The literature was used for comparative purposes and benchmarking.
   The documents reviewed cover the 2019-2020 United Nations Strategic Framework, which was extended until 2022, two annual progress reports, the UNSDCF internal guidance for evaluation, Humanitarian Needs Assessments for 2019, 2020-2021, the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2019-2020-2021, and Libya Joint Country Assessment 2018. The evaluators also consulted broader literature on effective, multi-actor approaches in stabilization contexts, including evaluations of other UN strategic frameworks.

2- **Key Informants Interviews:** Semi-structured interviews with 64 key informants ranging from UNCT members, national stakeholders, donors, and CSOs. The interviews collected information and solicited participants' feedback, perceptions, and views. interviews also captured the positions of key informants and the organizations they represent.

The interviews (a) complemented missing information from the desk review and observation, including understanding the implementation of the UNSF as well as roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders, (b) examined views related to the programme implementations, challenges, and lessons learned, and (c) provided recommendations on ways forward. The selection of key informants was done in consultation with RCO and UNCT members.

*Interviews with 64 interlocutors from 44 Bodies*

*8 Donor agencies of 4 countries*

*20 National Governmental stakeholders – including 3 municipalities*

*14 UNCT members*

*2 CSOs*

**3-    Validation meetings:** The evaluation adopted a process of validation throughout its inception, and reporting phases. (a) UNCT members endorsed collectively the inception report post 2 rounds of comments and one meeting with the evaluators.  (b) post data collection, a preliminary findings workshop was held with UNCT members to discuss the preliminary findings and solicit feedback. (c) The report was drafted and shared with RCO for feedback. (d) The team also solicited feedback on the report from all UNCT members. (e) Two findings workshop are organized with the Libyan government stakeholders, and donors to solicit 360 degrees feedback.

The evaluation examined questions of **relevance**, in terms of whether the UN system at the country level is contributing to the needs and priorities of Libya during the period 2019-2021. Questions explored the degree to which the interventions were appropriate to the local context. Enquiries also explored which groups/stakeholders were consulted, and whose voices and views were heard and included, and how emerging needs were addressed.

Questions of **effectiveness** examined whether the UNSF contributions are alleviating the impact of the crisis on the lives of the people through supporting the provision of essential basic services (social protection, education, health, and WASH) and civil society. Questions of **transformability** in Libyan institutions, policies, and to building the foundations of an equitable, fair, and peaceful governance system in Libya that respects human rights and the rule of law.  The evaluation examined modalities of work under the UNSF, namely the cooperation, coordination, participation of governmental and non-governmental actors, and the inclusion of stakeholders from the three Libyan regions.

### 2.3.2   Evaluation Questions

Under **relevance**, the questions cover the relevance of the activities with respect to how the needs were identified and prioritized. Questions explored the degree to which the interventions were appropriate to the local context. Enquiries also explored which groups/stakeholders were consulted, and whose voices and views were heard and included, and how emerging needs were addressed.

**KEQ1**- Has the SF supported the government to target and address pressing needs and responded to emerging needs, and included HDP?

**KEQ2-** Have the UN Joint Country Assessment and the SF effectively targeted and addressed the key development issues and challenges towards the achievement of the SDGs in Libya?

Under **effectiveness**, the questions highlighted the progress towards the outputs and outcomes and reflected upon the general benefits of the UNSF to Libya. The questions examined the effectiveness of coordination modalities between the UNCT and donors, governmental institutions, and CSOs, in addition to the coherence of UN agency interventions. Questions explored the extent to which the interventions were coordinated and complementary towards common goals. The questions also looked at both enabling and deterring factors to the achievement of results and gauged the counterfactual argument.

**KEQ3-** Has the SF met the stated outcomes and outputs given Libya's volatile context?

**KEQ4-** Has the SF strengthened coordination, cooperation and partnership with the government, civil society, and other actors?

Under **Sustainability and transformative change,** the evaluation explored how the UNSF worked to ensure gender inclusion, respect of human rights, prevention or mitigation of conflict,

and inclusion of various ethnic and political groups, as well as people with various disabilities. The evaluation also examined how the UNSF contributed to developing the capacities of national stakeholders on individual, organizational, and structural levels.

**KEQ5-** Has the SF conformed to the cross-cutting principles and issues (i.e. gender, human rights)?

**KEQ6-** Has the SF extended support in such a way to build national and local capacities and ensure long-term gains?

**KEQ7-** Has the SF promoted and supported inclusive and sustainable development that leaves no one behind?

**KEQ8-** Has the SF promoted or supported policies that are consistent among each other and across sectors, given the multi-sectoral nature of peacebuilding and socio-economic development?

**KEQ9-** Has the SF supported the country and the people in strengthening resilience and contributed to reducing vulnerability against the protracted conflict and other crises?

**KEQ10-** Has the SF contributed towards challenging negative social norms, behaviors and practices to achieve substantial gender equality?

### 2.3.3    Limitations and challenges

Given the request that the evaluation be conducted remotely, the evaluation had no field-based observation. The methodology agreed with the Resident Coordinator's Office also excluded interviews with beneficiaries in the Libyan public, because this was determined to be out of scope and budget to do effectively. Instead, a sample was selected from civil society organizations knowledgeable about the populations' daily experiences and elected representatives, from areas in the West (Tripoli), South (Sabha) and East (Benghazi), where the UNCT has noted considerable fragility. Hence the evaluation may not represent views of the broader public and civil society, but all perceptions were triangulated, to the extent possible, through: 1) the input of 64 individuals, including a wide range of policy advisers, AFPs and Libyan policymakers; 2) reviews of available evidence, including the UNCT's own reporting, needs assessments and funding appeals; and third party sources, including databases, analyses, media reports and broader academic and practitioner literature. The evaluation faced some challenges in connecting with UNCT members

who relocated out of Libya (end of mission), and who supposedly possess some of the institutional memory.

Additionally, the evaluators faced challenges in accessing evidence on programmatic activities and results. The evidence was at times extremely limited, including at output-level, but most notably with respect to outcome-level achievement, which best practice defines as behavioural change (i.e. change in Libyan and, as relevant, international actors' and institutions' behaviour). This made it difficult to assess relevance, effectiveness and sustainability/transformational change. Open-source searches sometimes returned more detailed information about AFPs' activities (and in some cases results), but as is noted in the evaluation findings, it was very difficult to connect this information to UNSF annual reporting, considering details on key performance indicators were absent. It was also a key challenge for the evaluators to disentangle AFP strategic plans from the UNSF, and how to take those on balance.

## 3. Main Findings

### 3.1.   Relevance to Libyan context

**Finding 1: Libya lacks a "National Development Plan". In the absence of national consensus on development goals, it is challenging to develop a strategic framework for the UNCT.**

Libya did not have a National Development Plan (NDP) at the time of UNSF drafting, and still does not. In this context, it is very challenging to build consensus about the short-, mid- and longer-term, outcome-level changes, to which the UNCT and Libyan stakeholders should be working in partnership.

More specifically, considering the effects of Libya's conflict, and its overall fragility, the absence of a mid- to long-term national vision, strategy and plan presents additional challenges. The Libyan government has requested UN support across a significant range of development, peacebuilding, and humanitarian issues. Without the foundations of an NDP, it is very challenging to build consensus with Libyan government stakeholders on:

- which needs, issues and challenges are priorities.
- what the relationship is between short-term effort, and longer-term objectives.
- whether the UNCT's approach is the most relevant to Libyan priorities, partnership needs, and capacities.

These issues are further unpacked in additional evaluation findings below.

The eventual existence of an NDP is among the key performance indicators for the 2019-2022 UNSF. However, in Libya, NDP development is a highly political process, deeply entwined with Libya's peace process, which foresees national elections in December 2021. On the one hand, there is demand among Libyan partners for a National Development Plan (NDP). On the other hand, there are difficult questions about how and when (and even whom within) the GNU will develop it. Assuming elections proceed as planned, the UNCT would have only one year, under the current UNSF, to support the government in Libya to prepare an NDP and achieve the relevant UNSF target.

More importantly, evaluation consultations also continuously emphasised the need to manage expectations and set realistic goals. The UNSF is framed around several SDGs mainly SDG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 while prioritising SDG 16. Yet, as the UNSF acknowledges, many actors in Libyan government still question the relevance (to their immediate priorities) of certain types of "developmental logic", specific Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and indeed the needs of certain social groups (e.g. migrants, refugees, women and girls). Some Libyan stakeholders expressed their view it was too ambitious to attempt to pursue all the SDGs at once and are likely not aware of a Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support (MAPS) process. This finding also suggests that they do not perceive a prioritisation—i.e. around SDG 16—in their engagement with the UNCT.

**Finding 2: The UNSF provides guiding direction, via impact, outcome and output statements that are broad and ambitious. While this may have been done to reflect the UNCT's "developmental approach,"** [23] **it is not evident that UNCT had a clear plan for <u>how to leverage various agencies' capabilities in a stabilization context, or what concretely was meant by "HDP nexus" in Libya</u>.**

The "strategic intention" of the UNSF was to craft a "light-touch", "high-level strategic framework", to guide and enhance joint UNCT working practices, and foster close collaboration with the Libyan government and other local and international partners, in the pursuit of common objectives. However, even within the UNCT, clarity on what the UNSF strategy is and how it should be delivered was compromised—with some interlocutors saying the UNSF was not taken into consideration in day-to-day operations.

---

[23] UNSF, p.ii.

This appears to relate, in part, to the overall UNSF design. The 2019-2022 UNSF is a wide-ranging and ambitious document.[24] As is stated in the UNSF, Libya's crisis involves numerous, intersecting dimensions (political, conflict/peace, security, humanitarian, developmental, domestic/international, etc.). The multi-dimensional, joint analysis underpinning the UNSF is a strength, as is the use of integrated, thematic priorities (rather than stove-piped, sectoral thinking). Thanks to this joint analysis, the UNSF paints a coherent picture of pressing needs and developmental challenges.

Nevertheless, the UNSF falls short of a clear, lean, integrated, and **coherent strategy**, for producing **coherent outcomes** for Libyans, migrants, and refugees, as well as marginalised social groups within these populations.[25] In future, the next CF's Outcome Statements also could be strengthened, and brought into greater alignment with HDP nexus principles, if they more closely aligned with guidance that is now available (through the Joint Steering Committee to advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration, JSC) on the definition of "collective outcomes".[26] (As the UNCT's now-defined "Nexus Approach for Libya" explains, however, it may not be realistic to have higher-level strategic outcomes that precisely align with this guidance. See sub-finding 5 below.)

Overall, the UNSF was difficult for the Libyan government and UNCT to operationalize, due to several issues, such as:

1.      **A lack of strategic focus.** (What is the UNCT able to do well? What won't the UNCT do?)

**Despite the intention to provide greater "strategic focus", it is not clear that the UNSF reflects a true prioritisation of effort, or a clear understanding of UNCT's capacity in the**

---

[24] Libya does not have a national development plan (NDP). As described in the UNSF, the UNCT saw the UNSF development process as an opportunity to advocate for, and reinvigorate earlier steps toward, the creation of an NDP oriented around the Sustainable Development Goals. Perhaps for these reasons, the UNSF lays out: i) a comprehensive, multi-dimensional diagnostic of pressing needs and structural and institutional weaknesses driving Libya's fragility, and ii) priorities that could be pursued to address them, aligned with the logic of a developmental approach. Further findings on the relevance of a developmental approach in the Libyan context are explained below.

[25] For whom disaggregated (i.e. not "population-level") monitoring is needed (women, youth, IDPs, the disabled, people from the South, certain ethnic groups, tribes and clans, etc.)

[26] "Collective outcomes should represent a measurable, intermediate target between the current level of need, risk and vulnerability and the targets set by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They should not be confused with generic strategic objectives (e.g. reduce mortality, improve governance, increase resilience) or replace SDG targets. Even if some activities remain under the sole remit of humanitarian or development responses, programmes and projects should, as far as possible, be organized around commonly agreed outcomes to avoid duplication and fragmentation. Collective outcomes need to aim at reducing need, risk and vulnerability of targeted populations (not just meet needs) and change the status quo. Collective outcomes should be ambitious but realistic. For example, a collective outcome on a particular disease might be too specific; a more appropriate outcome might focus on the reduction in deaths from health-related emergencies. The focus of collective outcomes – how broad or specific they are – will undoubtedly depend on the context and the range of issues to be addressed." Useful examples from Chad and Somalia are given. UN OCHA, "Collective Outcomes: Operationalizing the New Way of Working", April 2018, p. 2. http://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2018/Apr/OCHA%20Collective%20Outcomes%20April%202018.pdf

**Libyan context.** The UNSF appears to mirror the overall "portfolio" of what the UN was at that point doing in Libya, alongside statements on programmatic entry-points that could be explored, in principle. [27] While it is useful to promote holistic, systemic thinking, by organising this information under broad themes and cross-cutting considerations, in effect the UNSF encompasses every aspect of Libyan society, both present and future. (See Finding 1 on Libya's lack of a National Development Plan, which likely contributed to the choice to provide a comprehensive document.)

Some UNCT members described the UNSF as an "umbrella document", yet some still found it "difficult to completely align" country programme documents and interventions with it. The few Libyan counterparts who know / heard of UNSF also describe the document as "huge and broadly flexible". This perception may have contributed to mismatched expectations about the UN's role (should the UN lead on reconstruction of infrastructure?) and issues like co-financing, or indeed, what the Libyan government should be financing independently, who sets the plans, and alternately who implements and how.

The comprehensiveness and length of the document (over 70 pages of analysis and guidance) also contributed to both repetition and inconsistencies, making it difficult to digest and locate strategic direction.

2.      **The level of ambition set for a two-year strategy**.

The UNSF describes several, overarching goals, which vary slightly throughout the framework (see Notes 32, 33, 34, 35 and 37). The UNSF impact, outcomes, and outputs are ambitious—the type of long-term development goals that many UNCTs are pursuing, in diverse contexts, worldwide. The UNCT's "developmental approach" is clear in the UNSF, but the relevance of the overall design to Libya's specific, recent context, could have been improved. (The next few sub-findings explain some options for how.)

T**he Libyan context** (lack of consensus, within the Libyan government, on development goals and priorities, as described in Finding 1) **demands well-targeted effort and agile planning and operational systems that can deliver confidence-building results in the near-term**. Broader evidence and experience also suggest that "long-term development should not be ignored" in

---

[27] "Below follow identified specific key areas of programming that are in many cases already reflected in agency CPDs. CPD development followed the SF outcome design and are thus aligned with the SF. Some additional programming content that is not covered through the sum of CPDs will be addressed through joint initiatives including JPs. The development of the Joint Work Plan at RG level will address detailed arrangements including complementarities between agency activities, determining the division of labour in space, time-wise sequencing, scope and scale, interlocutors/IPs and beneficiary targeting, among and between agencies, funds and programmes. This will include a number of multi-agency Joint Programmes." UNSF, p. 25.

stabilization contexts, but without key foundations for stability in place, it is not always clear "developmental" approaches are useful.[28] A more relevant strategic framework in the Libyan context would more clearly lay out specific stabilization objectives, as well as HDP objectives which the UNCT could influence, along with the establishment of an evidence-based and conflict sensitive affirmative action/ positive discrimination agenda that sets the ground for HDP nexus. In the current UNSF, such objectives are not well articulated or easy to find.[29] One exception is the Basic Services pillar, where several key performance indicators did suggest targeted effort and implied a slightly more realistic aim: ensuring some critical services were delivered and/or restored through UNCT programmes, particularly for vulnerable populations, to prevent the emergence of a further destabilising, major, humanitarian crisis. However, the Basic Services pillar Outcome statement laid out higher ambition: i.e. the *Libyan government* would demonstrate capacity to deliver quality services, notably tailored to the needs of populations (girls, women, migrants and refugees) for whom there is not broad consensus, across Libyan society, on need.[30]

3. **The lack of specificity in the overall UNSF theory of change.**

The UNSF overall theory of change (TOC), and theories of change for the three pillars, do not have clearly articulated causal pathways. UNCT response to "urgent and emerging" needs—i.e. the "stabilisation" aspect of the UNCT's approach—is also missing. (What were near-term stabilisation goals? What hypotheses link these goals to the deeper, structural issues described in the TOCs?). A few key assumptions, notably the Libyan government's capacity to engage with the UNCT (see Finding 6), were not explicitly acknowledged.

The TOCs would be improved by laying out, more clearly: whose behaviour is supposed to change (actors), how and why, and what the assumptions are at each level of logic / connections in causal pathways. Part of the "how and why" also relates—as mentioned above—to a clear understanding of the UNCT's capacities and comparative advantages. Developing clear TOCs in a complex and uncertain environment is not an easy task, but it is worth the investment of time and effort.

