INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND'S INVESTMENTS IN THE AFRICAN STATES

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Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African states

CASE STUDY REPORTS

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Contents

ABBREVIATIONS

Donor coordination for the Great Green Wall Initiative

ACW	Africa Climate Week
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AE	Accredited entity
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement*
AfDB	African Development Bank
ARC	African Risk Capital
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
Bln	Billion
BOAD	*Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement*
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CO2	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSE	*Centre de Suivi Ecologique*
DPIP	Decennial Priority Investment Plan
EE	Executing entity
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
FAA	Funded activity agreement
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCFA	*Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine*
FCV	Fragility, conflict, and violence-affected
FGD	Focus group discussion
FMO	*Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden*
FP	Funded project
GAMS	Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGW	Great Green Wall
GGWI	Great Green Wall Initiative
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GI	Governing Instrument
GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
Ha	Hectares
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development

IGREENFIN	Inclusive Green Financing Initiative
IKI	German International Climate Initiative
INTPA	International Partnerships (EU, former DEVCO)
IP	Indigenous peoples
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LDC	Least developed country
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
LMIC	Lower middle-income country
LTV	Long-term Vision on Complementarity, Coherence and Collaboration
MDB	Multilateral development bank
Mln	Million
MoFEC	Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
MSME	Micro-, small and medium-sized enterprise
NDA	National designated authority
NFP	National focal point
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSS	*Observatoire du Sahara et du Sahel*
PA-GGW	Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall
PCA	Pegasus Capital Advisors, L.P.
SADC	South African Development Community
SAP	Simplified approval process of the GCF
SAWAP	Sahel and West Africa Program
SBSTTA	Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS	Small island developing State
SURAGGWA	Scaling-Up Resilience in Africa's Great Green Wall
TA	Technical assistance
TOR	Terms of reference
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	United States dollar
WFP	World Food Programme

Fragile, conflict- and violence-affected societies

ATPA	*Agenda Transformación Productiva Amazónica*
CAF	*Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina*

ACW	Africa Climate Week
AE	Accredited entity
AFC	Africa Finance Corporation
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement*
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMA	Accreditation master agreement
AMDA	Africa Minigrid Developer Association
APR	Annual performance report
ARAF	Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund
ASNaCC	*Appui à la mise en oeuvre de la Stratégie Nationale Changement Climatique du Mali*
Bln	Billion
BOAD	*Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement*
CAMCO	Camco Management Limited
CAR	Central African Republic
CCA	Clean Cooking Alliance
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CO2	Carbon dioxide
COMIFAC	Central African Forest Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSE	*Centre de Suivi Ecologique*
CSO	Civil society organization
DAE	Direct access entity
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EARF	Energy Access Relief Facility
ECCP	Efficient, Clean Cooling Program
ESMAP	Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS	Fragile and conflict-affected situations
FCV	Fragility, conflict and violence
FMO	*Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden*
FP	Funded project
FY	Fiscal year
GCA	Global Center on Adaptation
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGW	Great Green Wall
GHG	Greenhouse gas

GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
GOGLA	Global Association for the Off-grid Solar Energy Industry
GWPO	Global Water Partnership Organization
Ha	Hectares
IAAT	Intensification of agriculture and agroforestry techniques
IAE	International accredited entity
ICRF	Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund
IDBZ	Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International financial institution
IGREENFIN I	Inclusive Green Financing Initiative
ILO	International Labour Organization
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LDC	Least developed country
MDB	Multilateral development bank
MFC	*Mali-Folkecenter Nyetaa*
Mln	Million
MoFEC	Ministry of Finance and Development of the Federal Cooperation Republic of Ethiopia
MtCo2eq	Metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent
NAP	National adaptation plan
NDA	National designated authority
NDC	Nationally determined contribution
ND-Gain	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NOL	No-objection letter
PCA	Pegasus Capital Advisors, L.P.
PIDACC/NB	Programme for integrated development and adaptation to climate change in the Niger Basin
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PSO	Private sector organization
PV	Photovoltaic
RPSP	Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme
SAP	Simplified Approval Process
SCA	Save the Children Australia
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SnCF Global	Global Subnational Climate Fund
SRMI	Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative
SURAGGWA	Scaling-Up Resilience in Africa's Great Green Wall
TA	Technical assistance
UN	United Nations

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO-CTCN	United National Industrial Development Organization – Climate Technology Centre and Network
USD	United States dollar
VRE	Variable renewable energy
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

