INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND'S INVESTMENTS IN THE AFRICAN STATES

Final report - *Volume I*

GREEN CLIMATE FUND | Independent Evaluation Unit

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GREEN CLIMATE FUND
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION UNIT

Independent Evaluation of the Relevance and Effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's Investments in the African States

FINAL REPORT

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FOREWORD

Although African continent is one of the smallest contributors to global carbon emissions, with just around 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, the threat of climate change on the continent is amongst the largest in the world. At the same time, while the threat remains large, the economies have already taken a hit of between 5% and 15% as a result of climate change. African countries have committed to bold aspirations to build climate resilient and low-carbon economies in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement. Governments have initiated systems for adaptation responses to climate change throughout the continent. However, persistent under-resourcing and a need for more capacity and competencies at the institutional level continue to hamper progress. This is despite the promise developed countries made in 2009 at the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to collectively mobilise United States Dollars (USD) 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries.

But where exactly are we today? Reports in 2022 still estimated that in mobilising climate finance, developed countries still fall significantly short of the annual USD 100 billion goal. A key role is attributed to multilateral funds, like the GCF, in supporting developing countries to reach their NDCs, particularly the most vulnerable countries like the African states.

While goals with astronomical numbers such as 100 billion are significant for policy makers, it is important to keep in mind the human stories and real-life impact that climate change effects have for people. Young climate activists around the world remind us of what positive change efforts to build up resilience can have on communities on the ground. "*Climate change is more than statistics, it's more than data points. It's more than net-zero targets. It's about the people, it's about the people who are being impacted right now.*" insists Vanessa Nakate, Climate Activist and founder of the Rise Up initiative, in Uganda in January 2022.

That is why it is vital to ensure that the climate finance being made available to African states is being put to best use. Institutions like the GCF, as the largest multilateral climate fund, should continue to improve collaborations and work to support African states realize their climate aspirations towards low-emissions, climate resilient pathways.

It is in this context that I introduce to you the final evaluation of the concerted effort to assess the relevance and effectiveness of GCF's investments in the vulnerable countries, after Small Island Developing States and least developed countries. **The purpose of this evaluation** is to encourage learning from the experience of the GCF in Africa so far, and to assess the support given to the continent by the GCF in their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while developing in a sustainable and climate resilient manner. Most countries have indicated their commitment to fighting climate change through NDCs but need more financial and technical capacity assistance. This is where the GCF comes in. Against the backdrop of the urgent climate crisis in Africa, the evaluation has asked the questions of how the GCF's approach and investments in the African states are relevant to meet the continent's needs, whether they have been effective in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and their livelihoods and whether these impacts are likely to be sustained.

In summary, the evaluation provides four areas for critical recommendations. First, in re-focusing the GCF towards learning and results, the GCF should consider shifting its Africa portfolio towards adaptation, based on comprehensive stakeholder engagement and mapping as well as the intentional use of result areas for programming. Second, in helping streamline climate action and finance on the continent, the GCF should operationalize the coherence and complementarity framework both at project and country level. Third, the GCF builds on a strong partnership model. Partners are key to success. The GCF should reinforce clear and shared responsibility and accountability across its ecosystem, including NDAs and focal points, for programming and support, to address and remedy high transaction costs. The GCF should also take initiative in providing more tailored approaches with its accredited entities, to address hindrances in accessing the GCF. The GCF should also actively consider CSOs in local climate action management and provide opportunities for capacity building and direct access. Lastly, learning locally is imperative to leapfrog as a climate fund. The GCF should consider steps to enhance stakeholder engagement in the planning, implementation and access to the GCF in Africa. And for this, the GCF should consider a comprehensive and integrated learning and knowledge management approach to allow us to learn from the people on the ground. My team and I hope this work will help the GCF in the delivery of the much-needed climate finance to the African states to combat climate change.

Andreas Reumann

Head a.i. of Independent Evaluation Unit, Green Climate Fund

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This evaluation was managed and completed by Mr. Daisuke Horikoshi with an evaluation team of Mr. Andreas Reumann, Dr. Anastasia Aladysheva, Mr. Peter Mwandri, Mr. Prashanth Kotturi, Mr. Mutukwa Musole, and Ms. Elangtlhoko Mokgano. The evaluation has been jointly written and is co-owned by a team of experts from Universalia: Dr. Eric Abitol, Mr. Phil Cox, Ms. Aurélie Ieroncig, Dr. Ansgar Eussner, Dr. Marie-Éve Yergeau, Ms. Shaida Mahmoud, Dr. Amanda Woomer, and Ms. Rennie Jordan.

All responsibility, including for any errors, lies solely with the IEU, who carried out this assessment. Views expressed here are not a reflection of the official views of the GCF Board, nor its members and the countries they represent.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Agence de Développement Agricole
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AE	Accredited entity
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement*
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMA	Accreditation master agreement
APR	Annual performance report
ARAF	Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund
ARC	African Risk Capital
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid land
AU	African Union
BOAD	*Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement*
CFF	Climate Finance Facility
CI	Conservation International
CIF	Climate Investment Fund
COA	Country ownership approach
COP	Conference of Parties
CPI	Climate Policy Initiative
CSO	Civil society organizations
DAE	Direct Access Entity
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DCP	Division of Country Programming
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EDA	Enhancing direct access
EE	Executing entity
EGIP	Embedded Generation Investment Programme
EU	European Union
FAA	Funded activity agreement
FCS	Fragile and conflict-affected situations
FCV	Fragile conflict and violence
FP	Funding Proposal
GCA	Global Center on Adaptation

GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGW	Great Green Wall
GGWI	GGW Initiative
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GI	Governing Instrument
GNI	Gross national income
IAE	International Accredited Entities
IDFC	International Development Finance Club
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IPAG	Indigenous People's Advisory Group
IRM	Initial resource mobilisation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC	Least developed country
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
LEAF	Leveraging Energy Access Finance
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MENA	Middle East and Northern Africa
MOE	Ministry of Environment
MSME	Micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises
NAP	National Adaptation Plans
NDA	National designated authority
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NOL	No-objection letter
PACJA	Pan African Climate Justice Alliance
PAP	Proposal approval process
PCA	Pegasus Capital Advisors
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PSF	Private Sector Facility
RCC	Regional Collaboration Centres

RPSP	Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme
SANBI	South African National Biodiversity Institute
SAP	Simplified approval process
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TA	Technical assistance
TACATDP	Tanzania Agriculture Climate Adaptation Technology Deployment Programme
ToC	Theory of change
UGP	Updated Gender Policy
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollars
USP	Updated Strategic Plan
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WRI	World Resources Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

MANDATE

This evaluation was approved by the Board of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) at its thirtieth meeting, through decision B.30/10 and as part of the Independent Evaluation Unit's (IEU) 2022 Work Plan. The GCF's Governing Instrument identifies least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states (SIDS) and African states as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, the GCF has provided special considerations for these countries. The present **Independent Evaluation of the Relevance and Effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's Investments in the African** States is part of a broader effort by the GCF's IEU to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of interventions in vulnerable states (including LDCs and SIDS).

CONTEXT: THE AFRICAN STATES AND THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND

The African continent's immense and growing climate change related challenges serve as the basis of the GCF's investment there, and thus also of this evaluation. The African continent accounts for the smallest share of the planet's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet faces some of the most significant and accelerating climate adaptation challenges. At 1.64 billion people, African states have the highest share of population experiencing very strong or extreme heat stress days when compared to other continents. Moreover, 20 of the continent's 54 states were classified by the World Bank in 2022 as experiencing high-intensity conflict, medium-intensity conflict, and/or high institutional and social fragility. The relationship between climate and fragility is complex and poses additional obstacles for the African states.

To address the many climate-related challenges, large financial resources are required. Yet, a significant gap continues to exist between actual climate finance flows to African states and the reported costs of implementing both their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The GCF is the largest multilateral climate finance institution in the world, and thus has a central financial contribution to make alongside other environment and climate funds and organizations. All African countries are eligible for GCF funding to support them in meeting the challenges of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

SCOPE AND METHOD

Scope: This evaluation assesses whether and the extent to which GCF approaches and investments are effective in contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC and other global and regional agendas. It examines the GCF's effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and promoting a paradigm shift toward low emission and climate resilient development pathways in Africa. It considers matters of innovation, replicability and scalability, ascertaining whether positive impacts are likely to be sustained. The evaluation was undertaken with consideration for diverse stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. It also recognizes the heterogenous situation of African states and explores how these differences have informed, enabled or constrained their engagement with the GCF.

Methods: The evaluation was undertaken using a mixed-method approach, including a document review (of both internal and external documents), an analysis of the GCF's portfolio in Africa and external databases (including the World Bank Open Data), the portfolios of the Global Environment

Facility (GEF), the Climate Investment Fund (CIF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF), of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-Gain) data, and others, stakeholder consultation, event attendance, case studies and country missions[1], a survey administered to civil society organizations, and a so-called 3CO – Complementary, Coherence and Cooperation – Analysis.

KEY FINDINGS

RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

GCF support to African states aligns mostly with relevant international agendas on climate action, including the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As it stands, SDG alignment is explicit in each GCF project design and disaster risk management content is embedded in several GCF projects in Africa.

GCF engagement on the continent is relevant to the realization of African states' commitments to reduce GHG emissions and increase climate resilience. Over the past seven years (2015-2022), the GCF has become the largest among the multilateral climate finance contributors to the African states, with a rate of growth in contributions outpacing that of its peer funds. At the same time, the amount of climate finance made available, overall, has been short of what is needed to meet the pledge made by developed countries of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (then 2025), and well short of estimated climate financing needs.

The programming scope offered under the GCF's eight result areas aligns with regional and country needs across the African states. **However, there are concerns about a portfolio that presently shows substantially more mitigation than adaptation initiatives on account of climate change trends in Africa and the continent's relatively minor role as a GHG emitter.** Specific commitments toward African states in the GCF's Initial Investment Framework include the pledge to achieve an overall 50%-50% balance (on grant-equivalent basis) in the GCF portfolio between mitigation and adaptation (Green Climate Fund, 2020c). However, as recognized at the Conference of Parties (COP) 27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, the African states portfolio continues to show more mitigation projects. Cumulatively, over seven years, the GCF's mitigation-focused projects have made up 59% of GCF finance approved for the African states. Also, more than 40% of the approved financing in Africa addresses "energy generation and access result area".

COHERENCE IN CLIMATE FINANCE AND DELIVERY

For the time being, **the pursuit and operationalization of cooperation and complementarity remains largely unsystematic, unincentivized and thus limited**, realized primarily by accredited entities (AEs) of the multiple funds at national and in some cases regional (or multi-regional) project levels. A good example of a major – if still nascent – initiative for joint programming is related to the Great Green Wall (GGW). It is one concrete example of how the GCF and GEF Secretariats

[1] Five case studies were prepared as part of this evaluation. Three thematic case studies were undertaken to explore particular areas of interest, including Case study 1 on the Great Green Wall (GGW) with a field mission in the Ivory Coast, Case study 2 on fragile, conflict, and violence-affected (FCV) African States with a field mission to Africa Climate Week (ACW) 2022 in Gabon, and Case study 3 on countries without a single-country funded project (FP) with a field mission in Tunisia. Two country-specific case studies with related field missions to those countries were undertaken to better explore the GCF's work and impact on the ground, including Case study 4 on Kenya and Case study 5 on South Africa. Case study reports are provided in Volume III of this report.

have worked together to support complementary actions, with implementation undertaken by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

While there is evidence of constructive cases, further coordination is inhibited by a series of factors that include weaknesses related to in-country coordination for climate financing; the high transaction cost in terms of staffing coordinating among the Funds and staffing in AEs for planning and jointly implementing, scaled up or even parallel projects; and the different planning processes and decision-making schedules of the Funds themselves. While GCF Funding Proposal templates now ask about the complementarity and coherence of projects, there are no financial resources available specifically for pursuing coordination, which can be very time-consuming.

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES

Overall, based on a framework developed by the IEU, most African countries are understood to have **moderate country ownership**, having received generally enabling support from the GCF, for example in the form of readiness support. Country ownership has been a central component of the GCF strategy from the beginning, though there is no Board-approved definition of country ownership. All African states have a national designated authority/focal point in place; **however, its position in governments and the strength of staff vary significantly, which creates coordination and stakeholder engagement challenges for some.**

GCF expectations for stakeholder engagement are well established in policy and guidance notes, and they are evidenced through the Fund’s engagement with African states. The GCF country readiness, program/project preparation and observer activities related to the GCF Board facilitate participation most especially around those aspects of its mandate that are anticipatory – i.e., related to policy, planning and project design. **However, robust stakeholder engagement in management, in governance and in monitoring and learning at country level are yet to be in place.** For this reason, among others, the quality of engagement is routinely questioned by African stakeholders, particularly among civil society. There is significant variability in the engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) by national governments in project planning, monitoring and implementation, such that civil society remains a vastly under-utilised source of experience, wisdom and capacity.

The GCF has articulated a preference for Direct Access Entities (DAEs) over International Accredited Entities (IAEs) for the development of projects, in line with a country-owned approach. However, **the direct access model of the GCF is inhibited by a paucity of nominated and accredited DAEs**, with only 18 DAEs accredited in 13 of the 54 African countries. There are promising indications that this will shift positively into the relatively near future, though the business case for accreditation in a few countries (e.g., South Africa, Tunisia, and others) has been brought into question by entities given the immense effort required.

Multi-country projects are more common in African states. Only four countries have no multi-country funding proposals (FPs) approved or projects in the pipeline, another five countries have at least one in the pipeline, and 45 countries have one or more multi-country projects approved. **In general, stakeholders see single country projects as indicative of greater country ownership,** as they are necessarily focused on national priorities and requirements, and the amounts to be approved (including the co-financing) are known before the No Objection Letter (NOL) is given.

In interviews, some national stakeholders of African countries with weak capacities expressed the view that IAEs, with their more extensive experience, are able to prepare, approve, and implement projects more quickly than national institutions. Thus, to move more quickly towards results, some indicated that they prefer to work with IAEs. Nevertheless, **a preference for DAEs is more widely**

expressed by national stakeholders, both in principle and because DAEs are said to be more attuned to national needs and priorities that IAEs.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INVESTMENTS

At the time of this evaluation, it is still too early to comprehensively assess the achievement of results from GCF investments in African states, particularly at a portfolio level. The first project was approved seven years ago, it takes some 2-3 years to initiate implementation, and the results only become apparent after five years or more. Also, the COVID-19 pandemic has reportedly led to lower implementation rates and results than projected in Africa. Nevertheless, there are specific projects in Africa, referred to as legacy projects, that provide examples of early results or projected impacts, with more information about mitigation projects, given adaptation results take more time.

Approved single- and multi-country projects in African states (excluding projects that include countries from other regions) are expected to, directly and indirectly, **reach over 200.6 million (million) beneficiaries in Africa**. They are also expected to **reduce the equivalent of over 360.9million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2).** A review of the GCF portfolio's focus suggests it will contribute to a larger extent to advancing mitigation over adaptation objectives.

Countries with strong DAEs are found to have the most developed portfolios, as per the total portfolio value. Specifically, African states in which an active DAE is headquartered are found to have portfolios of higher value of total finance. Active DAEs are also more likely than others to have single country FPs, to have received Project Preparation Facility (PPF) support, and to receive country co-financing on projects.

The GCF has been **effective at leveraging co-financing in Africa**, however, co-financing for LDCs and in African fragile conflict and violence affected (FCV) states experiencing **medium-intensity conflict and high institutional and social fragility remains low** compared to the level of co-financing leveraged in other African states.

In total, **77% of co-financing leveraged has been geared towards mitigation**. Although co-financing comes from diverse sources that include African governments and the private sector, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are the largest source of co-financing, providing co-financing for a third of the GCF's African projects and representing over a third of the total co-financing amount. Mitigation projects were reported as being more attractive given the higher possibility of returns on investments and the limited extent to which strong business cases have been made for adaptation projects.

Private sector engagement with the GCF in African States has been **slow in launching, although momentum has developed** during the GCF-1 period, with 65% of private sector financing provided after 2019. Private sector engagement and investments are largely based on the GCF's ability to de-risk investments through a combination of financial instruments, an increase in equity, and guarantees from initial resource mobilisation (IRM) to GCF-1. Additionally, the GCF has only placed **modest emphasis on promoting the participation of micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)** in GCF activities in African LDCs, SIDS, and FCV states, which are in fact the vast majority of private sector actors in Africa.

Africa has received the second highest single country share of readiness funding overall. The GCF has invested its resources in building the institutional capacity of African states primarily through its Readiness programme. The level of support fluctuates but trends positively for all country groups in Africa, and particularly for LDCs.

However, the GCF's Readiness support has been under-utilised and is challenging to access by the countries and entities needing it most. Indeed, African States have not been accessing all the Readiness support to which they are entitled and to the levels required to build generally much-needed capacity. Challenges in accessing Readiness have reportedly pertained to the complexity and length of the process and relatedly high transaction costs, which are further compounded in certain non-English speaking countries and countries with limited capacity. Given that the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP) is often the gateway to engaging with the GCF, challenges in accessing the Programme become a major impediment to the GCF's effectiveness, particularly for DAEs seeking to build timely and robust pipelines.

PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARDS LOW EMISSION AND CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT PATHWAYS

Paradigm shift is central to the GCF's objectives, and its meaning is woven into all the stages of the programme/project management cycle. The GCF's paradigm shift potential is assessed based on three dimensions: scale – a quantifiable change in magnitude of results within and beyond the project; depth – extent of uptake by targeted groups or embeddedness in systems, independent of cost; and sustainability – the degree to which the change is supported structurally, culturally and financially such that the change is irreversible. **However, in the African states portfolio, the task of operationalizing "paradigm shift potential" in project design and implementation occurs without a shared understanding of pathways to impact.**

Examples of paradigm shift potential are emerging in scenarios where the GCF has contributed either with readiness support or through a project. As such, these examples offer clues as to what is needed to enable shifts toward new paradigms. **For the time being, though, key elements of paradigm shift are lacking in abundance and are distributed unevenly across the African states portfolio.**

Indeed, at this stage in the development of the African states portfolio, it is too early to see signals of scale, depth, and sustainability beyond what can plausibly be created by accredited entities (AEs) within project time frames. While signals of systems change are evident within country legal-policy-institutional environments and within projects that indicate paradigm shift potential, evidence of systemic change occurring outside the realm of individual projects is limited because of the maturity of the portfolio and its make-up as a set of discreet projects.

GENDER EQUITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION

The **GCF's commitment to use a gender-responsive approach** can be traced to its 2019 Updated Gender Policy (UGP), while its commitment to gender sensitivity originates in the Governing Instrument and the UNFCCC document itself. The policy is operationalized by the GCF's Gender Action Plan (2020-23), which requires the GCF to ensure that AEs have, "established competencies, tools and processes to achieve results", and that its Board has the information required to, "exercise oversight responsibility for the Gender Policy and Action Plan."

The evaluation has found that **gender-related dimensions** of the African states portfolio **are considered across design, implementation and monitoring stages, and most systematically during project design** with the development of required gender assessments and gender action plans.

Across the portfolio, **reporting on gender-related co-benefits is limited and largely confined to commentary on formative processes identified in gender action plans** such as assessments, tendering, recruitment, skills development, setting up service delivery mechanisms (e.g., micro-funds), and adjusting institutional policies and practices. **Nevertheless, gender-related co-benefits reported at this stage are growing and diverse.** They include employment opportunities, sector-specific capacity enhancements, equitable access to information and resources, emergent women-led services/businesses, benefits-sharing mechanisms and more**.** While progress is underway in achieving certain elements of mainstreaming, **evidence of transformative change (where imbalances in power relations between women and men are addressed, and where visible and invisible structures and norms upholding these relationships are removed) is confined to specific projects and is largely anecdotal**.

In the African States portfolio, the involvement of indigenous peoples has reflected a much more limited extent than gender across the stages of project development. The evaluation encountered little evidence of the GCF engagement with indigenous peoples across the African portfolio. With a few exceptions, the dominant refrain from African stakeholders is that there are no indigenous peoples affected by or involved in project activities or that indigeneity is complex or ill-advised in an African context. Yet, the requirement to engage with indigenous peoples as part of the project cycle is spelled out in the GCF's Indigenous Peoples Policy.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms are set up to track gender-related dimensions of the African portfolio. In some project contexts, gender performance indicators are found to be overly complex, not well understood and remote from beneficiaries. **By contrast, there is no provision at a portfolio level to understand the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities or to track co-benefits associated with their participation.**

Across the Africa States portfolio, the shortcomings most commonly observed in the implementation of M&E relate to the selection of indicators and methods (quantitative and qualitative) used to address gender mainstreaming; the ability to track the engagement of youth; and the ability to track the participation of indigenous peoples through the project cycle, the utilisation of their knowledge systems, and the results obtained.

Efficiency

African States have received the lowest average financing per project (including GCF and co-financing), standing at USD 116.9million per project, when compared to USD 169.7million in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and USD 204.4million in Asia Pacific. Project designs suggest outcomes will be likely achieved efficiently. Indeed, a review of output indicators to total project financing suggests that GCF interventions in Africa are likely to be cost-effective compared to the GCF portfolio as a whole.

The extent to which the GCF is accounting for high operating costs in Africa remains somewhat limited, **as the policy on AE fees is applied uniformly across regions and AE types.** The GCF policy on fees states that fees are determined based on the project size, with no regard to project location or country classification such as LDC, SIDS or FCV states. Of particular interest, early evidence suggests that **DAEs have the potential to deliver outcomes more cost-effectively** than is the case for IAEs.

Widely described as **cumbersome and resource intensive, many of the GCF's processes are inadequate** for the urgency of and needs in African states. Heavy and rigid procedures have made access to financing through the various modalities a difficult, time-consuming, and costly process. This has further heightened the need for both capacity building of African institutions to access financing, and for streamlining GCF processes to ensure greater efficiency. **Important challenges in working with the GCF include a lack of DAEs, language-related barriers, lack of flexibility,**

lack of clarity and consistency in process and procedure, currency risks, and matters of access and proximity. While also affecting country ownership, project implementation, and the willingness of stakeholders to engage with the GCF, these challenges have a particular effect on the GCF and its partners' ability to work efficiently.

SUSTAINABILITY, REPLICATION AND SCALABILITY

The concept of sustainability is found to be central to the GCF's strategic objectives, as recognized in the Updated Strategic Plan (USP), particularly as it relates to the GCF's objective of enabling a paradigm shift. However, given project trajectories, with only the oldest projects in Africa just coming to a close, it is too early to assess the extent to which the GCF's contributions in African states will be sustained.

Nevertheless, several GCF intervention design features and factors such as:

- Strong country ownership is widely observed to be a determinant of sustainability.
- Alignment with priorities and needs, which is required to be emphasized in project documents, is also regarded as enhancing the potential sustainability of projects.
- Ensuring local communities understand interventions' benefits and co-benefits has the potential to increase the desire for these benefits to be sustained.
- Ensuring there is a capacity to sustain project outcomes is central to the sustainability of benefits.
- Private sector engagement favours sustainability, in part through business continuity as well as the provision of critical financial resources.

Relatedly, the concepts of replicability and scalability are associated with paradigm shift and systemic change, innovation, as well as cooperation and coordination with other climate funds and co-financing, including by governments, other agencies, and/or the private sector. **Still somewhat limited, conceptual visibility, coherence, and guidance at the GCF on the related concepts of replicability and scalability are largely concentrated at the project level only.** In particular, GCF projects generally include considerations for expanding the scope and reach of existing projects, and also for building on prior projects in some cases, as a number of project examples provide.

Replicability and scalability can take many often-overlapping forms, in terms of strategies and approaches, instruments, and solutions, as evident in many GCF FP designs. First, **working with existing partners (e.g., other funds and AEs) on linked** projects has been a scaling and replication strategy of the GCF. For instance, as partners with a long term vision on complementarity, Coherence and Collaboration between the GCF and the GEF (LTV), the GCF and GEF have encouraged efforts to link, lightly coordinate and scale their work, as in the case of the GGW Initiative. Second**, using new financial instruments, including concessional finance in sectors where perceived risks ward against private sector investment, has helped overcome obstacles and build new opportunities for scaling**. These include the water, sanitation and ocean sectors, the decentralized renewable energy sector, and the agriculture sector where a combination of concessional finance, adaptive climate smart technologies and capacity building support are expected to bring about change at scale. Third, **geographic expansion of solutions, either locally/nationally, to other single countries or to multiple countries is a frequently pursued way to scale impact**. Indeed, the GCF has been supporting projects that have broad reach, in multiple countries and regions globally, with an African component.

KEY CONCLUSIONS

The findings led to the following conclusions.

Relevance and targeting of the GCF in Africa

For the most part, **GCF has been moderately relevant to the African states**, in line with international agendas on climate action. However, **its portfolio is weighted towards mitigation results areas.** The GCF has proven itself to be an important source of financing, capacity development, and other forms of support to African states for tackling key and urgent climate change related challenges. However, African states stakeholders have called for a re-balancing to take place towards adaptation, given the real and imminent climate impacts they are facing.

Institutional coherence and complementarity

Regional or portfolio level complementarity efforts among other climate funds are limited. Much remains to be done to effectively operationalize a coherent and coordinated provision of climate finance and related support in Africa. Moving towards greater impact, the GCF has started to work with these and other leading finance and development actors, as well as a whole range of stakeholders at sub-national, national, regional and global levels. In particular, the GCF Secretariat has pursued a high level approach to cooperation with the GEF at the strategic level, and to a far lesser extent with the AF and CIF. For the time being, while unsystematic and unincentivized, **the pursuit and operationalization of cooperation and complementarity are realized mainly by the AEs of the multiple funds.**

Country ownership of projects and programmes

- **The GCF's expectations for stakeholder engagement are well documented in policy and guidance notes. However, robust stakeholder engagement in management, in governance and in monitoring and learning at country level are yet to be put in place.** For this reason, among others, the quality of engagement is routinely questioned by African stakeholders, particularly among civil society. There is significant variability in the engagement of CSOs by national governments in project planning, monitoring and implementation, such that civil society remains a vastly under-utilised source of experience, wisdom and capacity.

Institutional capacity for accessing the GCF

- **The existing menu of support for accessing the GCF is not effective** for some African states. Many African states, particularly LDCs and FCVs, are still facing challenges in accessing the GCF's RPSP and PPF resources. Indeed, African states have received the second highest single country share of RPSP funding among the regions, but African LDC and FCV states are not accessing all the RPSP support to which they are entitled, and to the level required to build generally much-needed capacity. Given that the RPSP is often the gateway to engaging with the GCF, challenges in accessing GCF's climate funding become a major impediment. The PPF also barely serves the needs of SIDS and FCV states. Only a few PPFs have reached approval in African FCV states and SIDS to date.

Access to the GCF's financial resources

- **The direct access model of the GCF in Africa is inhibited by a paucity of nominated and accredited DAEs,** with only 18 DAEs accredited in 13 of the 54 African countries. Also, the number of concept notes submitted by African DAEs has declined in recent years. Additionally, the GCF has only placed modest emphasis on promoting the participation of MSMEs in GCF activities in African LDCs, SIDS, and FCV states, which are in fact the vast majority of private sector actors in Africa. The extent to which the GCF is accounting for high operating costs in

Africa remains somewhat limited, as the policy on AE fees is applied uniformly across regions and AE types. Of particular interest, early evidence suggests that DAEs have the potential to deliver outcomes more cost-effectively than is the case for IAEs. Also, the evidence shows the effectiveness of PPF support for preparing FPs.

The GCF's engagement with countries

- **The GCF's current engagement is not appropriate for some countries in Africa. The GCF is perceived as difficult to access for African states due to its geographical and cultural distance.** The English-only working language of the GCF is a serious and costly impediment confronting non-Anglophone African states (e.g., in the Sahel and the Maghreb). In fact, to date, six countries out of 54 are without any GCF FPs. In addition, 17 countries are without any single country GCF FPs.

Gender and social inclusion

- **Across the portfolio, reporting on gender-related co-benefits is limited and largely confined to commentary on formative processes identified in gender action plans** such as assessments, tendering, recruitment, skills development, setting up service delivery mechanisms (e.g., micro-funds), and adjusting institutional policies and practices. Nevertheless, gender-related co-benefits reported at this stage are growing and diverse. They include employment opportunities, sector-specific capacity enhancements, equitable access to information and resources, emergent women-led services/businesses, benefits-sharing mechanisms and more.
- **Across the African states portfolio, the consideration and active involvement of indigenous peoples is limited**. In particular, the stages of project development struggle to speak comprehensively to indigenous peoples policy objectives. With a few exceptions, the dominant refrain from African stakeholders is that there are no indigenous peoples affected by or involved in project activities, or that indigeneity is complex or ill-advised in an African context.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation makes six major evidence-based recommendations to the GCF Board and Secretariat.

Recommendation 1. Targeting and positioning of the GCF in Africa

The GCF should consider focusing more on addressing adaptation needs in the African states through more accessible financial instruments for LDCs and FCV states.

1) **The GCF should consider shifting its African states portfolio towards a greater focus on adaptation**. Such a shift should be based on specific country needs, comprehensive stakeholder mapping and engagement, and an intentional use of result areas for programming. In doing so, GCF should remain responsive to the priorities of African states in all their diversity, particularly regionally and for vulnerable countries and FCV states, while paying attention to linguistic diversity. A shift towards more adaptation programming would respond to the call from the continent's regional, national and civil society leaders for a portfolio that is more in line with African climate adaptation needs. The applicability of results areas for investment and the monitoring requirements of the Fund is very limited. The GCF has not yet found a way to consider the intentional use of results areas in programming overall, while remaining attentive to the potential overlap between adaptation and mitigation projects.

Programming across results areas, particularly on adaptation, should be targeted to match and balance both continental priorities and the priority needs of specific countries, as per their strategic documents at national level, such as NDCs, NAPs and country programmes.

2) Aside from non-grant instruments, **the GCF should focus on a greater number of smaller and more accessible national level projects based on grants, particularly for LDCs and FCV states in Africa**. In doing so, the GCF should decrease the risk profiles of such states and increase the likelihood of co-financing and co-investing there.

Recommendation 2. Institutional coherence and complementarity

To streamline climate finance in Africa, **the GCF should operationalize the framework of complementarity and coherence at country and project level**, with the intention to reach across various types of stakeholders. Such an operationalization may benefit from RPSP and PPF support as well as project financing informed by shared learning and knowledge sharing processes.

1) **The GCF should engage with the GEF, AF and CIF to lead processes for a systematic and increased information exchange on project planning, development and implementation.** Stakeholders in such a process include climate funds, development organizations, regional governance and development bodies, and implementing/executing entities.
2) **Based on the lessons from the GGW**, **the GCF should consider incentivizing programmatic approaches which allow for the consideration of complementarities among entities** that develop and implement projects for multiple climate institutions.
3) **The GCF should consider directing some RPSP resources towards NDAs/focal points to foster the capacity for complementarity, coherence and coordination** among the climate funds, their accredited and executing entities, and other partners at country level.
4) The Board should consider **an independent assessment on complementarity, coherence and** coordination across the GCF ecosystem.

Recommendation 3. Country ownership and institutional capacity

1) **The GCF should clarify and reinforce guidance on the selection of, and responsibilities allocated to the NDAs/focal points** of African states. In addition, **the GCF should consider a more tailored approach to RPSP support in Africa.** With it, the GCF should consider developing terms of reference and/or guidelines for NDAs that provide clear guidance to them on how to work with the GCF.
    a) **At the country level**, **the GCF's RPSP support should be coupled with heightened GCF guidance. The GCF should also incentivize and monitor RPSP for African LDCs, SIDS and FCV states.** Tailored guidance on the RPSP should aim at encouraging national multi-stakeholder convening, inclusive of state and non-state actors, for planning, networking, collaboration, project design, implementation, and sharing of investment results. Particular attention should be given to African LDC and FCV states, and to those countries without DAEs or inactive DAEs. In addition, the success of such support could be measured through a key performance indicator for the Secretariat which monitors RPSP finance flows to African LDCs, SIDS, FCV states, and to those African countries without DAEs.
    b) **The GCF should consider and remedy high transaction costs for participating in the RPSP** through simplifying the processes used to access the RPSP, and shortening their duration. Such measures should consider the simplification of RPSP templates,

delegated authority in approval, and multi-lingual approaches to increase access for non-Anglophone states.

c) In addition to this, **the GCF should test and consider support for particular entities to overcome financial barriers to applying for the RPSP**. Such support should, in particular, **benefit entities in African LDCs, SIDS, FCV states, and those countries without DAEs and also no single country FPs.**

2) **The GCF should clarify roles and expectations on local stakeholder engagement by a national designated authority/focal points throughout the project cycle.** Stakeholder consultations mostly take place at the design stage but the involvement of local stakeholders or CSOs is often observed as decreasing during project implementation. Active local stakeholder engagement during the project implementation stages will enhance the sustainability of the project.

Recommendation 4. Access and partnership

The GCF should make special efforts to remove the barriers in African states – in particular for entities operating in LDCs, SIDS and FCV states – to accessing the GCF, by taking the following actions:

1) **The GCF should revisit accreditation requirements and processes for national DAEs in LDCs, SIDS and FCV states**, with the goal of **reducing the transaction costs** of becoming a partner to the GCF. Additional considerations could include the simplification of processes and extending the accreditation period significantly, with intermittent and lighter "accreditation reviews".

2) **The GCF should revise its policy on fees for AEs operating in Africa**, to account for the high operating costs of working in the continent, **particularly in LDCs, SIDS and FCV contexts in Africa.** The policy should also account for the additional responsibilities of the AEs, including project monitoring and reporting and institutional learning.

3) **GCF should encourage the pursuit of strategic accreditation among private sector actors in the African state**s, in particular for local financial intermediaries. The Fund should identify engagement opportunities, together with country partners, for those entities likely to enable broader and integrated engagement and partnership with private sector actors. Partnering with, and supporting local financial intermediaries is key. For example, given their successes in attracting private sector adaptation finance, GCF-funded climate change adaptation projects in Tanzania, South Africa, Rwanda and Botswana should be considered for learning and replication.

4) In the African context, **the GCF should tailor their approach to private sector engagement towards MSME participation**. The Fund should reverse the trend of primarily engaging with large entities in the Private Sector Facility entity portfolio. The participation of MSMEs and local actors in climate change mitigation and adaptation projects should be encouraged, given their pre-eminence on the continent.

5) **The GCF should provide CSOs with opportunities for capacity building and direct access. African civil society can support localized decision-making, particularly on climate change adaptation investment**s. CSOs are a notably under-utilised resource for NDAs/focal points and the GCF. To ensure appropriately and consistently inclusive CSO participation in national programming, the GCF should provide CSOs with opportunities for capacity building and direct access through the RPSP.

Recommendation 5. GCF's engagement with countries

The GCF should consider steps to increase efficiency in its engagement with stakeholders of the GCF ecosystem, to enhance planning, implementation and access to the GCF, in particular in the African states.

1) **The GCF should increase its regional presence and engagement in Africa**, through existing institutional structures (e.g., regional dialogues, structured dialogues).
2) **The Board should review and change the organization's hitherto English-only policy** for project submissions and accreditation applications, as well as for supporting documents (e.g., policies) in order to remove a major obstacle to the development of country ownership and project portfolios in African non-Anglophone countries.
3) The GCF should increase the Secretariat's human, institutional, linguistic and financial capacity for absorbing the heightened workload that increased and diversified engagement in Africa will entail.

Recommendation 6. Learning and vulnerable groups

The GCF should consider a comprehensive and integrated learning and knowledge management approach in the African states. In particular, the GCF should strengthen its knowledge base on the integration of environmental and social co-benefits, gender transformation and indigenous considerations, evident across the African states portfolio. At the same time, it should become more intentional, consistent and proactive in applying its indigenous peoples policy in the African states. Such efforts could be complemented by the following actions:

1) As GCF advances gender transformation, **it should use tailored, African-led, independently verifiable assessments, to supplement the monitoring of data.** This should build a systematic and synthetic understanding of its gender impacts in the region. At the same time, these assessments should be used in developing more gender-transformative projects and monitoring and reporting practices.
2) **The GCF should revise its monitoring and reporting approaches** and **align them with the indigenous peoples policy.** Such revision should increase GCF knowledge of the implications and impacts of GCF projects on indigenous peoples in the African states. Here, the GCF should actively seek the advice of the Indigenous People's Advisory Group regarding the apparent reticence by some African states to recognize indigeneity in the formulation of projects.