---

[28] A. Rathmell, "Measuring Stabilisation: Some observations from international experience", Wilton Park Conference paper, June 2019. p. 2.

[29] Some examples of narrower stabilization objectives could include: a "measurable impact on short-term conflicts", "increasing legitimacy of the […] government" or achieving a "balance of power between competing […] factions" (Ibid.), or "90 per cent of people in need have access to functioning basic social services including water, sanitation and education by 2019" (OCHA, April 2018). These may not be the most appropriate examples for how the UNCT (and/or UNSMIL) could orient effort in Libya, but they are implied in some indicators within the results framework, and very close to the description of the Basic Services objective described informally by members of the UNCT. Hence, it would have been helpful to lift up a more focused, overall strategy, that orients agencies, funds and programmes' (AFPs) comparative advantages around a realistic level of ambition.

[30] "By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on quality social-service delivery for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards enhancing human security and reducing inequalities."

Simpler and more precise is better: the aim should be to provide a basis for the UNCT and AFPs to test and refine specific hypotheses, working down to more granular levels, in their country programme documents and individual interventions. See recommendations section for further information.

4.      **Indicators that were difficult to measure and may have needed revision.**

This sub-finding is addressed more thoroughly under the "effectiveness" section of the evaluation report, below.

5.      **The use of shorthand in areas where further explanation was merited (e.g. HDP nexus).**

The UNSF references approaches that may be useful in a context that needs stabilization, like the "HDP nexus". This is a good starting point—but the UNSF did not provide much guidance on what this looks like, in the Libyan context. A very strong development in 2021 was the UNCT's development of a "Nexus approach for Libya", as articulated in the Sabha Nexus Strategy, and its determination that the approach can only feasibly be *operationalized* at area-level.[31] See also Finding 8 for more information on the application of the HDP nexus approach in the 2019-2021 period.

6.      **The lack of an operational plan.**

The UNSF did not have an operational plan at the outset; the foreseen Joint Work Plan is now being developed. The evaluation found that many UNCT activities remained relevant to pressing and emerging needs over 2019-2021 (see Finding 7). Nevertheless, the lack of a UNSF operational plan presents a few challenges.

First, the existence of an operational plan (or plans, by pillar) at the start **may have helped to better align expectations, with the Libyan government,** about what was inside or outside the UNCT's capacity to do (e.g. large-scale reconstruction, as mentioned above).

Second, the UNCT did not have **a clear starting point for joint planning, before the JTCC went into hibernation** for much of 2019 and 2020. **An operational plan – which could form the basis**

---

[31] "The context of a fragmented and politically divided Libya as well as the other factors outlined herein have made the process of defining strategic priorities a challenge for the PMT. Joint analysis indicated that a nexus approach to Libya requires a tailored approach depending on the area of the country targeted. Areas where considerable fragility was noted included Tripoli, Sirte, Sabha and Derna; all areas with wide variances in the tribal, socio-political and security environments. It was noted that resources for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities are limited and that prioritisation would be necessary." Humanitarian, Development & Peace Nexus: The New Way of Working, Libya: Sabha Nexus Strategy, May 2021, p. 4.

**for implementation of UNSF across UNCT and with the Libyans. – can support contingency planning when risks materialise and assumptions fail.**

Some working groups (WG), or sub-working groups (SWG), under the original, envisioned structure (Figure 1 below), appear to have met. However, it was not always clear which ones these were.[32] During consultations, many respondents referred to the humanitarian working groups under OCHA, or WGs set up under the four tracks[33] of the Berlin process.

One donor consulted highlighted why lack of joint planning activity and documents, inhibit efficiencies and results (emphasis added):

It feels to me, having participated in two different [Berlin Process WGs], there should be more synergy, collaboration, and coordination between them. Lots of issues overlap and are related. [WGs are set up to have] political, security and human rights focus [...] 70% of issues are going to overlap, if not more. But because there's **no process set in place for different working groups to collaborate on outcomes that result from the various means they hold independently**, this leads to duplication [and] confusion on the part of Libyans, when different representatives of the international community are coming at them on same issue, but with slightly different perspectives, asks, and recommendations. The economic working group deals with a lot of political issues, as well, I can imagine, but maybe those issues more specialised. But for political, security and human rights, there is a lot of overlap. We have **yet to see a proposal [for genuinely pooling effort,** even though] a lot of people who sit on these committees are on multiple WGs [such as some multilateral institutions' ambassadors and people from the smaller international missions]. We could have periodically a larger meeting, to ensure we're coordinating and on same page with key, cross-cutting issues. **[It's about] finding a way – it doesn't need to be a meeting**. Maybe UNSMIL itself can play the coordinator role between [the Berlin Process] working groups, **so each is aware of what other is doing, sending around documents we all have access to**. That would be one recommendation.

Provided there is agreement that they add value, operational plans can be a useful aid to the coordination of relevant responses, in a dynamic context, without increasing the burden of meetings. As explained further in the Recommendations section of this report, the evaluation team is not suggesting that a single, definitive plan is feasible. If operational plans are lean, regularly updated, and widely distributed, planning documents can help ensure joint planning

---

[32] The exception was the Local Governance SWG, co-chaired by the Ministry of Local Governance and Germany, revitalised in mid-2020.
[33] Military, political, economic and international humanitarian law/human rights.

conversations not only happen at higher levels of the UNCT and the Libyan government, but also cascade down through AFPs, and across thematic groups, in the most efficient way possible.

Finally, without a UNSF operational plan to review, the evaluation team has been unable to assess some aspects of UNSF relevance. First, the team was unable to assess the relevance of the UNCT's planned implementation approach to Libya's mid- to long-term development challenges.[34] The UNSF provides guiding direction only at a high level, and in such broad terms, that almost any activity an AFP might propose could be considered "in alignment" (though as above, some AFPs clearly indicated that they found it difficult to work with). It is hard to judge whether broad alignment with the UNSF would be the same as "doing the right thing, at the right time, in the right place, with the right people". Second, the evaluation team cannot assess the true extent to which the UNCT adapted to remain relevant[35]. The evaluation scope did not allow for an examination of individual AFPs' CPDs, to examine plans at that level pre- and post- conflict/COVID disruption. Evaluation of the future CF would be aided, if any operational plans were available -- which can be Joint Work Plans at Result Group or area-based WG level -- and if there were more systematic capturing, and reporting, of lessons learned and evidence on how the UNCT is adapting.

**Finding 3: The complex interdependencies among dimensions of Libya's crisis create "wicked problems", which the broader evidence base suggests cannot be tackled effectively by taking "institutional reform" as the starting point.**[36]

The intersecting dimensions of Libya's crisis create "wicked problems"—which are difficult to address through the lens of "institutional reform".[37] (The main hypothesis underpinning the UNSF is that: Libya can be stabilised;[38] sustainable peace built;[39] and equitable, accountable, and

---

[34] How exactly was the UNCT aiming to contribute to outcome-level achievement? Is there strong evidence to support the relevance and effectiveness of the approaches selected?

[35] The evaluation scope did not include individual CPDs, the team could not look at plans at that level pre- and post- conflict/COVID disruption. Neither was the evaluation able to comb through minutes of meetings to address and assess the systematic capturing of lessons learned / evidence of how the UNCT is adapting. See our recommendations for ideas on how to enhance the capturing of lessons learned / adaptation in reporting

[36] K. Menkhaus, "State Fragility as a Wicked Problem", Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University, PRISM, Vol. 1, No. 2 (03/2010), pp. 85-100. Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice, Report 42 – March 2015, p. 10.

[37] At all levels, UNSF objectives centre around institutional reform processes.

[38] "The common overarching goal is to prevent, mitigate and reverse any (potential) negative effect or impact of the current conflict on the social and economic conditions in Libya, and on the capacity of state institutions while contributing to ongoing peacebuilding efforts." UNSF, p. iii.

[39] "UNSF outcomes and related activities will be designed to contribute to the overarching goal of building sustainable peace in Libya." UNSF, p.ii.

transparent institutions "restored"[40] (*or developed*); **by strengthening** "Libyan **institutions'**[41] **capacities** at all levels".[42])

Rather, "wicked problems" need to be unpacked into more granular and specific problems that an intervention strategy will target and solve, and ambition needs to be scaled down to a realistic level—with incremental, precise, and achievable goals. This is especially important in the context of a two-year strategy. The other advantage of taking a more focused, problem-solving approach—with more realistic ambitions that can be achieved and evidenced in the nearer-term[43]—is that this is often critical to building stakeholders' confidence and motivation to stick with difficult changes in their own behaviour.

The HDP nexus approach logic, and broader body of stabilization literature, also support the idea that incremental, achievable goals have the potential to catalyse meaningful change, both in the short- and longer-term. However, it is often very difficult to predict exactly how, when, and why; broader experience suggests that having the right relationships, at the right time, to put the right evidence in the right people's hands, when opportunities for change unexpectedly emerge, is key. This may be a less ambitious starting point than "institutional reform", but it more accurately reflects how major shifts in policy or behaviour tend to happen, and what "actor-centred" change looks like in practice. Additionally, there are some preconditions that need to be created in the short-term, before any assumptions can be made about contributions to longer-term, transformative, and sustainable change.

**Finding 4: <u>The UNSF should have been seen as fundamentally a process tool</u> and been designed expressly to promote a feasible and proportionate level of (meaningful) coordination and joint programming.**

---

[40] "As intimated, the UNSF sets out to achieve the general goal of restoring peace and restoring equitable institutional functions." UNSF, p.iii.

[41] The institutions of focus in the UNSF are: i) those that enable non-violent conflict resolution (e.g. peace and mediation processes between conflict actors), and ii) those that are operated by government (GNA) actors, in the public sector, to meet the population's needs (i.e. governance and economic institutions, social services). "Initiatives designed for purposes of supporting the above Outcomes will systematically address the overarching goal of contributing to the strengthening of UN-led efforts to achieve political progress in view of creating a national consensus on the formation of a government that is capable of unifying national institutions, taking the necessary measures to correct the economy and restore security." UNSF, p. 24.

[42] "Overarching Objective: By late 2020, Libyan institutions' capacities at all levels are strengthened thus ensuring accountability, transparency and provision of equitable and quality social services addressing vulnerability and participation gaps and encouraging economic recovery towards a diversified and inclusive model." UNSF, p. 24.

[43] While it is important to monitor large-scale, longer-term impacts to which the intervention strategy is contributing, to achieve this goal, results frameworks also need to be sensitive to relevant, incremental milestones. Even these incremental milestones can be "hard won" and take time; hence a good practice to support outcome-level monitoring is the Outcome Monitoring, or Outcome Harvesting, approach, which focuses on actor-centred change. This is discussed in more detail in the recommendations.

The UNSF would have been strengthened by focusing on its core purpose—which was partly about setting unified direction, but more fundamentally about "strengthen[ing] the UN's ability to [...pursue] a set of priorities" by enabling the UNCT to "coordinate, communicate and collaborate more effectively and efficiently", over time. It is indeed clear from the UNCT's December 2020 Strategic Planning Retreat that this ambition is still a priority, but currently seen as a weakness. The evaluation found that this is due partly to the absence of an operational body/personnel in charge of coordination, communication, and joint planning functions. While the RCO is the UNSF "keeper", operationalization of coordination and programming needs dedicated resources: personnel, time, and budget. Moreover, the multiple layers of coordination, planning and reporting within the UN system in Libya (UNSF, UNSEF, humanitarian action, etc) have created confusion and impacted prioritization rendering coordination fragmented.

In some cases, without the JTCC structure (Figure 1) fully operational, AFPs—and indeed, individual project and programme managers—were obliged to individually pursue coordination when there were clear incentives to do so (i.e. agency-level demand). When coordination is thus "decentralised", inevitably, multiple understandings of what coordination means emerge. (AFPs often centre their understanding of "coordination" around their own mandates and areas of expertise and interest- despite some competition amongst some agencies whose mandates intersect). Though the evaluation did not find a common understanding of what coordination is, or should achieve, the most common mechanism in use is meetings for sharing information—albeit not comprehensive—and limited attempts to joint planning.

**International Technical Cooperation with the Libyan Government of National Accord Coordination Framework***

*Proposed by the United Nations and validated of the Libyan PMO Office – 18 July 2017

**Finding 5: The multi-dimensional crisis has affected governmental actors' motivation, opportunity, and capability to carry out basic functions. As a result, it has been difficult for UNCT to support the government to <u>target action where needs are greatest.</u>**

**Since 2011, governing capacities in Libya have declined precipitously.** The multi-dimensional crisis has affected governmental actors' motivation, opportunity, and capability to carry out basic functions. These functions include the ability to identify and agree on pressing needs, prioritise attention, and ultimately direct time and resources to many competing priorities.

Libya's government was divided until March 2021; society remains deeply fragmented; and there is a lack of data to inform decisions. The conflict escalation in 2019 and the ongoing pandemic further complicated the situation. As a result, it has been difficult for UNCT to support the government to target action where needs are greatest. Security, logistical challenges, and in some

*Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1 JTCC proposed organizational structure*

cases political sensitivities also make it **difficult for the UNCT to reach populations with some of the greatest needs—and better understand what those needs are.** (See further discussion under "Effectiveness", below.) The UN's access inside Libya is uneven: the number of local staff recruits across the country is very limited, and international staff members' movements outside UN bases (e.g. in Tripoli) are highly restricted. The UN has little footprint in the East and South, which relates to the restricted list of actors with whom the UN could engage, before government unification in spring 2021. Most UNCT members work largely from Tunis, while some (particularly those serving non-resident agencies) operate from Egypt, Rome, Geneva and elsewhere. Despite that, some UNCT presence remains essential and active, some UNAFPs who have a footprint in Libya showed acceptable levels of agility to respond to the quick changes and emerging needs resulting from the conflict, and COVID-19.

Given basic governing functions are so weak, the UNCT (through the UNSF process, JCA and other activities) and many local and international partners have tried to provide basic insights, which might aid prioritisation and targeting. The UNSF itself evidenced and highlighted pressing needs, related to the public's access to and quality of basic services, protection, rights, and opportunity. It also acknowledged exacerbating sources of fragility and development issues (e.g. corruption, absence of legitimacy among Libyan institutions, poor Public Financial Management).

Overall, sources consulted during the evaluation felt managed expectations were needed—and that improving basic governing functions is a longer-term, ("generational") change. This links to Finding 6, next.

### Finding 6: The UNSF appears to have <u>assumed a level of government capacity</u> that does not match the reality of where Libya was in 2017/2018, or indeed is today.

Libya has been an unstable context since 2011, partly because of government dysfunction. As a result, many Libyans are still not convinced that the governing elites serve the people's best interest. The UNSF recognized these sources of fragility and very relevantly aimed to help government become "better able to respond to the needs of the people" and demonstrate greater "transparency, accountability and inclusivity".[44]

However, the UNSF **does not explain how the UNCT could grapple with, or "programme for", known barriers to government taking on greater responsibility for systemic change**. For

---

[44] UNSF, p. 62.

example, the UNSF hints at challenges with Libyan government engagement in its design.[45] The current UNSF also acknowledges that its predecessor – the 2013-2014 UNSF – was no longer used to guide programming by 2014, when a major escalation in the conflict forced much of the UNCT to evacuate to Tunisia. Each of these examples underscore that government capacity, including capacity to engage with the UNCT, is a complex issue. (So, too, is the UNCT's capacity to engage with the Libyan government). Importantly, capacity interacts with other considerations, like motivation and opportunity, as discussed in the previous finding.[46]

The UNCT has extensive (and recent) previous experience with very similar conditions to those that made it difficult to deliver the 2019—2021 UNSF.[47] (The exception is the unforeseen, global COVID-19 pandemic—which caused major disruption that could not have been mitigated.) The UNSF's assumptions were that such risks[48] and conditions would not re-emerge, and the security situation would remain stable enough to permit "smooth roll-out of UN operations". The UNSF also lacks a contingency plan, a risk analysis, and scenario definition.

In short, more focus on lessons learned could have been beneficial. Lessons learned and how they shaped the 2019-2022 UNSF are not explained—and it is difficult to understand the extent to which these lessons are shared across UNCT (institutional memory). The evaluation could not find evidence of lessons learned from 2014 UNSF.

**Finding 7: From April 2019 to January 2021, the UNCT mostly focused on <u>responding to humanitarian needs and delivering basic services to the most vulnerable</u>, under the Basic Services pillar of the UNSF. These needs were indeed the most pressing during a period of major armed conflict and a pandemic-related public health emergency.**

By 2020, the UNCT reports effort shifted to focus "on stabilization efforts and early recovery".[49] Such adaptation is commendable and in line with best practice, but the evaluators were unable to

---

[45] GNA officials' capacity and willingness to work with the UNCT on UNSF delivery was not included among key assumptions. It is understandable that some challenges (incentives, interests) were not explicitly stated in the UNSF, considering UNCT access is consent-based, and the UNSF co-signed by the GoL-via Ministry of Planning.