Countries without a single-country funded project

AE	Accredited entity
AF	Adaptation Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANME	National Agency for Energy Management
AWB	Attijariwafa Bank
BAU	Business-as-usual
BCAS	Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
BCCRF	Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
Bln	Billion
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CNI	*Communication Nationale Initiale*
CNRD	Committee for Reconciliation and Development
CNT	National Transition Council
CTCN	*Centre International des Technologies Environnementales de Tunis*
DAE	Direct access entity
DNPNCC	*Direction Nationale Pollutions, Nuisances et Changements Climatiques*
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FP	Funded project
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
KtCo2eq	Kilotons of CO_2 equivalent
IAE	International accredited entity
ICZ	Intertropical Convergence Zone
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Km	Kilometres
LIC	Low-income country
LMIC	Lower-middle income country

MDB	Multilateral development bank
Mln	Million
Mm	Millimetre
Mm3	Million cubic metres
Mt	Metric ton
MW	Megawatt
NAMA	Nationally appropriate mitigation actions
NC3	Third National Communication
NDA	National designated authority
NDC	Nationally determined contribution
NOP	No-objection procedure
OSS	Sahara and Sahel Observatory
PANA	*Plan d'Action National pour l'Adaptation*
PNDES	*Plan National de Développement Economique et Social*
PNI-REDD+	National Investment Plan REDD+
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PWC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
RCD	Constitutional Democratic Rally
RPSP	Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme
SCP-NAP	Sustainable consumption and production national action plan
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SNCC	*Stratégie Nationale sur le Changement Climatique*
SNDD	*Stratégie Nationale de Développement Durable*
TWh	Terawatt hours
UMIC	Upper-middle income country
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States dollar
VNR	Voluntary national review

Kenya

AE	Accredited entity
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement*
AfDB	African Development Bank
APR	Annual performance report
ARAF	Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid land
AYICC	African Youth Initiative Challenge
BAU	Business-as-usual
Bln	Billion

CCD	Climate Change Directorate
CCUs	Climate change units
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CI	Conservation International
CIDPs	County Integrated Development Plans
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CSO	Civil society organization
DAE	Direct access entity
EARF	Energy Access Relief Facility
ESS	Environmental and social safeguards
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FMO	*Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden*
FLLoCA	Financing Locally-Led Climate Action Program
FP	Funded project
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
IAE	International accredited entity
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMTC	Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Finance
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
KCB	KCB Bank Kenya Limited
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
LDC	Least developed country
LEAF	Leveraging Energy Access Finance
MDB	Multilateral development bank
Mln	Million
MoAI	Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
MTP	Medium Term Plan
MtCO2eq	Metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
MWCT	Maasai Wilderness Conservation Trust
NAP	National adaptation plan
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NDA	National designated authority
NDC	Nationally determined contribution
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority

NGO	Non-governmental organization
NOL	No-objection letter
PACJA	Pan African Climate Justice Alliance
PCA	Pegasus Capital Advisors
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PWC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
RPSP	Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS	Small island developing State
SnCF Global	Global Subnational Climate Fund
SPR	Second Performance Review
SRMI	Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative
TWENDE	Towards Ending Drought Emergencies
UGEAP	Universal Green Energy Access Programme
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States dollar
WRI	World Resources Institute

South Africa

ACW	Africa Climate Week
AE	Accredited entity
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement*
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMA	Accreditation master agreement
ANC	African National Congress
BAF	Blue Action Fund
Bln	Billion
BMZ	*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* – Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAEP	Climate Action Enhancement Package
CFF	Climate Finance Facility
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CO2	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRAFT	Catalytic Capital for First Private Investment Fund for Adaptation Technologies in Developing Countries
CRDB	CRDB Bank Tanzania
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CSO	Civil society organization
DAE	Direct access entity

DBN	Development Bank of Namibia
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFFE	Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment
DMRE	Department of Mineral Resources and Energy
EDA	Enhanced direct access
EGIP	Embedded Generation Investment Programme
EIF	Environmental Investment Fund
ESS	Environmental and social safeguards
EU	European Union
FAA	Funded activity agreement
FBC	FBC Bank Zimbabwe
FP	Funded project
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGW	Great Green Wall
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GI	Governing Instrument
GIZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
GW	Gigawatt
IAE	International accredited entity
IDBZ	Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
IPPs	Independent power producers
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JETP	Just Energy Transition Partnership
KfW	*Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau*
LDC	Least developed countries
LNG	Liquified natural gas
Mln	Million
MtC	Metric tons of carbon
MW	Megawatt
NAP	National adaptation plan
NCCAS	National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy
NDA	National designated authority
NDB	National Development Bank of Botswana
NDC	Nationally determined contributions
ND-Gain	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NDP	National development plan