MAIN REPORT

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

1. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established by 194 governments in 2010 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to contribute to the global response to climate change. The GCF's mandate is to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries, and to help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Today, the GCF is considered a key institution in the global architecture to respond to challenges of climate change.
2. The GCF's present day commitment to support climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries is anchored to its Governing Instrument (GI). Article 2 of the GI brings to the fore the adaptation and mitigation dimensions of climate change management in the wording of the GCF's objective, "to promote a paradigm shift toward low emission and climate resilient development pathways…".[2] The document recognizes climate change as a global emergency requiring a global response but steers the GCF's programming response toward developing countries and, in particular, to those most vulnerable to climate change effects (United Nations, 2012).
3. The GCF aims to provide equal funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation. Its support is delivered across the following four adaptation results areas, namely: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; and (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. It is also delivered across the following four mitigation results areas, namely: (v) energy generation and access; (vi) transport; (vii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (viii) forests and land use.
4. The GCF's GI identifies least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing States (SIDS) and African states as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, the GCF has provided special considerations for these countries, as reflected in its approach generally, and in the prioritization of programme and project delivery more specifically. Key among these is its allocation of resources for adaptation, which ensures a minimum floor of 50 per cent for LDCs, SIDS and African states (decision B.06/06).
5. Similarly, the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP) – which provides funds to countries to help with adaptation planning and the development of frameworks for long term climate action, as well as resources for strengthening the institutional capacities of national designated authorities (NDAs)/focal points and Direct Access Entities (DAEs) – ensures a floor of 50 per cent of readiness support allocation to vulnerable countries, including African states (decision B.08/11). The Board further requested that consideration be given to promoting the participation of private sector actors in developing countries, in particular local actors, small and medium-sized enterprises, and local financial intermediaries in SIDS, LDCs and African states.

[2] The notion of "paradigm shift" is elaborated in GCF documents starting in 2014, including the first iterations of the GCF's mitigation and adaptation performance frameworks. Paradigm shifts are expected to be evident in the emergence of low-carbon, climate-resilient development pathways accompanied with learning and knowledge, and enhancements to enabling environments which include policies and regulatory frameworks. These are expected to be measurable using qualitative and quantitative means which go beyond simply adding up results project by project (B.08/07, p.1, 2, 7). The GCF's initial investment framework defines paradigm shift potential as, "the degree to which the proposed activity can catalyse impact beyond a one-off project or programme investment" (decision B.27/06).

6. The GI dictates that access to the GCF, "will be through national, regional and international implementing entities accredited by the Board". Mindful of the principle of country ownership, it places the onus on recipient countries to determine their modes of access – that is, through direct access by sub-national, national or regional entity, or through international access, including through the United Nations, multilateral development banks (MDBs), international financial institutions, and regional institutions.
7. It also sets out the expectation that the Fund will operate in a manner complementary to "other existing funds under the Convention, and between itself and other funds, entities, and channels of climate change financing outside of the Fund" (United Nations, 2012).

B. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

8. The present "Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States"[3] is part of a broader effort by the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of GCF's interventions in vulnerable states (including LDCs and SIDS). As such, it builds on previous IEU evaluations, including but not limited to the "Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in SIDS" and the "Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the least developed countries".
9. This evaluation assesses whether and the extent to which GCF approaches and investments are effective in contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC, and promote a paradigm shift towards low emission and climate resilient development pathways. The evaluation considers effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and whether positive impacts are likely to be sustained. Moreover, the evaluation was undertaken with consideration for diverse stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. It also considers matters of innovation, replicability and scalability. Finally, the evaluation recognizes the heterogenous situation of African countries and explores how these differences have informed, enabled or constrained their engagement with the GCF. Table 1-1 below provides an overview of high level evaluation questions that served to guide the design of this evaluation.

Table 1-1. Key evaluation questions

#	Questions	Evaluation criteria
1	To what extent, and how is the GCF relevant and responsive to the specific needs and urgency of climate action of African states?	Relevance
2	To what extent, and how is the GCF approach coherent and complementary with the climate finance landscape in its support of African states?	Coherence in climate finance delivery with other multilateral entities
3	To what extent and how has the GCF-supported African states in ensuring ownership over climate-related investments based on using country systems – including national budgets, accounting or procurement systems – for realizing climate action objectives?	Country ownership of projects and programmes
4	To what extent and how are GCF investments catering to the high potential for transformation within African states' economies, and the potential for high levels of demonstration?	Effectiveness

[3] The "Evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States" was undertaken with the support of a team of consultants provided by Universalia.

#	QUESTIONS	EVALUATION CRITERIA
5	To what extent is the GCF contributing to/enabling a paradigm shift towards low emission and climate resilient development pathways?	Innovativeness in result areas
6	To what extent has the GCF been effective in addressing gender-related and social inclusion dimensions of climate interventions?	Gender equity and consideration of social inclusion
7	Is there any evidence of unexpected results from GCF interventions, both positive and negative?	Unexpected and unintended results
8	To what extent has the GCF aimed to reduce the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change in the most efficient way?	Efficiency
9	To what extent is the GCF business model responsive to emerging challenges and priorities?	
10	Are GCF accomplishments in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change likely to be sustained?	Sustainability, replication and scalability
11	To what extent are GCF investments replicable and scalable?	

C. METHODOLIGY

10. Intended to provide learning opportunities, inform decision-making and improve performance while also furthering accountability, the evaluation adopted a utilisation-focused approach, ensuring it is useful to its intended users on all priorities. In line with the overall utilisation-focused framework, the evaluation team worked closely with all relevant stakeholders to ensure the exercise was highly participatory and that insights and recommendations are useful to all, while fostering appropriation and buy-in.
11. As a theory-based evaluation, this assessment further employed a contribution analysis methodology (John Mayne, 2008) informed by a realist evaluation approach (Ray Pawson and Nick Tilley, 1997; Gill Westhorp, 2014; International NGO Training and Research Centre, 2017), which saw the drafting of a GCF theory of change (ToC) to describe its activities, outcome pathways, and assumptions (understood to be conditions that are necessary for GCF investments to yield desired results). The adoption of these components has enabled the evaluation team to make visible the strengths and limitations of the GCF's design and implementation of its work and investments in relation to the African states. It provided key information to feed into recommendations for decision-making related to the future adaptation of the GCF's approach and implementation mechanism. The ToC was also used to present the findings of the African states evaluation, and to highlight areas where recommendations were to be made. The ToC, with plotted findings and recommendations, is provided in Volume II, Annex 5.
12. The evaluation was undertaken using a mixed-method approach, including a document review (of both internal and external documents), an analysis of the GCF's portfolio in Africa and of external databases (including the World Bank Open Data, ND-Gain data, the portfolios of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF)), stakeholder consultation, event attendance, case studies and country missions, a survey administered to civil society organizations (CSOs), and a so-called 3CO (complementary, coherence and

cooperation) analysis. A detailed overview of the methodology used is provided in Volume II, Annex 1.

13. A range of stakeholders were consulted for this evaluation, totalling 266 people, from report inception, data collection on global engagement, and for its case studies (including country missions). Stakeholders interviewed and otherwise engaged included internal GCF staff, including from the GCF senior management team, the GCF Secretariat, GCF Board Members, GCF divisions, and the staff of the independent units. Interviews were also conducted with external stakeholders, including International Accredited Entities (IAEs) and DAEs, NDAs/focal points and other national authorities, CSOs and private sector organizations, other delivery partners, academia and relevant stakeholders. A full list of stakeholders consulted is provided in Appendix 2.

14. Five case studies were prepared as part of this evaluation. Three thematic case studies were undertaken to explore particular areas of interest, including: Case study 1 on the Great Green Wall (GGW) with a field mission in the Ivory Coast, case study 2 on fragile, conflict, and violence affected (FCV) African states with a field mission to Africa Climate Week (ACW) 2022 in Gabon, and case study 3 on countries without a single country funded project with a field mission in Tunisia. Two country-specific case studies with related field missions to those countries were undertaken to better explore the GCF's work and impact on the ground, including case study 4 on Kenya and case study 5 on South Africa. Case study reports are provided in Volume III.

15. A survey was deployed to gather perceptual data from civil society stakeholders on various dimensions of the GCF's approach, work and investments in the African states. The survey was developed using a four-point Likert-style scale with write-in responses and was deployed through both the GCF civil society network and local civil society groups and networks in African states across the continent, with the support of the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) and Care International. The survey was delivered between July 2022 and September 2022 and captures responses from 27 CSO representatives, ten of whom responded to all survey questions. Survey results are provided in Volume II, Annex 4.

16. A 3CO analysis was conducted, based on a framework constructed as part of this evaluation with the following leading global climate and environmental finance institutions: the GCF, GEF and its hosted funds: Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the AF, and the CIF with its Clean Technology Fund, the Strategic Climate Fund for the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, and the Forest Investment Program. The 3CO analysis identified similarities, overlaps as well as key differences between the climate and environmental finance institutions, as they operate generally and in Africa. The analysis deepens understanding of the comparative advantage of each, of their business models and implementing entities. It also informs recommendations on improved coordination and cooperation in Africa, specifically. The 3CO analysis is integrated directly into the main body of the report.

17. Finally, the evaluation builds on a systematic review of previous IEU evaluations and their case studies. This review entailed the extraction and synthesis of insights relevant to the present evaluation, compiled in a "synthesis report", provided in Volume II, Annex 2. The previous evaluations included in this review include the following:

- Independent evaluation of the Green Climate Fund's country ownership approach (COA) (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2019a)
- Independent evaluation of Green Climate Fund's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2019a)

- Independent evaluation of the Green Climate Fund’s environmental and social safeguards and the environmental and social management system (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2020a)
- Independent Evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund’s investments in SIDS (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2020c)
- Independent assessment of the GCF simplified approval process (SAP) pilot scheme (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2020b)
- Independent evaluation of the adaptation portfolio and approach of the Green Climate Fund (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2021a)
- Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund’s investments in the least developed countries (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022b)
- Report of the synthesis study: An IEU deliverable contributing to the Second Performance Review of the GCF (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022b)

D. LIMITATIONS

18. The data available for this evaluation has been extensive, which favours a robust analysis and the development of grounded and actionable recommendations. However, data collection for this evaluation was challenging on a number of fronts. Accessing stakeholders in Africa took longer than anticipated, particularly in African FCV states. Given the evaluation was undertaken during the tail-end of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), field mission planning was hesitant and time-consuming, though in-person deployments were finally realized in a number of cases. Several evaluation team members fell ill with COVID-19 during the evaluation, which delayed preparation of the case studies and other evaluative activities. Administration of the CSO survey took a great deal longer than anticipated, and with a participation and response rate that was lower than desirable. Finally, changes in evaluation team members required both socializing new members into the work while also bringing added expert capacity to the effort. Despite these limitations, the evaluation team believes that the report is informed by an extensive and appropriate knowledge base and conveys an accurate portrait of the GCF’s work in Africa.

E. ROADMAP OF THE REPORT

19. The report is composed of three volumes. Volume I constitutes the main report, including key findings and analysis. Volume II provides additional appendices. Volume III contains the case study reports.
20. Volume I of the report is composed of 11 chapters and three appendices, organized as follows.
21. **Chapter 2 provides an extensive description of the context and background of the evaluation.** The chapter provides an overview of socio-economic development of African States and climate change impacts on the continent, including actual and projected impacts. It also provides a high level overview of the GCF structures to support project development and implementation in Africa, and the representation of African States in the GCF’s functioning and operations. Finally, it describes the support delivered by the GCF in African States.[4]
22. **Chapter 3 assesses the extent to which the GCF is relevant and responsive to the specific needs and urgency of climate action in African States.** This is assessed both in terms of the GCF’s

[4] A more detailed overview of the context and background is provided in the evaluation’s approach paper.

alignment with international agendas on climate action in Africa and the alignment of the GCF’s portfolio with key challenges and evolving adaptation and mitigation needs.

23. **Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which, and how the GCF’s approach is coherent and complementary with the climate finance landscape in its support of African States.** More specifically, this chapter discusses the relevant GCF policy framework, examines cooperation with the GEF, AF and CIF, considers areas of actual and potential complementarities, and raises some important challenges for consideration.

24. **Chapter 5 evaluates the extent to which and how the GCF has supported African States in ensuring ownership over climate-related investments.** The chapter assesses country ownership overall, while examining specific dimensions of an indicator framework of country ownership, highlighting factors that have supported and hindered country ownership. The chapter further explores stakeholder participation and the consideration of local communities in GCF programme and project development and implementation.

25. **Chapter 6 assesses the extent to which GCF investments in African States have been effective. The chapter discusses the extent to which GCF has been able to meet objectives and intended results.** It reviews the mobilisation of complementary and catalytic financial resources, as well as private sector engagement and mobilisation of private sector investments. The extent to which the GCF has been effective in building institutional capacity in African States is also discussed in detail. Finally, the chapter discusses mechanisms and early indications of unintended and unexpected results.

26. **Chapter 7 assesses the extent to which the GCF is contributing to and enabling a paradigm shift towards low emission and climate resilient development pathways.** More specifically, this chapter explores the extent to which GCF investments have contributed to the transformation of African States’ development pathways.

27. **Chapter 8 assesses the extent to which the GCF has been effective in addressing gender-related and social inclusion dimensions (particularly those for indigenous peoples) of climate interventions.** It explores the extent to which gender-related dimensions and indigenous peoples are considered at the design, implementation, and monitoring stages of GCF interventions and lead to beneficial outcomes. This chapter will also take a closer look at the extent to which current monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms allow gender-related and indigenous peoples-related dimensions to be tracked.

28. **Chapter 9 assesses two areas of efficiency:** first, the extent to which the GCF has adopted efficient approaches towards reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change; and second, the extent to which the GCF’s business model (processes, programmes, funding windows, and modalities) is responsive to urgent priorities and emerging challenges.

29. **Chapter 10 explores the sustainability of accomplishments and the establishment of framework conditions for achieving sustainability of benefits.** It also discusses the scalability and replicability of GCF interventions within countries and beyond them.

30. **Chapter 11 provides conclusions and recommendations emerging from the present evaluation.**

31. Appendix 1 provides additional supportive analysis, organized as per the structure outlined above. Appendix 2 provides a list of stakeholders consulted for the evaluation. And References provides a list of documents consulted as part of the evaluation.

Chapter 2. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

A. OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN STATES

32. The “Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund’s investments in the African States” was undertaken at a time when the African continent, itself changing significantly and in many ways progressively, faced immense and growing climate change related challenges. Understanding some key dimensions of the underlying context in Africa is important for situating the nature and extent of these climate-related challenges, and the work of the GCF itself in supporting the continent’s efforts to meet them.

33. As of 2021, 1.64 billion people lived in Africa, corresponding to 21 per cent of the world’s population.[5] A recent decline in mortality rate for children under five[6] combined with high fertility rates is contributing to significant population growth, with the continent’s population projected to double by 2050 (United Nations, n.d.). Additionally, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has experienced a high rate of urbanization; the percentage of individuals living in urban areas increased by 35 per cent between 2000 and 2021, compared to 21 per cent globally over the same period. Among the drivers of urbanization is rural to urban migration, which may be influenced by, and influence, environmental and other stressors.

34. **The African states are largely composed of low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle income countries, together accounting for over three quarters of African states** (World Bank, 2022). Only 13 per cent of African states are classified as upper-middle income countries and 2 per cent as high-income countries (representing seven countries and one country respectively). Nearly two thirds (61 per cent) of African states are classified as LDCs, while 11 per cent are classified as SIDS (representing 33 and 5 countries, respectively).

35. The poverty rate on the continent has declined in recent decades, with the percentage of people living in SSA on less than United States Dollars (USD) 2.15 per day declining from 58.7 per cent in 1994 to 35.1 per cent in 2019.[7] In 2021, African states had an average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of USD 2,580 and a median gross national income (GNI) per capita of USD 1,550 (see Table 2-1. Finally, primary education completion rates remain somewhat lower in SSA, standing at 70 per cent compared to 90 per cent for the global primary education completion rate.

[5] The majority of data in this section comes from the World Bank Open Data. Important information on the data is noted where relevant.

[6] It should be noted that despite a decline in mortality rate, under-5 mortality rates in 2020 remained at 73 per thousand live births in SSA, as compared to 37 globally.

[7] There is no data available for the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA).

Table 2-1. Overview of socio-economic situation in African States, 2021

INDICATOR	AFRICA
Countries	54
Population [billion]	1.64
Average GDP per capita [USD]	2,580
Median GNI per capita [USD]	1,550
Median ND-Gain (readiness)[8]	0.31
Median ND-Gain (vulnerability)[9]	0.52

Source: World Bank open data (*https://data.worldbank.org/*) and ND-Gain data (*https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/*)

36. **A high proportion of African states experiences some degree of conflict or fragility. The World Bank defines two categories – FCV, and FCS (fragile and conflict-affected situations)**[10] – one characterized by violent conflict, and the other in which countries are experiencing high levels of institutional and social fragility.[11] In 2022, 20 of the continent's 54 states were classified by the World Bank as experiencing high-intensity conflict, medium-intensity conflict, and/or high institutional and social fragility. The World Bank's list provided the basis for the analysis of the GCF's engagement in African FCV states that is found in this evaluation.

37. **The continent is further marked by high linguistic diversity of approximately 2,000 languages, with countries that are predominantly Anglophone, Arabophone, Francophone, Hispanophone and Lusophone, and with numerous indigenous languages**. This diversity also extends beyond language and culture, with significant climatic diversity and a variety of landscapes including deserts, semi-arid regions, grasslands, and rainforests.

B. AFRICAN STATES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

38. **The African continent accounts for the smallest share of the planet's GHG emissions yet faces some of its most significant adaptation challenges**. In 2019, the most recent year for which data are available, African states contributed under 4 per cent of total GHG emissions (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2020).

39. **Despite its limited contribution to climate change, Africa is considered one of the most vulnerable regions in the world** (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022). Warming trends have accelerated in Africa, with warming observed during the 1991–2020 period exceeding trends observed in 1961–1990 and 1931–1960 (World Meteorological Organization [WMO], 2021). Shifts in precipitation are noted across the continent, with some regions experiencing increases in precipitation, while others are experiencing dryer conditions. Sea level rise also threatens the continent's coastal regions. Tropical, South Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts have been particularly vulnerable, with the rate of sea level rise higher than the global mean.

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[8] A score of 1 represents the highest level of readiness and a score of 0 represents the lowest level of readiness.
[9] A score of 1 represents the highest level of vulnerability and 0 represents no vulnerability.
[10] The World Bank speaks of both FCS and FCV contexts, situations and states. For simplicity, this report mainly uses FCV when referring to states affected by fragility, conflict and violence.
[11] The World Bank criteria for these two categories are based "on a threshold number of conflict-related deaths relative to the population" for violent conflict and "on public indicators that measure the quality of policy and institutions as well as specific manifestations of fragility" for those countries deemed to have high levels of institutional and social fragility.

40. **Among changes in climate recorded in Africa, droughts and floods have become more frequent and severe.** As noted by a 2021 World Bank report: “For instance, relative to 1970-79, the numbers of droughts and floods were nearly threefold and tenfold, respectively, by 2010-19.” (World Bank, 2021). Moreover, while extreme heat on average occurs for three days per year, its incidence is much higher in Africa. As noted in The Economist (2022), the average person living in Africa now experiences five days of extreme heat per year. Indeed, African states have the highest share of the population experiencing very strong or extreme heat stress days compared to other continents. With a high level of confidence, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) attributes changes in terrestrial, freshwater, and ocean ecosystem structures, as well as terrestrial and ocean range shifts, on climate change. It also observes with high confidence important negative impacts of climate change on agriculture, infectious diseases, health stressors, displacement, and damages to key economic sectors. It has medium confidence in attributing impacts to climate change in the areas of water scarcity, fisheries’ yields, flooding, and infrastructure damage. These changes have the potential to impact ecosystems and human wellbeing in Africa in a broad range of ways. For instance, the Global Challenges Research Fund’s Agricultural and Food Systems Resilience: Increasing Capacity & Advising Policy (GCRF-AFRICAP, 2022) projects that climate change will increase and/or intensify crop failures, food insecurity, and loss of livelihoods in SSA if urgent action is not taken.

41. **Climate change in Africa is happening against the backdrop of a global energy inequality gap.** In 2014, global per capita energy use was equivalent to 1,920 kilograms (kg) of oil. In SSA, it was 687 kg, while in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), it was 2,353 kg. Moreover, as of 2015, renewable energy made up only 17.54 per cent of total energy consumption globally but represented 67.53 per cent in SSA (and only 1.56 per cent in MENA) (GCRF-AFRICAP, 2022).

42. Forests, particularly tropical rainforest, represent an important carbon sink and have an important role to play in mitigating climate change. However, forest cover globally has been dropping over the past 20 years, from 31.2 per cent in 2000 to 30.7 per cent in 2020. This rate of decrease has been more pronounced in SSA, passing from 29.7 per cent in 2000 to 26.3 per cent in 2020.[12] However, Africa remains home to some of the largest tropical rainforests in the world, such as the Congo River Basin, which has the potential to sequester an additional 600 million metric tons of CO_2 (MtCO2) annually (Harris and Gibbs, 2021). Indeed, protection and management of the Congo Basin’s forest has featured in recent climate agreements as well as in GCF funding.[13]

43. **To address many climate-related challenges, large financial resources are required. Yet, a significant gap continues to exist between actual climate finance flows to African states** and the reported costs of implementing both their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs). The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates a climate finance need for Africa in the period 2020–2030 of USD 2.8 trillion (Guzmán and others, 2022). Based on African government commitments to date (estimated at 10 per cent of the total cost), the CPI estimates that USD 2.5 trillion will be required from international public and private sources and from the domestic private sector. This is around USD 250 billion/year.[14] Actual flows have not reached far beyond 10 per cent of this amount. In 2019/2020, for example, USD 29.5 billion was channelled to African states. To put this into global context, climate finance increased steadily between 2011/2012

[12] Note the MENA region has seen a slight increase, from 1.9 per cent in 2000 to 2.1 per cent in 2020.
[13] See, for example, USD 500 million DRC-Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI) agreement announced at COP26, and the GCF co-funded project PREFOREST, approved in 2021 (Central African Forest Initiative, 2021); Reliefweb, 2021); Green Climate Fund, n.d-d).
[14] In a study by CPI in June 2022, NDC cost data was collected from 51 of 53 countries, representing 93 per cent of Africa’s GDP (Guzmán and others, 2022).

and 2019/2020 (from USD 364 billion to USD 632 billion), though the growth trend tapered somewhat at the end of the decade and will likely show some additional dampening on account of COVID-19. In 2019/2020, African states were the recipients of around 4.6 per cent of the global total for that year (Meattle and others, 2022).

44. In Africa, **public financing has predominated over private financing**. In 2019/2020, 86 per cent of flows in Africa were publicly sourced. Multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) were the largest source of public financing (at 40 per cent, USD 11.5 billion), followed by bilateral DFIs and international governments (notably: Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom (UK)). As per the same CPI study, the private sector contributed only 14 per cent (USD 4.2 billion) of total climate finance in Africa, much lower than in other regions like South Asia (37 per cent), East Asia and Pacific (39 per cent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (49 per cent). Sources of private sector investment were split between domestic (49 per cent), international (39 per cent), and unidentified sources (12 per cent); 81 per cent of these investments were directed to mitigation projects.

C. The Green Climate Fund and African States

45. **The GCF is the world's single largest multilateral climate finance institution**. **All African countries are eligible for GCF funding,** to support them in meeting the challenges of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The GCF has approved FPs in Africa since 2015 and is highly active in the region. Given the GI provides little guidance to the GCF for its work in Africa, Board Members and the Secretariat have shaped its engagement in practical collaboration with other stakeholders of the GCF partnership.

46. **To facilitate the provision of needed support, the GCF has a team in its Division of Country Programming (DCP) providing direct support to African states.** They support countries, their DAEs as well as IAEs in planning, identifying, designing and implementing what are meant to be country driven, transformational climate investments. Staff dedicated to Africa are divided into three teams, including one which focuses on Francophone LDCs, another on Anglophone LDCs, and another which works with non-LDC African countries. These teams are composed of regional managers, regional officers, and regional analysts. Africa is the only region with a designated Africa Adaptation Advisor.

47. The GCF Board includes three Board Members and four Alternate Members from the African states. Currently, the Co-Chair of the Board is the Board Member from South Africa.

48. The GCF also developed a number of safeguard mechanisms and associated policies to ensure GCF-funded initiatives do not cause harm to local communities and the environment, globally and in African states. Of note is the GCF's Indigenous Peoples' policy, which recognizes the different criteria used for identifying vulnerable and historically marginalized groups, including traditionally underserved communities in SSA (decision B.19/11).

49. The GCF provides support to African states through three modalities: the RPSP, Project Preparation Facility (PPF), and FPs. A few key points on the GCF portfolio in African states under each modality as of the thirty-fourth meeting of the Board (B.34) are provided below and developed throughout the report.

    - **A total of 182 RPSP activities** were approved in African States, valued at USD 142.7 million. **All African States have at least one approved RPSP** grant, provided with the help of over 50 delivery partners.

- The African States count 22 PPF supports, totalling USD 14.3 million. **PPF support has been delivered in 34 African States.**
- **The GCF counts 85 FPs in African states, representing 41 per cent of FPs funded by the GCF as of B.34.** Of the USD 11.3 billion transferred globally, **African states have been allocated about 35 per cent, at USD 3.9 billion. This portfolio is tilted towards a delivery of mitigation over adaptation result areas.**

50. In examining the GCF's work in and with respect to the African states, this evaluation considers three important and related matters. First, it examines and assesses the GCF's **purpose, relevance, role, and approach** in Africa. Second, it examines the GCF's **portfolio** in Africa to assess the extent to which the portfolio itself advances the Fund's priorities for Africa. Third, it assesses the extent to which GCF operations and systems are **adapted to the challenges in African contexts.** These different dimensions of the evaluation are all related to one another, and together provide an overall picture of the strengths, challenges, impacts and constraints facing the GCF in its climate change mitigation and adaptation work with African stakeholders and their partners, in all of Africa's diversity.

Chapter 3. RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE NEEDS AND URGENCY IN AFRICAN STATES

51. This chapter assesses the extent to which the GCF is relevant and responsive to the specific needs and urgency of climate action in African states, both in terms of the GCF's alignment with international agendas on climate action in Africa and the alignment of the GCF's portfolio with key challenges and evolving adaptation and mitigation needs.

A. GCF STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENDAS ON CLIMATE ACTION IN AFRICAN STATES

52. **Finding 1. GCF's support to African States aligns substantially with relevant international agendas on climate action.**

53. The GCF traces its origins to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and the UNFCCC (see Box 3-1), as one of the three so-called Rio Conventions (United Nations, 1992).[15] At Rio, a breakthrough agreement on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities" paved the way for developed country parties to provide financial resources to developing country parties.[16] Accordingly, Article 11 of the UNFCCC describes a financing mechanism that provides resources on a grant or concessional basis, is accountable to the Conference of the Parties (COP) and guided by the Convention, and is entrusted to one or more existing international entities set up with the equitable and balanced representation of all parties.[17]

Box 3-1. UNFCCC objective

"…to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved with a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."

– UNFCCC, Article 2

54. Over the years, the UNFCCC Secretariat has supported parties on Convention commitments, and since 2013 has worked through partnership-based Regional Collaboration Centres (RCCs) covering Eastern and Southern Africa (based in Kampala, Uganda), and Western and Francophone Africa (based in Lomé, Togo). A third among six RCCs was established in 2019 to cover the Middle East, north Africa and South Asia (RCC MENA SA). The RCCs provide capacity building support on relevant technical and governance/management topics as well as stakeholder engagement activities.

[15] The other two being the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). From their specific vantage points, the three entities share a common interest in addressing climate change through adaptation.
[16] The intent behind this principle is described here on the UNFCCC website.
[17] The GEF has served as an operating entity since the Convention entered into force in 1994. GCF followed suit in 2011, a year after being established at COP16.

These include the regional climate weeks that help consolidate agendas ahead of the annual United Nations climate change conferences.[18]

55. At COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009, the parties pitched the idea for a mechanism that a year later in COP16 was formally named the GCF. Articles 102 to 112 of the "Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session" set out the governance and institutional arrangements for the mechanism and the process by which it was to be designed.

56. Adopted by 196 Parties at COP21 (2015), the Paris Agreement brought fresh impetus to the GCF mandate. This first legally binding treaty on climate change gave urgent focus to global warming through the goal of limiting temperatures to "well below 2ºC, preferably 1.5ºC, compared to pre-industrial levels" (United Nations, 2015). Parties committed to identifying in their NDCs targeted reductions of GHG, and to formulating NAPs for building resilience to the shocks of climate change events (droughts, fires, floods, etc.). The parties also re-affirmed their commitments to make "finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate resilient development" (United Nations, 2015). Around the same time, at least two additional climate-relevant developments occurred on the global stage, further diversifying the climate action agenda. One was the launch of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, and the other the launch of United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

57. Since the 2009 meeting of the UNFCCC (COP15) in Copenhagen, climate finance expectations among developing countries have been conditioned by the pledge made by developed countries to mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries. The goal was formalized at COP16 in Cancun, Mexico and again at COP21 in Paris, France, where the timeline was extended to 2025.

58. **The GCF's engagement in Africa is relevant to the continent's commitments to reduce GHG emissions and increase climate resilience.** Over the past seven years (2015–2022), **the GCF has become the largest among the multilateral climate finance contributors to African states and has a rate of growth in contributions outpacing those of its peer funds** (see Chapter 4 on matters of coherence and complementarity). At the same time, the amount of climate finance made available, overall, falls short of what is needed to meet the USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (extended to 2025) pledge of developed countries, and well short of estimated climate financing needs.

59. As to Africa's commitments, Agenda 2063, the African Union (AU) 50-year strategic framework posits "environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities" as one of its goals. The continent's first collective climate change response strategy (2022–2032) linked to Agenda 2063 is more specific. As shown in Box 3-2, it hinges on four "strategic axes". The first three axes very much align with the contents of the GCF's investment framework, while the fourth axis aligns with the GCF's result areas.

60. More broadly, an overarching alignment exists vertically between the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032) and the principal agreements defining the international climate change agenda. Beyond the UNFCCC, the strategy specifies the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and the Sendai Framework (African Union, 2022, p.4). Laterally, across the various global frameworks, there is also a high degree of cross-referencing and, regarding the Sendai Framework, agreement that the NAP process is a strategically sound point of convergence. The literature also speaks to the

[18] The mandate of the UNFCCC Secretariat and descriptions of the RCCs and regional climate weeks are set out in the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (n.d-b).

potential for greater levels of collaborative engagement.[19] As it stands, SDG alignment is explicit in each project design, and disaster risk management content is embedded in several GCF projects, including in Africa.

Box 3-2. Strategic axes of the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032)

Strengthening policy and governance, recognizing the critical role that governance and institutions play in hindering or driving climate action. This axis focuses on enhanced institutional coordination, coordinated regional climate action, anticipatory governance, expanded climate information services, and climate literacy.

Adopting pathways towards transformative climate resilient development by identifying key sectors where adaptation and mitigation are critical, and action areas for building resilience. The chosen sectors are critical given their sensitivity to climate change and their role in driving development. They include agriculture and land use, oceans, food systems, water systems, urban and transport systems, industry and energy.

Enhancing the means of implementation towards climate resilient, low emission development, including through climate finance and resource mobilisation, technology transfer and enhanced capacity building; and awareness creation and outreach.

Leveraging regional flagship initiatives by promoting coordinated regional action and effective collaboration between a variety of stakeholders, including, inter alia, the AU, regional economic communities, non-state actors, and national governments. This axis identifies key continent-wide initiatives that are driving change in many of the action areas identified by the strategy.

Source: African Union (2022)

B. GCF PORTFOLIO ALIGNMENT WITH KEY CHALLENGES AND EVOLVING ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION NEEDS

61. **Finding 2. The programming scope offered under the GCF's eight result areas aligns with regional and country needs across the African states. However, a portfolio profile that presently shows substantially more mitigation than adaptation initiatives is widely contested on account of climate change trends in Africa and the continent's relatively minor role as a GHG emitter.**

1. ADDRESSING MITIGATION VERSUS ADAPTATION BALANCE

62. **LDCs, SIDS, and African states are recognized in the GI as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.** Specific commitments toward African states as part of this grouping emerge in the GCF's Initial Investment Framework to guide the GCF's first replenishment and the 2020–2023 Strategic Plan (Green Climate Fund, 2020c). Key among these is the pledge to achieve an overall 50:50 balance (on grant-equivalent basis) in the GCF portfolio between mitigation and adaptation, and a minimum allocation floor of 50 per cent for adaptation projects.[20]

[19] The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015) suggests disaster risk reduction could be strengthened in policy decisions, monitoring mechanisms and implementation arrangements.
[20] Decision B.27/06.

63. **Calls from African leaders for greater attention to climate adaptation go at least as far back as the 2015 Paris Agreement**. In a 2021 joint communiqué of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the AU's African Adaptation Initiative and the Global Center on Adaptation (GCA), African leaders asserted that the costs of not developing adaptive strategies could outweigh the already considerable costs associated with climate action.[21] In the lead up to COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, three related themes were evident in the African stakeholder discourse:

- **Progress that has been made in combating climate change through mitigation and to a lesser extent adaptation has been insufficient to stem its impacts**. Africa is losing ground on climate resilience, and the human, economic and ecological costs are mounting.
- It is a situation that adds to an historical injustice wherein **the most impacted nations have contributed least to global cumulative emissions**, and that, increasingly, warrants reparations for loss and damages.
- While Africa shoulders this disproportionately large burden from climate change and, by short-term necessity, continues to channel resources toward disaster response instead of climate resilience, the continent also continues to offer enormous potential to be a leader in low emission and climate resilient development through renewable forms of energy, land restoration, water conservation and biodiversity conservation, and through the mobilisation of climate finance in Africa (Atwoliand others, 2022); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2022b); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2022a).

64. **As it stands, the African states portfolio continues to show more mitigation projects despite calls to find a better-suited balance**. Cumulatively, over seven years, the GCF's mitigation-focused projects have made up 59 per cent of GCF finance approved for the African states, while adaptation focused projects have made up 41 per cent of the GCF finance. Over the past seven years, this balance remains unaltered on a year-by-year basis.[22] A majority of African stakeholders consulted for this evaluation have called for this balance to be reviewed, to be more in line with the strategies and stated priorities of African states.

65. Nevertheless, at a country level, variances in the mitigation-adaptation balance are evident, and the socio-economic status of the country appears to be a variable. Mitigation-focused projects are considerably more in evidence in non-LDC countries than are adaptation focused projects (70 per cent to 30 per cent). Within LDCs, the two thematic areas are in rough parity.

2. African States and GCF result areas

66. All of the GCF's result areas are addressed in the African states portfolio. However, among them, **transport stands out for being hardly featured at all; buildings, cities, industries and appliances is nascent;[23] and energy generation and access stands out for its dominance (in financial terms) in both LDCs and non-LDCs.**

[21] Perceiving fresh-start opportunities in the wake of COVID-19, African leaders made this appeal for heightened attention to climate adaptation for Africa, warning audiences that while Africa as a continent stands responsible for a mere 5 per cent of global emissions, the effect of aggregated climate impacts, currently estimated to range between USD 7 billion and USD 15 billion per annum, could rise to about USD 50 billion per annum by 2040, and could lower GDP by up to 3 per cent by 2050. (African Development Bank, 2021).
[22] In 2018 (B.18 and B.19), project approval decisions showed a brief movement toward parity before establishing a ~40:60 adaptation-mitigation pattern that has held until today.
[23] Of the nine countries of FP086 "Green Cities Facility", only Tunisia derives from the African priority group, with no investments as yet made in the country.

67. **Energy generation and access projects are most prominent in the portfolio** (Figure 3-1), making up **42 per cent of its value to date** (Guzmán and others, 2022).[24] Projects are most in evidence in the higher emitting non-LDCs like South Africa and Nigeria, Morocco and Egypt. Here, needs are focused on energy conversion and infrastructure expansion. In these settings, the presence of a relatively large population base plugged into the grid and driving demand creates favourable prospects for financial return on investment. Such prospects are less evident in other result areas and particularly so among adaptation projects.

68. In the energy sector, questions of strategic relevance vis-a-vis the GCF's participation in transition projects centre on the eligibility of chosen transition pathways for GCF financing. Of note are those pathways that incorporate the exploitation of natural gas or the production of hydrogen as part of an energy transition from more polluting fuels to renewables. Questions of strategic positioning relate to the role the GCF should play (if any) in energy transition initiatives to be an optimal catalyst amid the presence of other financing partners.