[46] See the COM-B model for behaviour change.

[47] The UN system has faced severe access problems since 2014. Periods of conflict escalation and changes in conflict dynamics (e.g. 2011-14, 2014-18, 2018-19, 2019, 2020) have repeatedly shifted priorities and balances of power. See discussions in: F. Wehrey, *"This War is Out of Our*
*Hands": The Internationalization of Libya's Post-2011, Conflicts From Proxies to Boots on the Ground*, New America, September 2020. W Lacher, 2018.

[48] E.g. "UNSF's developmental logic might be undermined by political/security-related context", and "Political developments might result in (a) a change of key interlocutors and, potentially, a different set of expectations and demands from the GoL side that the UN would need to quickly react to; (b) political fragmentation undermining UN efforts to support Libyan institutions ".UNSF, p. 46.

[49] UNSF 2020 Results Report, p. 19.

assess how the UNSF Results Framework or underlying theories of change were adjusted. (Revision of the former is currently underway.)

## Finding 8: All interlocutors confirmed the need for Humanitarian - Development – Peacebuilding, however few could clearly respond on how to coordinate activities along the three Nexus Pillars.

The evaluation could not find evidence of "nexus" or general joint planning, or the development of a comprehensive intervention.[50] Because HDP nexus programming has not been launched in Libya previously, it has taken some time to lay foundations for its piloting. Sabha was selected as the pilot location, for nexus-type working, under the guidance of the PMT.

The UNSF assumed HDP nexus approaches were evident in the Libyan context and did not provide more explicit guidance on what the approach looks like, in practice. This is somewhat surprising: while "HDP nexus" is relatively new terminology (gaining traction from 2016),[51] effort to create more integration, "coherence", complementarity, efficiency, and effectiveness in UN partnerships and delivery is not new.[52]

The NWG experience has provided useful lessons learned. First, applying nexus approaches in *specific geographical areas* (e.g. Sabha) is a strong approach. At this granular level, it is often easier to identify the key actors with comparative advantages to solve problems, in concrete and targeted ways.[53] The area-based working group had an advance position to contribute to a common evidence base, improve conflict sensitivity and better target action and stakeholder engagement

---

[50] NB, the evaluators recognise that joint programming is not the same thing as "joint programmes". Joint programming (or the "New Way of Working") is an **ongoing process** of working out, using evidence: how, when, where, and in what ways UN (and other partners') capabilities and comparative advantages can be leveraged, to solve specific problems, along change pathways in the theory of change (TOC). Joint programmes are one tool for constructing joint programming approaches, but there are others.

[51] For a discussion of what the HDP Nexus is, and is not, see: Inter-Agency Standing Committee and UN Working Group on Transitions, Background paper on Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, Inter-Agency Standing Committee and UN Working Group on Transitions
Workshop, 20-21 October 2016. Available at: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/peace-hum-dev_nexus_150927_ver2.docx.

[52] The UN system has undergone a series of similar reforms since 1975. Humanitarian coordination has been high on the UN agenda since creation of the IASC in 1991, and from 1992 onward, there have been numerous recommendations, resolutions and UN reform agendas adopted that seek to enhance integration and coherence among humanitarian, development and political / peace and security efforts—with some controversy. See, e.g.: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992) An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York; see also, Donini A, (1998) The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda. Occasional paper #22, Thomas J Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, both cited in Stockton 2003. See also "Delivering as One" approach adopted between 2001 and 2007, with pilots launched in eight countries that year.

[53] For example: how many staff are present in this health centre, and what do they need to maintain a basic level of service? Which roads need lighting to increase public safety and use of services after dark? Do militia affect how laws are enforced (e.g. which businesses are regulated), and what does that mean for people who want to disengage? Who has the relationships, access and proven competency to solve the problem?

to seize opportunities for positive shifts in policy or behaviour. Hence the next UN CF for Libya would be greatly strengthened by including lessons learned on how broad, guiding principles were applied in the Libyan context.

Members of the NWG also recommended strong and consistent PMT engagement, to avoid inefficiencies and build confidence in collaborative working practices, by ensuring participants feel processes are transparent and all UN AFPs committed.[54] This recommendation also aligns with broader "One UN" experience.[55]

## 3.2. Effectiveness

Findings in this section of the evaluation falls into two main categories: (**A**) Effectiveness in results delivered on the ground, including conformity with cross-cutting issues. (**B**) Effectiveness in coordination and partnerships.

## A- Effectiveness in results delivered on the ground, including conformity with cross-cutting issues

**Finding 9: The UNCT has delivered indispensable support under the basic services pillar, though outcome-level monitoring has been hampered by the lack of evidence and limited data available from the national statistic system[56]. With little data available and given access issues that contributed to limitations in identifying and reaching key populations, it is difficult to independently assess whether, and to what extent, UNCT has delivered assistance to the most vulnerable people as a priority.**

The 2019—2020 conflict negatively affected public service capacities and quality. The UNCT was widely seen as indispensable in providing key basic services support, especially in humanitarian and emergency response, health response for COVID-19, education, food assistance, and WASH

---

[54] One respondent felt the larger HDP NWG did not fully understand the PMT's thinking from the outset, which created inefficiencies. They attributed this partly to the COVID-related suspension of the WG, but also partly to: 1) inconsistent attendance by some PMT members; 2) the use of a consultant in the coordinator role (though the consultants were viewed to be very capable). Because consultants are supportive resources, the respondent felt NWG members did not perceive the consultants as having the mandate to speak on behalf of the UN position. A Resident Coordinator in a different context also observed that when it comes to writing UNDAFs or designing strategic direction more generally, "Consultants kill ownership" within the UNCT itself. He also recommended incentivising UNCT leadership and ownership of joint working practices: "UN staff's participation in joint UN work must be reflected in their performance plan, and actual contributions highlighted in their performance appraisal. UN co-chairs can be asked to provide inputs." B. Pouezat (2015).

[55] As a Resident Coordinator in a different context explained: "People will come to meetings only if they gain something – information, understanding. Keep the meetings and the minutes short, the chairmanship lively and participative, and hold UN co-chairs up to their responsibility of representing the whole UN family, not their agency interests." B. Pouezat (2015).

[56] The national statistic system is comprised of BSC in addition to other ministries such as MoH, MoSA, MoE, CBL, MoF, MoA)

services. All respondents confirmed it would be extremely difficult for Libyans to cope with the protracted conflict and diminishing basic services, had it not been for the UNCT.

This evaluation was conducted remotely, and complete up-to-date information on the full range of UNCT activities and results was not readily available to the evaluators, to independently assess some statements in the UNSF 2020 annual report. However, the report does present evidence that UNCT assistance has reached many Libyans, migrants and refugees, during a challenging period for operations. [57]

While the UNCT was able to collect data against the *Pillar 3: Basic Services* output most relevant to the support above ("Output 3.2 – Social service delivery system enhanced and supported across relevant sectors to deliver high-quality inclusive and gender-sensitive services and social safety nets that are effective, efficient, accurately targeted and sustainable", 9/10, or 90% of indicators), outcome-level monitoring was not possible. Fully half of the Outcome 3 indicators had no data available against which to assess progress toward 2020 targets.

Despite difficulties gathering data against indicators,[58] by the end of 2020, the UNCT assessed progress towards outcome-level achievement to be relatively high under *Pillar/Results Group (RG) 3: Basic Services*[59] in comparison to *RG1: Governance*[60] and *RG2: Economic Recovery*[61]. The UNSF 2020

---

[57] The UNDP-led Stabilization Facility for Libya supported "rehabilitation to schools, rehabilitation of healthcare units, equipping WASH systems, and putting in place street solar systems", which may benefit up to 4.5 million Libyans (approximately two thirds of the population), via improved access to basic services. 1,169,041 persons, over half of them children, received UNICEF's support to health and nutrition, education, WASH and child protection services. 19,570 school children accessed WFP's support to school feeding, in the context of COVID-19. 25,000 migrants (8% of the estimated population in need) and 45,000 internally displaced persons (11% of the estimated IDP population by August 2020) received relief items from IOM. OCHA's 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated 304,000 migrants and 44,000 refugees were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2020. It also estimated 392,000 people remained internally displaced by August 2020, a slight reduction from July, but 30% higher than the number a year earlier. UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Libya, December 2020.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_2021-final.pdf.
[58] At the end of 2020, due to lack of data, the UNCT could not assess half (4/8) of the relevant RG3 outcome-level indicators, and one (1/15) output-level indicator. RG1 was missing data against one-fifth (2/10, 20%) of outcome-level indicators and roughly the same proportion of output-level indicators (6/27, 22%). RG2 was missing data against one-third (4/12, 33%) of outcome-level indicators and a quarter (4/16, 25%) of output-level indicators.
[59] The UNCT reported that 61% of the total indicators (14/23) were "above 60%" on their way toward 2020 targets, including 38% (3/8) outcome-level indicators. Considering *only* the indicators that had enough data to assess (18), **3/4 (75%)** of the outcome indicators and 11/14 (78%) of output indicators were reported to be performing well (i.e. "High" / above 60% performance). This RG is mainly assessed at output level (57% of indicators).
[60] The UNCT reported that 41% of the total indicators (15/37) were "above 60%" on their way toward 2020 targets, including 30% (3/10) outcome-level indicators. Considering *only* the indicators that had enough data to assess (29), **3/8 (38%)** of the outcome indicators and 12/21 (57%) of output indicators were reported to be performing well (i.e. "High" / above 60% performance). This RG is mainly assessed at output level (73% of indicators).
[61] The UNCT reported that 29% of the total indicators (8/28) were "above 60%" on their way toward 2020 targets, including 17% (2/12) outcome-level indicators. Considering *only* the indicators that had enough data to assess (20), **2/8 (25%)** of the outcome indicators and 6/12 (50%) of output indicators were reported to be performing well (i.e. "High" / above 60% performance). This RG has a greater proportion of outcome-level indicators—many of which are macro-economic indicators that take time to show results, which helps to explain overall performance 2019-2020.

Results Report explains that effort under the latter two RGs was mainly reoriented around the peace process,[62] and signalled a few, specific achievements. These achievements were often incremental/enabling steps that could be useful for testing hypotheses in the theory of change, over time.

Hence the report and results summary tables triangulate with findings from broader evaluation consultations, which suggest the UNSF's broader ambitions (particularly related to economic recovery and governance) could not be achieved, [63] given nearly all key assumptions [64] underpinning the strategy were invalidated by the armed conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Additionally, the UNSF 2020 Results Report does not clarify how reported achievements relate to the UNSF's indicators of strengthened, more responsive institutions (RG1), economic recovery (RG2), and the Libyan government's capacity to design and deliver quality social services (RG3). Instead of reporting directly on progress against each indicator, the report groups indicators into performance categories: a. no data; b. low achievement / below 30%; c. partial achievement / 30-60%; d. high achievement / 60% percent. It was difficult for the evaluators to interpret what this means, considering:

- **Indicator targets are set in different formats**: **qualitative description** (e.g. "mechanism established and submits policy recommendations"); **numbers** (e.g. 33,300 youth disaggregated by gender, age, location, responsible agency; three shares of renewable energy); **proportions** (e.g. 70% of adults), **percent change** (30% reduction). It is indeed possible to apply a coding system, which converts data from different formats (qualitative and quantitative) into something that can be compared and aggregated (e.g. "Level of progress against 2020 targets"). But it is not clear how this was done; meaning / ability to learn and adapt across the UNCT is lost, without more transparent explanation of performance (not only what was achieved, but also how and why the UNCT contributed). The performance groupings used also lack some transparency about

---

[62] "The UNCT played a central role in facilitating peacebuilding and reconciliation processes, supporting the engagement of women and youth in the political dialogue, building institutional capacity on justice for children and fostering active youth involvement in civil society organizations and public/political life." "On the economic recovery front, the nature of the Libyan crisis required the UNCT to focus more on humanitarian interventions and less on support to real economic recovery, at the nexus between humanitarian response - development work." UNSF 2020 Results Report, p. 8.

[63] See also description of planned, available, and spent resources, Results Report, p. 23. RG1 had more available budget in 2020 than was planned for, but only 47% of the available budget was spent (equal to 71% of planning assumptions). RG2 had less available budget than planned for, and 73% was spent (48% of planning assumptions). RG3 also had more budget available than planned for and spent 62% of available funds (77% of what had been planned for). In all three RGs, the difficult operational context impeded utilisation.

[64] 1. Security conditions in Libya do not degenerate and allow for smooth roll-out of UN operations. 2. By 2019, the presence of the UN on the ground in Libya increases. 3. International and regional forces do not hinder the peaceful transition of Libya. 4. Donors' interest to fund development interventions in Libya is stable or increased. 5. No major shocks are observed in the international market for hydrocarbons. 6. Basic commodities (including food) are available in the Libyan market. The Annual Report cites, e.g., "security challenges and COVID-19 preventive measures that hampered the respective UN agencies' ability to deliver", p. 23.

*backslides.* Low (<30%) achievement is not the same thing as explaining negative trends (i.e. where there has been a reduction from baseline, or a change that increases stability risk).

- **There is no differentiation between milestones, due for measurement at the end of 2019, and targets, due for measurement at the end of 2020**. (For example, how does 30-60% achievement relate to the unique milestone and target thresholds set for each indicator?) It is also unclear how disaggregation is accounted for in the UNCT's assessment of progress against the results framework. (For example, are children, youth, women and men in different locations benefitting, or are benefits accruing to some groups inequitably?) It would have been beneficial if the UNCT reported achievement using existing (or adjusted) milestones and targets (e.g. 50% of milestones achieved, 30% of targets met), with an explanation of what was no longer realistic.

- **The report explains** types of direct beneficiaries to whom the UNCT provided support, stated as **a mix of activities and outputs**: technical assistance (assessments, feasibility studies, manuals, SOPs/protocols, strategies, support to elections, etc.), training, capacity building, outreach, grants, sensitization, networking, etc. However, the reporting does not consistently signal a) what Libyan authorities are doing differently, as a result, or b) what changed in the daily lives of Libyans, migrants, and refugees, because of this support. Under RG1, reporting and consultations raised some examples related to the former, and specifically the Berlin Conference, LPDF, and 5+5 Joint Military Commission. Under RG3, the latter was somewhat clearer, though still, in some cases, population size *estimates* are used (assumed beneficiaries), rather than more robust evidence.[65] While the evaluators were able to find some external examples of valuable M&E techniques, like "outcome mapping"[66], it would be beneficial if this practice were integrated and documented within UNCT learning processes.

In general, AFPs tend to measure outputs, but very rarely reported on intermediate outcomes from programming—particularly capacity development programming—though intermediate effects should be measurable, even without a more functional national statistic system[67] . Examples might include:

- How have training participants applied new skills in their daily work? What specific problems have they been able to solve?

---

[65] E.g. Given some health and education impacts can take longer to measure, the UNCT could consider strengthening the use of perception surveys and other tools (e.g. smaller/case studies) to understand access to, use and quality of services delivered, as an alternative to providing estimated numbers of beneficiaries        , based on the size of populations in a particular area.

[66] A technique that documents "change stories", or case studies, which help explain, for example, what conditions created space for the intra-Libyan dialogue and how UNSMIL and the UNCT contributed.

[67] See note 55

- How were vulnerabilities reduced among key populations of concern? What behaviours have they or others adopted, or what are service providers doing differently, to reduce their exposure to harm, abuse, neglect, and exploitation?

Capacity building results appear to be an area for improved monitoring and evaluation. Some respondents explained that they have difficulty measuring capacity building results, for several reasons: fragmented government, low levels of transparency and accountability, conflicting and rapidly changing government policies, lack of funding, segmented and compartmentalized administration, strictly hierarchical top-down management, and the absence of a performance-oriented culture. All these issues point to the need for more realistic and incremental goals, and monitoring systems that capture and explain not only what has improved, but also how and why. The evaluation found that AFPs tend to measure outputs (number of trainees, number of households that received social grants), but very rarely reported on intermediate outcomes (which should be in AFPs' capacity to measure, even in the absence of a functional national statistic system[68]).