NGO	Non-governmental organization
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOL	No-objection letter
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA	Pegasus Capital Advisors
PCC	Presidential Climate Commission
PCFTT	Presidential Climate Finance Task Team
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PSAA	Project-Specific Assessment Approach
RPSP	Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme
SAGEN-CET	South African-German Energy Programme – Capacities for the Energy Transition
SANBI	South African National Biodiversity Institute
SAP	Simplified approval process
SIDS	Small island developing State
SnCF Global	Global Subnational Climate Fund
SOW	Statement of work
SSN	SouthSouthNorth
TA	Technical assistance
UMIC	Upper middle-income country
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USD	United States dollar

CASE STUDY REPORTS

Chapter 1. DONOR COORDINATION FOR THE GREAT GREEN WALL INITIATIVE

CONTENTS

TABLES

FIGURES

A. Background and context

1. Overview of the Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established by 194 governments in 2010 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to contribute to the global response to climate change. The GCF's mandate is to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries, and to help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Today, the GCF is considered a key institution in the global architecture for responding to the challenges of climate change.

The GCF aims to provide equal funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation. Its support is delivered across the following four adaptation result areas, namely: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; and (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. It is also delivered across the following four mitigation result areas: (v) energy generation and access; (vi) transport; (vii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (viii) forests and land use.

The GCF's Governing Instrument (GI) identifies least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing States (SIDS) and African States as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, the GCF has provided special considerations for these countries, as reflected in its approach generally, and in the prioritization of programme and project delivery more specifically. Key among these is its allocation of resources for adaptation, which ensures a minimum floor of 50 per cent for LDCs, SIDS and the African States (decision B.06/06).

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

This present "Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States"[1] is part of a broader effort by the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of interventions in vulnerable states, including in Africa, LDCs and SIDS.

This evaluation assesses whether and the extent to which GCF approaches and investments are effective in contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC, and promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. The evaluation considers effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and whether positive impacts are likely to be sustained. Moreover, the evaluation was undertaken with consideration of a diverse set of stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. It also considers matters of innovation, replicability and scalability. Finally, the evaluation recognizes the heterogenous situation of African countries and explores how these differences have informed, enabled or constrained their engagement with the GCF.

Five case studies were prepared as part of this evaluation, with data updated to the thirty-third meeting of the Board (B.33). Three thematic case studies were undertaken to explore particular areas of interest, including: the current case study 1 on the Great Green Wall (GGW), with a field mission in the Côte d'Ivoire; case study 2 on fragile, conflict, and violence-affected (FCV) states, with a field mission to Africa Climate Week (ACW) 2022 in Gabon; and, case study 3 on countries without a single-country funded project (FP), with a field mission in Tunisia. Two country-specific case

[1] The "Evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States" was undertaken with the support of a team of consultants provided by Universalia.

studies with related field missions to those countries were undertaken to better explore the GCF's work and impact on the ground, including: case study 4 on Kenya, and case study 5 on South Africa.

A total of 42 stakeholders were consulted in preparing this case study (see Appendix 2). Individual interviews were conducted with 34 people, while 8 individuals were consulted through focus group discussions (FGD).

3. About the Great Green Wall Initiative and the GGW Accelerator

The Great Green Wall Initiative (GGWI) was established in 2007 as a flagship land restoration initiative that brings together African countries and international partners, under the leadership of the African Union (AU), which also created the Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (PA-GGW). It was initially conceived to combat desertification in the Sahel region by planting millions of trees in 11 Sahel countries, creating a Great Green Wall. Frequently called an 8,000 km-long natural wonder of the world or the largest living structure on the planet, the GGW has evolved into an integrated development approach (i.e. the GGWI). Although it has received high-level political attention, it is however not listed as one of the 14 AU flagship projects for Agenda 2063.[2]

Since its creation, the GGWI has received extensive and diverse support, with involvement from the African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank, European Investment Bank (EIB), European Commission of the European Union (EU), Global Environment Facility (GEF), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and bilateral agencies such as *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD) and the German International Climate Initiative (IKI).