Figure 3-1. GCF portfolio in the African States by results areas



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

69. **Projects that address energy generation and access are also in evidence in LDCs and to a lesser extent in (somewhat overlapping) African FCV states where they are regarded as foundational to establishing sustainable development pathways.** Here, the relevance of the GCF to country needs hinges on its ability to create enabling environments for renewable energy development, to engage the private sector and de-risk investment, and to integrate local engagement processes. The GCF has been a growing actor in supporting the development of decentralized renewable systems – particularly solar and off-grid – across west Africa, with partners that include *Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement* (BOAD), AfDB, European Union (EU), and private developers. This points to the fact that energy investments can be understood as both mitigation and

[24] A similar pattern is described in the 2022 CPI analysis of climate finance in Africa. It shows 29 per cent of all climate finance in Africa allocated to energy systems, making it the sector receiving the largest flow of climate finance.

adaptation projects, given they advance low-carbon development pathways while building infrastructural and community resilience. Projects include:

- FP093, “Yeleen rural electrification project in Burkina Faso” (with AfDB)
- FP105, “BOAD Climate Finance Facility to scale up solar energy investments in Francophone west Africa LDCs”
- FP168, “Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) framework”, in six African countries (with AfDB)

70. Agriculture and forestry are identified as high GHG emitters, are strategically critical for supporting livelihoods in Africa, and are highly vulnerable to climate change. The continent is one of the driest, with 45 per cent of its land mass consisting of drylands and 50 per cent of the population living in arid, semi-arid, dry, sub-humid and hyper-arid areas. GCF investment in this sector is very much in the middle of the range across GCF result areas in the African states portfolio, whereas in the overall climate finance picture for Africa, it takes its place as the second biggest sector recipient behind energy systems (Meattle and others, 2022). GCF Board members and independent Technical Advisory Panel (iTAP) members therefore have emphasized the importance of maintaining, if not increasing GCF investments in climate smart agriculture. More resources would be allocated to the African states for REDD+ activities if the USD 500 million of the initial financial cap of the GCF REDD+ pilot programme were extended.

71. **In the realm of mitigation, other result areas receiving less attention in the GCF portfolio – such as transport; and buildings, cities, industries, and appliances** – are perceived as complex environments for investment. Urban centres, particularly the megacities, are big producers of GHGs, which makes them also significant solutions providers. Policy fragmentation and misalignments within and across jurisdictions, political dynamics, high up-front costs and longer payback timeframes make investment less attractive. The novelty of nature based solutions in these environments adds to the complexity. In the ecosystems and ecosystems services result area, the ways in which services are valued (primarily non-monetarily), long payback timeframes, as well as legal/regulatory considerations surrounding land tenure and use, all constrain climate action.

72. **While investment opportunities are less obvious in adaptation activities, private sector investors are finding ways to bring the adaptation imperative into their realm.** One investor stakeholder advanced the notion of “proximate opportunities”, wherein to support an adaptation outcome, investments are made strategically, say in a value chain, to support the sought-after transformation. In other words, the business proposition is informed through an adaptation process. Examples given and observable in the portfolio include investing in climate smart information services to support adaptation outcomes in the health or agriculture sectors.

73. Starting in the latter part of 2021, the GCF Secretariat began publishing sectoral guides to assist stakeholders in charting low emission, climate resilient pathways (Green Climate Fund, 2021i; 2021j; 2022d; 2022e). In these early days, these resources are potentially valuable but not as yet known to many non-GCF African stakeholders consulted for this evaluation.

Chapter 4. COHERENCE IN CLIMATE FINANCE AND DELIVERY WITH OTHER MULTILATERAL ENTITIES

74. This chapter assesses the extent to which, and how the GCF's approach is coherent and complementary with the climate finance landscape in its support of African states. More specifically, this chapter discusses the relevant GCF policy framework, examines cooperation with the GEF, AF and CIF, considers areas of actual and potential complementarities, and raises some important challenges for consideration.

75. **Finding 3.** The GCF Secretariat has pursued an intentional, high level approach to cooperation with the GEF, and to a far lesser extent with the AF and CIF. **For the time being, while unsystematic and unincentivized, the pursuit and operationalization of cooperation and complementarity is realized primarily by accredited entities (AEs) of the multiple funds.** There are however important inhibiting factors, in particular weaknesses related to in-country coordination of climate financing, the high transaction cost in terms of staff time required to coordinate among the funds and with the AEs for planning and implementing joint, scaled up or even parallel projects, and their different planning processes and decision-making schedules.

A. Frameworks for inter-institutional cooperation

76. The GCF operates in an environment of several global, regional, multilateral, and bilateral climate funds and agencies, each with their objectives and characteristics in terms of scope, scale, governance arrangements, funding mechanisms, and organizational processes. Indeed, there are important similarities, overlaps as well as differences between the climate finance institutions as they operate generally and in Africa, providing potential for increased albeit selective coordination and cooperation.

77. To begin with, **the prioritization of inter-institutional level complementarity, coherence and cooperation is articulated in various GCF documents**, providing a policy framework for such activities to be pursued in the African context.

78. In 2017, by decision B.17/04, the GCF Board adopted an operational framework on complementarity and coherence (hereafter 'operational framework') with a view to strengthening complementarity and coherence among operations and processes across climate finance institutions. This operational framework is based on the following four pillars (Green Climate Fund, 2017b, p.1):

- Pillar I: Board-level discussions on fund-to-fund arrangements
- Pillar II: Enhanced complementarity at the activity level
- Pillar III: Promotion of coherence at the national programming level
- Pillar IV: Complementarity at the level of delivery of climate finance through an established dialogue

79. The operational framework has served as both backbone and guidance for the exploration and development of cooperation between the GCF and other climate finance institutions, generally and in Africa. **The GCF has had a standing framework agreement on complementarity and coherence** in place since B.17 with all climate funds. **This has been particularly developed with the GEF.**

80. **In June 2021, cooperation between the GCF and the GEF was formalized in the "long term vision on complementarity, coherence and collaboration between the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility" (LTV)** (Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility, 2021). It was submitted to the GEF Council as a working document at its 60th meeting (14–18 June 2021), and shortly thereafter to the Board of the GCF at B.29 (28 June 2021), as annex II to the "Report on the activities of the Secretariat" (Global Environment Facility (2021); and Green Climate Fund (2021e). Both the GCF Board and GEF Council welcomed the document, and in particular the establishment of a joint Steering Committee to facilitate collaboration.

81. The first progress report on the implementation of the LTV was presented to the 62nd GEF Council meeting in June 2022, and to the Board of the GCF at B.34 in October 2022 (Global Environment Facility, 2022; Green Climate Fund, 2022a; Green Climate Fund, 2021y). The report detailed the various meetings held on executive and working levels between the GCF and the GEF. Among the activities, a joint booth was organized at COP26, as was a meeting with the heads of the AF and CIF. A meeting was also held jointly with the United Nations Secretary General, who has taken a keen interest in collectively pursued activities aimed at addressing climate change.

82. The Steering Committee was established with four representatives from each of the two finance institutions serving on it, namely the GCF and GEF. Since June 2021, several (mostly virtual) meetings have been held, and a workplan and terms of reference – including a commitment to increase collaboration with other relevant funds – for future work were agreed upon. The GCF has incorporated its commitment to pursuing the LTV goals in its USP in multiple ways; for example, as it relates to support for national adaptation planning (NAP), and attention to helping countries identify financing sources from GEF and other international climate funds (Green Climate Fund, 2021y; Green Climate Fund, 2020d).

83. **The LTV approach builds on a growing relationship between the GCF and GEF, which was formerly more opportunistic and has become increasingly intentional.** For instance, in supporting national or sub-regional processes, both the GCF and GEF have in the past inquired about other partners and funders, intent on building on existing work, in relatively passive alignment with national level aims and priorities. The LTV approach is different and proactive, intent on supporting countries in moving forward on their thematic priorities. The LTV also focuses on regional themes and ecosystem priorities, as in the Amazon region (i.e., an ecosystem-level initiative, transcending borders) and the GGW Initiative (GGWI). This is premised on acknowledgment of the relatively modest resources of the GEF, a greater level of GCF resources, and their collective intention and ability to attract and crowd-in other investors, by de-risking investments or through blended finance mechanisms. This was the case with the GGWI, to a moderate extent, with potential for much greater intentionality.

84. In the context of the updated SAP agreed at B.32 in May 2022 (decision B.32/05), the GCF Secretariat will develop templates and guidelines for fast-tracking the preparation and review of SAP proposals. The intent is to reduce the time and effort needed for SAP proposal preparation and review, including by identifying certain small-scale activities ready to be scaled up and replicated in coordination with other climate funds. This work will be done in close cooperation with the GEF. At the time of this evaluation, a study was being commissioned on GCF and GEF processes and policies, expected to identify opportunities for strengthening complementarity and coherence through closer alignment. Results of this study were expected to include policy- and process-oriented recommendations to inform relevant discussion and decisions by the GCF Board and GEF Council (Green Climate Fund, 2020d).

85. The GCF has no such commitments – similar to the LTV in place between GCF and GEF – with either the AF or the CIF, for multiple reasons. The GCF and GEF are not the same as the other climate funds. They are both financing mechanisms under the UNFCCC. They are accountable to the COP, which has provided the GCF and GEF guidance about enhancing complementarity and coherence. The LTV is one element in place in response to this guidance. The GCF and GEF are uniquely conjoined, under the same Convention, while also serving the Paris Agreement. In contrast, the AF was created under the Kyoto Protocol, reports to the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and since 2019 simultaneously to the Paris Agreement and its COP. The CIF has no institutional association with the UNFCCC and reports to the Board of the World Bank.

86. Nevertheless, the four funds are not operating in isolation from one another. While the LTV Steering Committee comprises only the GCF and GEF, there are senior level conversations about how the four funds can work together. The GCF organizes annual dialogues among the four climate funds, where they discuss ongoing activities and plans. The fifth annual meeting was held in Glasgow at COP26. Moreover, the GCF signed in 2019 a Statement of Partnership with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC) to strengthen their cooperation to achieve the Paris Agreement and promote the key role of public development banks (PDBs) in climate financing (Green Climate Fund and International Development Finance Club, 2020). The IDFC, which was created in 2011, now bring together 27 PDBs from all regions of the world, 14 of them accredited with the GCF. It is an important forum for discussion on climate financing and international cooperation (International Development Finance Club, Green Climate Fund and ITACA, 2022, p.2 and 13ff).

87. **The four funds (and the nationally appropriate mitigation actions facility) have been participating in the Climate Funds Collaboration Platform on Results, Indicators and Methodologies for measuring impact**, where different international climate-related financial mechanisms exchange ideas and collaboratively seek to identify and follow best practices in the areas of results management. A working group has been struck among the four funds, trying to translate climate benefits into common indicators, intent on helping countries better understand and report on their progress. Discussion has been underway for quite some time, with evidence of progress and an emerging alignment on indicators. There is a section in the GEF programme and strategy document on results frameworks (International Development Finance Club, Green Climate Fund and ITACA, 2022, p.2 and 13ff) that references this cross-fund effort, identifying those indicators now aligned with the GCF, AF, CIF and the nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions Facility (Green Climate Fund, 2022c).

88. At the same time, it is very difficult for four funds that have variably differing aims, agendas, governing bodies, approval cycles and impact priority areas to fully align and pursue projects together. As such, certain points of convergence appear easier to explore between two of the funds as opposed to three or four.

89. **Specifically, the GCF and AF have more similar models to one another than they do with the others for direct access to resources**.[25] Conversely, a challenge is seen in the CIF business model, which is to work with MDBs, a practice that is not the case for the AF. Also, the GEF hosts the AF Board Secretariat; for every AF project proposal that goes to the AF Board, GEF technical staff provide reviews. Regarding cooperation between the GCF and the CIF, working teams have held a series of technical discussions with a view to seeking synergy with CIF's new programmes,

[25] The AF has identified 17 projects that met the criteria set forth in the working pilot framework, such as having satisfactory implementation evaluations and interest from countries for scaling up. Discussions have advanced with partners in four countries, among them the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI).

including the Accelerating Coal Transition and Renewable Energy Integration programmes (Green Climate Fund, 2022a).

90. Ultimately, **the GCF has demonstrated a will to pursue cooperation with the other funds. It has put in place a strong LTV with the GEF, and it has engaged in a series of processes with the other funds to set the stage for a more intentional and impactful cooperation, at programmatic and project level, which remains largely ad hoc, unstructured, and opportunistic.** A key reason is in the lack of incentivization for this at the GCF. While funding proposal templates now ask about the complementarity and coherence of projects, there are no financial resources available specifically for pursuing coordination, which can be very time-consuming.

B. EXTENT OF COLLABORATIVE WORK IN AFRICAN STATES

91. **From 2015 to 2022, a total of USD 6.87 billion in project funding was approved for the African states by the four climate funds (GCF, GEF, CIF, and AF). The largest contributor among the multilateral climate funds was the GCF with USD 3.99 billion** (58 per cent of approved funding), followed by the GEF with USD 1.76 billion (26 per cent of approved funding), the CIF with USD 927.3 million (14 per cent of approved funding) and the AF with USD 190.6 million (3 per cent of approved funding).[26] Since 2015, each country in Africa has had at least one project from the GEF, AF and/or CIF.

92. Most GCF result areas, thematic priorities and focal sectors are complementary with those of the GEF, AF and CIF. Despite this, evidence from case studies prepared in the context of previous IEU evaluations, and new data and analysis prepared for the current one, all point to relatively limited, select examples of GCF complementarity and coherence with the three other climate finance institutions at project level in Africa.

93. However, **there is very early, limited evidence of regional or ecosystem level complementarity.** Also, the readiness support of varying organizations has served to build the capacity of a number of stakeholders focused on climate action. A few key points capture this below.

94. **A handful of GCF projects are actively being co-financed by other climate finance institutions. Five of the 209 GCF approved projects were reported to be co-financed by the CIF or GEF. Of the five, two are based in Africa**, including the multi-country project FP092 “Programme for integrated development and adaptation to climate change in the Niger Basin”, which has co-financing from the CIF. This project was approved in 2018 and has been under implementation since July 2022. The nine countries involved are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, the Niger, and Nigeria (Green Climate Fund, n.d-c).

95. **In a few cases, GCF projects drew on previous projects or built on work completed by other organizations.** In Ethiopia, FP136 “Resilient landscapes and livelihoods project” is understood to have “drawn extensively from the practical experiences and lessons from previous projects, including GEF projects” (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022a). On a related note, the LDC evaluation’s Ethiopia case study reported that GCF offers a higher level of funding than others; that it offers a diversity of financial instruments and models; and that countries may pursue direct access to GCF resources through DAEs should they wish to (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022e). However, the case study recognized the high level of competition for GCF funding.

[26] However, such approved funding must be taken with a grain of salt, given the particularly low disbursement rate of the GCF to African single-country projects (21 per cent).

96. The Kenya case study noted the four funds work in similar areas and that the National Treasury retains general oversight on all climate financing. It reported, however, that the following factors work against coherence at the country level, according to NDA and DAE stakeholders:

- Differing replenishment cycles among the funds
- GCF's practice of funding projects in the absence of country level analysis and planning
- Institutional anchoring to different parts of government for day-to-day coordination
- Projects of the funds anchoring to different parts of implementing agencies (National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) a case in point) and the NDA doesn't have the oversight over AF and GEF funding
- Lack of established processes for sharing project concepts at a country level, and of timelines for project preparation

97. In Ethiopia, it was noted that the most complementary climate projects are sustainable land management projects supported by the World Bank (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022e). In Seychelles, FP135, "Ecosystem-based adaptation in the Indian Ocean" was noted to be complementary to investments of other climate finance institutions as "it takes an ecosystem-based adaptation approach that is already common in the region and builds on past and ongoing investment" (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2020j).

98. GCF interventions in African FCV states are found to complement ongoing initiatives, as together, these support countries and organizations, from pipeline preparation to financing. This is notably the case for FP177 "Cooling Facility", a multi-regional FP which includes the participation of Somalia.[27] The GCF-supported Cooling Facility is complementary to the World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program's Efficient, Clean Cooling Program, as the facility will make financing available for pipeline projects prepared through the Efficient, Clean Cooling Program.

99. Similarly, complementarity is noted between FP178 "Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility", and the GCA Masterclass on Climate Resilient Infrastructure for G5 Sahel Countries. The GCF-supported Desert to Power Facility will provide financing to solar energy generation projects in G5 Sahel countries. Through its Masterclass, the GCA will seek to provide the knowledge and skills required to develop projects to be submitted to the Desert to Power Facility.

100. In Tunisia, the country case study found that the GCF is part of an ecosystem that offers strong potential for cooperation and complementarity. However, due to its low engagement in the country, this cooperation has yet to be established.

101. **One of the good, major, if still nascent initiatives for joint programming is related to the GGW**. **It is one concrete example of how the GCF and GEF Secretariats have worked together to support complementary actions.** The GCF Inclusive Green Financing Initiative (IGREENFIN) Phase 1 project and its associated Regional Support Programme together with the LDCF project, Great Green Wall Climate Change Adaptation Regional Support Project, are both implemented by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (see details in Box 4-1 below).

102. The GCF and AF secretariats have been supporting the Community of Practice of DAEs committee for the development and submission of a GCF readiness proposal to fund the initiative's action plan for strengthening DAEs. In the context of the pilot work with GEF on e-mobility, the GCF and GEF Secretariats are engaging in discussions with common AEs on synergies between e-mobility projects

[27] The first target area, space cooling and cool/green surfaces, includes cooling equipment, building automation and controls, as well as solar and vegetative roofs and walls, among others. The second target area, refrigeration, cold chains and logistics, includes refrigeration, storage, and distribution activities, and related equipment and logistics.

being considered under the seventh replenishment of resources of the GEF Trust Fund (GEF-7), and potential scaled up and/or parallel projects with the GCF (Green Climate Fund, 2021y).

Box 4-1. 3CO example at the project level – GGWI

The FP183 "IGREENFIN 1: Greening Agricultural Banks & the Financial Sector to Foster Climate Resilient, Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture in the GGW countries – Phase I, GCF Project" was approved at B.31 in March 2022. IGREENFIN 1 covers Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, as well as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana (which are not GGW members yet). IGREENFIN 2 is planned to cover the remaining GGW countries: Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sudan **(**Green Climate Fund, 2022b).

IGREENFIN 1 illustrates the opportunities for, and challenges facing inter-agency cooperation in a complex setting of regional and national institutions. The project is implemented by IFAD in coordination with a parallel project (also implemented by IFAD) funded by the GEF with USD 10 million and was approved by the 32nd LDCF Council in June 2022.

Component 3 of IGREENFIN 1 and the new GEF project will focus on knowledge management and innovation, and will deploy experts in the 11 GGWI countries, and the various organizations involved in the GGWI.

At the same time, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) GGW Accelerator Unit in Bonn and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Nairobi, with funding from *Agence de Développement Agricole* (ADA; EUR 3 million) and GEF (USD 2.5 million), support the capacity development of the Pan African Agency of the PA-GGW.

These coordinated activities resulted from continuous exchanges between committed staff from the GCF, IFAD, UNCCD and GEF at project officer level; they also pulled in ADA and UNEP, and discussed in virtual meetings held over more than a year how to formulate and advance the project documents, and managed to get them approved by their respective boards. This is the first such cooperation mechanism, and could, if successful, become an example for other regions (e.g., the Pacific, the Amazon or Congo region).

103. **As at B.34, a total of 51 GCF projects included an element of complementarity, coherence or interaction between different climate finance institutions across four interaction types identified by the Board in B.17/04: scale up, synergy, lessons learned and co-financing. Of these projects, 19 projects or 37 per cent were in African states** (see Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. Complementarity in GCF FPs



Source: Green Climate Fund (2022a), analysed by IEU DataLab.

104. Where interaction between projects exists in African states, it is primarily where GCF projects are being implemented in parallel and synergistically with projects of other climate funds. Interaction is equally fruitful where GCF projects are implementing lessons acquired from the efforts of other climate finance institutions. Seven funding proposals (FPs) for projects in African states have been identified for each of these two types of interactions in the GCF portfolio as of B.34.

105. **To a lesser extent, only two FPs for projects in the African states considered scaling up experiences from other climate funds, and only three proposals attracted co-financing from another climate fund**. In contrast, in other regions, GCF reportedly focused more on scaling up experiences from other climate funds, with 11 FPs compared to the two in Africa.

106. Before the GCF Readiness programme began in late 2014, other bilateral and multilateral agencies were supporting climate finance readiness activities. This support helped some countries to become front runners in their engagement with the GCF (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2018a). However, while the GCF's RPSP has built the capacity of African states and their climate action partners, there are further opportunities for strategic and complementary action at country level that lay dormant.

107. With regard to planning and programming, the readiness evaluation found that RPSP-supported country programmes had been centred on engagement with the GCF, rather than climate finance more broadly, which was seen to be a missed opportunity for preparing cooperation, investment planning and sequencing with other donors (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2018a). This stems in part from the fact that the purpose of GCF country programmes has been unclear, that these are non-binding, and that they have been prepared by only a minority of countries.

C. ACCREDITED ENTITIES AND PARTNERS

108. **The four climate funds each work with a variety of AEs, agencies and diverse partners in the implementation and delivery of climate finance and projects. These bodies play a key bridging and action-oriented role between the GCF and its resources**, and NDAs/focal points and their national priorities. Together, AEs (and their equivalents across funds), NDAs/focal points and the GCF form a triad purposefully designed to have effective and sustainable impact. Given the high degree of overlap between the AEs (and their equivalents across funds), there has been evidence of as yet limited but emergent collaboration across the four funds at national and in some cases regional (or multi-regional) project level. While the potential for increased collaboration is immense, there are important obstacles warranting consideration.

109. As of October 2022, there were 113 GCF AEs, including 59 national, 13 regional and 41 international ones. This overlaps with all international agencies and AEs of the GEF, AF and CIF. Both the GCF and the AF have national DAEs as well as IAEs. The GCF has expanded significantly on the concept of DAEs, which was initiated by the AF, such that the GCF recognizes regional entities to be DAEs, while the AF does not. The GEF works through 18 international and regional entities called "agencies", and the CIF through six MDBs. All entities accredited by the other funds are also accredited with the GCF.

110. Also, 50 GCF AEs have benefitted from the fast track accreditation process as an entity already accredited to the GEF, AF and/or the Directorate-General for International Development and Cooperation of the European Commission. The GCF and AF continue to work on identifying ways to expedite the re-accreditation of entities that are accredited to both funds, and according to the GCF "Annual update on complementarity and coherence" as of B.34, "Regarding re-accreditation, of the 14 AEs re-accredited, 11 were re-accredited via fast track accreditation. Over the reporting

period, nine AEs re-accredited went through fast track accreditation." (Green Climate Fund, 2022a). Table 4-1 below presents GCF AEs that are also AEs or agencies of the GEF, AF and/or CIF (Green Climate Fund, 2021y).

Table 4-1. GCF AEs accredited with GEF, AF and/or CIF

GEF	AF	CIF
AfDB	ADA Morocco	ADB
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	ADB	AfDB
BOAD	AfDB	EBRD
Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)	Bhutan Trust Fund for Environmental Conservation (BTFEC)	IDB
Conservation International (CI)	BOAD	International Finance Corporation (IFC)
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)	CAF	World Bank
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)	Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	*Centre de Suivi Écologique* (CSE)	
Foreign Economic Cooperation Office (FECO)	Cook Island Government (MFEM COK)	
IFAD	Department of Environment, Antigua and Barbuda (DoE ATG)	
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)	EBRD	
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	Environmental Project Implementation Unit (EPIU)	
UNEP	FAO	
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	*Fonds National pour l'Environnement et le Climat* (FNEC)	
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	General Directorate of Sectoral and Special Programs and Projects (DIPROSE) [formerly *Unidad para el Cambio Rural* (UCAR)]	
World Bank	IDB	
World Wildlife Fund (WWF)	IFAD	
	Kemitraan	
	Micronesia Conservation Trust (MCT)	
	Ministry of Environment (MOE) Rwanda [formerly MINIRENA]	
	Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (MOFEC)	
	Ministry of Finance and Economic Management	
	Ministry of Water and Environment	
	National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)	
	NEMA	
	Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected Areas (PROFONANPE)	
	Protected Areas Conservation Trust (PACT)	
	Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS)	
	Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment	

GEF	AF	CIF
	Programme (SPREP) South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) UNDP UNEP World Bank World Food Programme WMO	

111. **United Nations organizations are the most prominent partner for projects in Africa, while MDBs are the group of IAEs with the second largest number of projects in Africa. In spite of their growing numbers, DAEs still have limited numbers of projects with the GCF.** As an important aside, the GCF and AF secretariats have been supporting the Community of Practice of Direct Access Entities Committee for the development and submission of a GCF readiness proposal to fund the initiative's action plan for strengthening DAEs. See Table 4-2 for additional details on the GCF portfolio in the African states by AE type.

Table 4-2. GCF portfolio in the African States by AE type

Type of AE	Approved projects	Pipeline – concept notes	Pipeline – funding proposals	Withdrawn
United Nations	24	37	6	39
Multilateral development banks	18	13	9	43
Bilateral DFIs	12	6	2	17
National DAE	10	25	6	45
Regional DAE	10	22	5	26
Other types of AE	11	45	4	20
African States portfolio	85	148	32	190

Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: "Other types of AE" category includes institutions classified as commercial banks, international non-governmental organizations (I-NGOs), foundations, investment funds, and asset managers.

112. As noted, United Nations organizations have been the most constant partner, as made evident by the year-on-year consistency in concept note submission. **However, the generally downward trend of MBDs, bilateral DFIs as well as DAEs in submitting concept notes to the GCF**, **after a period of early enthusiasm, is shown in Table 4-3 and Figure 4-2**. In 2015, of the 33 concept notes submitted to the GCF for projects in Africa, nine (27 per cent) were from MDBs, nine (27 per cent) were from United Nations agencies, six (18 per cent) were from bilateral DFIs, and six (18 per cent) were from DAEs (see Table 4-3). In contrast, of the 57 concept notes submitted to the GCF for projects in Africa in 2021, only four (7 per cent) were from MDBs, and five (8 per cent) from

bilateral DFIs, with the remainder from United Nations agencies (17; 30 per cent), DAEs (13; 23 per cent), and other types of AEs (18; 32 per cent).[28]

Table 4-3. Annual number of concept notes for the African States by AE type

Type of AE	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Missing dates
Multilateral development banks	1	9	12	4	17	5	11	4	2	19
Bilateral DFIs		6	2	3	6	2	5	5	1	7
United Nations		9	13	16	16	11	8	17	8	8
National DAE		5	18	8	10	6	10	7	6	17
Regional DAE		1	6	8	9	15	2	6	3	14
Other types of AE	2	3	5	16	8	10	4	18	9	6
African States portfolio	3	33	56	55	66	49	40	57	29	71

Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: "Other types of AE" category includes institutions classified as commercial banks, I-NGOs, foundations, investment funds, and asset managers.

113. **Given the importance of AEs for facilitating inter-institutional collaboration, the downward trend in concept note submission is worrying**, amounting to an inhibiting factor. Equally of concern is the **large number of withdrawn projects from MDBs and bilateral DFIs**, **which had high but then waning expectations for the GCF**. By way of example, MDBs work a great deal with the CIF, which along with the GEF provides a relatively higher share of support to central African states than the GCF (where it provides the smallest share of its support). As the MDBs downgrade their engagement with the GCF, the possibility of bolstering the GCF portfolio in partnership with MDBs and the CIF also decreases.

[28] These trends are to be interpreted with some caution, however, as many concept notes were not time-stamped (as per the last column to the right of Table 4-3) and thus cannot be reliably related to a particular year.

Figure 4-2. Trends in concept notes by type of implementation agency



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

114. As of B.34, MDBs had withdrawn 43 (22 per cent) of their submitted projects to the GCF, many of them in 2018. This trend is particularly pronounced for the AfDB, which has withdrawn 21 projects worth USD 1.13 billion, representing nearly half of all 43 withdrawn projects ever brought to the GCF by the AfDB. This is reportedly largely due to the GCF's stringent policies/procedures; these financial entities submitted many concept notes and FPs before realizing that many were not moving forward.

115. **The decreasing enthusiasm of MDBs in working with the GCF is mainly due to the perceived inefficiency of the GCF, and the time- and resource-consuming duplication and overlap of operational policies** (mainly safeguards, environmental assessment, and gender) and procurement requirements, all of which are highly impactful of proposal (and other) processing time.

116. These and other AE types are starting to retreat from the GCF, withdrawing projects and avoiding re-accreditation. Two such examples include *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KfW) and WMO, with a hint of more to come. Each retreat and withdrawal is a strategic, collaborative opportunity lost for impact and paradigm shift at scale. Of note, the IDFC might be a forum where the differences about review processes might be discussed in a group setting between the GCF and accredited PDBs, with a view to increase in particular the cooperation for adaptation finance, which is recommended by a recent report from *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD) (International Development Finance Club, Green Climate Fund and ITACA, 2022, p.16).

Chapter 5. COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES IN AFRICAN STATES

117. This chapter evaluates the extent to which, and how the GCF has supported African states in ensuring ownership over climate-related investments. The chapter assesses country ownership overall, while examining specific dimensions of an indicator framework of country ownership, highlighting factors that have supported and hindered country ownership. The chapter further explores stakeholder participation and the consideration of local communities in GCF programme and project development and implementation.

A. ENSURING COUNTRY OWNERSHIP ON CLIMATE-RELATED INVESTMENTS

118. **Finding 4.** Country ownership has been a central component of the GCF strategy from the beginning, with the GCF business model honouring a country driven approach to delivering climate finance. Overall, **most African countries are understood to have moderate country ownership, having received generally enabling support from the GCF**.

119. **Finding 5.** While country ownership and readiness clearly enable and reflect countries' abilities to pursue adaptation and mitigation measures, **the RPSP has been under-utilised and is challenging to access for the countries and entities that need it most.**

120. **Finding 6. The direct access model of the GCF is inhibited by a paucity of nominated and accredited DAEs**, though there is evidence to suggest this will shift positively in the near future.

1. COUNTRY OWNERSHIP IN BOARD DECISIONS AND GUIDELINES

121. **Country ownership has initially been a central component of GCF strategy, more than of most other international agencies, with the exception of the AF** (which pioneered the direct access approach). The principle of country ownership is reflected in the GCF's GI and in various Board decisions. The GI provides that "[t]he Fund will pursue a country driven approach and promote and strengthen engagement at the country level through effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders" (Green Climate Fund, 2011).

122. Decisions B.07/03, annex VII, and B.08/10, annex XII established the role of the NDAs/focal points in the initial project approval process, including the non-objection procedure. Decision B.08/10, annex XIII provides initial best practice guidelines for selecting and establishing NDAs/focal points. Decision B.08/11, annex XVII provides initial general guidelines for country programmes to enable country ownership through NDA/focal point leadership in the process. Decision B.10/10 reconfirms the importance of enhancing country ownership, country drivenness and the role that NDAs/focal points can play in this regard. Decision B.11/10 further elaborates the role of the NDA/focal point to lead an annual participatory review of the GCF portfolio in their countries with the participation of all relevant stakeholders.

123. These decisions were followed by the Guidelines for Enhanced Country Ownership and Country Drivenness, adopted at B.17, and the most recent comprehensive guidance from the Board on this matter (Green Climate Fund, 2017a). Paragraph 8 states:

> *The principle of country ownership will be considered in the context of all GCF operational modalities and relevant related policies including the RPSP and the PPF, the Proposal Approval process, including the simplified approval process, as well as the accreditation process, recognizing that country ownership is a continual process. NDAs/[focal points] have a key role in these processes in a way which builds national and institutional capacity and facilitates engagement with relevant stakeholders.*

124. The principle is based on the fundamental notion that a country must lead and be well-empowered to address the challenges of climate change. The RPSP is supposed to assist developing countries in advancing country ownership, and as such, is a central if not the main GCF tool for enhancing country ownership.

125. However, **there is no formal, Board-approved definition of country ownership. Further, the concept of country ownership has variable meanings to different NDAs/focal points and other stakeholders.** The GCF has been sensitive to this fact, as articulated in the Guidelines for Enhanced Country Ownership and Country Drivenness, paragraph 17:

> *Recognizing that country ownership is an underlying principle and an ongoing process, and that country ownership may mean different things in different contexts, quantitative measurement alone of country ownership is unlikely to provide meaningful results. The Fund should make efforts to draw lessons from how country ownership is being interpreted and implemented in different contexts, and to use such lessons to inform the development of policies and programmes, stakeholder engagement, and country programmes.*

126. **Given this recognition of the importance of context, countries retain a great deal of flexibility in defining and pursuing country ownership. Countries have flexibility in institutionalizing the NDA/focal point, in choosing its location in the government, and in the composition of the coordinating body in-country that deals with the selection of priority projects (which will receive no-objection-letters (NOLs)) and nominates DAE candidates for accreditation.** While the GCF strongly advocates the involvement of the private sector and civil society in this coordinating body, it is not a requirement. There is also no template for country programmes, and indeed, the country programme is not a pre-requisite for obtaining GCF funding for projects. The RPSP supports the development of concept notes, which are recommended but not required for preparing and submitting proposals for FPs. Moreover, some countries go ahead and prepare concept notes and FPs, eventually obtaining approvals without RPSP support.

127. **The GCF has articulated a preference for DAEs rather than IAEs to develop projects – more clearly than other climate funds (except for the AF)** – but the choice of IAEs and/or DAEs depends on the country in question, given the options available at the time. The GCF also encourages the use of national rather than international consultants, noting that capacities may vary a lot across countries. Again, this is all within the purview of countries, in line with the principle of country ownership.

2. Indicator framework

128. **While the broad principle of country ownership is clear, and the diversity in understanding of country ownership is acknowledged, there are a series of key factors that have been understood to underlie country ownership** (see Appendix 1). These factors point to country ownership overall and to country ownership in engaging with the GCF to address climate change

and action priorities, pointing to progress made by a country in developing climate change related strategies, plans and projects, and ultimately the extent to which country ownership has been pursued and developed, with the contribution of GCF support. This is premised on the assumption that engaging with the GCF advances the climate change priorities of African states.

129. These factors or indicators amount to a framework of country ownership, as presented in Table 5-1. **The framework should not be understood as a scoring system for countries. Rather**, **each of the indicators provides specific and valuable insights into areas where African states may wish to further strengthen their engaged focus with the GCF to advance their country-owned and driven approach, both in engaging with the GCF and more broadly**. The composite framework is also a way for the GCF to identify areas of country ownership where it could provide more intentional and additional support. It is in fact a way for African states and the GCF to further frame and pursue discussion on ways to better advance the principle of country ownership in practice, based on evaluative insights.

130. A total of 15 indicators have been included in the country ownership framework. First listed and described in Table 5-1, they are then followed by a general discussion and a more specific one on each of the indicators (for additional detail, see Appendix 1).

Table 5-1. Indicator framework of country ownership

No.	Indicator	Score description	Source
Role of the NDA			
1	NDA acting as an executing entity (EE) for approved FPs	0 – No 1 – Yes	EE dataset
2	Country acting as a co-financer of the GCF approved project	0 – No co-financing from government 1 – In-kind co-financing from government 2 – Grant co-financing from government 3 – Other financial instrument (loan, equity, guarantees)	Co-financier dataset
3	Number of entities nominated for accreditation	0 – No entity identified 1 – Entity identified and nominated 2 – Nominated entity/entities continuing with accreditation process Note: For regional DAE, consider only the headquarters country	Accreditation dataset
4	Number of national DAEs accredited	0 – None 1 – One national DAE 2 – Two national DAEs 3 – Three and above national DAEs	Accreditation dataset
5	Stakeholder engagement: Engagement of the NDA at the project design or preparation phase	0 – No information reported in the funding proposal on engagement with the NDA during project design or preparation phase 1 – The funding proposal mentioned engagement with the NDA during project design or preparation phase	Country ownership Investment Criteria
Country strategies			

No.	Indicator	Score description	Source
6	Availability of the country programme	0 – No country programme 1 – Draft of country programme is available 2 – Country programme is available and shared with the GCF	Country portal
7	Availability of NDCs or updated NDC report	0 – No NDCs 1 – Old NDC available 2 – Updated/new NDC available	Climate Watch data
8	Availability of NAP	0 – No NAP 1 – NAP available and shared with the UNFCCC	UNFCCC website
Access to RPSP and PPF support			
9	Country received the readiness support for NDA strengthening	0 – No readiness support received 1 – Pipeline of RPSP proposal 2 – One RPSP grant approved 3 – More than one RPSP grant approved	RPSP dataset
10	Country received the readiness support for NAPs grant)	0 – No NAP support received so far 1 – Pipeline of NAP proposal 2 – NAP support received	RPSP dataset
11	Country received the PPF support	0 – No PPF support received so far 1 – Pipeline of PPF proposal 2 – One PPF support approved 3 – More than one PPF support approved	PPF dataset
Access to climate finance from GCF and other multilateral climate funds			
12	Presence of single country funding proposal	0 – No single country funding proposal 1 – One or more single country concept note/funding proposal in the pipeline 2 – One single country funding proposal approved 3 – More than one single country funding proposal approved	Portfolio dataset
13	Presence of multi-country funding proposal	0 – No multi-country funding proposal 1 – One or more multi-country concept note/funding proposal in the pipeline 2 – One or more multi-county funding proposal approved	Portfolio dataset
14	DAEs’ capacities to develop projects (approved project from national DAE)	0 – No project from DAE 1 – One or more DAE concept note/funding proposal in the pipeline 2 – One DAE’s funding proposal approved 3 – More than one DAEs’ FPs approved	Portfolio dataset
15	The country has received climate finance from multilateral climate change funds for the year 2015 and above (GEF, AF, CIF)	0 – No 1 – Yes	Climate funds data

Source: Compiled by the evaluation team (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022)

3. Overall analysis

131. The indicator-based analysis of country ownership in addressing climate change challenges with GCF support provided a whole range of insights. Overall, of the 54 African states, 17 per cent are characterized as having low, 68 per cent are characterized as having moderate, and 15 per cent are categorized as having high country ownership.[29]

132. **Countries with the lowest country ownership have very little engagement with the GCF**, and these include Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Cabo Verde, Algeria and South Sudan. The only other two countries with low country ownership are Somalia and Central African Republic. Somalia is the only African state categorized in 2022 as an FCV country with high-intensity conflict. Also in 2022, Central African Republic is identified as an FCV country with medium-intensity conflict. All other African States, the overwhelming majority at 85 per cent, have moderate or high country ownership. The states with the highest level of country ownership in 2022 have been identified as Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Namibia, and Senegal.