**Finding 10: The UNSF clearly articulates what cross-cutting principles and issues are, and the joint programming delivered by several agencies suggests that there is an attempt to mainstream these approaches.**

The Libyan context is particularly challenging, as it relates to gender equality issues, human rights, and protection of migrants and refugees. Nevertheless, UNCT programming often addresses these issues and includes measures to promote women participation and access, respect of diversity and human rights, and inclusion of migrants and refugees. Examples include: support to ensuring greater gender diversity and inclusion of youth in the LPDF; work with municipal councillors to enhance women's leadership and attention to children's rights; support to improve government understanding and tracking of migration patterns; support to enhance understanding of anti-corruption and promote the protection of human rights in law enforcement; work to promote accountability and justice for human rights violations; work to enhance women's role in violence prevention, including violent extremism; work to include vulnerable populations in the labour market and enhance livelihood sustainability; support to expand access to healthcare and protections tailored to marginalised and vulnerable populations' needs (e.g. in detention).

---

[68] See note 55

UNCT has engaged in several capacity building programmes directed at national stakeholders to ensure proper understanding of human rights issues. The evaluation could not validate the results of the capacity building programs on the practices of national stakeholders.

**Finding 11. Libya lacks a sufficient evidence base, on which programmes and interventions can be built and adapted, based on learning. The <u>need for an evidence-base </u>was consistently mentioned by stakeholders as an urgent priority. Many stakeholders identified this as being key to supporting more targeted and needs-based operations; to coordinating different international and national actors around a common framework of development and peace; and to understanding effectiveness.**

Access to reliable data upon which to base decisions is a persistent challenge, one which is not just technical, but also a deeply political, in the Libyan context. Libya has never had national information management systems that track essential indicators. Several, national government partners highlighted the politics surrounding this issue: "a political mindset of secrecy of data", distrust in the motives of international partners, disagreements over data accuracy, and the historical association of information with security/intelligence services. National stakeholders report that ministries sometimes compete over or withhold information from each other.

Donors and other partners also highlighted the political sensitivities of information that could "expose" governance problems, mismanagement, corruption, etc. The political nature of data is also evident in the gap between Libyan government and UNCT perceptions about, and trust in, each other's capacities and motives. Governmental stakeholders voiced frustrations over the accuracy of data the UNCT produces, while several UNCT respondents spoke of inaccurate/incomplete government data. Evidence related to sensitive issues—notably what must be done to meet the needs of refugees, migrants, women and girls, other marginalised social groups—is particularly subject to debate and negotiation.

**An evidence base is seen as critical for strengthening the credibility of the UNCT effort**, in terms of ensuring that it is grounded in realities as much as possible. The UNCT engages in multiple manner in identifying needs, whether through assessments they lead alone, through inter agency efforts, or through cooperation with other actors. These actors include governmental entities, INGOs, and CSOs.[69] Common assessments include the Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) delivered by REACH; IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM); the UN -Habitat City

---

[69] The at times tense relationship between government and civil society actors was evident in responses from some national stakeholders.

Profiles of Ubari, Kufra, Benghazi, Janzour, Sebha, Sirte and the UN JCA. These joint efforts were seen as valuable.

Yet, the overall picture is one of fragmented effort. Several interlocutors spoke of contradictory, redundant and insufficient data. Others spoke of weak data sharing practices. Many stakeholders (national government, UN, INGOs, municipalities and local actors) are engaged in data collection and analysis, without clear coordination, validation, control over duplication or even sharing. Thus, the **existing data, which is "available" to an extent, does not establish a comprehensive body of evidence on which planning, and implementation can be based**. The situation is particularly challenging at the local level, considering Libya's myriad "micro"-contexts are so different; national-level data does not reveal enough about these situations; and data related to humanitarian need is more systematically collected and available than data related to other, key matters (e.g. income, unemployment, infrastructure, basic services, stakeholder mapping, etc.).

Part of the problem links to the poor coordination mechanisms between UNCT and the government (Finding 9 above); the absence of clear data gathering frameworks, indicators, and sampling; the fragmentation of governmental agencies; and the inability of ministries in Tripoli to engage and work with the regions (particularly from 2019 until June 2021).

Several members of the UNCT provide some support to the National Bureau of Statistics and Census (BSC) and other line ministries in data collection, management, analysis, and demographic projections in 2019, 2020. **More systematic effort would be beneficial, which aims not only to strengthen these capabilities, but also, importantly, support the challenging cultural shift throughout ministries to ensure that they function.** Moreover, more widespread use of area-based coordination may help to ground available data in a more granular and nuanced understanding of complex, local contexts.

B-    **Effectiveness in coordination and partnerships**

**Finding 12: Coordination and communication can be improved in Libya in general: across the UN system, between the UN and Libyan authorities, and amongst all international and local partners working on the themes addressed in the UNSF. Coordination under the UNSF was also difficult, as it lacks an operational plan; the foreseen Joint Work Plan is only now under development.**

Both the UNCT and government partners report difficulties communicating and coordinating with each other. Reasons included:

a)    paradoxes within Libyan government institutions (e.g. a hierarchical culture, whereby people are reluctant to engage without time-consuming, formal approvals from higher ups, on the one hand; confusion and lack of clarity about who is responsible for what on the other, high turnover and changes in personnel);

b)    confusion among Libyan partners about division of roles within the UN system (e.g. UNSMIL vs. UNCT);

c)    a lack of plans (including a National Development Plan);

d)    lack of regular contact with each other; and

e)    mismatched expectations from some Libyan government entities/officials about UNCT roles and capacities; one example would be reconstruction efforts. (Several UNCT and donor respondents reported that some Libyan government entities expects the UNCT to deliver a large-scale reconstruction effort or fix infrastructure or basic services problems which the Libyan government directs but does not have full financial or operational responsibility for. Donors considered such an expectation from a Middle-Income Country unrealistic, particularly as authorities have not taken steps to recover stolen financial assets overseas.) The mismatched expectations are partly due to the government fragmentation, and governmental entities' inability to fulfill partnership obligations, whether financial, operational or oversight.

Several governmental and donor interlocutors indicated that some UNCT members are working in silos, and sometimes in competition and duplication. Despite the presence of the UNCT meetings, joint planning and fundraising have been limited to some agencies' bilateral cooperation, which is less in development and peace building fields.

*The PMT & Nexus Working Group construct was a good attempt at meaningful, area (location)-based coordination between the UN system and other, external partners.* The group continues to work toward broader buy-in to collective outcomes and a joint strategy—partly due to limited PMT effort on some issues, particularly defining nexus coordination and strategy, and lack of incentives for NWG members to contribute meaningfully and consistently.

Area-based coordination (i.e. at a more local level) may be a way forward, to avoid sensitivities around framing Libya as a country divided among East, West and South—something some government actors view as a risk/problematic mindset to "entrench" during a period of delicate peace negotiations. Area based coordination is also conflict sensitive and potentially more relevant, given the myriad of localized actors and their influence on politics, the economy and security.

**Finding 13: Engagement with Libyan decision-makers also remained weak in UNSF implementation, for several reasons outside the UNCT's control.**

The UNSF demands close cooperation, willingness, and commitment, of both the UNCT and government agencies. Hence the roles and expectations of UN agencies and the government of Libya need to be clearly discussed and agreed. This is true at the strategic level (e.g., UNSF design), as well as the implementation level (e.g., design and delivery of relevant interventions by UN AFPs and others).

Three issues emerged from consultations, which stakeholders mentioned affect the type of partnerships built. First, Libyan stakeholders consulted have many ideas about the UN's role, but do not commonly refer to the UNSF.[70] For example, Libyan partners identified a wide range of roles for the UN agencies: support to policy making and programme formulation, capacity development of national institutions, support to SDGs/development agenda, provision of humanitarian assistance, support to NGOs, facilitation of dialogue and the peace process, the political settlement, reconstruction, advocacy of international standards and values. Yet with the JTCC not meeting regularly--while Libyan authorities were unable to collectively cooperate to make it effective -- the UNSF could not function as a "live" tool that is used consistently to frame partnership conversations or orient mutual expectations.

Second, Libya is a fragmented operating environment, and there is a general atmosphere of mistrust with international actors—further entrenched over the past years of political instability. This context contributes to challenges in ensuring the appropriate Libyan decision-makers are leading implementation.[71] The real extent of Libyan officials' engagement with, influence on, and ownership of UNSF delivery and monitoring was not evident to the evaluators.[72]

Third, interlocutors indicated that general presence in Libya, and access to several regions, has been difficult. Conflicts, (e.g., the Tripoli conflict in 2019-2020; Sabha fighting 2019; Tarhouna in 2021) and COVID-19 pandemic control measures are aggravating factors. The volatile situation has repeatedly pushed UNCT to re-focus its action and funds towards humanitarian response.

Apart from the obvious health, safety and security concerns, there are deeper structural and political factors, stymieing access to the country or to certain regions. Regional polarization creates

---

[70] International actors felt Libyan national actors, both governmental and NGOs, have a vague understanding of the UNSF, the role of UNCT, and types of expected support.

[71] i.e., the people who have the influence to build support for, and capacity to pursue, efforts that meet the public's needs and expectations.

[72] The UNSF development process included a group of Libyan officials, who validated some of the priorities and needs. The endorsement of UNSF was delayed until later in 2019 and signed by the Minister of Planning.

conflict risks—in terms of what assistance is provided, where, by and to whom—which are difficult to navigate and can create bottlenecks. Stakeholders consulted also cited conflicting prerogatives, unclear bureaucratic processes, multiple chains of decision making, weak and sometimes conflicting lines of command, resulting in instances of subordinates not following supervisors' directives.

**Finding 14: The UNCT found ways to programme with national stakeholders, despite the challenges. At the same time, some Libyan stakeholders expressed frustration through their perception that international partners sometimes prefer to "work around" authorities, without adequate consultation.**

Despite the above challenges, the UNCT has nevertheless found ways to programme with national stakeholders. Programmes under the UNSF are designed using various approaches. Some agencies suggest interventions and plans to national stakeholders when needs arise; others consult with national stakeholders and some line ministries through regular meetings and needs assessment exercises.

Yet, numerous Libyan stakeholders expressed candid frustration, low morale, and discouragement caused by their view that the UNCT sometimes "works around" authorities and decision-making structures. AFPs have tried to work with certain units or sub-sections, where they are able to navigate some constraints and get traction, or with some municipal-level institutions without formally engaging other central authority decision-makers. There was broad agreement, including among donors and members of the UNCT, that longstanding and well-articulated tensions between local and central authorities create further challenges for effective coordination and the development of a common vision and plan.

**Finding 15: The evaluation identified a <u>drift between government entities and local civil society organizations</u>.**

Government attitudes toward civil society compound the challenge of building effective partnerships. Local non-governmental actors consider themselves well positioned to partner with and help UN agencies, as well as ensure reach and access to everyone in need, including those in the most remote areas and stigmatized groups. Yet governmental bodies in Libya often distrust, and express frustration about, UNCT engagement with the CSOs.

Several respondents amongst UNCT members, donors, and Libyan governmental entities have also identified the need for engagement with communities' local stakeholders, municipalities, NGOs, and the private sector to ensure better reach and development in remote areas.

**Finding 16: Coordination with UNSMIL around advocacy and communication with national stakeholders appears to be an area for improvement.**

During the past few months, UNSMIL's bi-weekly briefings to UNCT were introduced, to improve information sharing. That said, some UNCT members expressed the view that they need more support and a more inclusive approach with UNSMIL to push forward some policies, positions and issues (i.e. gender) with the national stakeholders. Some national interlocutors also spoke of inconsistent communication from different UN entities, different messaging towards national stakeholders and sometimes unclear directives.

The findings on communication also suggest that the UNCT communication and advocacy strategy, which may be explored in the coming period, would benefit from lessons learned via the UNSF more broadly, e.g.: set concrete and achievable goals, aiming to solve specific problems or target specific bottlenecks for the remaining period of implementation; focus on the theory of change, results and solid M&E; leverage comparative advantages and the most credible messengers, across the UN system[73] in the service of results[74].

### 3.3 Sustainability and transformative changes

**Finding 17: Libya has been grappling with a multi-dimensional and protracted crisis. While it is perhaps more obvious with the benefit of hindsight, the political situation and institutional set-up on the ground in 2018, when the UNSF was developed, was unsustainable. It would have been helpful if the UNSF provided more guidance on expectations regarding "sustainable capacity building of Libyan government institutions", in the current operating context.**

Libya during the period of 2019-2020, and until March 2021, was split between two governments. At the time the UNSF was drafted, there was a degree of recognition within the UN system, and

---

[73] We mean UNSMIL, UNCT and World Bank together

[74] See, e.g. Pouezat (2015): "Better to aim low and ratchet up the ambition once something is seen to work, rather than try for the moon, hit a snag and undermine the credibility of the entire effort. [...Each] agency representative should have a well-defined share of responsibility in the work of the whole, and be accountable for it to the whole"

among many Libyan and international experts working in Libya, that a governing institutional set-up that afterwards produced rival governments was fundamentally unsustainable. The resulting fragmentation impacted the way the UNCT works in Libya: the UN's approach to government institutional capacity building was supposed to support just one of these governments, the internationally recognised, West-based GNA. The reporting documents reviewed do not provide further insight into the extent to which support provided to governing actors in the East and South was designed to be sustainable.

In short, expectations for sustainability could have been better explained within the UNSF document. Despite the political sensitivities, this issue was not grappled with at UNSF level. (That is, many Libyans across the country did not express the view that the GNA and its ministries represented their interests.) Through the LPDF and overall peace process, the Libyan people are currently working to define the character of their government – which is a step towards government institutions that may become more unified and sustainable in the coming years. Part of the challenge is that there's very little open explanation or sharing of lessons learned about the informal institutions operating in the country. (Formal government institutions do not operate in a vortex.) While it may be difficult to raise with Libyan partners, there is not an existing culture that rewards the adoption of new behaviours that result in better service to the public.


**Finding 18: Overall, the evaluation found <u>limited evidence on which to judge the sustainability of results</u> delivered under the 2019-2022 UNSF – with more evidence of work on resilience.**

Related to the previous finding, specific goals regarding sustainability, over two years, could have been explained in the UNSF TOC and included as measures and indicators in the results framework.  Without this guidance, hypotheses that AFPs could test, or measures and indicators with which to do so, it appears that agencies have not been able to report on achievements.

While "sustainability" is mentioned over 100 times in the UNSF—indeed, truly mainstreamed across the UNCT's approach, as a principle— the document could have provided a more cohesive and specific explanation of:

-        The UN's vision for what more sustainable Libyan institutions would look like (assuming that they must also be unified, functional, and inclusive). The vision is somewhat implied in parts of the results framework, but this is longer-term work that has not yet been evidenced.
-        Precisely how the UN could support conditions for the emergence of such institutions (i.e., some weakness in teasing this out in the UNSF TOC).

While actions were limited, the UNCT did deliver some support to life skills, entrepreneurship, rural employment and innovative subsistence agriculture—all of which have the potential to sustainably benefit the populations reached. The Libyan government's lack of engagement and financial support to some initiatives designed to promote sustainable development was also a constraint.

The UNSF guidance under "Sustainability and Resilience" is dedicated to resilience—which was indeed a more realistic area to focus on, between 2019 and 2021. It also appears that AFPs are more comfortable working with the concept of "resilience". This is very beneficial to ongoing work to operationalize the UN's HDP nexus approach in Libya, which the PMT has now defined more clearly as centering strategic priorities and joint work on "the areas in which there needs to be a reduction of vulnerability and risk in order to bring about a reduction of needs".[75] However, there are differing perceptions among the UNCT, Libyan national partners, and donors about whether the UN's major areas of focus and capabilities (e.g. support to the political process and elections, food distribution) actually create resilience, as Libyans understand it (i.e. having basic needs met— notably safety and security provided by a legitimate, representative and trustworthy security sector—and greater focus on inclusive economic development).

As above, the evaluation found that there are good reasons why the UNCT focused on meeting urgent and humanitarian needs, linked to the complex emergency the country faced from 2019— 2021. Yet questions regarding the composition of the security sector, DDR, and the GNU's lack of command and control over militias and some regions in the country are likely to remain pressing stability issues in the coming period. These issues are likely to have significant implications for sustainable peace.

**Finding 19: The UN system has promoted and supported important steps that may promote transformative change in Libya, but it is too early to tell. As ever in fragile contexts, sustainability is a long-term process.**

While an evaluation of sustainability and transformative change is merited, the evaluators recommend more emphasis on the latter, in the current, Libyan context.

The UNCT performed well in its ability to monitor, and where possible, seize openings for transformative change. Examples include: its support to the Libyan peace process; joint programming which ensured marginalised groups could influence peace and security dialogue

---

[75] Humanitarian, Development & Peace Nexus: The New Way of Working, Libya: Sabha Nexus Strategy, May 2021, p. 4.

(including women, youth, and Libyans from the South, though there is some debate over the extent to which these populations have been fully represented and involved); innovative responses to the COVID-19 crisis, which has improved access to healthcare (e.g. expanded telemedicine, online health and hygiene courses for children); and joint programming that helped youth develop life skills and demonstrably improved justice for children.