A report on the GGWI's implementation and perspective up to 2030, prepared by the consultant company Climatekos in 2019/2020 on behalf of the UNCCD, found that the GGWI has yet to reach its full potential for many reasons. These include governance, funding, and technical challenges manifesting as a lack of high-level political support, weak organizational structures, and a lack of coordination and practice mainstreaming. As a result and following discussions at the 2021 One Planet Summit in Paris, the GGW Accelerator was launched with EUR 3 million (mln; approximately United States dollars (USD) 3 mln) provided by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) to UNCCD. During the summit, funding pledges for the GGW Accelerator reached USD 14 billion (bln), which were later increased to USD 19 bln, with the AfDB, World Bank, European Commission, and EIB pledging the largest amounts.

The terms of reference (TOR) for the GGW Accelerator outline the following:

- 2021: Design a GGW online platform for monitoring, tracking, and connecting financing flows with project needs
- 2021–2022: Support GGW countries in establishing enhanced monitoring and reporting systems
- 2021–2023: Track implementation progress in beneficiary countries against the GGW results targets
- 2023–2024: Transfer of GGW Accelerator Unit to the PA-GGW
- 2025: Review and evaluate the impact of GGW Accelerator investments and progress made towards the 2030 GGW ambition[3]

The GGW Accelerator programme notably seeks to better support the GGWI and organize the community of donors around five pillars of investments, namely:

[2] African Union (n.d.).

[3] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2022a).

- Pillar 1. Investment in small- and medium-sized farms and strengthening of value chains, local markets, and organization of exports
- Pillar 2. Land restoration and sustainable management of ecosystems
- Pillar 3. Climate-resilient infrastructure and access to renewable energy
- Pillar 4. Favourable economic and institutional frameworks for effective governance, sustainability, stability and security
- Pillar 5. Capacity building[4]

From the beginning, the GGW Accelerator has been managed mostly by UNCCD Bonn, in cooperation with the PA-GGW. The transfer of the GGW Accelerator Unit from the UNCCD to the PA-GGW is foreseen for 2023–2024. Until then, the UNCCD continues to serve as the GGW Accelerator secretariat. In this role, the UNCCD is developing a framework to monitor the progress of all investments related to the GGW. The UNCCD is also working closely with the PA-GGW to develop a logical framework and tools to harmonize monitoring and reporting, as well as to track how the pledges are committed, translated into projects, implemented in the field, and reaching beneficiaries. In parallel to this, the GCF has created its umbrella programme.

4. GEOGRAPHICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Geography and climate: Launched in 2007, the GGWI aims to address land restoration in the Sahel region, at the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. Its outreach spans across 11 countries, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan. The map below (see Figure A - 1) shows in green the areas targeted by the initiative. The GGWI does not cover entire countries but defines corridors or zones within these countries, the width of which vary from 15 km to more than 300 km, with an average annual rainfall between 100 mm and 400 mm. The land areas needing restoration are even wider. Detailed data is available for all countries on annual rainfall, degraded lands, and areas planned for restoration by zone and type of land.

Regional demographic: The sizes of GGW countries vary widely, as do their population numbers, with about 200 mln in Nigeria and just under 1 mln in Djibouti. The total population size of the 11 GGWI countries is about 450 mln. While the population growth rates vary among these countries, all are expecting significant increases in the coming decades, with annual growth rates projected to vary between nearly 2 per cent in Djibouti and Mauritania to 3.66 per cent in the Niger and 4.91 per cent in South Sudan.

[4] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2022a).

Figure A - 1. Land restoration zones in the GGW countries



Source: Nora Berrahmouni and others (2016). Map of lands with restoration potential across Sub-Saharan Africa

Regional, political and economic: Ten of the 11 GGWI countries are LDCs, with the exception being Nigeria, which is a lower middle-income country (LMIC). Several countries are among the world's poorest, like Chad and the Niger.[5] Most countries are heavily indebted and therefore face constraints to increasing external borrowing.

Seven of the member countries are Francophone, and the rest are Anglophone. While this does not prevent their cooperation, it results in some challenges, particularly between the English-language-dominated AU Commission (AUC) based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the largely French-speaking PA-GGW, based in Nouakchott, Mauritania.

5. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT

The Sahel region is particularly vulnerable to climate change. Climate vulnerability and projected changes in climate foresee an above-average increase of temperatures in the Sahel region, combined with increased fluctuations in precipitation. Temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster here than in the rest of the world. The Sahel will thus become hotter than it currently is, with some areas experiencing increased but erratic rainfall. Extreme weather events, including droughts and floods, are expected to intensify, threatening the livelihoods of farmers and pastoralists, who make up large parts of the population.[6]

[5] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2020); and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2022).