133. When comparing the extent of country ownership with a country's climate risks score, or with the ND-Gain readiness index,[30] the results show a weak negative correlation (-0.08) between the country's climate risks score and its ownership score; there is no apparent connection between the observed levels of climate risks and country ownership. However, there is a positive correlation between a country's ND-Gain readiness index and the extent of country ownership; in other words, countries with high economic, governance and social readiness also exhibit higher country ownership (see Figure 5-1).

134. **While there is no clear causal relationship between high readiness and country ownership, their positive correlation indicates that both aspects go together in enabling countries to reduce climate risks and impact**.[31] Both are helpful for creating a stable enabling environment with institutions suitable for facilitating capital mobilisation for adaptation and mitigation measures.

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[29] Countries with a "score" of less than or equal to 10 are categorized as having low country ownership. Countries with scores between 11 and 22 inclusively are categorized as having moderate country ownership, and countries with scores above 22 are classified as having high country ownership.
[30] The ND-Gain country index summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience.
[31] From the correlation test output, the p-value (0.06) is less than the significance level, implying that the ND-Gain readiness and country ownership scores are significantly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.27 at a 90 per cent confidence level.

Figure 5-1. Correlation of country ownership with climate risks and readiness



Source: Country Ownership Framework as of 31 October 2022 (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022), and country index (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, n.d.), accessed in September 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

4. Findings for specific indicators and issues

135. An examination of the specific indicators of the country ownership framework has raised a number of important issues, the most salient of which are discussed below.

a. Availability of country programmes, strategies and plans

136. A key factor of country ownership is the existence of a country programme or other key climate change strategies and plans, especially NDCs and NAPs. Having at least one of these in place reflects the strategic intentions and priorities of African states, and it enables more effective and efficient engagement with the GCF. They also enable the development of a national orientation and country portfolio with the support of AEs as opposed to (and in addition to) the development of AE portfolios of projects across countries.

137. Twenty African countries have prepared country programmes. But only nine of them have been shared with the GCF and uploaded to the GCF website. Consulted stakeholders in Africa have indicated that the strategic and operational purpose of country programmes has not been clarified. While some NDAs/focal points have reservations about the usefulness of country programmes, some others said they helped to accelerate the development of concept notes, as reported for Liberia. Except for Libya, all countries have NDCs, and a large majority (45) also have updated NDCs. In

contrast, only 15 countries have NAPs, even though a majority have obtained RPSP funding for adaptation planning (see Table 5-2 for details).[32]

138. Nigeria and South Africa are working on a just transition plan, operationalizing the net-zero objective with intermediate milestones, and without GCF involvement thus far. According to UNDP, eight more countries have "directly and indirectly referenced just transition in their revised climate pledges (NDCs), demonstrating a strong political will to incorporate a social dimension into their climate action".[33]

Table 5-2. Availability of country programmes, strategies and plans

Indicator	Observation	No. of countries	Percentage (%)
Availability of the country programme	No country programme	34	63%
	Draft of country programme is available	11	20%
	Country programme available and shared with the GCF	9	17%
Availability of NDCs or updated NDCs report	No NDCs	1	2%
	Old NDC	8	15%
	Updated or new NDC	45	83%
Availability of NAP	No NAP	39	72%
	NAP available and shared with the UNFCCC	15	28%

Source: Country Ownership Framework as of 31 October 2022 (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022)

b. NDA/Focal point positioning and functioning

139. **All African States have NDAs/focal points in place. However, their locations in governments and the strength of staff vary significantly.** Most NDAs/focal points are located within a country's MOE, and there are indications that coordination with other ministries is often not easy, particularly in countries where different departments work in silos. This creates difficulties for the pursuit of stakeholder consultations, which are at different levels of development between countries (as discussed in Chapter 5.B). Such consultations advance best when high level government interest and encouragement manifest in supporting them. This has been the case in some GGWI countries, for instance.

140. The IEU's COA evaluation made the important point that NDA/focal point leadership is highly dependent on context and stakeholder perception. In Morocco, a country with very high country ownership, less than 40 per cent of in-country survey respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the NDA/focal point had the convening power within the Government to provide leadership on GCF issues. In contrast, in Uganda, a country with moderate country ownership, nearly 100 per cent of in-country survey respondents affirmed the same.[34] The COA evaluation noted that NDA/focal point capacity to monitor the GCF portfolio in implementation was perceived as low overall. And the survey of CSOs from or working in Africa pointed to widespread concerns about the transparency of

[32] In some other cases, the primary objective is not to prepare NAP document but give general support to adaptation planning.

[33] See United Nations Development Programme (2022). For Nigeria, see International Labour Organization (2022). For South Africa, see Presidential Climate Commission Towards a Just Transition (n.d).

[34] The online survey was sent to the IEU mailing list, which contains broader GCF network (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2019b).

NDAs/focal points in Africa. In other words, even countries with high country ownership could stand to gain from NDA/focal point strengthening. This needs to be assessed by countries themselves on a case-by-case basis.

c. Government co-financing

141. Government co-investment is one consideration for country ownership. In this respect, the COA evaluation reported that approximately 39 per cent of projects in Africa (23 out of 59) had recipient government investment/co-investment. This was observed in selected African case studies.

142. Projects in 44 African states have received project-country government co-financing (in-kind, grant or other types of instruments). Among these countries, eight were considered having high country ownership while 35 others moderate country ownership. Only one country with low country ownership (Eritrea) has had projects co-financed by its government.

143. **Countries with higher levels of country ownership are also found to provide more co-financing**. Indeed, countries with high country ownership had an average of two projects receiving project country government co-financing, with an average value of USD 92.3 million. On the other hand, countries with moderate co-financing had on average one project receiving project country government co-financing, with an average value of USD 45.2 million.

144. In FP034 "Building Resilient Communities, Wetland Ecosystems and Associated Catchments in Uganda", benefits from co-investment from the government of Uganda represent over 40 per cent of the project's value.[35] In Togo, in-kind support for readiness grants was provided by the government (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022e). A more elaborate discussion on financial resources mobilisation is pursued in Chapter 6.B.

d. Readiness support for NDA/focal point strengthening

145. Readiness is an important resource offered by the GCF with multiple purposes, including the strengthening of NDAs/focal points. Increasingly over seven years, African states have taken advantage of country readiness supports for capacity building, strategic frameworks, NAP, and pipeline development as intended, though without ever reaching the maximum amount allocated by the GCF for these activities. Allocations to African states have amounted to 30 per cent over the period.

146. While an elaborate discussion on readiness is provided in Chapter 6.D, the focus here is specific to the matter of readiness access and the need for immediate resources. Simply put, there is a disconnect in evidence. While readiness support is critical, Readiness programme resources are not being accessed to their full extent. Readiness programme access is difficult and is not backed by resources to access the Readiness programme itself. The Readiness programme is inaccessible to some of the countries who need it the most, such that several external organizations have developed a kind of readiness support for accessing the GCF itself (e.g., as in the case of the GCA, whose Africa Adaptation Accelerator Program supports African organizations in becoming accredited with the GCF). Consulted interviewees also explained that resources are needed to get ready for readiness in the sense of becoming able to prepare the application for an RPSP, which can take many months to do, requiring repeated interactions with the GCF Secretariat (Omari-Motsumi and others, 2019).[36] Indeed, those countries with the most need for readiness support are also disfavoured by the up-front investments required to access it.

[35] Ibid.
[36] This document provides a more general discussion of these national capacity issues and their limiting effects on the preparation of projects.

147. A problem for some NDAs/focal points, DAEs and candidate entities is reportedly that RPSP funding cannot be used for paying or topping up the salaries of staff who prepare projects or work on accreditation or re-accreditation. While national experts are available in these institutions, heavy up-front investment is required ahead of projects becoming approved and effective. Project fees are only forthcoming with the first disbursements, which can then fund the salaries of staff and other operational expenses.

e. Number of entities nominated for accreditation

148. **Of 54 eligible countries, 12 countries have no DAEs nominated**. In most countries, one or two applicants for DAE accreditation have been nominated. The South African case said that the case for accreditation with the GCF is not ironclad. There, several DAE candidates gave up their accreditation intentions when they realized the effort required. Both NDAs/focal points and the international finance units of these DAE candidates have found it difficult to justify the necessary investments, and to present a strong business case for accreditation to their upper management in view of the uncertain prospects of obtaining future projects over protracted horizons.

149. Nevertheless, the number of DAEs in the African States is likely to increase in the future. There are 48 DAE candidates in the pipeline, with 28 currently under review (stage I and stage II) and 20 nominated by an NDA for accreditation that have not requested a DAP account.

f. Number of national DAEs accredited

150. **In 13 of the 54 African countries, a total of 18 national DAEs have been accredited. Nine countries have one national DAE each, three countries (Kenya, Senegal and Zambia) have two national DAEs, and in Morocco there are three national DAEs. Further, in 44 countries, not a single national DAE project has been approved.** In three countries, there is one or more concept note or funding proposal in the pipeline from a national DAE. In seven countries, at least one project has been approved. This reflects a wider GCF challenge, given that globally, only six DAEs account for 74 per cent of all projects. Namibia is the only African state where more than one national DAE project has been approved. Namibia is also the only African country with an enhancing direct access (EDA) project, based on a financing modality that makes resources available to local organizations in developing countries. See Table 5-3 for details.

Table 5-3. Status of DAEs in the African States

Indicator	Observation	No. of countries	Percentage (%)
Number of entities nominated for accreditation	No entity nominated	12	22%
	Entity identified and nominated	16	30%
	Accreditation process ongoing for nominated entity	26	48%
Number of national DAEs accredited	No national DAE	41	76%
	One national DAE	9	17%
	Two national DAEs	3	5%
	Three DAEs and above	1	2%
DAE’s capacity to develop projects (approved project	No project from DAE	44	81%
	One or more of DAE’s concept notes/FPs in the pipeline	3	6%

INDICATOR	OBSERVATION	NO. OF COUNTRIES	PERCENTAGE (%)
from national DAE)	One DAE funding proposal approved	6	11%
	More than one of DAE's FPs approved	1	2%

Source: Country Ownership Framework as of 31 October 2022 (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022)

151. For the time being, **there are no criteria for how many DAEs are needed or make sense per country to advance country ownership effectively and efficiently.** Given that becoming accredited has been observed to be a complicated and lengthy process, and that developing proposals for both RPSPs and FPs has been resource intensive, it has been difficult to find strong DAE candidates – especially in LDCs and SIDS – due to their scarce resources.

152. However, while having one or more DAEs accredited is part of the basis of country ownership, an increase in the number of DAEs is no guarantee that more project proposals will be submitted. Several DAEs like the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (MOFEC), the Commercial Bank in Kenya, or the Ministry of Water and Environment of Uganda so far have submitted zero or very few projects to the GCF.

g. DAEs capacity to develop projects

153. **The number of concept notes submitted by African DAEs has declined in recent years, with 45 projects being withdrawn at various stages of the pipeline by a national DAE** (see details in Chapter 4). In interviews as part of the direct access synthesis study with NDAs/focal points, former NDAs/focal points and DAEs in Africa, it became clear that many DAEs started, in early years of their accreditation, submitting many proposals and expecting them to be approved quickly. Since then, they have increasingly expressed disappointments with the GCF, refraining from submitting any more until they get clarity on the outcomes of the existing pipeline.

154. That said, while accounting for differences deriving from the specificities of country and entity, it has been found (as in the COA evaluation) that DAE capacities to develop good GCF FPs are often generally low (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2019a). The recent LDC evaluation highlighted access to GCF support as a challenge for LDCs, with particular disadvantages for DAEs (Independent Evaluation Unit (2022b). The adaptation evaluation had a similar observation for regional DAEs, indicating that the challenge for increasing activity among this group could be "due in part to the lack of regional DAEs with the capacity, experience and networks to implement GCF projects" (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2021a).

h. PPF support received

155. PPF support spans all thematic foci, supporting project preparation through several pipeline development related activities.[37] They supported pre-feasibility, feasibility studies and project design, environmental, social and gender studies as well as identification of programme- and project level indicators, with a few supporting risk assessments.

156. Thirty countries have received PPF support, with 18 of them receiving one grant and 12 receiving more than one. This has resulted in 35 concept notes and FPs, of which eight were approved by the Board; four of the approved projects are under implementation. This clearly demonstrates the usefulness of this tool for preparing FPs and thus advancing country ownership.

[37] These include (i) pre-feasibility, feasibility studies and project design; (ii) identification of programme and project level indicators; (iii) risk assessments; and (iv) environmental, social and gender studies.

157. **Except for nine African states, all have single country projects approved or in the pipeline**. There are 14 countries with projects still at the pipeline stage, 12 countries with one approved project, and 18 have more than one approved single country project. Multi-country projects are more common. Only four countries have no such projects, another five have at least one in the pipeline, and 44 countries have one or more multi-country project approved (see Table 5-4 below).

Table 5-4. Access to GCF climate finance

Indicator	Observation	No. of countries	Percentage (%)
Presence of single country FPs	No single country FP approved and no concept note submitted in the pipeline	9	17%
	No single county FP approved but one or more single country concept note submitted in the pipeline	14	26%
	One single country funding proposal approved	13	24%
	More than one single country funding proposal approved	18	33%
Presence of multi-country FPs	No multi-country FP approved and no concept note submitted in the pipeline	4	7%
	No multi-country FP approved but one or more multi-country concept note submitted in the pipeline	5	9%
	One or more multi-country funding proposal approved	45	83%

Source: Country Ownership Framework as of 31 October 2022 (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2022)

158. In general, **single country projects involve greater country ownership, as they are necessarily focused on national priorities and requirements, and the amounts to be approved (including the co-financing) are known before the NOL is given. For multi-country projects, this is usually not the case**, as the amount allocated for each participating country is defined by an IAE only when project implementation progresses, and local partners are identified and contracted. This reduced national involvement explains why several countries (Central African Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan), which have no single country projects and no PPF, still have one multi-country project approved or in the pipeline. As those are largely handled by IAEs, which collect NOLs from NDAs/focal points, national capacities can be weak while countries are still able to participate. In such cases, a project might never be realized in a specific country; this is entirely in the hands of IAEs.

i. Role of IAEs and international consultants

159. In interviews, some national stakeholders of African countries with weak capacities expressed the view that IAEs, with their more extensive experience, are able to prepare, approve and implement projects more quickly than national institutions. Thus, to move more quickly towards results, some indicated they prefer to work with IAEs. This was also acknowledged by the adaptation evaluation, which stated that, “in some instances, IAEs may be the best suited to carry an adaptation project through given their experience managing large, complex adaptation projects in hard-to-reach places” (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2021a). Project SAP017 “Climate proofing food production investments in Imbo and Moso basins in the Republic of Burundi”, approved under IFAD, was

shared as one such example. Nevertheless, a preference for DAEs is more widely expressed by national stakeholders, both in principle and because DAEs are said to be more attuned to national needs and priorities than IAEs.

160. An issue repeatedly mentioned in interviews speaks to the use of international versus national consultants. While it is recognized that international consultants are often more familiar with the requirements of the GCF, their high costs are widely deplored. National consultants are often preferred by NDAs/focal points and DAEs in order to advance country ownership and capacity building, and to benefit from their familiarity with local conditions and languages. IAEs regularly use international consultants, at times combined with national consultants. Mixed teams are most often used (also to overcome the travel restrictions imposed by COVID-19), a practice likely to be continued and expanded in future.

B. STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMMING AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

161. **Finding 7. The GCF expectations for stakeholder engagement are well established in policy and guidance notes,** and they are in evidence through the Fund's engagement with African States. The GCF country readiness, programme/project preparation and observer activities related to the GCF Board facilitate participation most especially around those aspects of its mandate that are anticipatory – that is, related to policy, planning and project design.

162. **Finding 8.** In the context of African States, **there is less evidence, to date, of robust stakeholder engagement in management, in governance and in monitoring and learning.** For this reason, among others, the quality of engagement is routinely questioned by African stakeholders.

a. GCF parameters for stakeholders engagement

163. **In the GCF, the meaning of "stakeholder engagement" has become much more explicit over the past seven years regarding who should be engaged, when and how. There is no indication in the evaluation that the parameters set out for stakeholder engagement are insufficient. With regard to the GCF's funded activities, stakeholder engagement expectations are set out in policy.** Meaningful consultation and engagement are strategic priorities embedded in its "Revised environmental and social policy" (Green Climate Fund, 2021d), its "Updated Gender Policy" (Green Climate Fund, 2019e) and "Action plan" (2020–2023) (Green Climate Fund, 2020c), and its "Indigenous Peoples Policy" (Green Climate Fund, 2018b). What is required, specifically, of an AE (or an EE) to meet the GCF requirements is set out in the GCF guidance note, "Designing and ensuring meaningful stakeholder engagement on GCF-financed activities" (updated in May 2022). The GCF calls for stakeholder engagement plans for projects and for readiness activities with a commitment to support them. The annual performance report (APR) template requires specific commentary on stakeholder engagement activities undertaken (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2019a; 2022b).[38]

[38] Stakeholder engagement is a critical facet of country ownership. The 2019 "Independent evaluation of the Green Climate Fund's country ownership approach" observed "ownership" to be encompassing of "local communities, civil societies, the private sector, women's groups, indigenous peoples' organizations, municipal-/village-level governments, etc." The IEU COA and the LDC evaluations found that stakeholder engagement was most consistently observed at the national government level, and variable among other groups depending on the project. In reviewing guidelines for stakeholder engagement in the GCF, the COA evaluation also found that policies and guidelines left "significant flexibility

164. For stakeholder participation in GCF governance, guidelines date back to 2013. These set out a process for accrediting organizations from civil society and the private sector. They provide the steps by which these accredited observers select "active observers" (two from civil society and two from the private sector) to participate in GCF Board meetings.

b. Stakeholder engagement at country level

165. At country level, stakeholder participation comes in many forms and operates at multiple levels. In this evaluation, observed examples of actively facilitated stakeholder engagement include the following:

- NDAs/focal points convening representatives of government, civil society, business/industry associations, sector specialists and others to review nationally derived project notes, to formulate criteria for issuing NOLs related to IAE project concepts, and to review and recommend decisions on those designs.
- CSOs, operating as EEs, leading inclusive approaches with community stakeholders to plan and implement land restoration activities.
- A civil society partnership that convenes scientists and policy makers, conducts applied research, and supports peer learning activities associated with adaptation planning and project development.
- A pan African initiative to support CSO engagement with NDAs/focal points and country level processes associated with the GCF and other climate finance actors.

166. Observed country level situations warranting heightened attention to stakeholder engagement include: evidence of NDAs/focal points operating without a firm understanding of GCF operations or their roles; frequent NDA/focal point (institution and/or individual) turnover; low levels of awareness of the GCF within strategically relevant ministries or industry groups; stakeholders demonstrating an understanding of the GCF that is limited to their project or their sector; language barriers compromising or cutting off communication with identified population groups; and CSOs actively engaged in climate action indicating little or no awareness of the GCF's country presence. Regarding the latter scenario, one CSO representative in a Horn of Africa country signalled that remoteness with the following words: "We should really participate more in the GCF process, but this tool is far away from us."

167. **Multi-stakeholder fora or platforms are evident, formative or being called for across multiple countries and on a regional level in the case of the multi-country GGWI**. There is limited evaluative data to indicate success against expectations. **However, stakeholder accounts point toward the following as ingredients for success: a relevant stakeholder mix and competent facilitation, a shared understanding of purpose, high level championship, lateral and vertical connectedness and positioning for influence, and some means to finance operations**. In the context of the GCF, platforms are thought to be useful for: knowledge sharing and peer support relative to GCF business processes, project level information sharing and networking, and subject matter-related discourse and learning. Country level GCF planning and advocacy is also mentioned, in large part related to the idea that organizational coherence at a national level can help NDAs/focal

for countries to pursue their own approaches to engaging stakeholders…do not offer much direction in terms of how the GCF Secretariat should identify and engage stakeholders in activities it undertakes", and do not define the terms "stakeholder" and "civil society".

points press any country level concerns associated with IAEs operating multi-country projects on home turf.[39]

168. Views are mixed on whether the NDA/focal point entity is optimally positioned to instigate multi-stakeholder participation at a country level given its identification with government. In multiple African settings, public sector, private sector and civil society operate with a cautionary stance toward each other. Governance arrangements warding against power imbalance might be required for NDAs/focal points to be effective in the role. Country context is a very large determinant of what is possible in this regard.

c. Stakeholder engagement at project level

169. The view that project level stakeholder engagement is integral to sustainable impact is evident across the full range of AEs – private sector/commercial, multilateral development banks, United Nations, and non-governmental organization (NGO). Of 85 African FPs reviewed, 67 (79 per cent) mentioned some form of stakeholder engagement at the project design/preparation phase. In 33 FPs (39 per cent), this engagement extended to local communities. To one international investor, for example, adherence to country ownership principles and engagement with relevant groups, "simply makes good business sense". That said, the extent to which this view is the norm across Africa's GCF stakeholders is unknown.

170. Indications are that styles vary along a collaboration continuum linking consultation with a deeper form of engagement. The consultation end of the continuum is epitomized in the following assertion by a government spokesperson: "[the] government is fully capable of developing its project concepts and actively consults with local government when doing so". In the same vein, an international private sector AE operating without an anchor presence at the beneficiary level is poorly positioned to do much else than consult. A key informant working in a conflict zone, observes that historic associations, good and bad, between a government or organization and a population group often influence the depth of engagement possible.

171. **Project level stakeholder engagement occurs robustly in the design stages of a project cycle, as policy dictates, and drops off in implementation. A related observation is that project engagement is more likely to be "consultative" than "inviting" into some form of co-implementation or governance role**. The exception to this is where the project is, by design, participatory.[40] Within the Africa portfolio, several projects follow an "ecosystem management" or a "locally led adaptation" approach, wherein stakeholders as a rule are embedded as participants in project design and implementation, and acknowledged as important sources of wisdom. One such project located in Kenya, FP113 "Towards Ending Drought Emergencies: Ecosystem-Based Adaptation in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Rangelands (TWENDE)" is briefly described in Box 5-1.

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[39] In one Horn of Africa country, stakeholder engagement practice has brought government ministries and agencies together to align water-related policies and programming. Breaking down silos and building trust across stakeholder groups are especially important and delicate tasks in FCV states. A key lesson from these settings especially is that tribal and other dividing lines need to be navigated with close attention.

[40] In 2017, Germanwatch, CARE International, PACJA and ENDA Energie launched the consortium initiative, "CSOs Readiness for the Green Climate Fund" with funding support from the German Government. In October 2022, the consortia (now including 11 CSO national and regional networks) produced a thematic brief entitled: Locally Led Adaptation in the Green Climate Fund – Performance Across the Fund's Portfolio in Africa". The study examined the funding proposals of 56 adaptation and adaptation-mitigation FPs against the eight principles for locally led adaptation developed by the International Institute for Environment and Development and World Resources Institute (WRI) in 2021 (see International Institute for Environment and Development, n.d.) and found some deficiencies vis a vis the eight principles.

Box 5-1. FP113 TWENDE

Drought responses in Kenya's arid and semi-arid regions have traditionally triggered humanitarian responses to tackle short-term food security issues. While important in the moment, these approaches have failed to address mounting stresses on fragile arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) ecosystems. Stresses experienced include overgrazing, loss of vegetation, soil erosion, and reduced evapotranspiration. With IUCN as the AE, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, the National Drought Management Authority and CI as EEs, and several specialized CSOs operating as service providers, the five-year, USD 31.5 million, TWENDE project is to approach the problem county by county. Following ecosystem management principles, the project is to develop landscape management plans and local governance structures, introduce climate smart information services to guide land use management decisions, undertake locally led land restoration activities, commercialize locally produced grass seed used to re-introduce vegetative cover, and invest in local level food production value chains.

172. The GCF is attempting to enhance the prospects for robust stakeholder engagement through the EDA pilot involving a project in Zambia. In Namibia, FP024 "Empower to Adapt: Creating Climate Change Resilient Livelihoods through Community-Based Natural Resource Management" is also an EDA pilot. The DAE is the Namibia Community Natural Resources Management Network that is made up of eight NGOs and the University of Namibia, and is intended to engage locally with stakeholders on climate adaptation initiatives. Three pilots are underway or approved for implementation, globally.[41] The model involves DAEs gaining capacities to engage project stakeholders over longer periods of time using more programmatic approaches.

173. The GCF is observed also to be financing technical assistance (TA) support projects to accompany the larger multi-country private sector fund initiatives with a facilitative presence at the local level.[42]

174. The observations of stakeholder engagement set out above align with a recently released study examining the alignment of the GCF Africa project portfolio with the principles of locally led adaptation (see Box 5-2).

Box 5-2. Observations of locally led adaptation in the GCF, Africa portfolio

In October 2022, GermanWatch, CARE International and a consortium of African CSO organizations released a study that examined programmes and project documents (proposals and APRs) for practices consistent with the eight principles of lLocally lLed aAdaptation advanced by the International Institute for Environment and Development and World Resources Institute (WRI) in 2021.

Highlights from the study include that:

- It is not necessarily the case that larger- scale investments bring greater impact (resilience, adaptive capacity, wellbeing of the most vulnerable).

[41] The model is designed to support DAEs in shifting beyond a project delivery model to one that is programmatic and that shifts more decision-making authority towards communities. The other two projects underway are: FP169 "Climate Change Adaptation Solutions for Local Authorities in the Federated States of Micronesia", and FP061 "Integrated physical adaptation and community resilience through an EDA pilot in the public, private, and civil society sectors of three Eastern Caribbean SIDS". USD 200 million has been set aside for the pilot that is expected to include 10 projects (at least four in SIDS, LDCs, and African States). The GCF has published a set of guidelines to support the pilot concept. More information on the EDA concept and the three pilot initiatives currently underway is available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp024. The EDA guidelines are available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/eda

[42] An example can be found in the coupling of FP152 "Global Sub-National Climate Fund (SnCF)", with the FP153 "Global Sub-National Climate Fund – TA Facility" provided by IUCN.

- There is a case to be made that the closer funding modalities are situated to beneficiaries, the greater the likelihood for adaptation impact (this aligns with the premise of the GCF - EDAEnhanced Direct Access pPilot pProject).
- On aggregate, those projects and programmes in the categories of private sector and multi-country categories, and those that use non-grant instruments, demonstrate least well the principles of lLocally lLed aAdaptation including “devolved decision-making”, “strengthening local capacities”, and “ensuring transparency and accountability”.
- Conversely, public sector, single country projects valued at USD 10 million or less demonstrate most closely those principles.

Exceptions to the rule – where large financial institutions using loan-based instruments demonstrate well across all principles – suggest that policies and guidance can contribute to better designed projects.

d. Civil society organizations, the State and the Green Climate Fund in African States

175. **Ambivalence and hesitancy characterize the relationship between CSOs and the GCF across African states**. The disposition of each national government toward civil society also has an important bearing on the latitude for engagement. Broadly speaking, CSOs pursue their interests in climate action with autonomy. For many, their efficacy is tied both to their ability to observe and advocate, and to their ability to engage substantively in climate adaptation/resiliency programming.

176. **Currently, CSO leaders see limited scope to engage with the GCF and a deference on the part of the Fund toward the NDA/focal point and the AE on matters of CSO engagement**. CSOs see opportunities to learn about the GCF, understand project developments, gain skills and experience in project work and, ultimately to gain access to GCF funding where they can directly contribute their own expertise. As such, there is a widespread perception of their being under-utilised as a strategic resource, based on interviews, and African states evaluation CSO survey results.

177. At the same time, African CSOs acknowledge the space they have as accredited observers to engage with the GCF Board. This has given them structured access to AEs presenting proposals to the GCF Secretariat on a variety of operational topics, and to the Office of the Executive Director. They have been solicited by the Secretariat on the formulation of the USP, the SAP, and the independent redress mechanism. African CSOs also have provided input on the newly produced sector guides and on the revision of the gender action plan. Routinely, prior to Board meetings, African CSO observers provide inputs through their active observer representatives on proposals.

178. At the governance level, CSO leaders see their scope to engage with the GCF limited by process constraints. They cite the length of time they have to review project proposals ahead of Board meetings (three weeks, and occasionally significantly less, as at B.34), and the limited scope for giving meaningful input at this late stage in the approvals process.

179. **Overall, African CSOs perceive themselves to be marginal contributors to the GCF while at the same time being uniquely placed as a resource to support the paradigm shift the GCF seeks. They see in the GCF missed opportunities to invest in civil society capacity, particularly at a time when the Fund is attempting to channel more resources toward adaptation**.

Chapter 6. EFFECTIVENSS OF INVESTMENTS

180. This chapter assesses the extent to which GCF investments in African states have been effective and meet objectives and intended results. It reviews the mobilisation of complementary and catalytic financial resources as well as private sector engagement and mobilisation of private sector investments. The extent to which the GCF has been effective in building institutional capacity in African states is also discussed.

A. Meeting objectives and intended results

181. **Finding 9. Countries with active DAEs are found to have the most developed portfolios, as per total portfolio value**.

182. The GCF's African States portfolio comprises 85 FPs as of B.34. The first of them, FP002 "Scaling up the use of Modernized Climate Information and Early warning Systems in Malawi" (M-CLIMES), was approved 7 years ago in 2015. Its first disbursement took place on 31 August 2017 – only five years ago – and project completion is anticipated for 28 June 2023. According to its 2020 APR, the project has achieved a number of targets and "most of the project outputs are on track". Once completed, the M-CLIMES project is expected to have a positive impact on the lives of 1.4 million people through outputs such as improved weather/climate forecasting (Green Climate Fund, 2021y). According to the APR, individual project activities have achieved implementation progress of between 25 per cent and 85 per cent, and therefore any discussion of results must be calibrated accordingly. This project serves to highlight the fact that even with the earliest projects funded by the GCF, there is still limited progress on output completion, and thus also limited outcomes.

183. At the portfolio level, it is too early to provide a strong evaluative conclusion, though **preliminary indications point to a relatively high likelihood of impactful results. Approved single- and multi-country projects in African states (excluding projects that include countries from other regions) are expected to reach directly and indirectly over 200.6 million beneficiaries of Africa's 1.4 billion people and are slated to bring about a reduction in emissions equivalent to over 360.9 million MtCO2.** A few key projects are notable among the GCF FPs in African states that demonstrate such impact potential:

- FP002 "M-CLIMES" which included the expansion of the country's hydro-meteorological network, has progressed towards the establishment of an integrated flood monitoring and forecasting system, has increased the mainstreaming of climate information services, and has provided more than 350,000 farmers in ten districts with seasonal forecasts. (AE: UNDP).
- FP078 "Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund" (ARAF) deals with the on-financing of solar pumps and has succeeded in reducing farmer vulnerability. The project has had a positive impact on around 13,000 farmers (and an estimated 52,000 household members, indirectly) in its first year.[43] Over its lifetime, the project expects to reach 10 million farmers (Green Climate Fund, 2021h). (AE: Acumen Fund, Inc.).
- FP042 "Irrigation Development and Adaptation of Irrigated Agriculture to Climate Change in Semi-arid Morocco" oversees the construction of a water supply pipeline from the Kaddoussa Dam to provide water access to farms. As of 2020, the construction of the pipeline was near

[43] The project estimated it has had an impact on 65,000 people, based on an average household size of five.

completion (98 per cent), while subscriptions for 3,169.83 hectares (ha) had been received (Green Climate Fund, 2021g). (AE: AFD).

- FP034 “Building Resilient Communities, Wetland Ecosystems and Associated Catchments in Uganda” has achieved several outputs, including the establishment and training of 72 groups in on-crop diversification and resilient agricultural practices in 2020. Also, it has installed 15 automatic weather stations that seek to enhance the provision of localized daily and seasonal weather information and has established a database that already shares weather and climate information with 1,546 farmers. (AE: UNDP).

184. **A review of the focus of the GCF portfolio suggests that GCF will contribute to a larger extent to advancing mitigation over adaptation objectives. As previously noted, the GCF portfolio places significant importance on the energy generation and access result area**. A review of projects’ self-reported information on the impact potential investment criterion points to a strong focus on energy, with 36 per cent of projects seeking to improve access to renewable energy and 19 per cent expecting to improve energy efficiency in African states.[44]

185. Given the nature of adaptation, tangible impacts often take time and are difficult to measure. Indeed, while adaptation interventions may lead to the development of outputs such as disaster risk management tools, “resilient” infrastructure, or weather forecasting systems, the extent to which these truly and effectively increase the resilience of communities to climate change only becomes apparent over time.

186. The average portfolio value of DAEs operating in African states is USD 62.4 million, comparatively less than the overall average GCF portfolio value for all DAEs of USD 83.2 million, and the average portfolio value of USD 94.8 million for DAEs operating in other regions. The overall median portfolio value of all DAEs is USD 38.5 million, which is similar to the median portfolio values of DAEs operating in Africa. In this study, a country was considered as having an “active DAE” when the portfolio value of its DAEs was equal to or above the median portfolio value of DAEs across African states. A trend is observed where **African states in which an active DAE is headquartered have a larger portfolio compared to countries without DAEs**. For example, African states in which “active DAEs” are headquartered – such as Togo (with BOAD), Tanzania (with CRDB Bank), Ethiopia (with MoFEC), South Africa (with DBSA), and Morocco (with Attijariwafa Bank, ADA) – have larger portfolios. These African states are found to have portfolios with higher values of total finance, with a median of USD 238 million compared to USD 106 million for other African states where (other than active) DAEs are headquartered, and USD 41.5 million for the remaining African states without DAEs (see Figure 6-1).

187. Stakeholders report that **DAEs can help countries move work forward, while ensuring alignment with local needs**. Some key GCF Secretariat and AE informants have noted **there are early indications that active DAEs lead to higher performing projects**. Countries with an active DAE are also more likely than others to have single country FPs, to have received PPF support and to receive country co-financing on projects as per the country ownership framework.

[44] These estimates are based on the data extraction of AEs’ self-reported information on expected performance against the investment criteria of the Fund.

Figure 6-1. Median value of portfolios in African States with/without active DAEs



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

188. On the other hand, the extent to which results are achieved in countries with no single country FPs remains very limited, with for instance no reported achievements in Tunisia and Guinea (countries with only multi-country projects). **Concerns over the extent to which results can be achieved through multi-country, and particularly multi-regional projects, were raised by interviewed stakeholders – indicating these projects don't always lead to interventions in all participating countries. Stakeholders observed this often puts African states at a disadvantage as more funds are channelled to regions with lower levels of risk**. These projects also offer countries very limited control in terms of when sub-projects will be developed and therefore funds disbursed. This is particularly concerning considering the increasing weight of multi-country and multi-regional projects in GCF's African States portfolio (see Figure 6-2).

Figure 6-2. Number of projects approved annually by scope



Source: GCF Tableau server as of October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

189. In this regard, stakeholders also raised concerns around the impact of such projects on country portfolios. **It is widely believed that multi-country projects are problematic because they limit a country's ability to develop single country FPs under result areas addressed in the multi-country project.** This is a misperception; it is the case that 25 African states see the same result area addressed in multi-country and single country projects (with on average three overlapping result areas per country).[45] Of these 25 African states, 16 are LDCs, two are SIDS, and nine are FCV states.