**Finding 20: Libyans are currently defining the shape of the governing institutions, including by running municipal and national elections, which means that <u>ambitions for capacity building must be well targeted and realistic</u>, to avoid inefficient approaches.**

Capacity building was requested by each and every respondent. There is a unanimous agreement that the Libyan institutions need long term programmes for capacity building on multiple levels: personal skills and competencies, technical level, organizational models and processes, and institutional capacities.

Respondents flagged the need for technical support in plans, operating procedures, early warning and other systems that can help them (particularly, national government) become less reactive. Several UNCT members indicated the need to develop capacity building approaches that go beyond the regular staff training and equipment, which has shown limited results until now.

Capacity building for Libya needs to be systemic and linked to the broader political and social context; adopt demand-driven approaches that fit the country needs (as identified through capacity needs assessments) and linked to performance expectations and merit; and reach various level of employees and not only the senior officials or public servants.

# 4. Lessons Learnt

The following is a summary of lessons learnt bringing in insights from interviews and the wider literature review.

1.      The process and management set-up underpinning Strategic/Country Frameworks matters more than the document itself.

A lesson learned and recommendation from broader UN experience is to view strategic/country frameworks (like the UNSF or UNDAFs in other contexts) "as a process, not a document".[76] Even in relatively stable contexts, UNCTs have found that SF/CFs and UNDAF documents "will be soon forgotten". However, *the working modalities, coordination and implementation mechanisms established through* the drafting of these documents, and codified in them, was what enabled UNCTs' ongoing pursuit of relevant and impactful responses to the public's needs. UNCTs elsewhere found that the key agreements within their strategic framework were essentially the "ground rules" for how the strategy would be collaboratively governed, delivered, monitored, tested, and reviewed for continuing "fit", and then redesigned/updated.

Interlocutors in Libya and UNCTs elsewhere stressed consultation and planning processes should be nimble: more frequent, consistent, results-focused, engaging and inclusive. All of these features are particularly relevant in stabilization contexts, where the situation on the ground is highly fluid, the assumptions underneath the SF/CF need frequent revisiting, and the overall (stabilization) logic demands even closer attention to windows opening for positive or negative change. These windows are unpredictable in any environment, but critical to efforts which seek to consolidate peace and catalyse longer-term transformations that help societies better prevent, prepare for, withstand, and recover from shocks and stresses.

The UNCT in Libya has recently invested in trying to reinvigorate many of the "best practice" ground rules that were laid out in the UNSF, but never fully actioned. As part of its ongoing work to update and extend the UNSF through 2022, the UNCT Libya is developing its first-ever Joint Work Plan, the result report, and introducing the Result Groups under the Programme Management Team (PMT), among others. The ambition was to help the UNCT identify the remaining gaps and achieve the intended results of the SF during the latter half of the SF implementation, as well as better prepare for this evaluation.

---

[76] B. Pouezat, "Inclusive UN strategic planning: a survivor's guide", Action 2030 Blog, UN Sustainable Development Group, 13 November 2015. https://www.undg.org/latest/blog/inclusive-un-strategic-planning-survivors-guide

The TOC is probably the most important part of the UNDAF and TOCs should also be seen as a process tool, supporting strategy testing.

2. Modest ambition and a results' focus – even if the results are small and hard-won at the beginning – can enhance the credibility of joint working practices, and increase motivation to stick with challenging changes in the way stakeholders collaborate.

A related lesson learnt from broader UNCT experience also applied to UNCT Libya and the UNSF. The "process" / management system's success depended on having the right incentives and mechanisms in place, and used consistently, to support close work among national/local authorities, UN actors, civil society and other partners, which drew on multi-dimensional and integrated analysis and pooled capabilities across stakeholders' areas of expertise and comparative advantage. In Libya, as elsewhere, this requires many changes in individual behaviour and organisational culture.

This initial step essentially allowed stakeholders to define and practice working within the structures that govern the framework, and indeed the "UNDAF process" itself: (a) a system for negotiating and taking evidence-based decisions, and a set of mechanisms that enable which joint working mechanisms (multi-agency cooperation); (b) a framework around which the UNDAF process could continue (with modest ambitions initially, practiced as consistently as possible to build confidence, and gradually enhanced and refined over time) through the joint management systems and joint working practices established with host government authorities (and practiced consistently).

# 5. Recommendations

1.     To encourage more engagement with the UNSF, significantly reduce the document size. Focus on the theory of change and the results framework.

Some UNSF design weaknesses derive from the volatility and sensitivity of the context, which the evaluators factored into their assessment, to ensure fairness. Therefore, the key evaluation findings (and these recommendations) take "context uncertainty" as a given. Focus is instead on what might have been done differently to better assist the UNCT in navigating uncertainty.

In this context, long and comprehensive guidance is perhaps less helpful than a concise and genuinely integrated strategy, with a clear and "testable" theory of change. TOCs need to be reviewed regularly and the right evidence collected to enable hypotheses, assumptions, and risks to be assessed.

2.     Enhance strategic focus and prioritization.

The use of three thematic pillars was a strength. Strategic focus could be further enhanced by setting clear and precise stabilization objectives that are achievable in the strategic framework timeframe. These could be "intermediate outcomes", underneath "higher-level outcomes"—but however presented, TOCs should be robust (as above), and the actors who are responsible clearly stated.

These goals should be the "linchpin" for integrated working and joint programming across the UNCT—but do not need to cover "everything". Hence, prioritization, based on a transparent acknowledgement of the UNCT's capacity, will be key.

3.     Build from the good progress on defining an HDP nexus approach for Libya, by ensuring this definition and lessons learned / guidance for operationalizing the approach (e.g. through area-based planning) are included in the next CF.

The Sabha NWG pilot experience produced very helpful refinements on what a nexus approach for Libya looks like, as well as what it does not. For example, a clear lesson learned was that it is easier to define and jointly pursue "collective outcomes" at area level, given the diversity of contexts across Libya. Hence the UNCT may wish to provide this guidance within the next CF; whatever process is chosen to facilitate the HDP nexus approach (e.g. via area-based working groups, or via Results Groups) should also be clearly indicated in the CF. The UNCT could also learn from other countries' experiences; several examples of collective outcomes that represent

"incremental steps towards achieving the 2030 Agenda in crisis contexts"[77] are available in the source cited.

It may be necessary to clarify how JTCC RGs and various WGs fit together or are rationalized, both in the next CF and through their terms of reference, particularly as and when the NWG approach is scaled up. (The evaluation found some confusion exists around multiple / parallel working groups. UNCT feedback on early drafts of this report included the view that objectives under the Basic Services pillar were clearer and more incremental than the evaluation of UNSF documentation suggested, which might also relate to planning documents specific to the humanitarian sector and those specific WGs.)

Notably, the NWG approach appears to have the potential to strengthen ongoing use of real-time analysis and common assessments across organizations that deliver humanitarian, human rights, development and/or peacebuilding work. Donors who attended multiple Berlin Process WGs similarly observed that some of the most valuable sessions were "cross-briefings" (one thematic WG exchanging updates with another). Both models can enable "cooperative analysis and coordinated implementation […] towards the long-term goal of peace, security and sustainable development", at different levels of planning. Recommendation 8 elaborates on coordination mechanisms.

4.      Ensure the next strategic framework includes operational plans / operational planning tools. While not a silver bullet, they are an important component of useful and functional strategic frameworks.

A key lesson learned, from wider experience, and consultations under this evaluation, is that the focus of a strategic framework should be on enabling an ongoing process (or cycle) of true, joint planning. Other UNCTs have found that *Joint Work Plans* may not help with strategic coordination of effort, if they merely consolidate agency-level planning. [78] (By *strategic coordination*, the evaluators mean coordination "with a purpose, conducted to achieve specified, agreed and

---

[77] UN OCHA (April 2018), Op. Cit.

[78] For example, in Ethiopia, a mid-term review of the 2016-2020 UNDAF found: "**Joint work plans are a collection of individual UN agencies' activities and do not enhance joint implementation, monitoring or reporting.** Joint planning was mostly done independently by UN agencies, followed by one or two meetings to compile and consolidate the work plans through the Results Groups (RGs). Consequently, the work plans have over a thousand activities listed, which just illustrates the absence of joint planning. There was also no evidence of joint monitoring, and all the Results Groups noted that they had difficulty in compiling joint reports due partly to the fragmented nature of the UNDAF." R. Chiwara and A. Tesfaye, Mid-term Review of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework Ethiopia (UNDAF 2016-2020), Primsom Management Services, November 2018. p. ix.

measurable objectives and effects, such as mobilising support for a particular policy or promoting a desired behavioural change."[79])

The UNCT has significant flexibility in how operational planning could be approached. For example, it may not be necessary to develop a highly detailed (and therefore difficult to maintain) work plan. Rather, the UNSF could have been strengthened even with some basic guidance on how various AFPs' unique competencies and capabilities could be leveraged to achieve a more precise goal than "strengthened institutions". Keeping things as clear, simple, feasible and proportional as possible is of course key to ensuring such guidance adds value.[80]

Planning could also be strengthened while reducing the complexity of coordination across the UN system by adapting approaches such as scaling up or down various agencies' presence, seconding AFP specialists (particularly from non-Resident agencies) directly into UNSMIL or the RCO, so they are providing advice and expertise across a range of programming; or alternatively, increasing the number of RCO staff and embedding these individuals in other AFPs, so that they act as focal points for coordination and identifying joint programming and fundraising opportunities.

5.     Make sure all interventions are grounded in strong needs assessment and analysis of Libyan government buy-in and have clear and achievable results. The Sabha nexus strategy experience provides good lessons learned for how "wicked problems" might be broken down into more manageable increments with clearer results and local-level buy-in, though the evaluators recognize that this remains challenging at national level.

In some instances, of course, the UNCT's role is to support and advocate for Libyan government action in areas where there is resistance (e.g. protection of migrants and refugees; gender equality). In general, however, government buy-in needs to be understood and the perception that the UNCT is "working around" officials avoided. It is essential to advocate with donors for targeted support to build national capacity based on ongoing assessment of their gaps and needs, that is coordinated, systematic and of sufficient quality.

---

[79] This definition of "strategic" coordination activity in conflict and stabilisation interventions is borrowed from the UK Stabilisation Unit. The definition was originally applied to "strategic communications", but the principle applies to strategic coordination as well. In other words, the strategic activity (communication, coordination, etc.) should be "routine business" (done on a "daily basis"), and therefore should "not be a highly complex and exclusive doctrine practised by specialists but an activity centred on people, governed by common sense and readily accessible to the generalist with appropriate training". J. Marrozzi, Strategic Communications in Conflict and Stabilisation Interventions, What Works Series, UK Stabilisation Unit, July 2016. pp. 3-5. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765464/Strat_Comms_paper_final.pdf

[80] For example, it may be unwieldy to articulate each agency's role directly in a common, overarching theory of change. However, such assessments do need to be made, on an ongoing basis, as various hypotheses are tested and refined over time.

6.      Integrate risk analysis and contingency planning exercises into programmes' planning and implementation. Scenario planning to support earlier action on early warning signs may be another useful tool and can potentially build from those already done through the Peaceful Change Initiative conflict sensitivity forum.

Such an approach would allow for agile responses to stressors, ensure minimum results during volatility, and help in testing the TOC assumptions. Ultimately, the UNCT needs tools that can help with navigating uncertainty and systematically capture learning so that "institutional knowledge" is retained within the UNCT itself.

7.      Increase the capacity of the Resident Coordinator's Office to provide support, coordination and outreach to donors that is uniquely in its areas of comparative advantage. More staff would be beneficial.

The RCO is uniquely positioned to support the following areas, which the evaluation found could be strengthened, *provided* adequate resources are allocated, to support a team that is already stretched very thin:

i)      **Assist AFPs in interpreting the "strategic intention" of the next CF/UNSF and in developing well aligned and targeted country programmes and joint programming/interventions** (which may include joint programmes, if that is the best fit).

ii)      **Facilitate and support coordination forums**, including by: a) working closely with UNSMIL and the Government of Libya, to ensure national stakeholders and civil society participate on a more regular basis, and b) promoting a culture of mutual accountability across the UN system, so it is clear that Working Group chairs must represent the position and principles of the entire UN system, and people in Libya, not narrower, own agency priorities.

iii)      **Monitor UNSF progress, with support from the UNCT M&E Working Group.** For example, the RCO can ensure that agencies are providing semi-annual (six-monthly) "returns" in a common format, and host formal, 6-monthly or annual "Strategy Testing" workshop(s), internally and at JTCC level, to review the UNSF theory of change, assumptions, risks and operational plan.

iv)      **Collate and disseminate the rationale for decisions, as well as lessons learned, across agencies and Working Groups, as a way of supporting the retention of institutional knowledge**. There are ways of gathering this information in real time, for example by providing a Working Group minutes templates that include a "decision log"[81] (decisions taken and rationale)

---

[81] This is a common practice in many policing services world-wide, as a way of enhancing transparency and accountability, while also supporting officers (both "frontline" and senior management), if decisions are later challenged. It has also proven helpful to promote a learning culture—e.g. combined with "after action reviews". In an ideal case, learning culture also treats "excluding wrong answers"

and a field for documenting lessons learned (which should be a standing agenda item and expected output of every meeting).

v)      **Develop and implement a joint fundraising strategy, including in support of HDP nexus working group.**

All the above implies that **the RCO may need additional resources, including staff members**, who are skilled (and can enhance the RCO's existing capacity) in: design and monitoring, evaluation and learning; results-focused problem-solving; facilitation, mediation, and multi-cultural diplomacy.

This is a worthwhile investment. It would not only to support effective UNSF design and delivery, but also to help position the UNCT as a credible, trusted and sought-after partner for the Libyan government, as it undertakes longer term reforms that will eventually outlast the UN political mission's mandate.[82]

8. Set realistic ambitions for coordination and what specific coherent outcomes it is supposed to produce for Libyans, migrants and refugees; prioritise the "institutionalisation" of feasible and proportionate mechanisms to support this ambition.

The evaluators recommend aiming for coordination activity that is efficient and meaningful, "starting small" as needed, to build confidence and good habits. A periodic, well-facilitated and engaging meeting, that attendees feel they get something out of, is better than more frequent meetings that do not have a clear output. Additionally, there is some confusion between various coordination forums: the groups provided for under the UNSF, the Berlin process working groups, and the      Humanitarian working group/ sectors. To avoid competition for people's attention across numerous tracks of working groups, it may be beneficial to streamline down to one "track" of working groups—while also determining how area-base working groups can complement and enhance coordination happening at national level.

---

as a valuable practice, provided, of course, intentions and practice aligned with policy, errors are quickly surfaced instead of ignored, and rectifications are swift.

[82] As the Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations notes: "In both conflict and post-conflict situations, the RC system has coordinated UN activities to build sustainable peace. In these settings, the RC can play an especially critical role in ensuring the emergence of long-term capacity for conflict prevention in the form of a system for democratic governance that is based on consensus among multiple stakeholders. The RC is the designated representative of the UN Secretary-General in a particular country, except when a peacekeeping operation headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is deployed. While peacekeeping operations are mainly present in post-conflict contexts and are normally of a limited duration, the UN country teams, headed by an RC, are typically a more long-term and constant UN presence in the country." Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *UN Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, "Chapter VXI: Recovery, Development and Sustainable Peace", Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. p. 201.

9.      Work across regions and sectors in an agile mode, where sector/locations related teams not only share information and coordinate interventions, but also closely plan and implement integrated approaches. Building from the Sabha nexus strategy experience, area-based planning groups may make it more feasible to do meaningful and effective "cooperative analysis and coordinated implementation".

Full "coherence" of UN policy and action may be unrealistic, and at a certain level, even undesirable. On the one hand, it's important that different aspects of the UN system's strategy in Libya are not undermining each other. On the other hand, even HDP nexus principles recognise that the independence and neutrality of humanitarian assistance should be respected and assured. This means humanitarian assistance cannot always be oriented in a way that promotes fundamentally political processes and concepts, of which there are many in HDP nexus theory: reform, resilience, human rights, inclusion, etc.

Area-based planning groups may be one of the more effective mechanisms to pursue.

10.     Adopt a system building approach to support and build the capacities and practices around data collection, monitoring and analysis for relevant authorities (National Statistic System including the Bureau of Statistics and Census and other agencies).

This should include the development of a national strategy for development of statistics, clear data collection protocols, analytical framework, clear indicators with clear data validation and sharing protocols, information management systems and quality controls. This can only be done through and with national and local governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to ensure better footprint on the ground and access accurate data.

11.     Aim to provide more detail on results indicators and lessons learned in annual reporting, which may require more support from the UNCT's M&E working group.