[6] Julia, Tomalka, and others (n.d.); and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021a). The latter includes regional data in an atlas.

Agriculture in particular is an important sector in the Sahel, providing livelihoods for a majority of the population. Most agriculture is rainfed and for subsistence purposes, meaning increasing drought will have widespread and potentially devastating effects on the population. Indeed, it is likely that crop yields for many staple crops such as maize, millet, and sorghum will decrease in the coming decades. Water scarcity is also increasing pressure on and tensions between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the region, and thus interethnic conflicts are predicted to increase.

Importance of the GGWI in fighting climate change

The GGWI was originally conceived as a large tree-planting project along the southern edge of the Sahara. Subsequently, it expanded into a comprehensive programme to address declining living conditions in the Sahel, especially due to drought and land degradation.

As per the 2021–2030 Decennial Priority Investment Plan (DPIP) prepared by the PA-GGW[7] and the GGW Accelerator programme,[8] the three objectives of the GGWI are to:

- Restore 100 mln hectares (ha) of degraded land in the Sahel
- Sequester 250 mln tons of carbon
- Create 10 mln jobs in rural areas

An overview of data on all land areas slated for restoration by the GGW countries is shared below, (see Table A - 1).[9]

Table A - 1. Estimate of zones to be restored in GGW member states

Country	Country area (KM^2)	GGW area (Ha)	Area of restorable land in Ha (70%)	Objectives in Ha (PIPD/DPIP 2021 - 2030)
Burkina Faso	274,200	109,663	7,676,410	3,300,856
Djibouti	23,200	10,965	767,577	330,058
Eritrea	121,144	70,244	4,917,057	2,114,334
Ethiopia	1,120,000	131,502	9,205,136	3,958,208
Mali	1,241,238	802,758	56,193,050	24,163,011
Mauritania	1,030,700	357,446	25,021,191	10,759,112
Niger (the)	1,267,000	472,236	33,056,544	14,214,314
Nigeria	923,773	397,222	27,805,540	11,956,382
Senegal	196,722	69,801	4,886,102	2,101,024
Sudan	1,886,068	595,679	41,697,555	17,929,949
Chad	1,284,000	308,334	21,583,411	9,280,867
Total	**9,368,045**	**3,325,851**	**232,809,573**	**100,108,116**

Source: Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (2021).

6. GCF GGWI PORTFOLIO

GCF is committed to delivering increased climate finance across GGW countries to promote climate-resilient agriculture, ecosystems restoration, an active bio-economy, climate-resilient infrastructure, and access to renewable energy in particular. In the 11 GGW member countries, the

[7] Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (2021).

[8] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2022a).

[9] Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (2021).

GCF has 30 projects to date, totalling USD 1.14 bln in GCF finance and USD 2.43 bln in co-finance, though not all of them are specifically GGW-identified projects (see Appendix 1). According to a GCF thematic brief on the subject, "GCF is supporting 37 Readiness activities worth USD 31.3Mn, which aim to strengthen GGW countries' ability to access climate finance and undertake national adaptation planning and support direct access entities."[10] The long list of projects was communicated by the GCF to the UNCCD Accelerator Unit tracker system, in line with similar practices of the other participating donor agencies; however, not all projects of all agencies, including the GCF, are or were originated as GGWI projects, which would include consultations with the relevant GGW agencies.

In its own words, the GCF's GGWI investments in the Sahel region endeavour to:

- **Establish enabling environments for novel climate solutions** – GCF provides grant-based technical assistance to support policymakers in identifying and implementing the right mix of public policy instruments;
- **Catalyze innovation** – By acting as an anchor investor and provider of patient capital, GCF supports the emergence of new climate technologies and business models;
- **De-risk and mobilize finance at scale** – GCF mobilizes finance by de-risking market-creating projects through concessional financing or co-financing. It establishes a commercial track record and unlocks private finance; and
- **Strengthen national financial institutions to drive the adoption of novel climate solutions** – GCF helps align finance with sustainable development. It enhances the capacity of domestic financial institutions to originate and appraise climate investments.[11]

This broad view of support to the GGW is in line with the expanded approach of the GGW, from its original focus on planting trees to land restoration and climate-resilient landscaping (including investments in solar energy, relevant infrastructure, and political institutions).

Table A - 2 below provides an at-a-glance perspective on the GCF projects directly related to the GGWI, which were examined in more detail for this case study. They are a subset of the 30 GCF projects undertaken in GGWI countries.