190. Another major factor that slowed the delivery of results in Africa was COVID-19. The pandemic has reportedly led to lower implementation rates and results than were projected for the continent. This is noted for several interventions, including the aforementioned projects. A review of APRs indicates that COVID-19 was the most frequent root cause of self-reported implementation challenges in 2020, which affected 27 FPs in African states (i.e., nearly three quarters (69 per cent) of FPs in African states that submitted an APR that year).[46] This was notably the case for the ARAF, where fundraising delays occasioned by the pandemic were incurred in 2020 leading to the project extending its final closing date by 4 months. Impacts on project implementation are also noted in African FCV states. These were seen with FP105, BOAD, for which the process of identifying new operations was slowed by COVID-19 and its related movement restrictions.

B. Enabling the mobilisation of complimentarity and catalytic financial resources

191. **Finding 10. The GCF has been highly effective at leveraging co-financing for its projects in Africa, and this has come from diverse sources. However, while the GCF has been particularly effective in leveraging co-financing for mitigation project components, co-financing for adaptation remains low by comparison**. Moreover, **co-financing for LDCs and African FCV states experiencing medium-intensity conflict remains low** compared to the level of co-financing leveraged in other African States.

192. The GCF has leveraged co-financing from a wide range of sources for nearly all projects in the African states. Some 82 out of 85 FPs in Africa have leveraged co-financing.[47] Co-financing has increased between the initial resource mobilisation (IRM) period and GCF-1 replenishment, with the co-financing ratio in Africa passing from 1:2.3 to 1:2.8. This co-financing is drawn from many sources, with over 100 different co-financiers.

193. MDBs are the largest co-financiers, providing financing for a third of projects in Africa and representing over a third of the total co-financing in the continent (see Figure 6-3). For certain projects, co-financing provided by MDBs is instrumental, representing over three quarters of total financing.[48] Governments also represent an important source of co-financing, providing financing for over half of the projects in Africa and representing 23 per cent of total co-financing.[49] The

[45] Among 48 African States that have approved FPs, 28 have both single-country and a multi-country projects.
[46] This estimate is drawn from the database on implementation challenges created by IEU DataLab, and from APRs submitted for the 2020 implementation period. A total of 39 APRs were submitted for projects under implementation in the African States, with 118 self-reported implementation challenges for the year 2020.
[47] FP024 in Namibia, FP049 in Senegal, and SAP019 in Sudan have not secured co-financing. These projects were approved close to the GCF's inception, either in 2015 (FP024) or in 2016 (FP049 and SAP019).
[48] This is the case for FP163 "Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility", a multi-country mitigation project where the World Bank provided 82 per cent of total financing; as well as for FP177 "Cooling Facility", a multi-country cross-cutting project where the World Bank provided 79 per cent of financing.
[49] More than half (55 per cent) of projects are receiving financing from project country governments, while 31 per cent are receiving financing from governments outside of Africa.

majority of this co-financing is provided by project country governments (representing 61 per cent of government co-financing).[50] While for most projects, government financing is either provided by project country government or bilateral government organizations, there are some instances where blended financing was provided.[51]

Figure 6-3. Co-financing amount by co-financier type



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: IGO means intergovernmental organization.

194. **Private sector co-financing is scantly leveraged in African states**, as only 13 projects managed to acquire co-financing from the private sector, representing (12 per cent) of total co-financing.[52] Local private sector financing also remains low, representing around 10 per cent of all private sector co-financing (see Chapter 6.C for more on private sector engagement and resources mobilisation).

195. Several stakeholders including NDAs/focal points, DAEs, and delivery partners note that securing GCF resources increased the credibility of projects and facilitated access to other financing sources. CSO survey respondents largely shared similar views, with 57 per cent indicating that the GCF has enhanced access to climate financing, to a moderate or major extent.[53] Delivery partners note that securing GCF financing, including RPSPs, provides the basis for showing that work is underway towards creating an enabling environment, strengthening NDAs/focal points and local political process, which impacts their ability to leverage additional financing.

196. The GCF also has the potential to de-risk investments, which has, in some instances, led to catalytic impact on fundraising. This is the case for ARAF, where the GCF provided financing to de-risk

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[50] In certain instances, governments provided the highest proportion of financing for projects, as seen in FP072 “Strengthening climate resilience of agricultural livelihoods in Agro-Ecological Regions I and II in Zambia”, an adaptation project in Zambia where the country Government provided 76 per cent of total financing.
[51] This has been seen in FP033 “Accelerating the transformational shift to a low-carbon economy in the Republic of Mauritius”, a mitigation project in Mauritius where 85 per cent of total project financing is government sourced (including 65 per cent from the country Government and 20 per cent from AFD).
[52] Projects such as FP152 “Global Subnational Climate Fund (SNCF Global) – Equity”, a multi-country mitigation project, received private sector financing representing around 80 per cent of total project financing.
[53] Note that this figure excludes respondents who said they “did not know”.

investments in the fund, which led to additional financing for smallholder farmer adaptation exceeding the expected USD 50 million. De-risking investments plays an important role in attracting private sector financiers who make risk-based decisions, and who are a crucial part of the solution for realizing NDCs and meeting climate finance needs in Africa (see Chapter 6.C below for additional discussion on this) (Meltzer, 2016); Stoll and others, 2022); United Nations Environment Programme, 2021a).

197. **De-risking investments is particularly key in African FCV states given the high risk of working in these countries. To this end, the GCF has recently begun to provide financing through equity and guarantees, placing itself in a first loss equity or first loss guarantee position**. This is noted in Mali, where the GCF supports increased risk tolerance through first loss under FP152 "SnCF Global – Equity", where GCF approved USD 150 million in equity financing. However, despite the higher level of risk associated with operating in these contexts, there is no significant difference in GCF's use of financial instruments in African FCV states and African non-FCV states. As of B.34, 43 per cent of approved GCF financing in African FCV states is planned though non-debt instruments (mainly through grants), compared to 39 per cent for African non-FCV states (with grants also being the preferred instrument).

198. **The co-financing leveraged has particularly been geared towards mitigation, while co-financing for adaptation has been somewhat limited**. Indeed, 77 per cent of co-financing has been geared towards a mitigation result area (see Figure 6-4). Mitigation projects were reported as being more attractive given the higher possibility of returns on investments (i.e., mitigation projects, particularly those related to energy generation and access often generate revenues) and **the limited extent to which strong business cases have yet to be made for adaptation projects; thus, challenges remain in developing bankable adaptation projects.** The lack of diversity in AEs is also noted as having an impact on project scope, with **DAEs exhibiting a greater focus on adaptation than IAEs. Indeed, 70 per cent of DAEs have a portfolio that directs more resources towards adaptation than mitigation, and 60 per cent of DAEs direct resources solely towards adaptation.** On the other hand, 44 per cent of IAEs have a portfolio that directs more resources towards adaptation, while 17 per cent direct resources solely towards adaptation.[54] This focus on mitigation has an impact on the extent to which financing is addressing both the vulnerabilities of the continent to climate change and the current adaptation climate finance gap – with some noting the gap is widening given increases in adaptation needs and related cost (United Nations Environment Programme, 2021a).

[54] It should be noted that 22 per cent of IAEs also have a portfolio that solely focuses on mitigation.

Figure 6-4. Total co-financing by results area



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: One funding proposal can address more than one GCF result area. Project proponents are required to indicate the estimated percentage of GCF and co-financiers' contributions devoted to each checked result area (Green Climate Fund, 2022f).

199. Moreover, while the GCF has leveraged USD 10 billion in co-financing in African states, **there is an important gap in co-financing for LDCs. Indeed, just over half (55 per cent) of projects approved in Africa that included at least one African LDC have leveraged less co-financing**, totalling USD 4.1 billion, compared to USD 5.9 billion in projects including non-LDCs. More specifically, average co-financing for LDCs with approved GCF projects is USD 133.5 million, compared to USD 344.9 million for non-LDCs. LDCs require important support given these are LICs which face severe structural impediments to sustainable development and are often vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks in addition to having limited human assets. Moreover, LDCs are particularly vulnerable to climate change and are considered slightly less ready to face climate change than non-LDCs.[55]

200. Finally, gaps in co-financing are also noted in countries experiencing high institutional and social fragility, with a co-financing ratio of 1:0.6 compared to countries experiencing medium-intensity conflict (1:2.6) and non-FCV states (1:2.7). This may be driven by high risk investment environments and competing country priorities.

C. PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT AND MOBILISATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTS

201. **Finding 11.** Private sector engagement with the GCF in African States has been slow in launching, but it has developed momentum during the GCF-1 period. **Private sector engagement and**

[55] Average ND-Gain vulnerability score of 0.57 in African LDCs compared to 0.46 in African non-LDCs – with a score of 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability and 0 representing no vulnerability. Readiness scores stand at an average of 0.30 in African LDCs compared to 0.35 in African non-LDCs – with a score of 1 representing the highest level of readiness and a score of 0 representing the lowest level of readiness.

investments are largely based on the GCF's ability to de-risk investments through a combination of financial instruments, with an increase in equity and guarantees from IRM to GCF-1.

202. **Finding 12. Overall, private sector investments are largely focused on mitigation, with limited investment geared towards addressing the adaptation needs of African States, despite this being a strong priority for most of these states** (allowing for contextual differences, for example, between Morocco and Somalia). This is due, in part, to the fact that the business case for adaptation is nascent.

203. **Finding 13. The GCF has placed modest emphasis on promoting the participation of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – which are in fact the vast majority of private sector actors in Africa – in GCF activities in African LDCs, SIDS, and FCV states**.

204. Private sector investments have gained momentum in recent years in the African states, with notable spikes in 2018 and 2021. This has been due to an increase in private sector co-financing between the IRM and GCF-1 periods, with 65 per cent of private sector financing provided after 2019 (see Figure 6-5). This is in part driven by the GCF's ability to de-risk investments. While the GCF offers a diverse range of financing instruments that include loans, equity, guarantees, and grants, a slight shift in the nature of the financing provided under GCF-1 is noted, with an increase in the provision of equity and guarantees.[56] The use of these instruments appears to have increased the participation of the private sector, with private sector financing being particularly notable for projects where the GCF has provided non-reimbursable financing. For all but two projects that received private sector financing, the GCF provided financing through non-reimbursable instruments.[57] Moreover, nearly all projects for which the GCF has provided financing through guarantees or equity have received private sector co-financing.[58]

205. Key examples of private sector investments include:

- FP168 "LEAF Framework", for which the GCF provided blended financing including guarantees (USD 80 million), grants (USD 10.9 million), and subordinate loans (USD 80 million), and which has leveraged USD 625 million in private sector investment.
- FP152 SnCF Global–Equity, for which the GCF provided USD 64.3 million in equity financing, and which has leveraged USD 257.1 million in private sector investment.

[56] The GCF approved USD 121.40 million in equity for three projects during the IRM period which increased to USD 150.73 million for five projects during the GCF-1 period. The Fund approved USD 2.81 million in guarantees for one project during the IRM period, which increased to USD 127.14 million for four projects during the GCF-1 period.
[57] The exceptions were the Climate Investor projects (including FP099 'Climate Investor 1', and FP190 "Climate Investor 2") which both received equity funding from the private sector.
[58] Some 80 per cent of projects for which the GCF provided guarantees leveraged private sector co-financing, and 75 per cent of projects for which the GCF provided equity leveraged private sector co-financing.

Figure 6-5. GCF financing by instrument and GCF replenishment cycle in the African States



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

206. However, **despite adaptation being a strong priority for African states**, **most private sector investments have focused on mitigation**, **with very little private sector co-financing going towards adaptation result areas**. Indeed, around 89 per cent of private sector co-financing is geared towards mitigation result areas. This is in part attributed to the lack of a strong business case for adaptation projects, long return on investment periods (in the order of decades), and to noted ethical issues with charging fees on services that are life and death matters. More precisely, private sector investments have thus far largely focused on renewable energy markets, which are dynamic and have seen the emergence of many opportunities in which the global private sector can engage. Indeed, just over three quarters (76 per cent) of private sector co-financing was directed towards the energy generation and access result area.

207. Other areas gaining private sector interest include industrial decarbonization, as in the case of Tunisia (this is growing in the cement manufacturing industry), and forestry funds.

208. **Nonetheless, some countries have attracted more private sector investment for adaptation. This is the case for Tanzania, South Africa, Rwanda and Botswana**. Key examples include:

- FP179 “Tanzania Agriculture Climate Adaptation Technology Deployment Programme (TACATDP)” is the project which received the highest amount of private sector investment, with USD 100 million provided by CRDB Bank. The programme notably seeks to increase the resilience of Tanzania’s agricultural sector by facilitating technology access through a lending and de-risking facility.
- In Rwanda and South Africa, most private sector adaptation financing is from FP181, “CRAFT – Catalytic Capital for First Private Investment Fund for Adaptation Technologies in Developing Countries”, which seeks to “scale up adaptation finance and accelerate development, application and transfer of private sector technologies in climate adaptation and resilience” (Green Climate Fund, n.d-e).

- In Botswana, FP158 "Ecosystem-Based Adaptation and Mitigation in Botswana's Communal Rangelands", received more private sector financing for adaptation than mitigation. The project seeks to restore vegetation in communal grazing lands impacted by climate change, which is foreseen as having the potential to increase the resilience of animal farming to drought as well as increase soil carbon concentrations while reducing GHG emissions.

209. Despite rising private sector engagement, the GCF remains misunderstood by the private sector; in interviews, stakeholders frequently noted that the private sector understood little of the GCF and its modalities. **In certain instances, a lack of clarity is noted in GCF policies related to the private sector, with some stakeholders pointing to the policy on fees** where the guidance on AE fees for the private sector notes that fees "will be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, as required". There is also a lack of clarity on the benefits for the private sector of being involved, although this is changing in response to greater awareness raising of the GCF's de-risking approach (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2021b).

210. **GCF processes also remain somewhat ill-suited for much of Africa's private sector engagement.** First, the accreditation process is deemed long, time-consuming and with incommensurate benefits. While some private sector entities, such as the *Agence de Promotion des Investissements Agricoles* in Tunisia persist in seeking accreditation, the Private Sector Facility (PSF) is currently working with no private sector DAEs in Africa – unless one considers commercial and development banks. Second, the lengthy, costly and highly bureaucratic processes of the GCF act as deterrents for African private sector engagement, as private actors seek rapid financing to move projects along quickly (see Chapter 9 for more on procedural challenges).

211. As highlighted by stakeholders, **the private sector landscape in Africa remains quite different to that of developing countries, with a landscape dominated by MSMEs**. However, the "Independent evaluation of the Green Climate Fund's approach to the private sector" (henceforth, the 'private sector evaluation') found that "the GCF does not place a strong focus on promoting participation of MSMEs in GCF activities in LDCs, SIDS, or African states" (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2021b). The PSF has, however, pursued an approach intent on promoting large, multi-country projects involving the private sector, as a way of avoiding lengthy bureaucratic processes on multiple smaller ones. This is a trade-off that merits being closely watched for MSME participation and outcomes over the coming 2-3-year period.

212. **The limited engagement with these smaller enterprises is further noted in African FCV states. This is in part attributed to the overrepresentation of large IAEs who are pursuing larger sized projects in African FCV states**, with 61 per cent of projects in FCV states being large or medium and 50 per cent of projects in FCV states being large or medium-sized multi-country projects. Stakeholders further emphasize the importance of considering the different contexts across African states, particularly accounting for the different levels of sophistication of the private sector, with for example important differences between countries such as South Africa and Morocco and countries such as Somalia and Algeria.

213. Finally, the GCF has approved support for several facilities that have as their objective the crowding-in of private sector investments. These include FP098 "DBSA Climate Finance Facility (CFF)", which seeks to de-risk and increase the bankability of climate projects to crowd-in private sector investment. As per the 2020 APR, the CFF had approved two projects that were at contracting stage, while two additional projects were at the due diligence stage and four were at the early review stage. However, there are reported challenges related to the rigidity of clauses in funded activity agreements (FAAs), which limit the GCF's ability to react rapidly to evolving markets. Also, the adoption of currency hedging has created issues, particularly given the long project timelines and

fluctuation in exchange rates. This has resulted in higher-risk investments, as the risk of currency losses can be high and unpredictable. In South Africa, this has created challenges for the FP098, DBSA-CFF and FP106 “Embedded Generation Investment Programme (EGIP)”, where, despite favourable lending conditions, planned investments have been blocked from going forward.

D. BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY IN AFRICAN STATES

214. **Finding 14. Africa has received the second highest single country share of readiness funding overall**. **The level of support fluctuates but trends positively for all country groups in Africa, and particularly so for LDCs**.

215. **Finding 15. African states have not been accessing all the readiness support to which they are entitled, and to the levels required to build generally much-needed capacity**. Challenges in accessing readiness have been reported, particularly pertaining to the complexity and length of the process and relatedly high transaction costs, which are further compounded in certain non-English speaking countries and countries with limited capacity. Given that the RPSP is often the gateway to engaging with the GCF, challenges in accessing the programme become a major impediment.

216. The GCF builds institutional capacity primarily through its Readiness programme. The programme seeks to “strengthen institutional capacities, governance mechanisms, and planning and programming frameworks to identify a transformational long term climate action agenda for developing countries” (Green Climate Fund, 2020b). Through the programme, countries can access up to USD 1 million out of which USD 300,000 is for NDA strengthening annually for institutional capacity building, coordination, policy and planning, and programming for investment, and an additional USD 3 million to support NAP processes (Green Climate Fund, 2020b).

217. As of B.34, the GCF approved 182 readiness activities in African states valued at USD 128 million. Africa has received the second highest single country share of readiness funding overall (see Figure 6-6), with support fluctuating but overall having increased for all country groups in Africa, and particularly so for LDCs (see Figure 6-7).[59]

[59] In per capita terms, readiness to Africa (at USD 0.09) was only higher than that provided to Asia Pacific (at USD 0.05).

Figure 6-6. RPSP amounts approved by region



Source: GCF iPMS and Fluxx database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: The figure does not include grants for workshops and events.

Figure 6-7. RPSP amounts approved in African States by classification



Source: GCF iPMS and Fluxx database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: The figure does not include grants for workshops and events.

218. **Readiness activities that have been approved remain below the financing levels made available under the Readiness programme**. For adaptation planning, the proportion of financing accessed by approved readiness grants remains at less than 80 per cent of the maximum grant amount available to be accessed over the years (see Figure 6-8).[60] There are indications of upward trends with the proportion of approved grants for capacity building, strategic frameworks and pipeline development increasing progressively from 20 per cent of the maximum grant amount that could be accessed in 2015, to 67 per cent of the maximum amount in 2021. This was however followed by a slight decrease to 52 per cent in 2022 (see Figure 6-9).

Figure 6-8. Readiness access for adaptation planning in African States



Source: GCF iPMS and Fluxx database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

[60] The percentage accessed was computed as a percentage of the product of the number of countries that received readiness support in that year. USD 1 million (out of which up to USD 300,000 can be used for establishing the NDA or focal point) per year is available for a country to support institution capacity building, coordination, policy and planning, and programming and direct support for strengthening; and USD 3 million per year is available for a country to support to formulate NAPs and adaptation planning processes.

Figure 6-9. Readiness access for capacity building, strategic frameworks and pipeline development in African States



Source: GCF iPMS and Fluxx database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

219. **The extent to which the Readiness programme is successful in supporting the development of DAEs across Africa and in building robust pipelines remains limited**. **Indeed, stakeholders largely agreed that DAEs require more capacity building than they are currently receiving**. As of B.34, the GCF has supported an estimated 25 activities delivered by DAEs, valued at USD 9 million (representing around 7 per cent of financing). Of course, there remain examples where readiness activities provided to DAEs led to the submission of concept notes. This is the case in South Africa, where readiness activities led to the submission of three concept notes – two of which were endorsed, and one is currently under review.[61]

220. **Stakeholders note that while the support provided is valuable, it remains too limited compared to the level of need.** This is reflected both in countries with a restrained portfolio (e.g., no single country projects) and those with a more developed portfolio. In the case study on countries with no single country FP prepared for this evaluation, all stakeholders in Tunisia with whom GCF readiness support was discussed noted that the support provided was insufficient to fill country gaps. Similarly, in Kenya the support is perceived as below the level needed to optimally strengthen institutions. Accessing the full amounts to which countries are entitled would be an important first step (while noting some of the barriers to accessing the programme).

221. **The readiness process itself is considered a barrier to accessing this much-needed support. Stakeholders consulted highlight challenges in accessing readiness financing, which is**

[61] The two concept notes that were endorsed are planned to move ahead to FPs. For one, “Scaling up ecosystem-based approaches to managing climate-intensified disaster risks in vulnerable regions of South Africa”, the FP is currently being developed. For the second, “Ecosystem-based adaptation solutions for transforming smallholder farming systems that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in South Africa”, efforts are underway to secure PPF support for the preparation of the FP. The concept note currently under review is at the fourth round of comments and the applicant foresees requesting PPF support once the concept note is endorsed.

perceived as having a high transaction cost, particularly for countries with very limited capacity and for non-English speaking countries. Given that the RPSP is often the gateway to engaging with the GCF, challenges in accessing the Readiness programme become a major impediment.

222. The process for accessing readiness financing is noted as being lengthy, in terms of both the time required for applications to reach approval and for the time it takes for implementation to begin. The overall time from application submission to approval in Africa ranges from 14 to 1,714 days, proving to be a lengthier process than in other regions (see Figure 6-10).[62] The time it takes from approval to receipt of disbursements is less variable and has a lower maximum number of days in Africa however (between 27 to 664 days), compared to both LAC (3 to 887 days) and Asia Pacific (17 to 722 days). Stakeholders find the process complicated and difficult to understand (e.g., expressing the GCF needs to simplify the templates) while others note the GCF is complex to approach (see Chapter 9 for more on these challenges). Stakeholders also note transaction costs are higher when engaging with international institutions, a concerning comment given readiness support in Africa is largely delivered by IAEs.

Figure 6-10. Duration from submission to approval, by region



Source: GCF iPMS and Fluxx database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

223. **Finally, there is widespread agreement regarding the need for readiness itself to be further clarified – the exact purpose and strategic value of the Readiness programme for countries remains unclear for several stakeholders**. Moreover, GCF Secretariat staff highlight the lack of adequate monitoring to track and measure downstream outcomes, making it difficult to assess the extent to which the programme is leading to intended impacts on the ground.

[62] Other regions record ranges of 2 to 937 days in Asia-Pacific, 9 to 1,180 days in Eastern Europe, and 7 to 886 days in LAC.

Chapter 7. PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARDS LOW EMISSION AND CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT PATHWAYS

224. This chapter assesses the extent to which the GCF is contributing to and enabling a paradigm shift towards low emission and climate resilient development pathways. More specifically, this chapter explores how GCF investments have contributed to the transformation of African states' development pathways.

225. **Finding 16**. Paradigm shift is central to the GCF's objectives, and its meaning is woven into all the stages of the programme/project management cycle. **In the African states portfolio, the task of operationalizing "paradigm shift potential" in project design and implementation occurs without a shared understanding of pathways to impact.**

226. **Finding 17.** Examples of paradigm shift potential are emerging in scenarios where the GCF has contributed either with readiness support or through a project. As such, these examples offer clues as to what is needed to enable shifts toward new paradigms**. For the time being, though, key elements of paradigm shift are lacking and are distributed unevenly across the African states portfolio**.

A. STAKEHOLDER UPTAKE OF THE GCF PARADIGM SHIFT "ASK"

227. In the GCF, paradigm shift potential refers to, "the degree to which a proposed activity can catalyse impact beyond a one-off project or programme investment".[63] This is to be assessed with reference to three dimensions: scale – a quantifiable change in magnitude of results within and beyond the project; depth – extent of uptake by targeted groups or embeddedness in systems, independent of cost; and sustainability – the degree to which the change is supported structurally, culturally and financially such that the change is irreversible.

228. As partners in the GCF's mission, AEs are expected to reach for transformative changes aligned with relevant Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Fund's objectives and result areas. **Across the African states portfolio, it is not clear to the evaluation that the substance of this "ask" has been taken up, beyond in a few instances**. In programme/project design, AEs are to describe the results pathways that connect planned activities to impacts – that is, results that are larger than what is directly achievable by the AE given the allowances of time and the availability of resources.

229. In a quality of entry analysis of FPs, by region, the pathways to impact provided by AE proponents were scored against a set of evaluative questions/criteria. Table 7-1 below, presents the data most pertinent to the relationship between actions and impacts. The scoring in this table is referenced to "risk". On each item, it shows the risk that the stated condition is not evident in the proposal package.

[63] GCF paradigm shift ambitions are set out in its investment framework (IF) and elaborated upon in its integrated results management framework (IRMF) (Green Climate Fund, 2021k).

Table 7-1. Scoring on pathways to impact criteria

CRITERIA	RISK AFRICAN STATES			RISK OTHER REGIONS		
	Low	Med.	High	Low	Med.	High
Causal pathways clearly identified and discussed	45%	36%	19%	31%	49%	20%
Paradigm shift potential is identifiable and measurable in the proposal	41%	36%	22%	42%	38%	20%
Methods for measuring attributable causal changes (outcomes or impact or other) discussed	14%	24%	62%	11%	29%	60%

Source: Fiala and others (2022).

230. On pathways to impact (paradigm shift potential), the table reveals a high level of consistency in the formulation of project designs between African states and other regions. **On the practice of mapping programme/project investments to big picture changes, the data indicates varied quality across the portfolio with a particular lessening of attention given by AEs to the matter of methods for measuring attributable causal changes**.

231. Written by AEs further into their project cycles and at a distance from the scrutiny and supports of the proposal period, APR commentaries suggest less adherence to the notion of causal pathways and paradigm shifts. **AE authors have not ventured in their thinking much beyond the bounds of their project concepts (i.e., beyond targeted sectors and population groups**), as can be seen in the following excerpts, drawn from the paradigm shift sections of a sampling of African states portfolio APRs.

- Expand climate advisory services throughout the region; agrometeorological applications support economic development across multiple sectors (e.g., agriculture, water, public health and energy), as well as disaster risk reduction and management; the process informs and is informed by relevant national policies and benefits from region-wide learning.
- Change coastal management philosophy from one focused on reactive, 'armouring' of hot spots to one that integrates climate variability into a coastal zone management approach that embraces alternatives to infrastructure solutions and engages affected communities in related livelihoods programming.
- Engage with those climate smart enterprises that demonstrate a clear plan for scale and replication; provide pre- and post-TA, relationship brokering support and consumer data; concentrate financing on early-stage set up to quickly establish enterprises as attractive investment propositions; track enterprise metrics to support enterprise operations promote further uptake of climate smart practices.
- Restore forests, grazing lands, village back yards and school grounds, and instigate natural resources business enterprises (e.g., tree nursery management, bee keeping) to obtain healthier communities/landscapes that are more resilient to shock, and that can sequester more carbon.

232. Here and in other instances not illustrated here, **AEs have focused their discussions on project activities and outputs**. **In part, this can be explained by the requirement of the GCF on AEs to focus their attention on project level theories of change, and it raises a question on how paradigm shift (and shift potential) sought at a country level is to be equated with the later stage outcomes stated in those theories of change**. More broadly, this speaks to the matter that GCF anticipates paradigm shifts to be brought about through the project modality, which is itself not conducive to shifting paradigms.

B. SIGNALS OF PARADIGM SHIFT

233. At this stage in the development of the African states portfolio, it is early to be seeing signals of scale, depth and sustainability beyond what can plausibly be created by AEs within project time frames. But signals of systems change are evident within country legal-policy-institutional environments and within projects that indicate paradigm shift potential.

234. In the realm of public administration, climate action is increasingly backed by legislation and policy, and supported through institutional arrangements. With this, expectations and lines of accountability related to international covenants are clearer. Multiple factors are driving these developments including the cumulative effects of climate change, the international diplomacy surrounding it and, in some countries, crisis events that are prompting urgent shifts in priority. In this realm, GCF readiness programming and projects are a contributor. Box 7-1 sets out the experience of Kenya.

Box 7-1. The evolution of Kenya's legal-policy-institutional response to combating climate change

The legal-policy-institutional landscape underpinning Kenya's climate action builds from an initial, national climate response strategy in 2010. This strategy paved the way for the first in a series of four-year climate change action plans in 2013, which gained legal backing through the creation of the Climate Change Act in 2016.

Around this time, Kenya submitted its first NDC to the UNFCCC, ratified the Paris Agreement and launched its Kenya NAP (2015–2030). Climate action gained prominence in Kenya's medium-term planning process and, by extension the annual planning and budgeting routines of ministries and agencies. Climate change units are mandated for state departments and national public entities, and county administrations are assigned climate action responsibilities.

Leadership on climate change is provided by the National Climate Change Council chaired by His Excellency the President and co-chaired by the Deputy President. The Climate Change Act assigns responsibility to The National Treasury and Planning to set strategy and make regulations, and in 2016, a policy was created to guide its climate financing role. The Act assigns the Climate Change Directorate as the lead agency for the coordination of the Government's response to climate change.

Kenya's Constitution (2010) is considered foundational. Article 10 of the Constitution sets out national values and principles of governance, such as sustainable development, devolution of government, and public participation, that are mandatory when making or implementing any law or public policy decisions, including climate change. Article 42 provides for the right to a clean and healthy environment for every Kenyan, which includes the right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations.

In this context, GCF is credited for the support it provided in strengthening the Government's institutional base and for its help in policy development for the country's management of climate finance.

235. In multiple countries, the GCF's country readiness programming is acknowledged for the financial and technical support it has provided. In the case of Kenya, the support concentrated within The National Treasury and Planning have enabled the Climate Finance and Green Economy Unit to gain visibility, influence, and strengthened institutional capacity to provide climate finance services and coordination well beyond what is required to coordinate GCF activities.

236. Within the project landscape, **signals of paradigm shift potential are evident to a limited extent, and GCF's actual contribution in each instance is varied**. In several countries with energy-

related projects (e.g., South Africa, Sahel countries, Egypt), clean energy pathways have been initiated; legislation, policy and regulation is in place or pending; investment prospects are favourable and consumer energy demand is sufficient to provide momentum. **A critical limiting factor vis-a-vis paradigm shift in these settings, however, is that pressing climate action priorities outside of these transition projects are not getting attention, and national actors are being overlooked.**

237. Adaptation projects anchored in ecosystem-based management approaches – that is, emphasizing local level engagement/governance, use of nature based solutions, value chain development, and the creation of enabling policy and land management practices – also show strong signs of scale, depth and sustainability potential. As such, they resemble best practice development projects. Here, though, the limiting factor seems to be in the ability to attract sufficient investment.

238. **At the GGWI, signals of paradigm shift potential manifest in the pledges of financial support to this complex regional initiative, the coalescing of national stakeholders across countries around a shared vision, the implementation-level capacity and coordination that is emerging, and the progress being made toward regional knowledge generation and management**. Here, continued movement toward scale, depth and sustainability hinge on the creation of bankable projects and the mobilisation of private sector resources. This example, if successful, could be replicated through GCF's new approach to look at co-investment platforms, for example in the GGW Southern Africa region.

C. Summary assessment of progress on the road to a paradigm shift in African States

239. African stakeholders would not want to diminish the importance of long term, big picture thinking, but at this still formative stage in the GCF's programming in Africa, country/regional level actors are thinking less about paradigm shifts and sustainability and more about the immediate tasks of building fit-for-purpose interventions to combat climate change.

240. Evidence of systemic change occurring outside the realm of individual projects is limited because of the maturity of the portfolio and its make-up as a set of discreet projects. Experience to date suggests that the **following elements, at minimum, are essential to shift countries into a new green paradigm**:

- **Sufficiently high volumes of funding**, **including from the private sector and other sources of co-financing**
- **Enabling legal-policy-institutional arrangements linked to international climate covenants**
- **Cross-project/cross-sector, multi-stakeholder exchange referenced to country/regional strategy or vision**
- **Right partnerships (for scale, depth, and sustainability)**
- **Strong and wide stakeholder involvement and commitment**
- **Planning and monitoring of results with lessons learned and shared**

241. **At the moment, these elements are lacking in abundance and are distributed unevenly across the African portfolio**.

242. Inculcating a paradigm shift perspective to the programme/project level requires:

- A shared understanding of the utility of this pathways to impact approach and, in particular, to national/regional development planning processes
- Well defined terms wrapped in an easy-to-understand methodology with practical examples and tools
- Iterations with collaborative learning

243. Relevant to this, among CSOs and public sector actors in Africa, there is a growing familiarity with the idea of resiliency pathways. As part of this, there is an interest, even urging on the part of some to see the GCF adjust its project preparation support focus away from establishing climate rationale for a project design, to one that is more amenable to elaborating and testing climate resilient pathways.[64]

[64] In this International Panel on Climate Change paper, climate-resilient pathways are development trajectories that combine adaptation and mitigation to realize the goal of sustainable development. They can be seen as iterative, continually evolving processes for managing change within complex systems (Denton and others, 2014).

Chapter 8. GENDER EQUALITY AND CONSIDERATION FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION

244. This chapter assesses the extent to which the GCF has been effective in addressing the gender-related and social inclusion dimensions (particularly those of indigenous peoples) of climate interventions. It explores the extent to which gender-related dimensions and indigenous peoples are considered at the design, implementation, and monitoring stages of GCF interventions (both geared at adaptation and mitigation), and the extent to which economic, social and environmental co-benefits being produced with GCF support have led to beneficial outcomes within these dimensions. This chapter will also take a closer look at M&E practices, particularly, the extent to which current M&E mechanisms allow gender-related and indigenous peoples-related dimensions to be tracked.

A. ADDRESSING GENDER-RELATED AND SOCIAL INCLUSION DIMENSIONS

1. CONSIDERATIONS FOR GENDER-RELATED DIMENTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENT OF BENEFICIAL OUTCOMES

245. **Finding 18. Gender-related dimensions of the African States portfolio are considered across design, implementation and monitoring stages, and most systematically during project design with the development of required gender assessments and gender action plans.**

246. The GCF's commitment to use a gender-responsive approach can be traced to its 2019 updated gender policy (UGP), while its commitment to gender sensitivity originates in the GI and the UNFCCC document itself (Green Climate Fund, 2011).

247. The scope of the UGP is inclusive of the GCF's institutional dimensions and its project portfolio. It sets out to "support and sustain an enabling environment" for GCF stakeholders at a country level, building on existing related policy commitments. It also commits to "support gender-related learning outcomes" at a sector level through the data and knowledge it accumulates (Green Climate Fund, 2019h).

248. The policy is operationalized by the GCF gender action plan (2020–2023). It requires the GCF to ensure that AEs have, "established competencies, tools and processes to achieve results", and that its Board has the information required to "exercise oversight responsibility for the Gender Policy and Action Plan" (Green Climate Fund, 2019d).

249. **With regard to the GCF's project portfolio, including that of African states, the policy requires the inclusion of a gender baseline analysis and action plan and "gender equitable and inclusive" stakeholder engagement activities throughout the design and implementation of projects and programmes.** The GCF is required to support these activities, on request, through the Readiness programme mechanism. On the basis of the analysis and action plan, AEs are required to select gender indicators and track project progress and results, and the Secretariat is tasked to aggregate data and report to the GCF Board (Green Climate Fund, 2019d). As part of this process, AEs and their delivery partners, NDAs/focal points and other country stakeholders are to receive

gender resources and supports geared toward mainstreaming gender concepts at the project level (Green Climate Fund, 2019d).[65]

250. While the GCF's UGP is guiding practice, certain operational challenges are also in evidence. As of 2021, all AEs of projects in the African states portfolio approved since 2019 are compliant with the UGP. African states' projects approved at or since the launch of the UGP have carried out gender assessments and developed gender action plans (Green Climate Fund, 2022g). This reinforces a pattern of compliance evident under the predecessor gender policy.[66] There is also an indication that multi-country projects in the Africa portfolio are making it a practice to assess, plan and identify measures for gender outcomes at the sub-project level. A review of eight multi-country project action plans showed intent to undertake detailed assessments and action plans as country sub-projects are determined (Table A - 5 in Appendix 1 provides examples of gender action plan activities extracted from the Africa portfolio).