The presentation of results against key performance indicators in the UNSF annual report made it very difficult to evaluate along the three categories of criteria in this evaluation. (That is, grouping by outcome/output, under "levels of achievement", rather than reporting against the individual indicators and their milestones and targets in the UNSF.) While it is understandably difficult to consolidate information across many AFPs, against many key performance indicators, in principle, the RCO could seek surge support from the UNCT M&E working group. There are several options to make the process easier, building on Recommendation 7 (increase staffing in the RCO to help support this), which could be considered under the next Libya CF. For example:

- Reducing the number of KPIs in the results framework. This may not be desirable, if it comes at the expense of clearly understanding what has changed on the ground, or leads to a focus on what is easy to measure, instead of what is important to measure.
- Ensuring Results Groups (with support from UNCT M&E specialists) provide six-monthly "returns" in a common format, or conduct six-monthly, light-touch "strategy testing" reviews and document the conclusions in minutes. Member AFPs could i) present progress against relevant milestones and targets, ii) review changes in the context and how this affects the UNSF TOC and intervention strategies, iii) contribute evidence against the UNSF theory of change and assumptions and iv) provide lessons learned. Ensuring broad access to key information (UNCT, Libyan government, other partners) would be beneficial. This information can then be referenced in annual reports and annual strategy workshops.
- Instead of reducing the number of KPIs at the outset, using the annual reporting process as the opportunity to revise the UNSF Results Framework. The update currently underway (as the UNCT goes into its final year of the current UNSF implementation) is a good practice that should be continued in the next CF.

It would also be beneficial to expand on **lessons learned** and how they influenced UNCT **adaptation** in the reporting and be as specific as possible. For example, a useful lesson learned, with clear programming implications, might be, "Building relationships with the policing services and their confidence in new approaches to improve public safety takes time—up to 18 months, including simulations and mentoring. Hence programming should follow a four-to-five year timeline to demonstrate and then consolidate results on the ground. Thus, it is important to align milestones targets under 24-month CFs accordingly". Lessons are less useful when they are generic [83] or only partially address the issue encountered. [84] The 2020 UNSF Annual Report provides high-level descriptions of how the UNCT adapted its work given the volatile context, and elaborating on this, for example with case studies, can contribute to wider learning and ensure future evaluations can unpack and credit best practice.

12. UNCT should continue to champion right based approaches and gender equalities, however, UNSF (CF) should consider including managed expectations about a generational perceptions and attitudes reform and ensure no harm when working on issues that have

---

[83] E.g. ("capacity building of Libyan civil society and the government remains critical to strengthen effectiveness and long-term sustainability". UNSF Annual Report 2020, p. 22.

[84] Ibid. For example, the annual report notes that the pandemic limited ground access for activities and monitoring. It proposes an interesting lesson learned that could have been elaborated: "Innovative evaluative methods and approaches need to be put in place". A more thorough lesson learned might have been that the UNCT needs to recruit more local staff to support ground implementation, or that it might be beneficial for the UNCT M&E Working Group to assess whether Libyan universities or research institutes have or could be supported to develop independent evaluation units, with access to key intervention areas.

negative perceptions. For gender mainstreaming, it remains unequivocally sensitive which stipulates the need to address issues from the Libyan women's perspective and include granular priorities that are affecting Libyan women's lives, and work through a more interest-based lens.

# 6.    Annexes

## 6.1.    Evaluation Matrix

Under **relevance**, the questions cover the relevance of the activities with respect to how the needs were identified and prioritized. Questions will explore the degree to which the interventions were appropriate to the local context. Enquiries will also explore which groups/stakeholders were consulted, and whose voices and views were heard and included, and how emerging needs were addressed.

| KEY EVALUATION QUESTION | SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTION | INFORMATION SOURCE |
|---|---|---|
| **KEQ1**- Has the SF supported the government to target and address pressing needs and responded to emerging needs, and included H-D-P | **Sub Question 1.1 -** How have needs been identified? What consultations with stakeholders (government or other) took place?<br><br>**Sub Question 1.2-** What mechanisms are there to deal with emerging needs (COVID-19/rounds of conflict)? How did the stakeholders (government or other) communicate around the pressing needs?<br><br>How did the UNSF integrated HDP | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| **KEQ2-** Have the UN Joint Country Assessment and the SF effectively targeted and addressed the key development issues and challenges towards the achievement of the SDGs in Libya? | **Sub Question 2.1-** What are key development issues and challenges in Libya and how are they linked to the SDGs?<br><br>**Sub Question 2.2** Which SF outcomes are in line with SDGs? And what progress has been achieved towards them? | comparison between UNSF outcomes and SDGs, KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |

Under **Effectiveness and Coherence**, the questions highlight the progress towards the outputs and outcomes and reflect upon the general benefits of the UNSF to Libya. The questions will also examine the effectiveness of coordination modalities between the UNCT and donors, governmental institutions, and CSOs, in addition to the coherence of UN agency interventions. Questions will explore the extent to which the interventions were coordinated and complementary towards common goals. The questions will also look at both enabling and deterring factors to the achievement of results and gauge the counterfactual argument.

| KEY EVALUATION QUESTION | SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTION | INFORMATION SOURCE |
|---|---|---|

| KEY EVALUATION QUESTION | SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTION | INFORMATION SOURCE |
|---|---|---|
| **KEQ3-**Has the SF met the stated outcomes and outputs given Libya's volatile context? | **Sub Question 3.1 -** What were the enabling factors that allowed the UNSF to deliver on outcomes and outputs, and what were the deterring factors? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | **Sub Question 3.2-** What were the benefits of the UNSF to Libya?<br><br>What would the situation be if UNSF was not in place? | |
| **KEQ4-**Has the SF strengthened coordination, cooperation and partnership with the government, civil society, and other actors? | **Sub Question 4.1-** To what extent and in what ways are the UNSF enhanced joint interventions bringing together government, CSO, and other actors? | KII with agencies, UNSMIL KII with National stakeholders,<br><br>KII with Donors<br><br>FGD with working groups |
| | **Sub Question 4.2-** What mechanisms of coordination/synergies between SF and UNSMIL/government/various national structures/ various regions / CSOs/donors were there? How do they function? Are these mechanisms needed and what can be done to improve them? Are there coordination gaps? | |

Under **Sustainability,** the evaluation will explore how the SF worked to ensure gender inclusion, respect of human rights, prevention or mitigation of conflict, and inclusion of various ethnic and political groups, as well as people with various disabilities. The evaluation will also examine how the UNSF contributed to developing the capacities of national stakeholders on individual, organizational, and structural levels.

| KEY EVALUATION QUESTION | SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTION | INFORMATION SOURCE |
|---|---|---|
| **KEQ5-** Has the SF conformed to the cross-cutting principles and issues (i.e. gender, human rights)? | **Sub Question 5.1-** How did the agencies integrate gender, human rights, refugee and migrant rights, and youth into their services & data collection? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | **Sub Question 5.2** To what extent are the UNSF strategic objectives aligned with and contributing to Libyan commitments to international/regional treaties and legal instruments? | |

| KEQ6-Has the SF extended support in such a way to build national and local capacities and ensure long-term gains? | Sub Question 6.1- What type of capacities were developed? Has capacity development targeted individual, organizational and institutional levels? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | Sub Question 6.2- What are the primary capacity gains that materialized on the national/local levels? | |
| KEQ7-Has the SF promoted and supported inclusive and sustainable development that leaves no one behind? | Sub Question 7.1- How did the SF work on inclusivity (gender/age/ethnic & political groups/disability/refugees & migrants)? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | Sub Question 7.2- Has the SF worked with various national stakeholders across 3 regions, and how? | |
| KEQ8- Has the SF promoted or supported policies that are consistent among each other and across sectors, given the multi-sectoral nature of peacebuilding and socio-economic development? | Sub Question 8.1- How does UNSF integrated H-D-P nexus integrated across agencies? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | Sub Question 8.2- What linkages and synergies exist between the mission UNSMIL and UNCT to integrate HDP? | |
| KEQ9-Has the SF supported the country and the people in strengthening resilience and contributed to reducing vulnerability against the protracted conflict and other crises? | Sub Question 9.1- What shocks and stressors[85] has the UNSF targeted to enhance resilience? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | Sub Question 9.2- Which vulnerable groups did the UNSF prioritise? | |
| KEQ10-Has the SF contributed towards challenging negative social norms, behaviors and practices to achieve substantial gender equality? | Sub Question 10.1- How are the interventions challenging gender and other social norms? | KII with agencies KII with National stakeholders, CSO Document review |
| | Sub Question 10.2- Were there any changes to policies and structures towards ensuring equal access and participation of women in the | |

---

[85] https://www.preventionweb.net/files/57759_undgframeworkforresilientdevelopmen.pdf: Stressors are (i) environmental degradation and sea level rises; (ii) food insecurity, volatility of food prices and chronic malnutrition; (iii) high levels of monetary and non-monetary poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic exclusion; (iv) political instability and political exclusion; (v) poor governance, fragile institutions, and limited application of disaster risk management schemes at the national and subnational levels; (vi) limited delivery and poor quality of basic social services, aggravated by increased urbanisation; (vii) tensions over exploitation and management of natural resources, particularly those that have transboundary nature; (viii) violence and conflict in some countries; … (x) influxes of migrants, internally displaced, and refugees; (xi) social and cultural traditional norms; and (xii) patterns and practices of discrimination and human rights violations.

| | peace process, politics, and economic activities? | |
|---|---|---|

## 6.2. Data collection tools

**Interview Questions Protocol**

·        Introduce yourself,

·        TO what extent have you cooperated with UN agencies? Which ones/programmes? What actions?

·        To what extent have you heard about the UNSF

| KEQ | SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTION |
|---|---|
| KEQ1- Has the SF supported the government to target and address pressing needs and responded to emerging needs, and included H-D-P Sub Question 1.2- What mechanisms did UNCT put in place to deal with the emerging needs (COVID-19/rounds of conflict)? | ·        Sub  Question 1.1 - How have needs been identified?<br><br>·        What consultations with stakeholders (government or other) took place?<br><br>·        Which stakeholders were consulted? GNA/LNA/South/municipal/CSOs? |
| | ·        Did UNSF respond to changes happening in the country;to emerging needs? In what ways did adaptation take place? What could have been done differently?<br><br>·        How did the stakeholders (government or other) communicate around the pressing needs? |

| | |
|---|---|
| KEQ2- Have the UN Joint Country Assessment and the SF effectively targeted and addressed the key development issues and challenges towards the achievement of the SDGs in Libya? | ·      Sub Question 2.1- What are key development issues/priorities and challenges in Libya? Are they linked to SDG targets in Libya? What progress has been achieved towards them?<br><br>·      Sub Question 2.2 Which SF outcomes are in line with SDGs?<br><br>·      How did UN contribute to the achievement of SDGs in the country? Through which specific initiatives, projects?<br><br>·      Have the UNSF LIBYA outcomes correspond to internationally agreed goals and treaties (SDGs, etc.)?<br><br>·      to what extent did UNSF work with the government to build data and information management systems to track SDGS |
| KEQ3-Has the SF met the stated outcomes and outputs given Libya's volatile context? | ·      Do UNSF LIBYA outcomes reflect national priorities in your focus area,<br><br>·      What could have been done differently?<br><br>·      Sub Question 3.1 - What were the enabling factors that allowed the UNSF to deliver on outcomes and outputs,<br><br>·      How is the outcome and output monitoring process carried out across agencies<br>·      To what extent is the current UNSF LIBYA designed as a results-oriented, coherent and focused framework? contains clearly articulated results (outcome level), indicators for measuring progress<br><br>·      what were the deterring factors that delayed or blocked the delivery of outputs and outcomes<br><br>·      does any of it has to do with capacity? Willingness? Coordination? Relation with gov? exclusion or inclusion of stakeholders |

| | |
|---|---|
| | · Sub Question 3.2- What were the benefits of the UNSF to Libya? |
| | · What would the situation be if UNSF was not in place? |
| | · How the government and local counterparts consider the support of UNSF |
| | · What is the expected role of the UN in Libya? |
| | o Support to policy making and program formulation |
| | o Capacity development of national institutions? |
| | o Support to SDG -development agenda |
| | o Provide humanitarian assistance |
| | o Support groups which the Government of Libya does not |
| | o Facilitation of dialogue, |
| | o Advocacy of international standards and values. |
| | Other, (specify)? |
| KEQ4-Has the SF strengthened coordination, cooperation and partnership with the government, | · Sub Question 4.1- In what ways the UNSF foster joint/interagency programming/interventions. Is it issue/sector-based? Do they link to national priorities.<br><br>· How UNSF is bringing together government, CSO, and other actors?<br>· In what ways did UNSF lead to harmonizing communications and operations? |

| | |
|---|---|
| civil society, and other actors? | · Sub Question 4.2- What are the mechanisms of coordination/synergies between: |
| | a- UNSF and UNSMIL/ |
| | b- UNSF & government |
| | c- UNSF & various national structures |
| | d- UNSF & various regions |
| | e- UNSF & CSOs |
| | f- UNSF & donors |
| | · Are there coordination gaps? And challenges? what can be done to improve them? |
| | · Is the distribution of roles and responsibilities among the different UNSF LIBYA partners well defined, and facilitated in the achievements of results? |
| KEQ5- Has the SF conformed to the cross-cutting principles and issues (i.e. gender, human rights)? | · Sub Question 5.1- How did the agencies integrate: <br> ü gender, <br> ü human rights, <br> ü refugee and migrant rights, <br> ü and youth into their services & data collection? |
| | · Sub Question 5.2 To what extent are the UNSF strategic objectives aligned with and contributing to Libyan commitments to international/regional treaties and legal instruments? |
| KEQ6-Has the SF extended support in such a way to | · Sub Question 6.1- What type of capacities were developed? |
| | · Has capacity development targeted individual, organizational and institutional levels? |

| | |
|---|---|
| build national and local capacities and ensure long-term gains? | · Sub Question 6.2- What are the primary capacity gains that materialized on the national/local levels?<br><br>· What sector/field /group received capacity building and in what topics<br><br>· Does the UNSF LIBYA respond to the challenges of national capacity development?<br><br>· does it promote ownership of programmes by national partners? |
| KEQ7-Has the SF promoted and supported inclusive and sustainable development that leaves no one behind? | · Sub Question 7.1- How did the SF work on inclusivity – what groups were identified to be vulnerable and excluded?<br>ü gender<br>ü Age<br>ü ethnic & political groups<br>ü disability<br>ü refugees & migrants |
| | · Sub Question 7.2- Has the SF worked with various national stakeholders across 3 regions, and how? |
| KEQ8- Has the SF promoted or supported policies that are consistent among each other and across sectors, given the multi-sectoral nature of peacebuilding and socio-economic development? | Sub Question 8.1- How does the H-D-P nexus work together across agencies?<br><br>Sub Question 8.2- What linkages and synergies exist between the mission UNSMIL and UNCT to integrate HDP?<br><br>· How did the UNSF integrated HDP (humanitarian -development-peace) across agencies work?<br><br>· Was it done Country based/agency based/sector based/??<br><br>· Were there any challenges especially with working with south and east while integrating HDP? |

| | |
|---|---|
| | · What linkages and synergies exist between the mission UNSMIL and UNCT to integrate HDP? |
| KEQ9-Has the SF supported the country and the people in strengthening resilience and contributed to reducing vulnerability against the protracted conflict and other crises? | · Sub Question 9.1- What shocks and stressors has the UNSF targeted to enhance resilience?<br><br>i) environmental degradation and sea level rises;<br><br>ii) food insecurity, volatility of food prices and chronic malnutrition;<br><br>iii) high levels of monetary and non-monetary poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic exclusion;<br><br>iv) political instability and political exclusion;<br><br>v) poor governance, fragile institutions, and limited application of disaster risk management schemes at the national and subnational levels;<br><br>vi) limited delivery and poor quality of basic social services, aggravated by increased urbanisation;<br><br>vii) tensions over exploitation and management of natural resources, particularly those that have transboundary nature;<br><br>viii) violence and conflict in some countries; ... |

| | |
|---|---|
| | ix)　　　influxes of migrants, internally displaced, and refugees; <br><br> x)　　　social and cultural traditional norms; and <br><br> xi)　　　patterns and practices of discrimination and human rights violations. |
| | ·　　Sub Question 9.2- Which vulnerable groups did the UNSF prioritise? |
| KEQ10-Has the SF contributed towards challenging negative social norms, behaviors and practices to achieve substantial gender equality? | ·　　Sub Question 10.1- How are the interventions challenging gender and other social norms? <br><br> ·　　To what extent did the UNSF worked on issues such as gender-based violence and discrimination, and promotes gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls |
| | ·　　Sub Question 10.2- Were there any changes to laws, policies and structures towards ensuring equal access and participation of women in the peace process, politics, and economic activities? <br><br> ·　　What were the main challenges your agency face when working with women |

·　　What were the lessons learnt from UNSF LIBYA implementation: from overall/focus area/agency perspective? Please consider the following areas formulation, implementation, M&E, coordination and partnerships.