251. In key informant interviews among those in AE roles, **AEs identified the following determinants of success in integrating a gender analysis into project designs:**

- **Political/institutional championing of gender mainstreaming – assessed as variable across the portfolio, influenced by societal norms in the country/region**
- **Internal capacities to conduct assessments and to develop and implement plans – assessed as variable, dependent on size, prior experience and operating context**
- **Access to data with which to inform progress against action plan outcomes/targets – assessed as variable, dependent on size, prior experience and operating context**
- **Access to a forum to exchange experiences on gender mainstreaming – assessed as variable, dependent on resources and connectivity with communities of practice**

252. During project preparation, the operational challenges AEs experience in meeting the GCF's gender requirements can be ameliorated through PPF support. The scope of support under the PPF is broad enough to allow exploration in each of these areas. Yet, while PPF utilisation is increasing on a year-by-year basis, the draw on these supports has been less than the limits imposed on them by the GCF. On this, the length of time required to access PPF support is noted by AEs to be a deterrent to its use.[67]

2. Gender-related co-benefits

253. **Finding 19. Gender-related co-benefits reported at this stage are growing and diverse.** They include employment opportunities, sector-specific capacity enhancements, equitable access to information and resources, emergent women-led services/businesses, benefits-sharing mechanisms and more. **While progress is underway in achieving certain elements of mainstreaming**, **evidence of transformative change** (where imbalances in power relations between women and men are addressed, and where visible and invisible structures and norms upholding these relationships are removed) **is confined to specific projects and is largely anecdotal**.

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[65] The document "Mainstreaming Gender in Green Climate Fund Projects" is the gender resource which sets out guidelines and procedures for conducting gender analyses, gender action planning, and for developing gender sensitive M&E frameworks. See more in Green Climate Fund and United Nations Women (2017).
[66] According to the Annual portfolio performance report 2018 by the GCF, a similar level of compliance was evident under the GCF 2017 gender policy, wherein the gender action plan was first introduced as a mandatory complement to the gender assessment. See more in Green Climate Fund (2019a).
[67] The GCF RPSP, iPMS and FLUXX databases show the proportion of approved grants out of the maximum grant amount that could be accessed, increased progressively from 17 per cent in 2015 to 71 per cent in 2021. This was however followed by a slight decrease to 48 per cent in 2022.

254. **While the GCF is shifting beyond a gender sensitive approach – one focused on mitigating the negative impacts of policies and programmes on men, women, boys and girls – and toward a gender-responsive approach focused on intentionally employing gender considerations to affect the design, implementation and results of programmes and policies**, **the evidence for this in the Africa portfolio is nascent and emerging**.[68,69] Across the Africa portfolio, project designs are most likely to name a gender-specific target in jobs created (44 per cent) or women's participation in a technical aspect and/or in an implementation role (39 per cent).[70]

255. **In the portfolio, reporting on gender-related co-benefits is limited and largely confined to commentary on formative processes identified in gender action plans such as assessments, tendering, recruitment, skills development, setting up service delivery mechanisms (e.g., micro-funds), and adjusting institutional policies and practices**. This is particularly the case for multi-country projects where, as part of their implementation process, AEs require time to prospect for sub-projects within the candidate countries that have provided NOLs. Where projects are able to report on their adaptation core indicators, the counting of beneficiaries is gender disaggregated. To the extent that they are evident in the APRs, examples of reported gender co-benefits include knowledge and resources to address gender-based violence; green jobs created; new avenues for leadership in local governance; learned entrepreneurial skills applied (e.g., seedling management, alternative energy sources); and end user access to low emission energy sources.[71]

256. APRs reviewed for this evaluation indicated considerable progress was to be made in the year that has now passed and will be reported on shortly. Two key factors bearing on this anticipated progress are the natural evolution of project cycles, and the recovery from COVID-19 disruptions to project mobilisation. At the time of writing, however, APRs for projects launched after 2020 are yet to show on GCF's operational documents tracker, and many projects launched earlier than 2020 are yet to have their APRs posted. Indeed, among the 158 (62 in Africa) projects approved between 2015 and 2020, only 95 (34 in Africa), or 60 per cent, have their APRs publicly available. As it stands, then, it is not possible to assemble a close-to-current picture of progress on gender co-benefits.

257. In fieldwork for this report, the evaluation team encountered an outstanding example of women's empowerment in the GCF-financed FP113, TWENDE. Facilitated by a project team comprising ministry and locally connected CSOs, the women are restoring rangelands in their vicinity that are dry and that have progressively lost their cover through overgrazing and multiple seasons of failed rains. The women have mobilised teams of their peers to dig bunds ('smiles in the sand') that will be ready to catch the topsoil when the next rains come. At that time, the women will have mobilised their village peers to help re-vegetate with grass seed that they have nurtured in seed banks.

[68] The gender action plan of the GCF 2020–2023 (Green Climate Fund, 2019d, p.3), specifies that, "the initial socio-economic and gender assessment is recommended for the GCF to build in a gender responsive approach to project planning, design and implementation arrangements in contrast to the GCF environmental and social safeguards, which employs the conventional, 'do not harm' approach…".

[69] In defining "gender responsiveness", the United Nations Children's Fund (2017) explains, "Gender-responsive programmes and policies reflect girls' and women's realities and needs, in components such as site selection, project staff, content, monitoring, etc. Gender-responsiveness means paying attention to the unique needs of females, valuing their perspectives, respecting their experiences, understanding developmental differences between girls and boys, women and men and ultimately empowering girls and women."

[70] This is consistent with Stoldt and Argueta (2022) study of the GCF's Africa portfolio. It found that while gender is generally considered across the programmes and projects studied, it is referenced without identifying drivers of gender inequality and is limited to gender quotas for participation. Meanwhile, an independent desk study by Schalatek, Zuckerman and McCullough (2021) was more critical of GCF's gender equality efforts. It said that across the portfolio sampled, most programmes and projects "fail to fulfil GCF's Governing Instrument and Gender Policy mandate to promote gender equality in Gender Action Plans, components and monitoring frameworks".

[71] These findings are drawn from various sources including a review of the latest APRs of 12 projects approved between 2017 and 2020. Of the sampled projects, six were adaptation, four were mitigation, two were cross-cutting, eight were single-country, four were multi-country, eight were IAEs, and four were DAEs.

Describing their experiences and their plans, the women highlighted the novelty and sense of purpose associated with their involvement, the skills learned, the influence gained in local level decision-making, the income earned to date and the promise of the benefits that will flow as their land recovers.

3. Considerations for indigenous peoples-related dimensions and achievement of beneficial outcomes

258. **Finding 20. In the African States portfolio, the involvement of indigenous peoples is reflected to a much more limited extent than gender across the stages of project development**. Yet, the requirement to engage with indigenous peoples as part of the project cycle is spelled out in the GCF's indigenous peoples policy. In certain parts of Africa, there is a reticence to recognize indigeneity. Under "social inclusion", project partners are encouraged to engage women, youth and other vulnerable groups in the consultative process, and to recognize the importance of drawing on local knowledge and systems.

259. As with its commitment to gender equality, the GCF's recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples is longstanding and rooted in international covenants, most notably the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UNFCCC. The GCF's 2018 Indigenous Peoples Policy sets out to ensure that indigenous peoples benefit from GCF activities and projects in a culturally appropriate manner, and do not suffer harm or adverse effects from the design and implementation of GCF-financed activities (Green Climate Fund, 2018b). The policy includes the principle of free, prior and informed consent that ensures communities are able to dictate their terms of engagement (Green Climate Fund, 2018b, p.4). Also, AEs declaring the presence of indigenous peoples in their programme or project impact areas are expected to establish an indigenous peoples plan for minimizing/compensating any adverse impacts for enhancing positive impacts (Green Climate Fund, 2018b, p.2).

260. **Consistent with the policy**, **the GCF established the Indigenous People's Advisory Group (IPAG) to enhance coordination between the GCF, AEs and EEs, governments, and indigenous peoples in relation to matters concerning indigenous peoples**. The IPAG, currently comprising four individuals on a three-year term, held its first meeting in October 2022 organized by the GCF Secretariat (Green Climate Fun, 2018b).[72]

261. **Stances toward identifying communities as "indigenous" are varied across African states. Some governments are reluctant to assign indigeneity to distinct groups. Importantly, in the context of GCF's work in African states, the indigenous peoples policy provides a generic list of characteristics associated with indigeneity, but highlights the principle of "self-identification**". It also acknowledges the use of multiple terms to describe communities that are in some fashion distinct (Green Climate Fun, 2018b, p.5). In this context, the term "indigenous peoples and local communities" is commonly used by international organizations to accommodate the reticence of states to acknowledge the presence of indigenous peoples.

262. The presence of indigenous peoples across many African states would indicate the likelihood that these groups are affected by the presence of GCF-funded activities. Yet the evidence of this involvement is notably scant. Key characteristics of groups identifying themselves as indigenous peoples include cultures and ways of life that are distinct from the dominant culture and are under

[72] According to the IPAG terms of reference, the body is to be made up of four indigenous peoples' representatives and four alternatives from the regions of developing states where GCF undertakes programme and project activity. GCF uses a self-selection process for nominations. In addition to its advisory role, the IPAG is to review the implementation and monitoring of the indigenous peoples policy.

threat; survival that in some way depends on access and rights to traditional lands; isolation geographically, socially and politically; and discrimination, domination and marginalization that violates human rights, threatens continuity and prevents participation. The International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020) estimates there are 476 million indigenous peoples globally (i.e., 6.2 per cent of the world's population), and that about 16 per cent of them live in Africa based on population data from 16 African states.[73] A 2006, publication of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights provides what is described as an "illustrative" listing of groups (e.g., pastoralist, farmer, hunter-gatherer) that spans 26 African states.

263. The evaluation encountered little evidence of GCF engagement with indigenous peoples across the Africa portfolio, yet indigenous peoples observer groups see a different picture. Two indigenous peoples organizations – the Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy Research and Education (TEBTEBBA) and the Indigenous Peoples' Training Institute (ELATIA) – have created the Indigenous Peoples Tracker on GCF Projects. This online resource supported by the Climate and Land Use Alliance identifies those projects in the GCF project portfolio that will, "potentially impact indigenous peoples positively or negatively" (Indigenous Peoples Tracker on GCF Projects, n.d.). The tracker references project documents accessible through the GCF website as well as comments made on project documents by indigenous peoples' organizations and CSO observers. As of the end of 2021, the tracker is showing 27 of the 84 projects in the African states portfolio that carry this potential to impact (positively or negatively) indigenous peoples. With a few exceptions, the dominant refrain from African stakeholders is that there are no indigenous peoples affected by or involved in project activities or that indigeneity is complex or ill-advised in an African context. This is reflected in the reporting available on projects. Indigenous peoples are mentioned explicitly in seven of the 20 APRs available for the projects identified by TEBTEBBA and ELATIA. Among those stakeholders that are implementing projects explicitly involving indigenous peoples, the information has thus far been scant and fragmented.[74]

264. The GCF's indigenous peoples policy and its revised environmental and social policy set out requirements for a tiered, independent grievance and redress mechanism. In addition to the GCF's own independent mechanism, AEs are required to manage their own mechanisms and, on larger investments, establish a third tier of grievance mechanism at the project level. Utilisation of the independent redress mechanism by stakeholders in African States has been low as compared to patterns in other parts of the world.

265. Key informants at the Secretariat suggest the use differential have less to do with the presence of grievances and more to do with the level of awareness of the mechanism itself. Training data on the mechanism indicates a relatively low level of interest by African stakeholders. That said, the scan of a sampling of APRs from African projects, shows a consistent pattern of AEs setting up grievance mechanisms at a project level and in many instances providing training.

B. MONITORING AND EVALUATION MECHANISMS

266. **Finding 21. M&E mechanisms are set up to track gender-related dimensions of the portfolio for the African states.** In some project contexts, performance indicators are found to be overly

[73] This report uses available data on indigenous and tribal peoples sourced from governments recognizing these distinct groups or from those identified by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). The main criteria used to identify indigenous peoples are self-identification and language spoken.
[74] The projects identified by TEBTEBBA and ELATIA are: FP002, FP003, FP011, FP012, FP022, FP023, FP024, FP026, FP034, FP048, FP049, FP072, FP074, FP078, FP113, FP128, FP135, FP136, FP139, FP158, FP159, FP175, FP179, SAP001, SAP006, SAP007, and SAP019.

complex, not well understood and remote from beneficiaries**. By contrast, there is no provision at a portfolio level to understand the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities or to track co-benefits associated with their participation.**

267. The new APR template increases the clarity of what is being asked of AEs and their implementing partners and, as such, it provides a stronger basis for aggregating data across the portfolio. In particular, the reporting template encourages quantitative and qualitative assessments to be written against gender action plan targets. At the same time, this specificity in the make-up of the data fields has the effect of excluding data or analysis that are not explicitly requested.

268. **Across the Africa States portfolio, the shortcomings most commonly observed in the implementation of M&E relate to the selection of indicators and methods (quantitative and qualitative) used to address gender mainstreaming**; the ability to track the engagement of youth; and the ability to track the participation of indigenous peoples through the project cycle, the utilisation of their knowledge systems, and the results obtained. Regarding GCF engagement with indigenous peoples, without some means of delineating the participation and results contributions of indigenous peoples, the GCF is under-prepared to engage indigenous peoples according to expectations set out in its policy.

Chapter 9. EFFICIENCY

269. This chapter assesses two areas of efficiency – first, the extent to which the GCF has adopted efficient approaches towards reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and second, the extent to which the GCF's business model (processes, programmes, funding windows, and modalities) is responsive to urgent priorities and emerging challenges.

A. EFFICIENTLY REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND LIVELIHOODS TO THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

270. **Finding 22. In line with legal obligations**, **GCF interventions in Africa are being implemented within approved budgets.** Project designs suggest outcomes will be achieved efficiently, and that GCF interventions are targeting and reaching vulnerable communities**.**

271. **Finding 23. The extent to which the GCF is accounting for high operating costs in Africa remains somewhat limited, as the policy on AE fees is applied uniformly across regions and AE types. Early evidence suggests that DAEs have the potential to deliver outcomes more cost-effectively than is the case for IAEs**.

272. In line with legal obligations, the GCF has been delivering projects within approved budgets in Africa.[75] Indeed, Africa-focused projects are currently being implemented with disbursed funds remaining below approved budgets. To date, four Africa projects are fully disbursed (FP023, FP024, FP043, and FP103). Among these, the disbursed amounts align with approved budgets, with the exception of FP043. Indeed, FP043 "Saïss Water Conservation Project", implemented in Morocco by EBRD, saw disbursements surpass the approved budget by 1 per cent, with the disbursed amount tallying to USD 31.35 million while the approved finance was USD 30.98 million. According to an IEU staff member, fluctuations of currency exchange rates are in most cases at the origin of project disbursements surpassing GCF approved budgets.

273. **While the GCF has been delivering projects within approved budgets, evidence suggests that it does not adequately consider the high cost of operating in Africa**, **and particularly in SIDS and FCV states that usually require additional management time and resources**. Africa received the lowest average financing per project (including GCF and co-financing), standing at USD 116.9 million per project, when compared to USD 169.7 million in LAC and USD 204.4 million in Asia Pacific, excluding multi-regional projects.

274. **In addition, among the three regions**, **projects in Africa received the lowest contribution of the GCF**, with on average USD 39.0 million per project. In comparison, LAC countries received on average USD 60.1 million per project and Asia Pacific countries received on average USD 46.5 million per project. The gap between African and non-African countries also reflects the fact that African states have a lower ability to leverage co-financing. For instance, there are institutions in Asia Pacific such as Macquarie Alternative Assets Management Limited and the ADB that have a significantly higher capacity to co-finance projects, resulting in higher total financing. More

[75] This section does not consider multi-regional projects.

precisely, Macquarie Alternative Assets Management Limited contributed USD 1.092 billion on FP186 implemented in India, while the highest co-financing in Africa has been USD 852.3 million from EBRD for FP039 implemented in Egypt.

275. **A concern is that the policy on fees outlines the fees structure for AEs related to public sector FPs**, as well as activities under the PPF and Readiness programme. Fees are determined based on the project size (Table 9-1), with no regard to project location or country classification such as LDC, SIDS or FCV states.

276. AE fees in Africa for approved projects stand on average at 6.4 per cent. This average is comparable to the average in other regions, which stand at 6.5 per cent and 5.7 per cent in Asia Pacific and LAC respectively, as well as the global average of 6 per cent.[76] In Africa, there are 21 approved FPs classified as large, with average AE fees at 3.4 per cent, and 29 medium-sized FPs with average AE fees of 5.9 per cent. Finally, there are 19 small and 16 micro FPs with slightly higher AE fees, standing on average at 6.9 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively.

Table 9-1. GCF fees structure for AEs

Project size	Fees cap % of GCF funding (grant portion)
Micro (< USD 10 million)	Up to 8.5%
Small (USD 10–50 million)	Up to 7%
Medium (USD 50–250 million)	Up to 5%
Large (> USD 250 million)	Up to 4%

Source: Green Climate Fund (2018c).
Note: In the case of the micro-size and small-size projects, a fees cap may be increased to 10 per cent and 8 per cent respectively if the Secretariat considers there to be a strong justification for increasing the percentage.

277. Average AE fees for medium and micro-sized project categories in Africa exceed the fees cap. The policy allows for a slight adjustment on fees at the Secretariat's discretion, and several projects in Africa have benefitted from it. Indeed, 14 medium, seven small and five micro-sized projects have exceeded the fees cap. The fact that the Secretariat had to adjust the fees cap on several occasions suggests that the fees structure included in the policy is not adequately designed for projects in Africa.

278. **Indeed, consulted stakeholders from AEs, CSOs and the GCF noted that AE fees provided by the GCF are not sufficient to cover the costs incurred by AEs for the implementation of activities.** For example, it was noted in South Africa that, while AE fees do cover immediate costs at the beginning of a project, this does not cover what comes afterwards for monitoring and reporting when incremental costs can be significant.

279. **The policy on fees structure presents some important limitations. First, the policy does not account for higher implementation costs in certain regions or countries, as the fees structure is applied globally.[77] Yet, the cost of doing business in SIDS or in FCV states is generally higher.** For instance, the average AE fees for single country projects in SIDS in Africa stands at 7.8 per cent of total project costs. Two of three projects for SIDS in Africa exceed their respective fees caps and all are small or medium-sized projects.

[76] GCF Tableau server, accessed on 31 October 2022.
[77] The policy allows for a slight adjustment of fees at the Secretariat's discretion, but no information is provided on the basis for increasing the percentage. See more in Green Climate Fund (2018c).

280. Second, the fee structure presented in the policy does not apply for private sector activities, where fees are determined on a case-by-case basis. This, in fact, has been reported by CSOs and other stakeholders as an issue of transparency that prevents the private sector from becoming invested with the GCF, when they do not know the costs or returns in advance.

281. There is evidence that DAEs have the potential to be more efficient than IAEs. For instance, a study on current challenges and future opportunities for the GCF in Africa published in 2018 notes that UNDP and UNEP charged the GCF an 8.5 per cent management fee in ten countries in the SSA region. By comparison, the formerly named Ministry of Natural Resources of Rwanda (MINIRENA, currently MOE) charged 6.4 per cent and the *Centre de Suivi Écologique* (CSE) in Senegal charged 5.1 per cent (Fonta, Ayuk and van Huysen (2018). GCF quantitative data provides further evidence of this. For instance, the average AE fees for medium-sized approved projects in Africa is 6.3 per cent for IAEs compared to 3.5 per cent for national and regional AEs. For small projects, the average fees are 7.5 per cent for IAEs while 3.6 per cent for regional AEs and 6 per cent for national AEs. This strongly suggests that DAEs have the potential to be more cost-efficient than IAEs, assuming DAEs operate as effectively as IAEs.

282. **A review of output indicators to total project financing suggests that GCF interventions in Africa are likely to be cost-effective compared to the GCF portfolio as a whole.** Indeed, project designs suggest the cost per project beneficiary is estimated at around USD 13.53 in Africa, compared to USD 16.94 for the GCF's entire portfolio. Further, the estimated cost per ha under improved management or reduced salinization is on average around USD 2.71 in Africa, compared to USD 10.91 for the GCF's entire portfolio. The estimated cost per job created is on average around USD 1,081 in Africa, compared to USD 2,368 for the GCF's entire portfolio. On the other hand, the estimated cost of 1 MtCO2 equivalent reduction is on average around USD 7.52 in Africa, compared to USD 4.72 for the GCF's entire portfolio. While these numbers should be interpreted cautiously as they do not take into account differences in price level indices across regions, they suggest that, overall, projects in Africa have the potential to efficiently target and reach vulnerable communities.

283. **To efficiently reduce the vulnerability of local communities, the GCF has to ensure it covers an appropriate policy landscape on and for Africa. However, to date, GCF projects in Africa have largely focused on mitigation, such that a stronger emphasis on adaptation is needed.** Indeed, 59 per cent of GCF financing is directed towards mitigation result areas, and 72 per cent of the total financing (GCF plus co-financing) is geared towards mitigation result areas.

284. Some nuance should be noted as certain projects falling under mitigation aim to provide access to key infrastructures and are thus also adaptation and resilience-building projects. For instance, FP102 "Mali solar rural electrification project" aims at increasing the rural population's access to electricity in 50 identified communities and has been categorized as a mitigation project. However, with around half of the country's population without access to electricity, this project will contribute also to increasing resilience and adaptative capacity by potentially enabling access to basic services such as household lighting, cooling, and electrical devices.

B. RESPONSIVENESS OF THE GCF BUSINESS MODEL TO URGENT PRIORITIES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

285. **Finding 24. Widely described as cumbersome and resource intensive, many of the GCF's processes are inadequate for the specific needs and urgency of climate action in African States.** Heavy and rigid procedures have made access to financing through the various modalities a difficult,

time-consuming and costly process, further heightening the need for capacity building of African institutions to access financing**.**

286. **Finding 25. Important challenges in working with the GCF include a lack of DAEs, language-related barriers, lack of flexibility, lack of clarity and consistency in process and procedure, currency risks, and matters of access and proximity.** These challenges are noted as affecting country ownership, project implementation, and the willingness of stakeholders to engage with the GCF**.**

1. Procedural challenges

287. Across all stakeholder types, **the GCF has been widely and highly criticized for its heavy and complicated procedures related to accreditation**, as well as the preparation of **concept notes, FP and PPF proposals, and readiness requests**. In addition, all consulted stakeholder groups reported that **the lack of DAEs, language barriers, lack of flexibility, lack of clarity and consistency, currency risks and proximity issues are creating significant difficulties** for them in working with the GCF.

288. GCF processes are generally time-consuming and resource intensive, which renders them inadequate for meeting the challenges the organization aims to tackle, and unresponsive to the needs and urgency of climate action. In all cases, stakeholders reported long delays in receiving answers from the GCF coupled with a lot of seemingly unnecessary back and forth, including from the Africa Desk specifically. In addition, heavy and complicated procedures make it difficult for entities engaging the GCF to meet all requirements in a timely way. This suggests that the **GCF model is not ideally matched to the purpose of supporting African states in pursuing a strong country driven and owned approach**. **In fact, to date, Angola, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cabo Verde, Libya and South Sudan are without any GCF FPs. In addition, 17 countries are without any single country GCF FP.**[78]

2. Accreditation

289. The accreditation framework of the GCF includes a set of both basic and specialized fiduciary criteria. The former applies to all candidates and relates to their key administrative and financial capacities, as well as transparency and accountability. The latter is based on the institutional capacities necessary to deliver against the GCF objectives and in accordance with the scope of responsibilities entrusted to an AE. The accreditation programme states that the accreditation process is expected to be completed within six months after submission of all required documentation, while the fast track accreditation process[79] will be completed within three months following submission.

290. However, **long delays in receiving accreditation are notable and widespread**. Quantitative data provides evidence of this, with an average of 728 days to receive accreditation (with accreditation master agreement (AMA) signed) for entities operating in African states as of the end of stage one (wherein submission is accepted by the GCF Secretariat), and 964 days between closure of stage one and the effectiveness of the AMA. This compares to a global average of 681 days to receive accreditation and 873 days between closure of stage one and the effectiveness of the AMA. In both

[78] Seventeen countries include Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Gabon, the Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Seychelles, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia.
[79] Organizations that have already been accredited by the GEF, AF and the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid of the European Commission (DG DEVCO) may be eligible to apply for fast-track accreditation if certain pre-requisites are fulfilled.

cases, the average delay is longer for entities operating in African states compared to the global average. Moreover, an upward trend is observed regarding the length of the accreditation process, as is evident in Figure 9-1. It should be noted that **this upward trend might be observed because most entities accredited during the IRM period, such as MDBs or United Nations organizations, have benefitted from the fast track accreditation process.** These AEs were accredited to the GEF, AF and/or the Directorate-General for International Development and Cooperation of the European Commission. In contrast, starting from GCF-1, various entities which were not necessarily working in the climate change sphere, applied for GCF accreditation. This caused a prolonged accreditation process.

Figure 9-1. Length of accreditation process by year of accreditation



Source: Accredited Entity Relations Unit data as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

291. For instance, for the AfDB, it took over 2 years for the fast track accreditation to be secured and over four years for the AMA to be effective. In South Africa, SANBI's fast track accreditation took nearly four years (February 2016 to October 2019) from the end of stage one to the effectiveness of the AMA. Finally, there is only one national DAE based in an African FCV state, the Ministry of Finance and Development of the Federal Cooperation Republic of Ethiopia, which waited 622 days to receive accreditation (AMA signed) following submission. These timelines do not account for the time required to prepare an application, including conducting all related studies and required consultations.

292. The heavy procedures and delays facing entities during the accreditation process are significant to the point that they have put a damper on their willingness to work with the GCF. In Tunisia, there were initially around ten national entities that started the accreditation process. Six years later, only two are still in the process, and none have been accredited as of yet.

293. **Delays have also been experienced in re-accreditation**, for instance by the DBSA in South Africa. According to key stakeholder informants, the delay raised concerns with DBSA's private clients, who were worried about the reliability of the investment framework offered by DBSA. This is not an isolated situation. Indeed, in this and other cases, GCF-related delays have had detrimental reputational implications for key partners, including DAEs, NDAs/focal points and others.

3. Proposal approval process

294. The proposal approval process (PAP) is also seen as problematic, particularly by NDAs/focal points and AEs. As outlined in the updated project and programme cycle policy, the process from project preparation to funded activity agreement (FAA) approval includes seven key stages, with a total of 24 individual steps (5 of which are voluntary, but strongly recommended). The GCF has sought to review procedures and reduce approval times through the development of the SAP and Activity Cycle, which can apply to projects that require a GCF contribution of up to USD 25 million and that have minimal environmental and social impact risks.

295. **Entities involved in a PAP reported that these processes are extremely costly and time-consuming.** For instance, two AEs in Tunisia reported several delays since they started the process more than four years ago. One of them noted having spent over USD 600,000 for concept note and funding proposal development.

296. In South Africa, an AE reported the need to invest a lot of staff time to prepare these projects and to react quickly to the various information requests of the Secretariat, which often changed and varied depending on who provided answers on any pending issues. This latter point was also made by a series of NDAs/focal points across Africa. This creates a problem, as the AE has to fund staff salaries for these activities before seeing any funding from project fees that only come in once disbursements are made, which usually takes two years or more.

297. On project review, the GCF uses six criteria to assess programmes and projects universally, with no indication or consideration for project location, AE type or capacity. The criteria are: (i) impact potential, (ii) paradigm shift potential, (iii) sustainable development potential, (iv) needs of the recipient, (v) country ownership, and (vi) efficiency and effectiveness. The GCF project activity cycle presented online states that the review process duration is of approximately six months. However, the average review time for accepted projects (PAP and SAP combined) in Africa is around 13 months (396 days) – double what is stated, but of a similar length to what is seen in other regions; the GCF-wide average is 360 days. Overall, **the time it takes for approval has been increasing since 2016, as evidenced in Figure 9-2**.[80]

298. In Africa, the SAP was used for 10 FPs. Quantitative data indicates the review time was significantly reduced compared to applications submitted using the PAP. As such, the review time for the SAP averaged 263 days (eight months) compared to 430 days (14 months) for the PAP. Nonetheless, the length of the approval process has been increasing since 2016 (see Appendix 1).

299. **While disbursement times are improving, it takes on average nearly two years (608 days) from Board approval to first disbursement for African states projects, for both SAP and PAP if their process times are combined**. This is nearly three months longer than what is seen in other regions, where an average of 527 days is noted. Disbursement and implementation progress remains slow. Indeed, while a large proportion of projects are under implementation and have received at least one disbursement, 21 per cent of approved financing for African States cannot be disbursed as the FAA is still not effective or conditions for first disbursement still need to be met (Figure 9-3).

[80] See more in Independent Evaluation Unit (2023).

Figure 9-2. Length of approval process (Average length from 2015-2022)



Source: GCF Tableau Server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.
Note: This analysis considered all 85 funded projects approved between 2015 – 2022, 182 RPSP grants and 22 PPF supports.

Figure 9-3. Disbursement status of approved GCF financing in African States



Source: GCF Tableau Server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab.

300. The low disbursement rate has created issues in countries. For instance, in one central African country, no disbursements from the GCF have been forthcoming since the approval of its first project in 2018. This has resulted in a loss of social and institutional capital for the NDA/focal point and led to the GCF being perceived as failing to keep the projects moving with IAEs in a timely manner.

301. Finally, delays in project closure are also noted. Of five projects meant to be closed as of 15 September 2022, all remain under implementation.[81]

4. Readiness and Project Preparation Facility

302. Heavy and rigid procedures have made access to financing through the GCF's various modalities a difficult process, further widening the capacity gap and exacerbating the need for allocating more

[81] These projects are FP005, FP022, FP023, FP024 and FP039.

resources towards the capacity building of African institutions. Whilst RPSP and PPF support are seen as effective instruments for building capacity on GCF processes, as well as for accessing and managing climate finance more broadly, they also need improvements for providing the required support in a timely manner.

303. Indeed, as per the RPSP guidebook, the review process for readiness applications is supposed to last between two and five months. However, **quantitative data provided shows that it takes on average 336 days (11 months) for applications to reach approval from the time of submission in Africa, making it the region for which Readiness programme approval takes the longest** (as compared to 258 days for Asia Pacific and 201 days for LAC). In deep-dive African FCV states, where there is a high need for capacity building to access financing, readiness approval has taken on average 368 days from submission.

304. **By comparison**, **PPF support is easier to access, but barely serves the needs of SIDS and FCV states.** Indeed, between 2016 and 2022, 22 PPFs have been approved in African states, taking on average 216 days to reach approval from the submission date.[82] However, only three single country and two multi-country PPFs have reached approval in African FCV states and one PPF was approved for Guinea-Bissau, an SIDS. PPFs submitted for LDCs take slightly longer than non-LDCs, at 239 days compared to 190 days.

305. Overall, the work programme of the Secretariat for 2022 and administrative budget noted the Secretariat has deployed additional full-time equivalent staff in the form of consultants, to supplement critical staff capacity gaps and to support iTAP in providing appropriate guidance towards selecting high-quality projects. **However, GCF stakeholders at the Secretariat and iTAP noted that their reliance on consultants to assess FPs puts a strain on resources and limits the ability for quick turnaround. Long delays are also partly due to coordination challenges between the Board and the Secretariat, as well as working with IAEs given they have their own, sometimes lengthy procedures to follow**. For instance, an IAE reported that receiving approval and clearance from the board of the AE before submitting the proposal to the GCF, generated significant additional delays to the process.

306. In addition to the procedures being heavy and resource intensive, and particularly so for African states, all stakeholder groups consulted reported significant difficulties in working with the GCF, as it often contributes to processes becoming lengthier. As mentioned above and indeed throughout this evaluation report, these difficulties are due to language barriers, currency risks, the lack of DAEs, lack of flexibility, lack of clarity and consistency, and the proximity/distance of the GCF.

5. Lack of Direct Access Entities

307. **Most countries in Africa have no or very few DAEs, despite continuous efforts from entities to complete the accreditation process and the direct access priority of the GCF being a key component of country ownership, as discussed earlier in this evaluation**. Additionally, DAEs that have completed the accreditation process face several challenges in preparing and submitting projects, resulting in a very limited number of DAE projects being approved. This leads to missed opportunities for the GCF to work with countries in an efficient manner by ensuring projects are better attuned to local realities and challenges, while reducing the procedural burden often seen with large IAEs who, in addition to GCF processes, have their own lengthy and heavy processes. Indeed, national entities are better placed to observe and understand opportunities and challenges, inform on urgent climate matters and bring the private sector onboard. They are also generally more flexible

[82] This refers to the average number of days between PPF submission and approval dates.

and quicker to adapt to new needs and priorities, as they tend to be smaller in size while having a less complex structure. The very importance of DAEs is discussed earlier in the report; this section emphasizes, the ongoing missed opportunity for greater efficiencies and cost-effectiveness from working with DAEs.

6. Language barriers

308. **Language barriers have been identified as an important challenge for non-Anglophone countries**. The GCF information disclosure policy states that English is its working language (Green Climate Fund, 2016a). As such, given the GCF works only in English and has limited capacity in other languages, there is an added strain on countries as they are required to translate GCF documents from English to the local language (and sometimes with multiple translations, as in the case of countries that are both Arabophone and Francophone).

309. Conversely, all countries' documentation that needs to be sent to the GCF has to be translated into English. Some (still limited) efforts are noted to counter this, as a GCF senior management stakeholder explained, subsidiary agreements are now only required to be translated if requested by the GCF. Nonetheless, stakeholders in non-Anglophone countries noted that the translation process creates bottlenecks and is done at a cost that exceeds their capacity. Some countries with low capacity as well as fragility report having developed their linguistic capacity simply to engage with the GCF appropriately and effectively, while in other cases this has acted as a deterrent to the preparation and submission of concept notes, FPs, and general engagement with the GCF.

310. **The English-only policy of the GCF was further found to be an obstacle to the development of country ownership in non-Anglophone countries** as it creates a lengthy and costly process and limits the extent to which the country can engage with the GCF on its own terms.

7. Lack of flexibility and evidence of rigidity

311. **Organizations involved with the GCF widely reported that the GCF lacks flexibility** and that **its processes are not adequately adapted to the different countries' contextual realities.** For instance, many LDCs have neither the resources nor the capacity to comply with GCF requirements for the accreditation process and need more capacity building from the GCF, such as through readiness support (which is also challenging and lengthy to access).

312. Additionally, accreditation and project approval requirements remain the same regardless of the type of entity requesting accreditation or funding, even though national entities generally have less capacity and fewer resources. Size differences as well as sectoral specializations among DAEs indicate there should be greater flexibility in the use of project funding templates. Concept notes are also criticized for requiring too much detailed information for early-stage projects, interpreted by certain stakeholders as a disconnection from the field. For example, in several cases, detailed climate information requested for project rationale is non-existent in Africa.

313. **Finally, there is a perceived inflexibility regarding adjusting budget, programmatic and organizational aspects of approved design to ensure continued alignment with the realities on the ground, particularly with projects that are approved and then disburse many years after they were conceived**. For example, in east Africa, there are concerns among AE stakeholders that any adjustments to project design once the FAA is approved would delay implementation and reduce project run times. In South Africa, it was noted that the FAAs are too rigidly formulated and that they do not allow AEs to react rapidly to evolving market conditions in South Africa and neighbouring countries, which affect potential private investors and local banks' willingness to work

with the GCF. Overall, key informants widely believed the lack of flexibility in adjusting approved projects and related FAAs has hindered both implementation and country ownership.

8. Lack of clarity and consistency

314. **Stakeholders of different types, including AEs, NDAs/focal points as well as government representatives decry the lack of clarity on GCF requirements and evaluation criteria, as well as a paucity of contextualized information and expectations, making it difficult to address GCF requirements properly in concept notes.** Inconsistencies were also reported due to rotations in GCF NDA/focal point personnel, whose expectations differed and forced entities to start over to comply with new requirements. The same is true of changes in GCF staffing.

315. In one telling and illustrative instance, an AE reported working closely with the Secretariat to develop a project, noting the process was going smoothly. However, there was an internal change in staffing and a new member of the Secretariat was assigned to their project. This new member backtracked and started putting into question several elements of the project, ultimately setting the project back significantly. In another case, inconsistencies were noted between advice given by consultants and feedback provided by the GCF staff, resulting in time-consuming “back and forth” interactions. Such inconsistencies are not isolated incidents.

316. As things stand, very recent efforts made by the GCF Secretariat to bring clarity to its processes by sharing information and infographics on its website are not as yet widely known to be making a reported difference to stakeholders.

9. Currency risks

317. **The hedging of currency risks is another key issue that has emerged from consultation with stakeholders,** with specific insights from South Africa and Tunisia. As detailed in the South Africa case study for this evaluation, the hedging of currency risk has been reported as delaying the start-up of already negotiated renewable energy projects with private clients in both South Africa and the three neighbouring countries participating in the multi-country FP098, DBSA-CFF programme (Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia), as well as for those interested in the national FP106, EGIP programme.

318. The issue is that the GCF lends in USD and insists on being paid back in USD, which creates big risks for those taking on these loans when their revenues are in national currencies, which often are weakening against the USD. Hedging is therefore needed, which incurs fees that the GCF is thus far unwilling to cover.

319. **Indeed, the risk of currency losses appears too high and unpredictable for at least some of the clients, which has effectively blocked planned investments from going forward**. In Tunisia, a key stakeholder (expert in climate finance) reported that currency risk is an important roadblock for the private sector to become invested with the GCF. It does not as yet appear that GCF has a clear approach for managing this risk appropriately in different contexts and with different partners.

10. Proximity/distance of the Green Climate Fund

320. **The evaluation shows that the relationship between Africa as a priority group and the GCF is perceived as “nonideal” by a majority of consulted African stakeholders. There is currently a lack of representation and a perceived inaccessibility to the GCF for these stakeholders. There is generally limited, and in some cases, no bilateral engagement with countries.** Both GCF and African stakeholders describe communication challenges, particularly in evidence between

NDAs/focal points and the GCF. Physical distance between African countries and the GCF headquarters in Songdo, Korea, and the absence of regional structures are widely considered as factors that generate and worsen communication issues, heightening the GCF's overall disconnectedness with regional and national African contexts.

321. For example, in one east African country, the absence of a GCF presence resulted in (i) the DAE having become a go-to organization for other entities seeking accreditation, for advice on how to go through the accreditation process, which is not their mandate, and (ii) the NDAs/focal points having to deal with frustrations and complaints that national counterparts have with the GCF. The latter has also been reported in a north African country.

322. **In all case study countries, and more broadly in consultations with African stakeholders across the continent who were consulted for this evaluation (e.g., during ACW 2022 in Gabon), there was near unanimous endorsement for a GCF African country office.** While this may not necessarily be the solution, it speaks to two key matters.

- First, **there is a perception that having an interlocutor that is Africa based would increase the relevance of the GCF's work in Africa, ease processes, and establish an understanding of African priorities** that would be reflected in the projects selected.
- Second, there could be value in an Africa based office that would help design projects by providing access to expertise and capacity that is currently lacking, while also moving projects through GCF processes faster and more efficiently to demonstrate prioritization of Africa.

323. This, however, would come with a paradigm change for the GCF itself, in that it has not only a gatekeeper role in treasury, but also a partnering role in project design, implementation and monitoring. That such a shift may be required is increasingly being mentioned in consultations with GCF Secretariat staff and other stakeholders.

324. Table 9-2 summarizes the key challenges observed during stakeholder interviews and data analysis undertaken by this evaluation. IEU's evaluation of "Independent Synthesis of Direct Access in the Green Climate Fund" summarized factors which hindered and facilitated GCF project approval highlighted by DAEs and other relevant actors as shown in Table 9-3.

Table 9-2. Summary of the key challenges for the African States

CATEGORY	CHALLENGES AND FACTORS FOR DELAYS
Accreditation process	• Lengthy RPSP approval process • Heavy and complicated procedures related to accreditation • Insufficient communication from both the Secretariat and the applicant (long delays in receiving answers from the GCF coupled with gratuitous back and forth) • Insufficient guidelines from the Secretariat • Inflexibility of both the Secretariat and Accreditation Panel • Difficulties of AEs to align with GCF policies and standards • Lack of flexibility (i.e., one-size -fit-all accreditation criteria) • Delays in fulfilling accreditation conditions by AEs and/or disagreement in altering internal rules • Lack of GCF policy to reject/terminate applications causing the indefinite remaining of inactive applicants in the pipeline indefinitely • Language-related barriers (e.g., English-only policies and templates) • Absence of GCF presence in the country

Category	Challenges and factors for delays
Project appraisal and approval stage	• High operations costs in Africa, in particular in SIDS and FCV states • Insufficient AE fees to cover costs • Lack of AEs operating in the country including DAEs • High up-front costs for project preparation • Lack of clarity and consistency of comments from the Secretariat • Lack of consideration for the specific circumstances of countries, including on climate rationale • High turnover of NDA/focal point personnel and GCF dedicated staff members • Complicated and difficult to comply GCF policies • Currency risks for project cost estimation • One-size-fit-all project approval process regardless of entity type and project size • Language-related barriers • Absence of GCF presence in the country
Post-approval stage (legal process)	• Language-related barriers • Lack of legal capacity and experience at entities
Implementation	• Lack of AEs operating in the country in particular, for multi-country projects • Limited country stakeholder engagement by multi-country projects • Lack of flexibility of GCF (e.g., adjusting budget and restricting the components) • Low disbursement rate • Currency risks during the project implementation • Absence of GCF presence in the country

Source: Qualitative interviews with NDAs, DAEs and Secretariat staff

Table 9-3. Hindering and facilitating factors for DAEs to get projects approved by the GCF

Levels	Hindering factors	Facilitating factors
Entity level	• Political or “marketing” reasons for accreditation, unrealistic expectations • Need to adapt policies to accreditation requirements, leading to a long delay between applying for accreditation and being able to submit projects for approval • Small staff, need for support to prepare concept notes and FPs • Limited understanding of what a “GCF project” is, at the entity level or at its client/partner level, leading to project ideas that are not aligned with GCF requirements • Low capacity to analyse climate data and undertake forward-looking modelling • High demand from countries (especially for regional entities, especially in SIDS) • Time required for stakeholder engagement (while	• Previous engagement with AF as a NIE • More widely, previous programming with international entities • Having fiduciary standards in place before becoming a DAE • Engagement as an EE in GCF projects • Engagement as Readiness Delivery Partner in GCF readiness activities

Levels	Hindering factors	Facilitating factors
	recognized important)	
Country level	• Insufficient knowledge of GCF procedures and requirements from the NDA, leading to the project developer having a low awareness of GCF procedures and requirements, resulting in difficulty originating bankable projects • Changes in national administration, affecting priorities and/or the national validation processes of focal points • Adverse economic circumstances in sectors relevant to the GCF (e.g., green infrastructure) • Lack of climate data to support climate rationale in project proposals	• Strong NDA • National involvement in the GCF (climate being a priority, country hosting the COP, country having a Board Member) • Existence of national coordination processes • Strong link between DAE and NDA and national administration
GCF level	• Changes in policies, expectations and guidance, leading to high uncertainty and difficulty in building knowledge and transferring it from one project to another • Lack of clarity on what processes entail; no clarity provided to NDA focal points on what the GCF is expecting in FPs and what each step of approval entails • Redundant processes (both for accreditation and FP approval; same questions asked multiple times by different divisions) • Long delays for all processes (accreditation, FP approval, PPF), which can lead to the pipeline "getting cold" (i.e., project proponents consulted might not be interested anymore several years later and/or with no visibility and certainty over the timeline of project approval) • Lack of considerations for the specific circumstances of countries, including on climate rationale • Unattractive conditions for the private sector (currency, subsidy level)	• PPF, despite difficulties, provides relevant support • Having a longstanding dedicated interlocutor • In-person meetings and structured dialogues

Source: Qualitative interviews with NDAs, DAEs and Secretariat staff

Chapter 10. SUSTAINABILITY, REPLICATION AND SCALABILITY

325. This chapter explores the sustainability of accomplishments and the establishment of framework conditions for achieving sustainable benefits, and discusses the scalability of GCF interventions and their replicability within countries and beyond them.

A. SUSTAINABILITY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ESTABLISHING FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

326. **Finding 26. The concept of sustainability is found to be central to the GCF's strategic objectives**. Several GCF intervention design features are supportive of sustainability, including country ownership and stakeholder involvement, alignment with needs and priorities, capacity building, private sector engagement and exit strategies. **However, given project trajectories, it is too early to assess the extent to which the GCF's contributions in African States will be sustained.**

327. As the oldest projects in Africa are just coming to a close, it is too early to assess the sustainability of the GCF's contributions in the continent. This concept of sustainability is however central to the GCF's strategic objectives, as recognized in the USP, particularly as it relates to the GCF's objective of enabling a paradigm shift. Indeed, the first of two long term strategic vision elements of the GCF is to "promote the paradigm shift towards low emission and climate resilient development pathways in the context of sustainable development". The USP further states that programming will seek to "promote projects and programmes with potential for innovation, replication, scale and financial sustainability (reflecting the components of paradigm shift), as well as projects which deliver integrated mitigation, adaptation and development benefits."

328. The importance of sustainability is further reflected in FPs and project selection. The funding proposal template includes considerations for the sustainability of interventions, with requirements for preliminary thinking on exit strategies to be included.[83] Also, under the updated investment framework, sustainability is considered under the "paradigm shift potential" selection criteria, which accounts for the "degree to which the proposed activity can catalyse impact beyond a one-off project or programme investment".

329. While too early to assess sustainability, several factors were identified that have important implications for the likelihood and extent to which sustainability may be achieved. **First, strong country ownership is widely observed to be a determinant of sustainability.** Key informants highlighted the importance of involving a wide range of local stakeholders in projects, with some noting this to be "critical". While there is strong evidence of stakeholder consultation taking place at the design stage, the involvement of local stakeholders is often reported as decreasing during project implementation. There are however noted efforts on the GCF's part to enhance engagement with

[83] Under section B.6, Exit Strategy (Green Climate Fund, 2022f), applicants are required to draft a page-long explanation on how they will successfully exit following project completion, particularly indicating how results and benefits will continue beyond the project/programme period and how the contribution to paradigm shift will be maintained. Key information to be included here touches on elements identified in this section such as long-term ownership and operational maintenance of investments (e.g., key infrastructure, assets, contractual arrangements).

local communities (see Chapter 5.B for an extensive discussion on stakeholder engagement geared towards fostering country ownership).

330. **Second, alignment with priorities and needs is also regarded as enhancing the sustainability potential of projects.** Project documents notably require applicants to describe the alignment of projects with existing policies – and therefore priorities – as well as describing how a project will address the specific needs of a recipient. While alignment with country level priorities and needs is important (see Chapter 3.B on alignment with African priorities), stakeholders highlight the importance of intervention alignment with the needs and realities of targeted populations – at the local level. This was for example noted in the Tunisia case study, where key informants were very optimistic that the anticipated benefits of the project currently under development, “Towards a Climate Resilient Agriculture and livelihoods in Southern Tunisia”, would last over time given the project addresses the pressing and critical issues of agriculture, livelihoods and food security of target vulnerable populations.

331. **Third, ensuring local communities understand interventions’ benefits and co-benefits is also widely observed as a determinant of sustainability,** as it has the potential to increase the desire for these benefits to be sustained. Co-benefits achieved may include the creation of jobs, improved health (e.g., through improved air quality), increased biodiversity, and increased representation of women and girls in decision-making processes. Early examples of interventions where co-benefits have been achieved are noted. This is the case for FP024, where 578 jobs were created for community members, which has the potential to address food insecurity and contribute to poverty eradication and income generation for these vulnerable communities.

332. **Fourth, ensuring there is capacity to sustain project outcomes is central to the sustainability of benefits.** Capacity building is found to be a central component of many GCF projects, applied at an institutional and/or community/constituency level. Nearly all projects in deep-dive African FCV states included such a component to favour the sustainability of the projects. Similarly, the aforementioned project (in development), “Towards a Climate Resilient Agriculture and livelihoods in Southern Tunisia”, includes capacity building for project managers as well as local populations. Concerns are noted however with regard to the limited capacity of certain institutions. This is notably the case of the PA-GGW, where limited capacity and institutional weakness has the potential to impact the coordination of the GGW, with implications for both the effectiveness and related sustainability of the initiative.

333. **Finally, private sector engagement favours sustainability, in part through business continuity as well as the provision of critical financial resources** (see Chapter 4.C). For instance, private sector involvement is perceived as critical for sustainability. This is the case of the BOAD agriculture interventions in the Niger, which include a first component on capacity building for producers geared towards resilience to climate change, and a second component which seeks to bring in private sector and financial institutions to provide credit to support producers. A specifically knowledgeable key informant notes that while the GCF provided the first level of technical and financial resources, private sector involvement is required for the project to become sustainable.

334. The private sector also provides business continuity – that is, sustained engagement following project closure – given their level of commitment to their projects and investments. This is notably seen in Liberia, under SAP018, “Enhancing Climate Information Systems for Resilient Development in Liberia (Liberia CIS)”, where weather radars were provided to the Roberts International Airport, which has now taken over their operation and maintenance costs given they are able to generate revenue through the use and maintenance of these radars.

B. Replicability and scalability of the Green Climate Fund's investments

335. **Finding 27. Conceptual visibility, coherence and guidance at the GCF on replicability and scalability is largely concentrated at project level.** GCF projects generally include considerations for expanding the scope and reach of existing projects, and for building on prior projects in some cases, as a number of project examples demonstrate. **The most prevalent obstacles to scaling at a higher level include an overall lack of prior experience, challenges associated with partnership development, the inadequacy of financial resources, and sometimes limited learning from prior experiences**.

1. Developing conceptual coherence

336. Many GCF-wide matters have important implications for its work in Africa, of course, and priorities, considerations and challenges of replicability and scalability are no different. **At the policy level, there is no Board decision or Secretariat guidance paper on replicability and scalability**. In fact, the words barely appear in Board decisions. There are however indications of what is meant by these terms, though they are disparately situated and unclear to most GCF stakeholders. Making these visible is an important step in advancing the priority itself, in relation to the GCF's work and investments in Africa. As will become clear, scaling up refers to strategies and approaches, instruments, and solutions, with dimensions of replicability.

337. The GI says, "The Fund will also provide resources for innovative and replicable approaches." (Green Climate Fund, 2011). **At the strategic level, scaling up is included in the GCF's USP and is considered in relation to project interactions with other climate funds.** Specifically, tracked interactions between the funds include: "(i) scale up – FPs scaling up experiences from other climate funds, (ii) synergy – FPs scaling up activities implemented with the support of other climate funds, (iii) lessons learned – FP implementing lessons learned in initiatives financed by other climate funds and (iv) co-financing – FPs attracting co-financing from another climate fund." (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2021a).

338. At the programmatic level, there are two specific contexts within which the Readiness programme considers scaling: "(i) in the NAP or other adaptation planning support where the guidelines stipulate this support aims to help countries catalyse the scale and range of financing instruments required by countries to adapt to climate change over time, and (ii) through the inclusion this year of the option of requesting readiness support for climate technologies, including for strategies to scale up prioritized climate technology solutions." (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2018a).

339. Replicability and scalability are concepts related to paradigm shift and systemic change, as well as cooperation and coordination with other climate funds and co-financing, including by governments, other agencies, and/or the private sector. They are also linked to innovation, as stated in the GI, because new concepts and approaches may be adopted by other interested parties, in particular by the private sector, when the new practices show advantages and spread.

340. One of the indicators for the six GCF investment criteria is paradigm shift potential. The Board document on investment criteria indicators states: "This vision for longer-term change should be accompanied by a robust and convincing ToC for replication and/or scaling up of the project results, including the long term sustainability of the results, …" (Green Climate Fund, 2019c).[84] However,

[84] This document was adopted by the Board and is contained in annex VII to decision B.22/15, paragraph (a).

so far, there is neither a definition nor a concept note clarifying and unifying these terms, and which also discusses the ways in which they relate to one another.

341. Moreover, the SAP evaluation found that neither the GCF Secretariat nor the iTAP specifically discussed the "ready for scaling up" criterion when processing SAP project applications (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2020b). The IEU stoplight assessment which reviews the quality of entry of project documents, further eluded that some FP do not cite good evidence to support their causal claims and need to improve acknowledging and planning for unintended consequences in their programme's ToC as well as include the potential for replicability and scalability (Fiala and others, 2022).

2. Manifestation of scaling and replication

342. In concrete terms, replicability and scalability can take many often-overlapping forms, in terms of strategies and approaches, instruments, and solutions, as is evident in many GCF FP designs. Several of these are discussed below with examples.[85]

a. On strategies and approaches

343. **Working with existing partners (e.g., AEs) on linked projects has been a scaling and replication strategy of the GCF**. **The GCF and GEF are partners with an agreed LTV, who have encouraged efforts to link, lightly coordinate and scale their work**. For example, the GEF had a USD 2.5 million project to strengthen the PA-GGW, which it has followed with another grant of USD 10 million for strengthening regional coordination and knowledge management focusing on the national GGW agencies. This subsequent grant will be implemented in close cooperation with IFAD's GCF FP183, "IGREENFIN 1: Greening Agricultural Banks & the Financial Sector to Foster Climate Resilient, Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture in the GGW countries – Phase I" (discussed below). This parallel scaling up of project funding by the GEF and GCF will be implemented by the same implementing entity, IFAD, which makes it much easier to closely coordinate activities.

344. SANBI, the second DAE in South Africa, has ambitious plans to scale up its adaptation activities, expanding on its multi-year experience of adaptation projects with local communities funded by the AF. With readiness funding, it has developed three concept notes, the first two of which are already endorsed by the GCF Secretariat.

345. These projects would enable a significant advance in the adaptation work in South Africa, particularly if the private sector participates. A private sector reference group was established by SANBI to guide the work, and a community of practice was formed to strengthen the relationships established through a series of workshops and events. These three projects would likely be complementary to those financed through Pegasus Capital Advisors (PCA, a private equity fund based in the United States) such as FP181, CRAFT project, while being smaller and more community-based.

346. The development of new partnerships has brought additional financial resources, including with other financial mechanisms and the private sector. It is also important to learn from the experiences of similar projects in other countries, particularly those that are more advanced in partnering with private sector entities.

347. In 31 of 41 FP received and reviewed by the IEU for African FCV states (nine in contexts of high institutional and social fragility, 20 in medium-intensity conflict contexts, and one in a high-

[85] Further information about these projects can be found in the respective case studies.

intensity conflict context), it was indicated that the projects will be scaling up some pre-existing project interventions. The remaining ten projects in countries with medium-intensity conflict and two in high institutionally and socially fragile states did not indicate the scaling up of any activities or scaling up was not relevant. A review of projects in the four deep-dive countries shows that projects seek to achieve replication and scaling primarily through information sharing. This is planned to take place through events (e.g., FP177 “Cooling Facility”) and through sharing lessons learned (e.g., FP148 “Participation in Energy Access Relief Facility (EARF)”). Several initiatives have positioned themselves as “proofs of concept” (e.g., FP096 ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’s Green Mini-Grid Program’) and have put in place measures to facilitate the replication of their processes. This is seen for FP148, where Acumen intends for the Fund’s processes and tools (e.g., eligibility criteria, fund management, requirements, monitoring, etc.) to be open source to facilitate the replication of the relief structuring.

348. Opinions expressed by CSOs consulted[86] through the evaluation survey provide guidance on where to focus attention to improve the likelihood and learning on this. CSO survey respondents are quite positive regarding the extent to which GCF investments are scalable and/or replicable within and/or across African states. Indeed, 44 per cent of respondents considered this as feasible to a moderate extent and 31 per cent to a major extent, with no contrary views expressed. However, on the question, “To what extent does the GCF have learning systems in place for enabling programming/project development, replication and/or scaling across Africa”, the answers reflect a more critical perspective. Here, 6 per cent answered “not at all”, 25 per cent said “to a minor extent”, 38 per cent “to a moderate extent” and only 6 per cent “to a major extent”, while 25 per cent responded that they “do not know”.

b. On instruments

349. **Using new financial instruments, including concessional finance in sectors where perceived risks ward against private sector investment, have helped overcome obstacles and build new opportunities for scaling**. These include the water, sanitation and ocean sectors, for example in FP099, “Climate Investor 1” and FP190, “Climate Investor 2”. Other examples are found in the decentralized renewable energy sector – for example, FP168, “LEAF Framework” – or the agriculture sector where a combination of concessional finance, adaptive climate smart technologies and capacity building support are expected to bring about change at scale. One such example is found in FP179, TACATDP.

350. FP162, “The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme”, will be implemented by IFAD with African Risk Capital (ARC) as EE, along with AfDB and World Food Programme. The project’s focus is on using risk management and risk transfer to insure farmers in the Sahel region against strong reductions in their revenues due to climate-induced disasters. If successful, the risk management component and the experiences gained could be expanded to other GCF projects in Africa and elsewhere, given that this is the first involvement of the ARC as EE in a GCF project.

351. In South Africa, there are several projects that provide concessional loans and equity to private investors in renewable energies. Relatively early ones are FP106 and FP098, both implemented by DBSA. FP106, EGIP, is a single country project offering concessional funding and risk-sharing to private investors in renewable energy projects. It is assisted by a USD 100 million blended finance package from the GCF and USD 437 million in co-financing. FP098, DBSA-CFF also plans to work with private investors in the renewable energy sector, but in four countries of the region including South Africa. Funding requested from the GCF for the South African part is nearly USD 39 million,

[86] Based on a total of 16 responses.

with co-financing programmed at USD 80.5 million. With this project, the DBSA plans on expanding its experiences gained with EGIP to neighbouring countries. For now, however, both projects are stuck due to problems resulting first from COVID-19, as well as from differences with the GCF Secretariat about currency hedging and risk-sharing with local banks.

352. In addition, FP095 “Transforming Financial Systems for Climate”, implemented by AFD, is pursuing on-lending for renewable energy with 17 countries involved. For the South African component, USD 100 million has been programmed, with three local banks involved, but local investors need to be engaged. For these multi-country projects, it is difficult to say what the financial amounts available to investors in South Africa and other participating countries will be as the allocation of project funding works on a first come, first served basis when promising investment proposals in a suitable country context are identified. The limit for now is not the availability of funding, but of interested and solid investors to join in these projects and apply successfully for funding by the local partner institutions of AFD.

353. For scaling up adaptation investments in South Africa, a promising avenue is found in FP181, CRAFT, implemented by PCA. It is a multi-country project, with the South African share of GCF funding planned to be about USD 17 million, and with supplementary co-financing of USD 50 million from private investors. This is a new approach to adaptation financing by providing equity funding by the GCF through PCA, and the uptake by South African stakeholders, including municipalities and private companies, remains to be seen. There is certainly a big need for such investments, but there are also difficulties, as the local partners of adaptation projects are often financially weaker and less “bankable” than those in the energy sector.

c. On solutions

354. Geographic expansion of solutions, either locally/nationally, to other single countries or to multiple countries is a frequently pursued way to scale impact. For example, Namibia’s Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia (EIF) has indicated its intent to replicate the good practices evident in other countries (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2018a). The SAP evaluation case studies of six projects in Africa (SAP001, SAP005, SAP006, SAP007, SAP011, and SAP012, taking place in Namibia (2 projects), Benin, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and the Niger) point to three projects with good potential for scaling up (one project ready to scale up with replication in other areas, one demonstration project with potential for replication, and one project with high expectations for replicability).[87]

355. The GCF has been supporting projects that have broad reach, in multiple countries and regions globally, with an African component. One such project is FP152, SnCF Global, implemented by PCA, with technical assistance provided by IUCN through FP151. This is a multi-country initiative designed to offer investors equity for investing in renewable energies in 42 countries, 17 of which are in Africa.

356. An example of planned replicability and scalability, with a focus on larger financial amounts and geographic expansion, is the up-coming on-lending scheme from local financial institutions to farmers and other rural stakeholders in FP183 “IGREENFIN 1: Greening Agricultural Banks & the Financial Sector to Foster Climate Resilient, Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture in the GGW countries – Phase I”. FP183 will be implemented by IFAD starting in the west African member countries of the GGW, as well as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, with plans for later expansion to east

[87] Regarding the experiences of countries with replication and scaling in other continents, the report by Wörlen, Altevogt and Keppler (2020) and Independent Evaluation Unit (2020b) contain examples from Mongolia’s XAC Bank and the EBRD experiences in Kazakhstan, among others.

African member countries. The project scales up the earlier SAP012, "Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture", likewise implemented by IFAD, which provided inclusive green financing for climate resilient and low emission smallholders in the Niger. It is both geographical replication and scaling up, where a pilot project is expanded to other countries in the region via the same implementing entity, IFAD, and funding institution, the GCF, with co-financing from IFAD.

357. A linked example of scaling is the planned FAO project (at concept note stage, at the time of writing), "Scaling-up Resilience in Africa's Great Green Wall" (SURAGGWA). The project plans to take the activities and experiences of SAP019 "Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan", to eight other GGW countries. This will make it another example of regional replication and scaling up, again with the same implementing entity, FAO, and funding source, the GCF.

358. In Tunisia, a single country project that aims to improve agriculture resilience in the south of the country was in the final stages of development at the time of this evaluation. This project has been designed to reach vulnerable communities and localities with potential for replication and scalability. It is conceived as a pilot to test approaches in different contexts such as grazing lands and olive groves. If the project works well in both grazing lands and olive groves, it will indicate that the project can be replicated in other grazing lands and olive groves in the south of Tunisia or elsewhere in similar countries. If it only works in grazing lands, then it will be a signal that the project should probably not be replicated as such in olive groves. The zones in which the project is planned to be implemented were selected to be representative of the different contexts found in the south of Tunisia. If successful and with appropriate resources, the project could therefore be replicated in similar zones, in Tunisia and other comparable countries.

359. In Kenya, there is some evidence of scaling up considerations in project designs, and most assuredly for those projects derived through national processes. A good example of this is found in FP113, TWENDE, implemented by IUCN (for more details, see Box 5-1). Scaling is expected to occur county by county, guided by policy and planning, improved extension, and market forces incentivizing sustainable agriculture and livestock management. At the end of the project term, lessons learned from application in 11 counties classed as ASAL are expected to be applied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and the National Drought Management Authority in the other 23 ASAL counties.

3. Additional insights

360. **Replicability and scalability can take many forms and sizes, but some common features are evident, given also the overlap between strategies and approaches, instruments and solutions**. Drawing on the few examples above, important insights and lessons can be gained. These are primarily related to partnership, planning and communication, funding, timeframes, information sharing and learning, and overcoming opposition. Of course, the way in which these are pursued needs to reflect the specificities of context, and any number of other variables associated with GCF approaches and the diversity of the African states themselves.

361. **Scaling and replication usually require partners, which can be international, national, public and/or private sector, who will join and carry projects forward, beyond initial GCF funding**. Arguably, the most significant obstacle to replication and scaling is in securing the right institutional and/or financial partners.

362. **Scaling and replication require planning at the project design stage by the participating project proponents (e.g., AEs/agencies), which takes time and continued communications among project officers and the secretariats of the GCF and other participating funds**, as

applicable. Communication is key to finding partners, keeping them involved, and increasing the circle of participating parties.

363. Scaling requires additional funding commensurate with the intended increase and outreach of the activities. With respect to adaptation projects, their partner and bankability prospects are prime challenges.

364. In general, replication and scaling involve experimentation and proof of concept, and must generally also be built on appropriate, timely and transparent information and learning, which are not always easy to secure. Thus, before scaling up, projects should ideally draw on monitoring data and evaluation insights to ensure that relevant lessons are learned and applied in subsequent stages.

365. Given scaling and replication often involve disrupting established ways of doing business, opposition should be anticipated, and commensurate political support on various levels is needed. Also, flexibility on all sides, including at the GCF, is required to allow for appropriate and rapid adjustments to new market conditions. In particular, when the main partners are from the private sector, public partners including the GCF will have to act and react quickly and predictably; otherwise, private sector interest will quickly wane. This also applies to the local banking sector, which has to overcome a significant aversion to risk and a certain inertia when its support is sought to finance new technologies and processes.

Chapter 11. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

Relevance and targeting of the GCF in Africa

366. **For the most part, GCF has been moderately relevant to the African states, in line with international agendas on climate action. However, its portfolio is weighted towards mitigation results areas.** The GCF has proven itself to be an important source of financing, capacity development, and other forms of support to African states for tackling key and urgent climate change related challenges. However, African states stakeholders have called for a re-balancing to take place towards adaptation, given the real and imminent climate impacts they are facing.

Institutional coherence and complementarity

367. **Regional or portfolio level complementarity efforts among other climate funds are limited. Much remains to be done to effectively operationalize a coherent and coordinated provision of climate finance and related support in Africa.** Moving towards greater impact, the GCF has started to work with these and other leading finance and development actors, as well as a whole range of stakeholders at sub-national, national, regional and global levels. In particular, the GCF Secretariat has pursued a high level approach to cooperation with the GEF at the strategic level, and to a far lesser extent with the AF and CIF. For the time being, while unsystematic and unincentivized, the pursuit and operationalization of cooperation and complementarity are realized mainly by the AEs of the multiple funds.

Country ownership of projects and programmes

368. **The GCF’s expectations for stakeholder engagement are well documented in policy and guidance notes. However, robust stakeholder engagement in management, in governance and in monitoring and learning at country level are yet to be put in place.** For this reason, among others, the quality of engagement is routinely questioned by African stakeholders, particularly among civil society. There is significant variability in the engagement of CSOs by national governments in project planning, monitoring and implementation, such that civil society remains a vastly under-utilised source of experience, wisdom and capacity.

Box 11-1. Thematic case study 1: The Great Green Wall Initiative[88]

This case study explores GCF's efforts in donor coordination through the GGWI, and the progress made to date on that front to obtain lessons learned.[89] The key findings include:

In general terms, coordination, cooperation and complementarity happens on three levels for advancing the GGWI: international, regional and national. At the international level, significant progress has been achieved with the creation of the GGW Accelerator programme. Over USD 19 billion has been pledged for future project funding, mostly by MDBs and bilateral donors.

Much of the pledges are loans however, which will be difficult for many countries to take up. Moreover, the capacity of GGW countries to develop bankable projects is very limited. The UNCCD, where the Accelerator Unit is currently located, has taken the lead in organizing virtual donor conferences for coordinating pledges, sharing information, and developing indicators and reporting standards.

At the regional level, the AU has the leading political role which is supposed to coordinate the efforts of its 11 member countries. At the national level, it appears, that the GGWI focal points and agencies are in most cases situated in the ministries of environment and are not well connected with the finance and/or planning ministries. While the latter have good contacts with donor agencies and capacities in developing bankable projects, this is not the case with the majority of the GGW focal points, which are often ignored by the MDBs and other donors, even during country missions, and a similar situation may be applicable to the case of GCF's NDAs.

The GCF has continuously participated in donor conferences organized by the UNCCD and has recently approved additional innovative projects, which were developed in close coordination with the GEF and with intense consultations also with IFAD, the responsible AE. Further projects are under preparation by the FAO and AFD. IGREENFIN1, with its flexible combinations of grant and loan funding for on-lending to small farmers and other stakeholders combined with capacity building on regional and national levels, appears promising for increasing the future role of the GCF in supporting and accelerating the implementation and scaling up of the GGW.

Institutional capacity for accessing the GCF

369. **The existing menu of support for accessing the GCF is not effective for some African states. Many African states, particularly LDCs and FCVs, are still facing challenges in accessing the GCF's RPSP and PPF resources**. Indeed, African states have received the second highest single country share of RPSP funding among the regions, but African LDC and FCV states are not accessing all the RPSP support to which they are entitled, and to the level required to build generally much-needed capacity. Given that the RPSP is often the gateway to engaging with the GCF, challenges in accessing GCF's climate funding become a major impediment. The PPF also barely serves the needs of SIDS and FCV states. Only a few PPFs have reached approval in African FCV states and SIDS to date.

[88] The full case study reports are attached to the main report as Volume III of this report.
[89] The GGWI was established in 2007 as a flagship land restoration initiative that brings together African countries and international partners, under the leadership of the AU, which also created the PA-GGW. It was initially conceived to combat desertification in the Sahel region by planting millions of trees in 11 Sahel countries, creating a Great Green Wall.

Box 11-2. Thematic case study 2: Fragile, conflict and violence affected societies

This case study examines GCF interventions in African FCV states.[90] Notably, it explores challenges, barriers and lessons learned so as to inform future GCF interventions and approaches in such contexts. The key findings include:

- GCF interventions in African FCV states are overall well-aligned with international agreements. However, while GCF interventions have the potential to support countries in reaching their GHG reduction objectives through heightened support on mitigation – particularly the result area of energy generation and access – there remains an important gap in financing for adaptation.
- Moreover, country ownership remains challenging in African FCV states, particularly related to the role of NDAs/focal points and DAE capacity. Notably, there are very few accredited DAEs in FCV states, with marked challenges in achieving accreditation. The importance of increasing the number of DAEs was strongly emphasized by national level key informants. While there are efforts to build NDA/focal point capacity through RPSP grants, accessing these resources is observed to be challenging given the complex and lengthy nature of the processes.
- While single country projects in African FCV states are ambitious, the GCF portfolio in these countries is largely composed of multi-country and multi-regional projects, and the extent to which these projects will lead to the implementation of activities in FCV states remains unclear.
- African FCV states face challenges in attracting co-financing given insecurity and political instability. With limited country capacity, investment from the local public and private sector is also constrained in these contexts, increasing reliance on the international community to finance projects. All of this highlights the importance of de-risking investments to attract the level of financing required.
- The GCF is largely considered to be maladapted to operate in African FCV states given its complex and lengthy processes, as well as its lack of flexibility and rigid requirements. This has led to the GCF being perceived as a barrier to financing rather than as a partner of choice. It has also resulted in a loss of social and institutional capital for the NDA/focal point in some instances. The complexity of processes has also required African FCV states to seek capacity building support from other institutions to effectively engage with the GCF and to access GCF financing.

Access to the GCF's financial resources

370. **The direct access model of the GCF in Africa is inhibited by a paucity of nominated and accredited DAEs,** with only 18 DAEs accredited in 13 of the 54 African countries. Also, the number of concept notes submitted by African DAEs has declined in recent years. Additionally, the GCF has only placed modest emphasis on promoting the participation of MSMEs in GCF activities in African LDCs, SIDS, and FCV states, which are in fact the vast majority of private sector actors in Africa. The extent to which thGCF is accounting for high operating costs in Africa remains somewhat limited, as the policy on AE fees is applied uniformly across regions and AE types. Of particular interest, early evidence suggests that DAEs have the potential to deliver outcomes more cost-effectively than is the case for IAEs. Also, the evidence shows the effectiveness of PPF support for preparing FPs.

[90] FCV states present multiple and unique challenges related to climate adaptation and mitigation given their overall if varying insecurity and instability. FCV states are identified annually by the World Bank according to their security status and institutional markers and include both conflict-affected societies – determined by the number of conflict-related deaths relative to the country's overall population – and institutionally and socially fragile countries. According to the World Bank's fiscal year (FY) 2022 list, 29 countries were classified as FCV states, 20 of which were located in Africa. As such, Africa has two thirds of countries classified as FCV states. This case study was informed by a deeper dive in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Somalia, as well as a field mission to Africa Climate Week 2022.

The GCF's engagement with countries

371. **The GCF's current engagement is not appropriate for some countries in Africa. The GCF is perceived as difficult to access for African states due to its geographical and cultural distance**. The English-only working language of the GCF is a serious and costly impediment confronting non-Anglophone African states (e.g., in the Sahel and the Maghreb). In fact, to date, six countries out of 54 are without any GCF FPs. In addition, 17 countries are without any single country GCF FPs.

Box 11-3. Thematic case study 3: Countries without a single country funded project

This case study explores GCF interventions in three African states where the Fund has not supported single country projects.[91] The key findings include:

- All countries selected as part of this case study have submitted an NDC as well as a series of other strategies and action plans to address climate change.
- Among the three countries, only Guinea has a national DAE. Tunisia has regional DAEs. Equatorial Guinea has no national or regional DAE.
- The lack of DAEs in the case study countries strongly diminishes country ownership and single country project submission.
- Multi-country projects that are being implemented by international entities do not entirely align with national priorities. In addition, national entities typically have a better understanding of specific opportunities and challenges in the country, tend to be more flexible, and have the ability to adapt faster. Other challenges for those countries include language barriers, heavy procedures, as well as a perceived lack of transparency and responsiveness.
- This case study also found that a lack of line of communication between GCF and the NDAs in some of the case study countries is a major problem. Some NDAs are not reachable by email or phone. There are no established relevant working contacts with some of the NDAs, either due to a high staff turnover within GCF when the contacts are lost, or internal changes within NDAs which are not known outside the authorities.
- The evaluation shows that capacities still need to be strengthened to enable countries to engage with the GCF and submit bankable single country projects. RPSP support is perceived as an effective way to increase capacity building and ownership. However, the support offered through the RPSP is insufficient and more readiness grants are needed to help countries comply with the GCF accreditation and project submission processes.
- It's frequently reported that the GCF lacks flexibility and does not take into account the cultural and economic contexts of countries, indicating that GCF processes are not adequately adapted to the diversity of African contextual realities. Also, heavy processes and modalities that generate long delays as well as a disconnection from the field result in the GCF being unable to adapt to countries' climate needs and priorities, and to respond to the urgency of climate action in a timely way.

[91] Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and Tunisia were selected for the case study countries to ensure diversity in country classification, level of income, level of GCF support received, and linguistic diversity. As such, this case study includes one low-income country, one lower-middle income country, and one upper-middle income country. It also includes a Spanish-speaking country, a French-speaking country, and an Arabic-speaking country. While considered for this case study, several countries were not responsive to the evaluation team's interview requests, and as a result were not included due to a lack of data.