·　　How would you describe the experience and how could it be more effective

·　　Do you have any recommendation for the next UNSF LIBYA cycle?

**Donors' specific questions:**

Has the SF supported the government to target and address pressing needs and responded to emerging needs, and included H-D-P

How would you describe consultations with stakeholders (government or other) across regions and political divisions GNA/LNA/South/municipal?

Did UNSF respond to changes happening in the country? To emerging needs? In what ways did adaptation take place? What could have been done differently?

Have the UNSF effectively targeted and addressed the key development issues and challenges towards the achievement of the SDGs in Libya? data and information management systems to track SDGS

Who are the Most vulnerable groups that UNSF should be targeting? Most vulnerable regions

Have the UNSF assisted Libyan gov towards respect of international treaties commitments (HR, IDPs, migrants, gender

What are the main results / benefits of UNSF

What were the enabling or deterring factors that delayed or blocked the delivery of outputs and outcomes

To what extent does the volatility of context impact the achievement of planned results?

What if the UN was not there?

What is the expected role of the UN in Libya?

o Support to policy making and program formulation

o Capacity development of national institutions?

o Support to SDG -development agenda

o Provide humanitarian assistance

o Support groups which the Government of Libya does not

o Facilitation of dialogue,

o   Advocacy of international standards and values. Other, (specify)?

What are the mechanisms of coordination/synergies between the agencies and the donors

Has the SF extended support in such a way to build national and local capacities and ensure long-term gains?

What are the main challenges affecting the work of UNSF in Libya?

Recommendations

## 6.3 Stakeholders interviewed

| Entity | Name |
|---|---|
| Ministry of Agriculture | Abdelhakim Abdelatif Al-Daghith |
| Ministry of Education | Fozia ben Ghishir |
| Ministry of Water Reseources | Omar Salem |
| | Abdel Salam Abou Rziza |
| Ministry of Human Rights and Migrants | Belqasem El Kantri |
| National Economic & social Development Board | Fadel Lameen |
| | Khaled Jazwi |
| Ministry of Social Affairs | Fawzia Mazen |
| Ministry of Health | Abdelmenem Kmeishi |
| Ministry of Health | Ghassan Karem |
| Ministry of Health East | Asma Mostafa Buiera |
| Ministry of Youth | Talis Aghil |
| Bureau of Statistics and Census | Abdallah Allag |
| Ministry of Planning | Essam Garbaa |
| Ministry of Interior | Salaheldine Suleiman |
| General information authority | Abdelbaset Baour |
| Ministry of Justice | Mohamad Ghrodeh |
| National Centre for Disease Control | Abir Bukhari |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs - East | Mansour Janat |
| MoLG | Maysa Altahir Elrejibi Hibri |
| | Mohammad Abu helga |
| Municipality of Sabha | Abdelrahim Abdel Aziz |
| Municipality of Tripoli | Fadil Jubran |
| Municipality of Benghazi | Osama Alkiza |
| Kafaa | Isa Barshushi |
| Jossor | Hala Bugaighis |
| US embassy | Leslie Ordeman |
| | Yared Asnake |
| USAID | Randolph Flay |
| | Kail- US regional economist |
| | Maher Al-Frijat |
| Germany | Deniz Sertcan |
| | Ulrike Borrmann |
| BMZ | Sebastian Aichele (BMZ) |
| Italy Cooperation | Daniele Ravioli |
| | Guilia Straccamore |
| Italian embassy | Patrone Niccolo Pietro |
| European Union | Sandra Goffin |

|  | Mary Hovers |
| --- | --- |
| ECHO | Elke Leidel |
| UNSMIL | Ashley Prwitt |
| UNDP | Filip Warnants |
|  | Craig Castro |
| World Bank | Michael Shaeffer |
| IOM | Mathew Huber |
|  | Amanuel Mehari |
|  | Tassilo Teppert |
| UNICEF Education | Ibrahim Farah |
| UNIECF - WASH | Mohammad Almjadleh |
| UNICEF | Narine Aslanyan |
| UNHCR | A. Jalil Sahibzada |
|  | Djamal Zamoum |
| UN WOMEN | Saskia Binet |
| WFP | Rawad Al Halabi |
|  | Ariuntuya TSENDAYUSH |
|  | Yukinori Hibi |
| UN Habitat | Ombretta Tempra |
|  | Heba Fekry |
| UNFPA | Hafedh Ben Miled |
|  | Mohammed El Mgabri |
|  | Tahir Ghaznavi |
| UNODC | Christina Alo |
|  | Mirna Bou Habib |
|  | Astrid Leo |
| UNESCO | Alexander Schischlik |
| OHCHR | Khouloud Najem |
| FAO | Toni Ettel |
| IFAD | Philippe REMY |
| UNOPS | Nathalie Angibeau |
|  | Farah SAYEGH |
|  | Desmond NGOCHI |
| UNV | Olfa Borsali Ben Hamida |

## 6.4. Bibliography:

| |
|---|
| IOM Libya Annual Report 2019 |
| OCHA Situation Report 2020 |
| OCHA Annual Report 2019 |
| OCHA Libya Bulletin Report December 2020 |
| WFP, Libya Annual Report 2019-2020 |
| UNFPA, Libya Annual Newsletter 2020 |
| UNDP, Libya Annual Report 2019 |
| World Bank, World Bank 2019 Economic Updates Report |
| World Bank, 2019-2020 Libya Report |
| Democracy Reporting International, At a Glance: Libya's Transition 2019-2020 Political Economy, Legitimacy, Power and Violence |
| UN JSC reviews : synthesis of findings and recommendations https://www.un.org/jsc/sites/www.un.org.jsc/files/general/jsc_review_synthesis_and_recommendations_0.pdf |
| 2020 UN Country Team Results Report, April 2021. |
| A. Rathmell, "Measuring Stabilisation: Some observations from international experience", Wilton Park Conference paper, June 2019. p. 2. |
| B. Pouezat, "Inclusive UN strategic planning: a survivor's guide", Action 2030 Blog, UN Sustainable Development Group, 13 November 2015. https://www.undg.org/latest/blog/inclusive-un-strategic-planning-survivors-guide |
| Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992) An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York |
| D. Ladner, Strategy Testing: An Innovative Approach to Monitoring Highly Flexible Aid Programs, The Asia Foundation, September 2015. https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Strategy-Testing-An-Innovative-Approach-to-Monitoring-Highly-Flexible-Aid-Programs.pdf |
| D. Wood, "Peace and Conflict Assessment of Libya", GIZ, 2018 |
| DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, OECD Legal Instruments, 2021. |
| Donini A, (1998) The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda. Occasional paper #22, Thomas J Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, |
| Draft report of Coordination Consultant, "International Coordination Structure in Libya: Assessment and Recommendations", 14 January 2013. https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/LBY/Coordination%20Consultant%20Report.doc |

E. Bajraktari, R. Cemerska, A. Georgievska, Final Evaluation: North Macedonia - United Nations Partnership for Sustainable Development 2016-2020, UN Resident Coordinator's Office, December 2019.

F. Wehrey, "This War is Out of Our Hands": The Internationalization of Libya's Post-2011, Conflicts From Proxies to Boots on the Ground, New America, September 2020. W Lacher, 2018.

Humanitarian, Development & Peace Nexus: The New Way of Working, Libya: Sabha Nexus Strategy, May 2021.

Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice, Report 42 – March 2015.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee and UN Working Group on Transitions, Background paper on Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, Inter-Agency Standing Committee and UN Working Group on Transitions

International Crisis Group – Hold your fire, Episode 27: Good News in Libya? 18 March 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/good-news-libya

International Crisis Group, "Libya Turns the Page", Middle East and North Africa Report N°222 | 21 May 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/222-libya-turns-page

International Crisis Group, From War to Peace: The Challenges of Libya's Transition (Online Event, 1st June 2021)
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/war-peace-challenges-libyas-transition-online-event-1st-june-2021

J. Marrozzi, Strategic Communications in Conflict and Stabilisation Interventions, What Works Series, UK Stabilisation Unit, July 2016. pp. 3-5.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765464/Strat_Comms_paper_final.pdf

K. Menkhaus, "State Fragility as a Wicked Problem", Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University, PRISM, Vol. 1, No. 2 (03/2010), pp. 85-100.

LIBYA Nexus Working Sub-Group (NWSG), Draft Terms of Reference (ToR), version 5, 10 June 2021.

Michie, Susan et al. "The behaviour change wheel: a new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions." Implementation science : IS vol. 6 42. 23 Apr. 2011, doi:10.1186/1748-5908-6-42

N. Stockton, Humanitarianism Bound: Coherence and Catastrophe in the Congo 1998-2002, unpublished study on behalf of OCHA, 2003.

P. Woodrow, N. Oatley, "Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes: Part I: What they are,
different types, how to develop and use them," CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and Search for Common Ground (2013)

PCi, Conflict Sensitivity Considerations relating to Local Governance Assistance in Libya, November 2019.

Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UN Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, "Chapter VXI: Recovery, Development and Sustainable Peace", Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. p. 201.

R. Chiwara and A. Tesfaye, Mid-term Review of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework Ethiopia (UNDAF 2016-2020), Primsom Management Services, November 2018. p. ix.

UN Development Operations Coordination Office, Common Minimum Standards for Multi-Stakeholder Engagement in the UN Development Assistance Framework, United Nations Development Group, 2017.

UN Development Operations Coordination Office, Companion Guidance: Programming Principles, United Nations Development Group, 2017.

UN Development Operations Coordination Office, Development Assistance Framework Guidance, United Nations Development Group, 2017.

UN Development Operations Coordination Office, Summary brief on UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) – Status, trends and next generation
March 2016.

UN Libya, Strategic Planning Retreat, UNCT Libya, Tunis, Tuesday 8 December 2020: Summary Document

UN OCHA, "Collective Outcomes: Operationalizing the New Way of Working", April 2018, p. 2. http://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2018/Apr/OCHA%20Collective%20Outcomes%20April%202018.pdf

UNFPA, UNWOMEN, World Food Programme, Empowering, Protecting and Building Resilience of Women and Youth in Sebha.

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/event/materials/session_4_libya_planning_strategic_framework.pdf

United Nations Strategic Framework for Libya 2019-2020 (2018).

United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework - Internal Guidance (2019).

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Libya: Humanitarian Programming Cycle 2021, Issued December 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_2021-final.pdf.

W. Lacher, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Libya Case Study, Stabilisation Unit, 2018.

Workshop, 20-21 October 2016. Available at: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/peace-hum-dev_nexus_150927_ver2.docx.

World Humanitarian Summit Transcending humanitarian-development divides, Changing People's Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need: Commitment to Action. http://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/WHS%20Commitment%20to%20action%20-%20transcending%20humanitarian-development%20divides_0.pdf

Z Sebastian, J Grävingholt and M Kreibaum (2019): Constellations of fragility: an empirical typology of states. In: Studies in Comparative International Development 54 (2), 299-321. DOI: 10.1007/s12116-019-09284-3

| |
|---|
| OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Libya 2021 |
| OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Libya 2020 |
| OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Libya 2019 |
| OCHA, Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2021. |
| OCHA, Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2020. |
| OCHA, Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2019. |
| Reach, Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, March 2021 |
| Triple Nexus: WFP Contribution to Peace, Beyond the Annual Performance, Report 2018 series, December 2019 |
| UNCT Libya, Strategic Framework (2019-2021) |
| Joint Country Assessment in 2018 by UNCT, UNSMIL, WB |
| Final 2020 Result Report (produced April 2021) |
| Outcome document from the UNCT retreat in Dec 2020 |

## 6.5 **Terms of Reference**

For the evaluation of the United Nations Strategic Framework for Libya (2019-2021)

**A.      UNSF Evaluation Context**

The UN Strategic Framework (SF) for Libya was originally planned to cover the period of 2019-2020. Drawing much of data and analyses from the Joint Common Assessment by the UNCT, UNSMIL and the World Bank in 2018, the SF was designed as a light, high-level framework that uses the Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as guiding logic of its results cluster architecture. The SF impact and strategic outcome level results were linked to selected SDG targets.

As an overarching programmatic vehicle, the SF aimed to ensure UN-internal aid coordination and coherence among UN resident and non-resident agencies operating in Libya. Moreover, it embraced the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in that it allows the development actors subsumed under the UNCT Libya to leverage the comparative advantages of political and humanitarian actors in support of the UNCT's developmental approach, in close coordination with UNSMIL and OCHA.

Overall, the SF is linked to SDG 16 as a general goal to which all Outcome pillars will contribute. While all SDGs and almost all targets are at least to some extent addressed through the SF, the focused SDGs in terms of agency support to related SDG targets are SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 5 (Gender Equality), closely followed by SDGs 4 (Quality Education), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), 1 (No Poverty) and 17 (Global Partnerships).

However, the implementation of the SF has been highly constrained due to the heavy armed clashes between April 2019 and June 2020, compounded with the COVID-19 pandemic. Adding to this was the presence of different governance structures across the country; deep fragmentation and limitations in national and sub-national governance capabilities, as the country endures multiple divides, have impacted negatively on the UN's planning and implementation to achieve development objectives.

In the absence of a national development plan and due to weak coordination amongst government instituions, the UNCT hoped that the SF implementation can be strategically guided by medium to long-term governmental priorities as per the Coordination Framework for International Cooperation for Libya, which also went completely dormant during the armed conflict. In addition, Libya is still classified as a L2 emergency country.

The SF was thus extended once until the end of 2021 and is in the process of extending an additional period of 12 months, including an update to the result framework. While developing a new CF starting in 2023, the UNCT aims at supporting the Libyan transition towards stabilization and peace consolidation.

In the context of the progress made from the four tracks of the Berlin Process (military, political, economy and human rights) as well as the UNDS reform, the UNCT Libya plans

to continuously developing the planned results until the end of 2022. This includes the development of its first-ever Joint Work Plan, the result report, and introducing the Result Groups under the Programme Management Team (PMT), among others. These will help the UNCT identify the remaining gaps and achieve the intended results of the SF during the latter half of the SF implementation, as well as better prepare for this evaluation.

The evaluation will be guided by the new evaluation guideline for the UN Cooperation Framewrok. The evaluation should be independent, credible and useful, and will adhere to the UNEG Norms and Standards (2017), the UNEG Ethical Guidelines (2020) and the UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation (2011). To be responsive to the needs and priorities of Libya, the evaluation will be conducted in a consultative manner and will engage a broad range of stakeholders. The findings from this evaluation should inform the next UN Cooperation Framework of the UNCT which will be prepared with the Government of Libya and other pillars of the UN system in the country.


## B.      Purpose, Objectives and Scope

The **overall purposes** of the UNSF evaluation will be to generate evidence and lessons learned which will guide formulation of the next UN Cooperation Framework (CF) and related Country Programmes of the agencies. The evaluation will also support greater accountability of the UNCT to SF stakeholders.

The **objectives** of the evaluation will be:

●      To assess if/how the strategic directions, goals and guiding principles of the SF, such as the H-D-P nexus, have been relevant in the context of Libya.
●      To assess the progress made towards the SF outcomes and their causal relationships, including the factors that hindered or enabled the UNCT's result achievements.
●      To generate a set of clear, forward-looking and actionable recommendations logically linked to the findings and conclusions, and identify lessons learned to improve the strategies, implementation mechanisms, and management of the next CF.

The **scope** covered by the evaluation will include all programmatic contributions to the SF outcomes by the UNCT, including non-resident agencies and activities implemented as part of global or regional programmes and projects. The evaluation will also include examining operational principles and cross-cutting issues, overall strategies and outcome/output specific strategies included in the SF. The SF will be evaluated against the strategic intent laid out in the SF document.


## C.      Evaluation Questions

Because of the high level of SF objectives and the complexity arising from UNCTs' multi-actor nature, this evaluation will be based on the new guideline of the DCO, the evaluation questions will assess the following dimensions.

1.      Relevance and appropriateness of the UN system support
●       Has the SF effectively supported the government to target and address pressing needs during its period?
●       Has the SF remained responsive to emerging and unforeseen needs of Libya and the people,  while giving due consideration to the inter-relationships between the H-D-P pillars?
●       Have the UN Joint Country Assessment and the SF effectively targeted and addressed the key development issues and challenges towards the achievement of the SDGs in Libya?