Gender and social inclusion

372. **Across the portfolio, reporting on gender-related co-benefits is limited and largely confined to commentary on formative processes identified in gender action plans** such as assessments, tendering, recruitment, skills development, setting up service delivery mechanisms (e.g., micro-funds), and adjusting institutional policies and practices. Nevertheless, gender-related co-benefits reported at this stage are growing and diverse. They include employment opportunities, sector-specific capacity enhancements, equitable access to information and resources, emergent women-led services/businesses, benefits-sharing mechanisms and more.

373. **Across the African States portfolio, the consideration and active involvement of indigenous peoples is limited**. In particular, the stages of project development struggle to speak comprehensively to indigenous peoples policy objectives. With a few exceptions, the dominant refrain from African stakeholders is that there are no indigenous peoples affected by or involved in project activities, or that indigeneity is complex or ill-advised in an African context.

B. Recommendations

374. **Recommendation 1. Targeting and positioning of the GCF in Africa**

The GCF should consider focusing more on addressing adaptation needs in the African States through more accessible financial instruments for LDCs and FCV states.

1) **The GCF should consider shifting its African states portfolio towards a greater focus on adaptation. Such a shift should be based on specific country needs, comprehensive stakeholder mapping and engagement, and an intentional use of result areas for programming.** In doing so, GCF should remain responsive to the priorities of African states in all their diversity, particularly regionally and for vulnerable countries and FCV states, while paying attention to linguistic diversity. A shift towards more adaptation programming would respond to the call from the continent’s regional, national and civil society leaders for a portfolio that is more in line with African climate adaptation needs. The applicability of results areas for investment and the monitoring requirements of the Fund is very limited. The GCF has not yet found a way to consider the intentional use of results areas in programming overall, while remaining attentive to the potential overlap between adaptation and mitigation projects. Programming across results areas, particularly on adaptation, should be targeted to match and balance both continental priorities and the priority needs of specific countries, as per their strategic documents at national level, such as NDCs, NAPs and country programmes.
2) **Aside from non-grant instruments, the GCF should focus on a greater number of smaller and more accessible national level projects based on grants, particularly for LDCs and FCV states in Africa**. In doing so, the GCF should decrease the risk profiles of such states and increase the likelihood of co-financing and co-investing there.

375. **Recommendation 2. Institutional coherence and complementarity**

To streamline climate finance in Africa, the GCF should operationalize the framework of complementarity and coherence at country and project level, with the intention to reach across various types of stakeholders. Such an operationalization may benefit from RPSP and PPF support as well as project financing informed by shared learning and knowledge sharing processes.

1) **The GCF should engage with the GEF, AF and CIF to lead processes for** a **systematic and increased information exchange on project planning, development and implementation.** Stakeholders in such a process include climate funds, development

organizations, regional governance and development bodies, and implementing/executing entities.

2) **Based on the lessons from the GGW, the GCF should consider incentivizing programmatic approaches which allow for the consideration of complementarities among entities** that develop and implement projects for multiple climate institutions.

3) **The GCF should consider directing some RPSP resources towards NDAs/focal points to foster the capacity for complementarity, coherence and coordination** among the climate funds, their accredited and executing entities, and other partners at country level.

4) The Board should consider **an independent assessment on complementarity, coherence and coordination across the GCF ecosystem**.

376. **Recommendation 3. Country ownership and institutional capacity**

1) **The GCF should clarify and reinforce guidance on the selection of, and responsibilities allocated to the NDAs/focal points** of African states. In addition, the GCF should consider a **more tailored approach to RPSP support in Africa.** With it, the GCF should consider developing terms of reference and/or guidelines for NDAs that provide clear guidance to them on how to work with the GCF.

    a) **At the country level**, **the GCF's RPSP support should be coupled with heightened GCF guidance. The GCF should also incentivize and monitor RPSP for African LDCs, SIDS and FCV states.** Tailored guidance on the RPSP should aim at encouraging national multi-stakeholder convening, inclusive of state and non-state actors, for planning, networking, collaboration, project design, implementation, and sharing of investment results. Particular attention should be given to African LDC and FCV states, and to those countries without DAEs or inactive DAEs. In addition, the success of such support could be measured through a key performance indicator for the Secretariat which monitors RPSP finance flows to African LDCs, SIDS, FCV states, and to those African countries without DAEs.

    b) **The GCF should consider and remedy high transaction costs for participating in the RPSP through simplifying the processes used to access the RPSP,** and shortening their duration. Such measures should consider the simplification of RPSP templates, delegated authority in approval, and multi-lingual approaches to increase access for non-Anglophone states.

    c) In addition to this, **the GCF should test and consider support for particular entities to overcome financial barriers to applying for the RPSP.** Such support should, in particular, **benefit entities in African LDCs, SIDS, FCV states, and those countries without DAEs and also no single country FP**s.

2) **The GCF should clarify roles and expectations on local stakeholder engagement by NDA/focal points throughout the project cycle.** Stakeholder consultations mostly take place at the design stage but the involvement of local stakeholders or CSOs is often observed as decreasing during project implementation. Active local stakeholder engagement during the project implementation stages will enhance the sustainability of the project.

377. **Recommendation 4. Access and partnership**

The GCF should make special efforts to remove the barriers in African states – in particular for entities operating in LDCs, SIDS and FCV states – to accessing the GCF, by taking the following actions:

1) **The GCF should revisit accreditation requirements and processes for national DAEs in LDCs, SIDS and FCV states, with the goal of reducing the transaction costs** of becoming a partner to the GCF. Additional considerations could include the simplification of processes and extending the accreditation period significantly, with intermittent and lighter "accreditation reviews".
2) **The GCF should revise its policy on fees for AEs** operating in Africa, to account for the high operating costs of working in the continent, particularly in LDCs, SIDS and FCV contexts in Africa. The policy should also account for the additional responsibilities of the AEs, including project monitoring and reporting and institutional learning.
3) **GCF should encourage the pursuit of strategic accreditation among private sector actors in the African states, in particular for local financial intermediaries.** The Fund should identify engagement opportunities, together with country partners, for those entities likely to enable broader and integrated engagement and partnership with private sector actors. Partnering with, and supporting local financial intermediaries is key. For example, given their successes in attracting private sector adaptation finance, GCF-funded climate change adaptation projects in Tanzania, South Africa, Rwanda and Botswana should be considered for learning and replication.
4) In the African context, **the GCF should tailor their approach to private sector engagement towards MSME participation.** The Fund should reverse the trend of primarily engaging with large entities in the PSF entity portfolio. The participation of MSMEs and local actors in climate change mitigation and adaptation projects should be encouraged, given their pre-eminence on the continent.
5) **The GCF should provide CSOs with opportunities for capacity building and direct access. African civil society can support localized decision-making, particularly on climate change adaptation investments.** CSOs are a notably under-utilised resource for NDAs/focal points and the GCF. To ensure appropriately and consistently inclusive CSO participation in national programming, the GCF should provide CSOs with opportunities for capacity building and direct access through the RPSP.

378. **Recommendation 5. GCF's engagement with countries**

The GCF should consider steps to increase efficiency in its engagement with stakeholders of the GCF ecosystem, to enhance planning, implementation and access to the GCF, in particular in the African states.

1) **The GCF should increase its regional presence and engagement** in Africa, through existing institutional structures (e.g., regional dialogues, structured dialogues).
2) **The Board should review and change the organization's hitherto English-only policy** for project submissions and accreditation applications, as well as for supporting documents (e.g., policies) in order to remove a major obstacle to the development of country ownership and project portfolios in African non-Anglophone countries.
3) The GCF should increase the Secretariat's human, institutional, linguistic and financial capacity for absorbing the heightened workload that increased and diversified engagement in Africa will entail.

379. **Recommendation 6. Learning and vulnerable groups**

The GCF should consider a comprehensive and integrated learning and knowledge management approach in the African states. In particular, the GCF should strengthen its knowledge base on the integration of environmental and social co-benefits, gender transformation and indigenous considerations, evident across the African states portfolio. At the same time, it should become more intentional, consistent and proactive in applying its indigenous peoples policy in the African states. Such efforts could be complemented by the following actions:

1) As GCF advances gender transformation, **it should use tailored, African-led, independently verifiable assessments, to supplement the monitoring of data.** This should build a systematic and synthetic understanding of its gender impacts in the region. At the same time, these assessments should be used in developing more gender-transformative projects and monitoring and reporting practices.
2) **The GCF should revise its monitoring and reporting approaches and align them with the indigenous peoples policy.** Such revision should increase GCF knowledge of the implications and impacts of GCF projects on indigenous peoples in the African states. Here, the GCF should actively seek the advice of the IPAG regarding the apparent reticence by some African states to recognize indigeneity in the formulation of projects.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTIVE DATA

CHAPTER 4. COHERENCE IN CLIMATE FINANCE AND DELIVERY WITH OTHER MULTILATERAL ENTITIES

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GCF, GEF, AF AND CIF

Objectives and target groups

The main objective of the GCF is “to expand collective human action to respond to climate change. The Fund aims to mobilise funding at scale to invest in low emission and climate resilient development on our home planet” (United Nations Environment Programme, n.d.). The GCF is a financial instrument under the UNFCCC, reporting to its COP. The GI for the Fund provides specific guidance on objectives, results and performance indicators for the Fund (see Green Climate Fund, 2011; Green Climate Fund, 2013a). The GCF is “working with partners in the public and private sectors in efforts to mitigate the effects of the changing climate, and to help vulnerable people adapt to changes to the environment” (Green Climate Fund, n.d-f).

The GEF was the first global source of funds for climate adaptation. It continues to play a leading role in strengthening the resilience of developing countries as an operating entity of the financial mechanism to the UNFCCC. It channels support for climate adaptation mainly through both the LDCF and SCCF. Strategies include retrofitting buildings to make them more energy efficient; adopting renewable energy sources like solar, wind and small-scale hydro; helping cities develop more sustainable transport such as rapid transit, electric vehicles, and biofuels; and promoting more sustainable uses of land and forests.

The AF is also a financial instrument under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It has been established to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries party to the protocol, in an effort to increase resilience and reduce the adverse effects of climate change facing communities, countries and sectors.

The CIF offers large-scale, low-cost, long term financing, which lowers the risk and cost of climate financing in developing and middle income countries to empower transformations in clean technology, energy access, climate resilience, and sustainable forestry. Working in partnership with governments, the private sector, civil society, and local communities, through six major MDBs, CIF provides highly competitive financing that reduces risk for investors, lowering barriers to piloting new technologies, scaling up proven solutions, opening up sustainable markets, and mobilising private sector capital for climate action.

Substantive areas of work for the four climate funds

The GCF categorizes projects by results area, the GEF by focal area, the AF by sector, and the CIF by focus area (see Table A - 1). The overview shows that the four funds largely work in similar areas. Only the GEF does not share all its focal areas with the three others.

Table A - 1. Result areas, sectors and focal areas addressed by the GCF, GEF, AF and CIF

GCF RESULTS AREAS	GEF FOCAL AREAS	AF SECTORS	CIF FOCUS AREAS
• Livelihoods of people and communities • Health, food, and water security • Energy generation and access • Ecosystems and ecosystem services • Forests and land use • Buildings, cities, industries, and appliances • Transport	• Climate change • Biodiversity • Land degradation • Chemicals and waste • International waters	• Agriculture • Food security • Rural development • Water management • Coastal management • Transboundary water management • Disaster risk reduction/early warning systems	• Renewable energy • Landscape approaches • Agriculture and landscape management • Water resources management • Sustainable forest management • Energy efficiency • Urban development • Climate information systems and disaster risk management • Infrastructure • Transport

Source: Green Climate Fund (n.d-f); Climate Funds Update (n.d-a); Global Environment Facility (n.d-b); Climate Change Mitigation; Climate Investment Funds (n.d-a).

The GCF and AF focus their support on similar areas, including food systems (e.g., agriculture and food security), the water sector (e.g., water security and water management), as well as community level adaptation and livelihoods. The GCF has also provided considerable support on energy generation and access, particularly in terms of funding amounts. These are also the areas into which the majority (over 50 per cent) of CIF FPs fall. The GCF and CIF have both provided the least support to the area of transport.

A comparison with GEF interventions is somewhat hindered by the high level at which GEF focal areas classify interventions. Nevertheless, GEF support on climate change has been significant, with a particular focus on mitigation. Similarly, the GCF has provided most of its approved funding for mitigation projects, though there are slightly more projects (in number) addressing adaptation.

In terms of numbers of projects, a review of the GCF projects in Africa reveals a focus on three results areas, as of B.32:[92]

- Livelihoods of people and communities, with 53 projects (up to 56 projects as of B.34)
- Health, food and water security, with 40 projects; (up to 45 projects as of B.34)
- Energy generation and access, with 28 projects (up to 31 projects as of B.34)

As of B.32, the GCF had supported 56 projects (67 as of B.34) addressing adaptation in African states, as well as 42 projects (62 as of B.34) addressing mitigation; this includes 20 projects (44 as of B.34) that were cross-cutting. A review of grant amounts indicates that a significant amount of

[92] Note that the analysis below is based on GCF's portfolio as of B.32 rather than B.33 unless specified otherwise. Projects approved under B.33 were not included to ensure accurate comparability with the GEF and CIF portfolios.

GCF funding is allocated to energy generation and access, representing around the same amount as the following four results areas combined.[93]

The GEF has provided a great deal of support in the area of climate change in the past two decades. Globally, from 2000 to 2021, it has supported 419 projects addressing this focal area, followed by biodiversity with 253 projects and then land degradation with 191 projects. Similarly, a review of grant amounts shows significantly more support provided to the climate change focal area than to the others. GEF climate change projects have largely focused on mitigation, with over 1,000 such projects, for which GEF has provided over USD 4.2 billion in financing, while leveraging USD 38.3 billion in co-financing. This is significantly higher that the USD 2 billion provided and USD 13 billion mobilised for 440 adaptation projects across its portfolio (Global Environment Facility, n.d-a; Global Environment Facility, n.d-b).

The AF has focused on adaptation in agriculture, with nine projects addressing this sector, as well as food security, rural development and water management, all with seven projects focusing on these sectors. An assessment of grant amounts shows a strong focus on food security, with USD 61.8 million in grants approved, followed by agriculture and rural development with USD 58 million and USD 57.6 million, respectively (Adaptation Fund, n.d-b).

CIF has focused on renewable energy generation, with 39 projects addressing this area, representing over half of the projects for which a focus area was identified. This is followed by landscape approaches, and agriculture and landscape management with 11 and 10 projects respectively (Climate Investment Funds, n.d-b).

Geographic areas of work in Africa

As of B.32, Eastern Africa had received a high level of support from all four funds, counting the highest number of single country projects, when compared to other regions. The second region for all four funds in terms of approved funding was Western Africa.

The GCF provided relatively high levels of support to Northern Africa, which received relatively low support per country from the other funds. The GCF provided the smallest share of its support to countries in Central Africa, which also received the least support from the AF, while the GEF and the CIF (to a lesser extent) provided higher shares of their support to this region. Southern Africa's shares ranked higher than Central Africa, except for the GEF (see Figure A - 1).

[93] As of B.33, USD 1.6 billion in financing was provided towards energy generation and access, compared to USD 576.9 million to livelihoods of people and community, USD 475.9 million to health, food, and water security, USD 307.4 million to forest and land use, and USD 293.1 million to buildings, cities, industries and appliances.

Figure A - 1. Distribution of projects by fund across sub-regions[94]



Source: GCF Tableau server as of B.32; Adaptation Fund (n.d-c); Global Environment Facility (n.d-c); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (n.d.).

Projects for priority country categories: LDCs, SIDS and FCV States

The proportion of single country projects funded by each fund supporting LDCs and SIDS is similar (see Figure A - 2 below). However, notable differences are evident in terms of the share of projects delivered in FCV states, ranging from over half of CIF projects, to less than a quarter for the AF. The CIF have provided no support to SIDS but considerable support to FCV states. SIDS received very small shares of single country projects from all funds (keeping in mind that multi-country projects are not included in the classification and discussion).

Figure A - 2. Distribution of single country projects by country classification



Source: GCF Tableau server as of B.32; Adaptation Fund (n.d-b); Global Environment Facility (n.d-c); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (n.d.).

[94] The analysis only includes single-country support provided.

Concepts, instruments and methods used

The GCF encourages and supports the development of country programmes. These are not binding and have been prepared only by a minority of countries. The GCF has also funded numerous NAPs. Funding is provided on a project basis in alignment with such strategic documents, including NDCs. The GEF works with country funding quotas under the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, by focal areas, with additional non-set-aside funds and opportunities to participate in impact programmes. The CIF defines national investment programmes, which include a list of concrete projects and funding sources. The AF responds to individual project submissions. All funds get their basic orientation from the NDCs, which were recently updated by most countries. Funds also refer the NAPs when developing projects.

The GCF initially offered grants primarily but is increasingly diversifying the financial instruments used to include loans, equity, and guarantees often used in blended finance schemes, particularly in cooperation with international and national private sector partners. This relates mostly to mitigation projects, but recently also on adaptation (e.g., with the private equity firm PCA as IAE).

The GEF has diversified its instruments over time, by including non-grant instruments (loans, equity, guarantees) on very concessional terms, mostly for mitigation. The AF provides grants of modest volumes, up to USD 10 million for adaptation, with a maximum of USD 20 million per country and an additional USD 5 million per country under the EDA window. CIF funding consists mostly of concessional loans of substantial volumes for middle income countries, but also includes a few projects in African LDCs.

The most extensive scrutiny of project proposals is reportedly exercised by the GCF, while the CIF relies on MDBs to use their standard methods for project appraisal. The GEF and AF fall between the two in terms of review details requested, with the GEF assisting the AF for the technical review of all project applications.

Resources available

Of the four funds examined in this study, the GCF has committed the highest value of resources for the purposes of addressing the challenges of climate change. Since starting operations in 2014, the GCF has committed USD 11.4 billion (averaging USD 1.27 billion/year), pledged and provided by the industrial country members. These figures and those below relate to the funds available to all developing countries and not only to Africa (Green Climate Fund, n.d-a).

In contrast, the cumulative pledges by donor countries for GEF-7 amounted to USD 4.1 billion. The share of GEF-7 with a focus on climate change activities is approximately USD 800 million for four years (Climate Funds Update, n.d-b) For GEF-8, a total of USD 5.33 billion was pledged by the donor community, with USD 852 million earmarked for the climate change focal area. This amounts to USD 213 million per year, slightly above the volumes for the previous four-year period (Global Environment Facility, 2022).

Since 2010, the AF has committed USD 923.5 million or about USD 77 million per year to projects and programmes. The AF is financed largely by government and private donors, as well as from a 2 per cent share of proceeds of Certified Emission Reductions issued under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (Adaptation Fund, n.d-a).

Since its creation in 2008, the CIF has received more than USD 10 billion from several donor countries. Over the lifetime of the CIF, this corresponds to about USD 700 million per year (Climate Investment Funds, n.d-a).

Since 2015, each country in Africa has had at least one project from the GEF, AF and/or CIF. From 2015–2022, a total of USD 6.86 billion in project funding was approved for the African states by the four climate funds (i.e., the GCF, GEF, CIF and AF). The largest contributor among the climate funds was the GCF, with USD 3.9 billion (58 per cent of approved funding),[95] followed by the GEF with USD 1.76 billion (26 per cent of approved funding), the CIF with USD 927.3 million (14 per cent of approved funding) and the AF with USD 190.6 million (3 per cent of approved funding). However, such approved funding must be taken with a grain of salt, given the particularly low disbursement rate of the GCF to African single country projects (21 per cent).[96]

Chapter 5. Country ownership of projects and programmes in African States

The 2018 RPSP evaluation developed a framework of country ownership that was anchored in an interpretation of the various decisions and the guidelines of the GCF (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2018a). It included the following:

- The NDA/focal point is established and functional.
- A non-objection procedure has been established and is operational including the issuance of an NOL.
- Stakeholder consultations are organized by the NDA/focal point.
- A country programme has been developed, includes a pipeline of concrete projects, and is agreed upon with the major stakeholders.
- One (or more) DAE(s) has/have been accredited.
- One (or more) DAE(s) has/have submitted FPs and/or seen it/them approved.
- Progress has been made on NAP planning and completion.

The framework used in the African states evaluation built upon this but made important changes as well, keeping in mind the balance between objective metrics and national contexts, priorities and differences.

Subjective indicators have been removed, as they were difficult to assess, while newer ones reflecting now-available data have been included. Dropped indicators include consultations among government departments and with external stakeholders, and the details of how NOLs are prepared and provided. The other criteria indicators have been largely retained, if slightly modified (e.g., focusing only on the existence and not comprehensiveness of country programmes and NAPs).

Other criteria were added, such as the country providing co-financing, the number of DAEs nominated in addition to those already accredited, the existence of an NDC and an updated NDC, the existence and use of RPSP and PPF support, and the existence of national and multi-country projects implemented by IAEs and/or DAEs.

Overall, this revised framework speaks less to the matter of country ownership overall and more to country ownership in engaging with the GCF to address climate change and action priorities, pointing to progress made by a country in developing climate change related strategies, plans and projects, and ultimately the extent to which country ownership has been pursued and developed, with the contribution of GCF support.

[95] As of B.34.
[96] Excluding multi-regional funded projects.

The updated framework and indicator-based analysis allowed for the creation of a compositive score of country ownership, which provided a whole range of insights. Subject to individual country scores, country ownership was categorized into scores representing country ownership that is low (10 or below), moderate (11 to 22), and high (greater than 22).

CHAPTER 6. EFFECTIVENESS OF INVESTMENTS

MEETING OBJECTIVES AND INTENDED RESULTS

Impact potential

Table A - 2 below provides an overview of projects and GCF financing approved for these projects by impact areas. Note that a project may address more than one impact area. The total GCF financing is estimated on a project basis. Therefore, in case of multi-regional projects, these include funds approved for other regions, and not all approved amounts reflected will be directed towards the impact area in question.

Table A - 2. Number of projects and GCF approved financing by impact indicators

IMPACT INDICATOR	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS	VALUE OF TOTAL GCF FINANCING (USD)	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GCF FINANCING (USD)
Renewable energy	30	35%	2,662,853,001	52%
Climate information technology and early warning systems	36	42%	1,651,367,562	32%
Energy efficiency	15	18%	1,570,846,639	31%
Infrastructure (includes all infrastructure outside of water access and management)	22	26%	1,556,276,167	30%
Water management and sanitation (treatment, quality, etc.)	26	31%	1,422,962,918	28%
Awareness raising, knowledge sharing	30	35%	1,316,104,451	26%
Food security, improving nutrition	28	33%	1,257,232,928	24%
Water access and availability (security, infrastructure…)	29	34%	1,137,652,984	22%
Improved carbon sequestration	24	28%	1,048,517,344	20%
Improved crops (improved varieties, diversifications, etc.)	20	24%	896,323,671	17%
Improving biodiversity ecosystem and ecosystem services	26	31%	880,597,095	17%
Improved soil quality, reduced soil degradation and land rehabilitation	18	21%	785,518,578	15%
Income diversification	16	19%	633,489,744	12%
Integrating climate change into local, national and regional planning	18	21%	512,700,213	10%

IMPACT INDICATOR	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS	VALUE OF TOTAL GCF FINANCING (USD)	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GCF FINANCING (USD)
Livestock	15	18%	483,838,542	9%
Market building and expansion	13	15%	451,277,160	9%
Fisheries	8	9%	334,043,508	6%

Source: GCF FPs the impact potential investment criteria as of 31 October 2022, extracted by IEU DataLab.

Countries with active DAEs

Countries with strong DAE presence, as per the size of the portfolio of DAEs in the country, have significantly larger portfolios (Figure A - 3).[97] These countries notably include South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, the Niger, Namibia, Mali, Ethiopia, and Morocco. A few outliers in other countries are noted including in Kenya, with a total portfolio value of USD 924.2 million (country with active DAEs) as well as Egypt, with USD 1,474 million (where no DAEs are active).

Figure A - 3. Distribution of country's portfolio by strength and presence of DAEs



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

[97] The strength of DAE presence was determined based on the size of their portfolio, with DAE presence considered as strong when the DAE portfolio in-country was above median value of country DAE portfolios.

ENABLING THE MOBILISATION OF COMPLEMENTARY AND CATALYTIC FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Mitigation and adaptation

A review of co-financing ratios by thematic focus provides additional evidence regarding gaps in co-financing for adaptation activities. Adaptation financing can be seen to have a co-financing ratio of 1:1.4 compared to 1:3.3 for mitigation financing (Figure A - 4).

Figure A - 4. Co-financing ratio in African States by thematic focus



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

Important differences are also noted in terms of the financing tools used in each thematic focus. A greater diversity in the instruments used by GCF for mitigation financing can be seen, while adaptation financing is largely provided through grants (approximately 70 per cent) and senior loans (approximately 22 per cent) (Figure A - 5).

Figure A - 5. Use of financial instruments in African States by thematic focus



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

Co-financing ratios

The co-financing ratio in Africa as of B.34 stood at 1:2.5, a figure that is slightly lower compared to the GCF portfolio average and other regions, with the exception of the LAC (Figure A - 6). This is largely driven by LDCs, with a co-financing ratio of 1:2.0 compared to 1:3.2 for non-LDCs. Notable differences are also seen in the co-financing ratio in countries experiencing high institutional and social fragility (1:0.6) compared to countries experiencing medium-intensity conflict (1:2.6) and non-FCV African states (1:2.7). While some differences are noted between SIDS and non-SIDS, these differences are much less pronounced. A comparison of co-financing by country income level also shows an upward trend as the income level increases, followed by a significant decrease in HICs, which see much lower levels of co-financing compared to even LICs.

Figure A - 6. Co-financing ratio by region



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT AND MOBILISATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTS

Private sector financing has largely been leveraged on projects where GCF has provided non-debt financing, with the exception of FP099, FP178 and FP190 where GCF provided a reimbursable grant (Table A - 3). Projects for which GCF has approved financing through non-debt instruments also largely receive private sector co-financing (Figure A - 7).

Table A - 3. Private sector and GCF financing in African States by instrument

FP REF.	PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING (MILLION)	GCF FINANCING (MILLION)					
		Equity	Grants	Senior loans	Subordinated loans	Reimbursable grants	Guarantees
FP005	85	20	5				
FP025	564		19	193			
FP026	1		18				
FP027	222	78	2				
FP039	852		5	150			
FP078	30	23	3				
FP080	102		2	50			
FP095	346		26	175			
FP096	68		1	20			
FP098	115		1		55		
FP099	561					78	
FP105	59		4	55			
FP106	437				100		

FP REF.	PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING (MILLION)	GCF FINANCING (MILLION)					
		Equity	Grants	Senior loans	Subordinated loans	Reimbursable grants	Guarantees
FP114	6		7	13			
FP128	78	11					
FP140	190		1	44	19		
FP148	30	30					
FP151	4		8				
FP152	257	64					
FP168	789		11		80		80
FP178	817		8	82		40	20
FP179	100		20	70			10
FP180	36	12					
FP181	100	33					
FP190	368					73	
FP197	81	10					
FP198	6		16				

Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

Figure A - 7. Private sector co-financing by GCF financing instruments



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

The private sector has provided the majority of its co-financing to mitigation results areas, with nearly three quarters delivered to energy generation and access (Figure A - 8).

Figure A - 8. Private sector co-financing by results area



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY IN AFRICAN STATES

Overview of RPSP support

Africa sees the second largest share of approved readiness funding (30 per cent), with a portfolio largely dominated by single country readiness (Table A - 4). International delivery partners and AEs manage the larger proportion of readiness grants in Africa, while local, national and regional delivery partners, AEs and NDAs see a smaller share (Figure A - 9).

Table A - 4. Percentage of readiness funding by region

SCOPE	AFRICA	ASIA PACIFIC	EASTERN EUROPE	LAC
Regional	2.0%	2.0%		5.6%
Single country	28.2%	31.6%	6.1%	24.4%
Regional total	30.2%	33.7%	6.1%	30.0%

Source: GCF iPMS, Fluxx and RPSP database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

Figure A - 9. Approved readiness funding to African States according to delivery partner and entity type



Source: GCF iPMS, Fluxx and RPSP database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

African countries have received 61.00 per cent of all readiness disbursements while Asia Pacific, LAC and Eastern Europe received 52.05 per cent, 69.20 per cent and 80.06 per cent, respectively (Figure A - 10). Africa is comparatively at the faster end of timings for receipt of first disbursements after project approval, at 27 to 664 days, compared to 30 to 610 days for Eastern Europe, 17 to 722 days in Asia Pacific, and 3 to 887 days in LAC. However, it took longer to fully disburse funds for projects in Africa, with 42 to 2,072 days from approval to final disbursement compared to 32 to 1,552 days in Asia Pacific, 398 to 1,306 days in Eastern Europe, and 71 to 1,932 days in LAC. This is despite average project durations not varying much between regions.[98]

[98] Average approved project durations for fully disbursed projects were 18 months for Africa and LAC, 16 months for Asia-Pacific, and 26 months for Eastern Europe.

Figure A - 10.Disbursed and undisbursed readiness funding



Source: GCF iPMS, Fluxx and RPSP database as of 31 October 2022, analysed by IEU DataLab

CHAPTER 8. GENDER EQUITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION

Table A - 5 provides examples of gender action plan activities extracted from the Africa portfolio.[99]

Table A - 5. Examples of gender action plan activities from the Africa portfolio

NAME	TYPE/STATUS	AE TYPE	THEME	RESULTS AREA	GENDER-FOCUSED RESULTS	SAMPLE ACTIONS
FP086 "Green cities facility"	Public sector, multiple countries (9, including Tunisia) Approved, 20 October 2018	IAE	Cross-cutting	Buildings, cities, industries and appliances Infrastructure and built environment Livelihoods of people and communities Transport	Gender advisory services Policy dialogue on enabling women's economic opportunities	Design/implement programmes to support municipal service providers in promoting equal access to women and men in their workforce Support sub-project clients to conduct legal, regulatory and policy reviews; develop a response plan; and increase employment and enterprise opportunities for women and men
FP159 "PREFOREST CONGO – Project to reduce GHG emissions from forests in five departments in the Republic of Congo"	Public sector, one country (Republic of the Congo) Approved, 19 March 2021	IAE	Mitigation	Forest and land use	Agroforestry and agroforestry systems National agricultural financing structures, business capacities and value chains	Raise awareness and train women, youth and the elderly on techniques to mitigate climate change Train women's and mixed groups in accounting management for farming
FP178 "Desert to power G5 Sahel facility"	Private sector, multi-country (Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, Chad, Mauritania) Approved, 7 October 2021	IAE	Mitigation	Energy generation and access	Institutional capacity re: operation of integrated energy systems Incentivize private sector investment	Raise awareness of gender-responsive energy policy amongst solar energy companies Establish and use gender-responsive tenders and procurement processes

[99] The following projects were identified in the case study on countries without a single-country funded project (Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Tunisia), for their intent to provide country-specific gender action plans and data at the point of launching their sub-projects: FP168, FP140, FP151, FP152, FP025, and FP086.

NAME	TYPE/STATUS	AE TYPE	THEME	RESULTS AREA	GENDER-FOCUSED RESULTS	SAMPLE ACTIONS
FP179 "Tanzania agriculture climate adaptation technology deployment programme" TACATDP	Private sector, one country (Tanzania) Approved, 7 October 2021	DAE	Adaptation	Health, food and water security Livelihoods of people and communities	Financing solutions Sensitization re: women's participation in agriculture value chains	Dedicated credit line and insurance schemes Support implementation of Tanzania's National Strategy on Gender and Climate Change Implementation
FP180 "Global fund for coral reefs investment window"	Private sector, multi-country (17, including the Comoros, Mozambique) Approved, 7 October 2021	IAE	Adaptation	Ecosystems and ecosystem services Health, food and water security Livelihoods of people and communities Infrastructure and built environment	Entrepreneurship in coral reef communities	Support women-led tourism businesses Investment in infrastructure that supports women in business
SAP006 "Building Resilience of communities living in landscapes threatened under climate change through an ecosystems-based adaptation approach"	Public sector, one country (Namibia) Approved, 28 February 2019	DAE	Adaptation	Ecosystems and ecosystem services Health, food and water security Livelihoods of people and communities	Land restoration for multi-use energy and livelihood benefits	Integrate gender components in revision of forest management plans Sensitize community stakeholders on the differences between nominal and empowering participation

CHAPTER 9. EFFICIENCY

Figure A - 11.Length of approval process and first disbursement by approval year



Source: GCF Tableau server as of 31 October 2023, analysed by IEU DataLab

Appendix 2. CONSULTED STAKEHOLDERS

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	POSITION	AFFILIATION
Ababio	Kwame	Head of Environment and Climate Change	African Union Development Agency
Abakar	Zougoulou	Scientific and Technical Director	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Abebe	Selam	Legal Advisor	African Group of Negotiators
Achoki	Marlene	Global Policy Co-Lead, Climate Change and Resilience	Care International
Adhiambo	Roniance	Chyulu Landscape Coordinator	Justdiggit
Afful-Koomson	Timothy	GCF Focal Point and Coordinator, Climate and Green Growth Division	AfDB
Ahamat	Haggar	Director General Great Green Wall Chad	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Aini	Rafik	Senior Expert in Natural Resources Management and Climate Change	Ministry of Agriculture, Hydraulic Resources and Fisheries (Tunisia)
Akosa	Titilope	Executive Director	Centre for 21st Century Issues
Albertani	David	Chief Executive Officer	R20 Regions of Climate Change
Alfa Nafo	Hussein (Seyni)	Coordinator, Africa Adaptation Initiative	Republic of Mali
Alloway	Mark	Senior International Expert to serve in the Accreditation Panel	Green Climate Fund
Aloni	Handa	*Responsable du Suivi de la Planification de l'Adaptation au Sein de l'Unité de Gestion par Objectif*	Ministry of Environment (Tunisia)
Amakobe	Wycliffe	Climate Change and Energy Specialist	Kenya Climate Change Working Group
Aman	Malik	Program Manager, Climate Finance and Green Economy Unit	National Treasury (Kenya)
Amany	Damit Serge Didier	*Directeur de l'Évaluation des Résultats de Développement des Projets*	*Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement*
Amatucci	Ludovica	Programme Analyst	United Nations Capital Development Fund
Aoki	Chizuru	GEF Lead Environmental Specialist, Programming Unit	Global Environment Facility
Ardinor	Branson	Climate Advocacy Lawyer	Center for Environmental Rights

Last name	First name	Position	Affiliation
Arnaoudov	Vladislav	Senior Quality Assurance and M&E Specialist, DPM	Green Climate Fund
Assima	Rahamatou	*Chargé d'évaluation*	*Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement*
Ayonrinde	Folasade	Senior Portfolio Manager a.i. (Readiness) - DPM	Green Climate Fund
Bachmann	Matthias	Director in Audit	KPMG Switzerland
Bako	Amadou Mamane	Administrative and Financial Director	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Balo Akakpo	Olade	Regional Officer, Africa Regional Desk (francophone), DCP	Green Climate Fund
Banga	Josué	Operational Assistant Consultant, Africa Regional Desk (francophone), DCP	Green Climate Fund
Bare	Sidi	Great Green Wall Agency Cameroon, *Secretaire Executif*	*Comité Interrégional de Lutte contre la Sècheresse dans le Nord*
Barnett	Mandy	Chief Director, Adaptation Policy and Resourcing	SANBI
Baroudy	Ellysar	Lead Carbon Finance Specialist	World Bank
Ben Abda	Afef	*Spécialiste Finance Climat au Bureau sous Régional Afrique du Nord*	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Ben Khatra	Nabil	*Secrétaire exécutif*	Sahara and Sahel Observatory
Bett	Robert	Senior Project Officer	IUCN
Bikzad	Abdullah	iTAP	Green Climate Fund
Bnouni	Sabria	*Directrice de la Coopération Internationale*	*Ministère des Affaires Locales et de l'Environnement* (Tunisia)
Boasiako Amoah	Antwi	Deputy Director, Climate Change Adaptation and Vulnerability	Environmental Protection Agency (Republic of Ghana)
Bouhari	Adamou	Technical Advisor for Capacity Building at Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall	UNEP
Boumaiz	Youssef	Project Relationship Manager	Attijariwafa Bank
Bours	Dennis	Evaluation Officer	AF
Bouzghaya	Fethi	*Sous-Directeur/Point Focal National pour le* Climate Technology Centre and Network	Ministry of Environment (Tunisia)

Last name	First name	Position	Affiliation
Boxer	Benjamin	Senior International Expert to serve in the Accreditation Panel	Green Climate Fund
Bui	Tom	Director	Global Affairs Canada
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