2.      Effectiveness of the SF through UNCT's coherent support
●       Has the SF met the stated outcomes and outputs? Has the SF delivered the most relevant objectives in Libya's volatile context?
●       Has the UNCT collectively prioritized activities in the SF based on the needs (demand side) rather than on the availability of resources (supply side)?
●       Has the SF strengthened the coherence of UNCT's support towards the common objectives and to deliver quality and integrated policy support? Has the SF reduced transaction costs?
●       Has the SF strengthened the position, credibility and reliability of the UN system as a partner for the government, civil society and other actors, and been used effectively as a coordination instrument?
●       Has the SF conformed to the cross-cutting principles and issues (i.e. gender, human rights)?

3.      Supporting sustainability and transformational changes
●       Has the SF support extended in such a way to build national and local capacities and ensure long-term gains?
●       Has the SF promoted and supported inclusive and sustainable development that leaves no one behind and strengthen foundation of the society?
●       Has the SF promoted or supported policies that are consistent among each other and across sectors, given the multi-sectoral nature of peacebuilding and socio-economic development?
●       Has the SF supported the country and the people in strengthening resilience and contributed to reducing vulnerability against the protracted conflict and other crises?
●       Has the SF contributed towards challenging negative social norms, behaviors and practices to achieve substantial Gender equality?

**D.      Methodology and Process**

The evaluation will apply a participatory and consultative approach, whereby key SF stakeholders and national partners will be engaged, and their views and feedback will be collected and used at different stages of the evaluation process. It will also adhere to the gender and human rights based approach to evaluation, ensuring that the UN SWAP EPIs

are successfully met. The SF evaluation will be conducted in close collaboration among the UNCT, RCO, national counterparts and DCO.

1.    Methodology

Given that (a) outcomes are, by definition, the work of a number of partners, and (b) UNSDCF outcomes are set at a very high level, attribution of development change to the UNCT (in the sense of establishing  a causal linkage between a development intervention and an observed result) may be extremely difficult and in many cases unfeasible. The evaluation will therefore assess the contribution of the UNCT to the change stated in the SF. The evaluation will need to assess and explain how the UNCT collectively contributed to the observed development results at outcome and output level, and whether the assumptions behind the identified causal pathways of change held or not.

Once the Evaluation Team for the SF is selected, a thorough preparatory work should be conducted by the consultants, one international and one local consultant, to define the specific evaluation strategies, data collection methods and required evaluation tools. An Evaluation Plan will be developed accordingly.

●      **Data collection**: The SF evaluation will use a multiple method approach, which could include a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection such as: desk reviews of reference material, interviews with relevant stakeholder groups (e.g. government officials, donors, civil society organizations, and beneficiaries), site visits and surveys as needed.

●      **Stakeholder participation**: The SF evaluation will be conducted in a participatory manner, ensuring the involvement of key stakeholders (e.g. government, civil society organizations, beneficiary groups, and donors) in all phases of the evaluation. To ensure inclusive consultations, the evaluation team should tap into the network that the UN agencies have  on the ground (i.e. women and youth groups).

●      **Validation**: All findings should be supported with evidence. Triangulation will be used to ensure that the information and data collected are valid. A final evaluation report will be prepared including identified constrains, lessons and challenges in relations to the priority interventions as well as specific recommendations made both to the UNCT and to individual agencies.

•      **Data protection:** The data collected for the SF evaluation should be used thoroughly for the purposes stipulated in the above section B and will not be shared with the third-parties without informed consents of the data sourcing agencies, in line with the UN Principles on Data Protectoin and Privacy.

2.    Processes:

The evaluation will be conducted in three phases:

**Phase 1- Preparation:**

i. Collection of reference material: The RCO in close consultations with UNCT members will compile a list of background material, documents, and reports relevant to the SF evaluation.

ii. Identification and selection of an Evaluation Team: The UNCT will jointly identify and select the appropriate consultants, one international and one local, for the SF evaluation. The RCO will take the lead, jointly with UNCT, in soliciting CVs of consultants available in the country or region.

iii. Development of evaluation strategy and design: Prior to the main data collection phase, the SF Evaluation Team will develop an inception report, which will include a design matrix, data collection and analysis methods, workplan, potential sites for field visits (if possible/needed), timeline, assess the availability of logistical and administrative support; and further identify and collect relevant reference material. This evaluation plan will be shared with the ASG-RC/HC and the UNCT for approval.

**Phase 2 – Conduct of data collection activities and the preparation of the evaluation reports:**

i. Desk review of reference material: The evaluation team is responsible for reviewing the reference documents, reports and any other data and information provided by the RCO.

ii. Main data collection: The evaluation team will conduct data collection activities as guided by the inception report. They will conduct agreed-upon interviews with stakeholders and site visits. At the end of the data collection activities, a meeting will be organized by the evaluation team, led by the evaluation team leader, participated by key stakeholder representatives, to present preliminary findings and obtain feedback from the stakeholders.

iii. Data analysis and reporting: The evaluation team will conduct further data analysis based on all information collected and prepare a draft evaluation report for the SF evaluation within three weeks upon completion of the main data collection and analysis activities. The SF Evaluation Team Leader will submit the report to the UNCT.

iv. Review of the draft report and finalization of the report: the draft SF Evaluation Report will be submitted for factual correction and feedback to key stakeholders. The SF Evaluation Team, in consultation with the UNCT, will prepare an audit trail to indicate how the comments were taken into account, and will finalize the SF evaluation report.

**Phase 3 - Follow-up:**

The UNCT together with the RCO will draft a management response to the evaluation recommendation with time bound action plan and will conduct follow-up activities, as guided by their respective processes and mandates. In the context of the UNDAF Evaluation:

i. Dissemination of the evaluation findings and recommendations

ii. Implementation of a follow-up plan, in particular focusing on the design of a new CF cycle.

3. Budget and timeframe:

In total, the evaluation process is planned for **6 months from launch to completion** (phase 1 (Feb-March 2021), phase 2 (April-June 2021) and phase 3 (July 2021)).

The costs of the SF evaluation can be shared among all involved parties including the RCO (USD 50k) and the UNCT members, based on the agreement reached within the UNCT. The expected total is USD 80,000.

### E.      Governance and management arrangements

The SF evaluation **Steering Committee (SC)** is the body responsible for the proper conduct of SF evaluation, co-chaired by the ASG-RC/HC and a government representative. UNCT members or government agency counterparts not on the SC may opt to join the Consultative Group (defined below). The SC and the Consultative Group should be formed at the start of the evaluation.

The SC will appoint an **Evaluation Manager**. The Evaluation Manager should not be and have not been involved in implementing a programme or a project to be evaluated, have a sound knowledge of the evaluation process and methodology, and understands how to abide by UNEG Evaluation Norms and Standards. Normally, it should be a M&E officer in the RCO (the position is still vacant). The ASG-RC/HC and UNCT should ensure that the Evaluation Manager could operate within an environment and conditions conducive to an independent and unbiased evaluation management and is not subject to undue pressure from any interested party.

The Steering Committee and the Evaluation Manager may also be supported by evaluation officers of agencies, particularly the regional evaluation advisors.

The Steering Committee will invite government counterparts and other key stakeholders of UNCT agencies to form a **Consultative Group**. The Consultative Group should be sufficiently inclusive to represent various sectoral interests. Key stakeholders include civil society representatives, in particular those who could reflect interest of various social groups, including women, youth, migrants, refugees, and people who are "left behind", as well as international development or financing partners. The Group can also include UNCT members not on the Steering Committee, or non-resident agency representatives. The Consultative Group will provide inputs at key stages of evaluation, such as in the design and activity planning, the validation of findings and the forming of recommendations.

The **Evaluation Team** will be comprised of independent external evaluators – a team leader with extensive evaluation expertise and a national evaluator (the team can have more members depending on the UNCT recommendation and the budget). There must be at least two members to allow triangulation of observations and validation of findings within the team. In composing the evaluation team, national evaluators should be used to the extent possible, and the gender balance should be kept.

## Qualification of the consultant – *Team Leader*

One international consultant, in her/his role as the SF Evaluation Team Leader, is needed with the following skills and experience:

● Advanced university degree (Masters and equivalent) in development studies, international relations, social science or related field; PhD an asset.

● 10 years of relevant professional experience is highly desirable, including previous substantive involvement in SF or UNDAF evaluations and/or reviews at programme and/or outcome levels in related fields with international organizations, preferably in DaO countries.

● Excellent knowledge of the UN system and UN common country programming processes;

● Specialized experience and/or methodological/technical knowledge, including some specific data collection and analytical skills, particularly in the following areas: understanding of human rights-based approaches to programming; gender considerations; environmental sustainability, Results Based Management (RBM) principles; logic modelling/logical framework analysis; quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis; participatory approaches;

● Knowledge of the development issue in the context of protracted conflict is an asset;

● Excellent written and spoken English.

● Excellent report writing skills as well as communication and interviewing skills.

## Qualification of the consultant – *National*

One national consultant, in her/his assisting role to the SF Evaluation Team Leader, is needed with the following skills and experience:

● Advanced university degree (Masters and equivalent) in development studies, international relations, social science or related field;

● 7 years of relevant professional experience is highly desirable, including previous substantive involvement in evaluations and/or reviews.

● Good knowledge of the UN system and UN common country programming processes;

● Excellent knowledge and experience with the national development priorities and issues;

● Experience and/or methodological/technical knowledge, including some specific data collection and analytical skills, particularly in the following areas: understanding of human rights-based approaches to programming; gender considerations; Results Based Management (RBM) principles; logic modelling/logical framework analysis; quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis; participatory approaches.

● Excellent written and spoken English and Arabic.

● Excellent report writing skills as well as communication and interviewing skills.

The SF evaluation will have a designated **Evaluation Advisor** in DCO to safeguard the independence and quality of the evaluation and to intervene in case of dispute.

See Annex 1 for the proposed roles and responsibilities in details.

**F.     Expected deliverables**

The evaluation team, led by the SF team leader is expected to produce the following deliverables:

● An inception report outlining the evaluation team's understanding of the issues under review including a review framework and a detailed work plan. The work plan should definesthe specific evaluation design, tools and procedures, outlining specific dates for key deliverables. The report further refines the overall evaluation scope, approach, design and timeframe, provides a detailed outline of the evaluation methodology;

● A presentation with preliminary findings to be shared;

● A first draft report for circulation and identification of factual corrections from stakeholders;

● A second draft report for circulation to the DCO and other external advisory entities for quality assurance;

● A final review report and presentation to be shared.

*Structure of the SF Evaluation Report*

The SF Evaluation Report should be developed in accordance with the UNEG "Standards for Evaluation in the UN system", "Norms for Evaluation in UN System and "Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation.". The report will not be longer than 50 pages excluding annexes, and should include the following sections:

1.     Executive Summary

2.     Introduction (Context and national priorities, Purpose, Scope, and methodology, etc.)

3.     A Reflection on the main findings which considers: (a) the results of the desk review of existing documentation available, and (b) the interviews/meetings/discussions conducted with key stakeholders, (c) the data collected during the field mission (if taking place)

● Relevance and appropriateness of the UN system support

● Effectiveness and efficiency of the SF through UNCT's coherent support

● Supporting sustainability and transformational changes

2.     Major challenges and lessons learnt

3.     Conclusions

4.     Recommendations identifying issues and opportunities to consider in preparing for the new CF

5.     Annexes might include the following:

● Photos

● List of used documents and persons met

● TOR

● The evaluation matrix

**G.     Reference materials**

● Strategic Framework (2019-2021)

- Joint Country Assessment in 2018 by UNCT, UNSMIL, WB
- Coordination Reports by RCO
- SF Result Report (to be produced by March 2021)
- SF Joint Work Plan for 2021 (to be produced in Q2 2021)
- UN Agency Country Programme documents, result reports, and evaluation reports (if taken place)
- Minutes from the UNCT meetings
- Outcome document from the UNCT retreat in Dec 2020
- Other documents as required

## Proposed Roles and Responsibilities

The **Steering Committee** is responsible for ensuring the SF evaluation is conducted in a timely manner and through proper process, so as to meet quality standards and be useful to the UNCT and to stakeholders. Specifically, the Steering Committee will:

● make key decisions on the SF evaluation in consultation with government counterparts and invite the counterpart officials and other key stakeholders to form a Consultative Group;

● inform UNDCO of the launch of the evaluation, so that an Evaluation Advisor can be assigned, and inform UNEG in order to obtain necessary support;

● appoint the Evaluation Manager;

● provide sufficient resources to conduct the evaluation – adequate budget should have been allocated in advance but, if needed, adjust it based on actual estimates made by the Evaluation Manager and agree on the funding sources;

● ensure that office staff give the Evaluation Team their full support;

● approve the terms of reference;

● approve the Evaluation Team proposed by the Evaluation Manager and cleared by the UNDCO Evaluation Advisor;

● ensure the Evaluation Team has access to information and stakeholders;

● comment on the draft report, using an audit trail;

● approve the final report after the clearance (with external quality check) by the UNDCO Evaluation Advisor;

● prepare the Management Response, in consultation with all UNCT members;

● organize a stakeholder workshop once the final report is ready;

● transmit the report to UNDCO to be placed on global/regional platforms and to relevant offices at regional level, at the agency headquarters;

● take measures to disseminate the evaluation and promote the use of evaluation and lessons;

● follow up on management response.

The **Evaluation Manager** is responsible for managing the entire process: ensuring that the evaluation is properly conducted, managing the validation and quality-control process, and making sure that the report fulfils the terms of reference. The Evaluation Manager will:

● conduct the preparatory work needed to define the scope and the evaluation questions by mapping activities, stakeholders and available secondary data (such as evaluation reports, results monitoring data and statistics);

● draft the terms of reference, circulate them to the Steering Committee and Consultative Group for comment and obtain approval from the Steering Committee and clearance from the Evaluation Advisor at UNDCO;

● draw-up the initial budget estimate based on the number and levels of Evaluation Team members, the estimated cost of activities required and the availability of secondary data, and obtain approval from the Steering Committee;

● recruit the Evaluation Team and obtain approval of Team choices from the Steering Committee and clearance from the Evaluation Advisor at UNDCO;

● provide the Evaluation Team with all the information it needs to conduct the evaluation efficiently and effectively (activity map, stakeholder map, secondary data, etc.) and arrange briefings by UNCT members and Programme Managers on their respective programmes and activities;

● receive and review the inception report prepared by the Evaluation Team, have it reviewed by the Evaluation Advisor of UNDCO, and advise the Evaluation Team on revisions, if needed;

● facilitate evaluation activities, assist the Evaluation Team in gaining access to stakeholders and additional information, and arrange meetings and logistics;

● receive the consolidated first draft of the evaluation and conduct a pro forma quality check[86] (structure and format, compliance with the terms of reference);

● send the first draft to the Evaluation Advisor at UNDCO for the record;

● manage the validation process by circulating the draft for comment to the Steering Committee, Consultative Group and any other key stakeholders, ensuring all comments and responses are properly recorded, using an audit trail;

● send comments to the Evaluation Team for draft revision;

● send the revised draft and the audit trail to the Evaluation Advisor for an external quality check and request that the Evaluation Team revise the report if necessary;

● send the final report to the Evaluation Advisor and obtain clearance for payment of the Evaluation Team (if the report has met the criteria of the external quality check);

● prepare for and manage the stakeholder workshop;

● arrange a debriefing of individual UNCT members to obtain Evaluation Team feedback in a safe space;

● complete the Evaluation Report for publication and dissemination;

● support the dissemination activities of the Steering Committee;

● support the Steering Committee in follow up to management response.

The **Consultative Group** will support the evaluation process, ensuring, in particular, that the evaluation properly addresses the issues of importance to different ministries/agencies and other key stakeholders involved and that the evaluators gain access to relevant informants and information sources. In addition to promoting ownership of and buy-in to the evaluation results, the Consultative Group will also:

● review and comment on the terms of reference;

● facilitate the evaluation process, helping the team to identify and gain access to government and other stakeholders;

● comment on the draft report;

● support the organization of the stakeholder workshop; and

● facilitate maximum in-country dissemination of the report.

The **Evaluation Advisor** of UNDCO will oversee the process to ensure the independence and quality of the evaluation. The Evaluation Advisor will:

● clear the selection of the Evaluation Team, confirming the professional credentials of the team members and the absence of any conflicts of interest;

---

[86] For the quality control of the Terms of Reference, the inception report and the final evaluation report – including for the external quality check by UNDCO, UNEG Quality Checklists (2010) should be used.

● establish a hotline for the Evaluation Team, to be used if the Team encounters risks to the independent conduct of the evaluation;

● review the inception report, checking if the approach and the methodology proposed are of professional quality;

● receive the first and final draft of the report and the audit trail to ensure the transparency of the process and ascertain that the Evaluation Team was not subject to undue pressure to alter the contents of the report; and

● conduct an external quality check of the draft report and clear payment to the Evaluation Team once any outstanding issues have been addressed satisfactorily.