Table A - 2. GCF projects directly related to the GGWI as per IEU Datalab

PROJECT NAME	AE	PROJECT STATUS	GCF FINANCE (USD)	CO-FINANCE (USD)	TOTAL PROJECT FINANCE (USD)
Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan (GAMS) – Simplified Approval Process (SAP)019	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	Under Implementation	9.98 mln	-	
Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture (IGREENFIN) – SAP012	IFAD	Under Implementation	9.55 mln	3.34 mln	9.98 mln
The Africa Integrated Climate	IFAD	Approved at	82.80 mln	22.90 mln	12.89 mln

[10] Green Climate Fund (2022).
[11] Green Climate Fund (2022).

Risk Management Programme: Building the resilience of smallholder farmers to climate change impacts in 7 Sahelian Countries of the GGW – FP162		B.28			
IGREENFIN1: Greening Agricultural Banks & the Financial Sector to Foster Climate Resilient, Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture in the GGW Countries – Phase I - FP183	IFAD	Approved at B.32	117.32 mln	82.10 mln	143.30 mln
Contribution to the Great Green Wall Initiative in Six West African Countries under the Climate Resilience for Rural Africa Initiative – ID_25930	AFD	Pipeline	44.94 mln	103.37 mln	199.42 mln
Scaling-Up Resilience in Africa's Great Green Wall (SURAGGWA) – ID_24390	FAO	Pipeline	154.00 mln	72.50 mln	148.31 mln

Source: Green Climate Fund Tableau Server as of B.33.

The new regional flagship project of the GCF in the GGW region, FP183, "Inclusive Green Financing Initiative (IGREENFIN1)", was approved in March 2022. The funded activity agreement (FAA) was executed in April 2022 but is not yet effective; as some conditions are still not fulfilled, there has been no disbursement yet. The project aims to enhance access to credit and technical assistance for farmers and farmer organizations, including women's groups, and micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) to help them adopt the best climate change adaptation and mitigation solutions. It will also build the capacity of local banks to support green businesses. It covers the West African member countries of the PA-GGW plus Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, and it will later expand to the east African member countries as well. A major aim of the project is to build greater coherence and complementarity of climate action in Africa. Its Component 3 will foster regional cooperation through technical assistance (TA) for the participating countries by dispatching experts and building a regional know-how database, which will help to share technologies and lessons learnt.

The project builds on the experience of SAP012, "Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture," under implementation by IFAD in the Niger. This project was approved in November 2019, and its FAA became effective in December 2020, which facilitated a disbursement to IFAD of USD 2.8 mln. Its purpose has been to improve access to credit for smallholder farmers in the Niger by engaging with commercial banks and microfinance institutions, which perceive such credits as high risk. Blended finance will provide incentives for the private sector to participate. In addition, TA and capacity building is offered.

FP162, "The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme" was approved in March 2021. It had been in the pipeline since December 2018. The FAA was executed in November 2021 but is not yet effective as some conditions are still not fulfilled, so there has been no disbursement yet. IFAD is the lead agency and will work with the AfDB, the World Food Programme (WFP), and African Risk Capital (ARC) as executing agencies. The latter will focus on using its expertise in risk management and risk transfer to insure farmers against large reductions in their revenues due to climate-induced disasters. Predominantly subsistence-based and reliant on rainwater, the agricultural sector in the Sahel is highly vulnerable to climate change. At the same time, the sector plays a

fundamental role in the economy (40 per cent of regional gross domestic product (GDP)) and employs approximately two-thirds of the workforce in most countries. The Sahel has been classified as one of the most degraded regions in the world due to unsustainable farming practices (slash-and-burn agriculture, deforestation, overgrazing of pastureland) and illegal logging, among other factors.[12] Access to agricultural insurance and better climate information services will help smallholder farmers in seven Sahelian countries to adopt climate-resilient agricultural practices.

An earlier project, SAP019, "Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan," has been implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The project was approved in November 2020 after being in the pipeline since May 2017. Its FAA became effective in November 2021, which allowed for a disbursement of USD 1.972 mln to the FAO in December 2021. The project aims to improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in the Kordofan region, where 98 per cent of agriculture is rainfed and thus greatly vulnerable to climate volatility. Gum Arabic is harvested from Acacia trees, which show reduced yields by as much of 50 per cent during times of drought. The project will also work with producer associations to facilitate contract farming arrangements and access to private sector financing. Moreover, the project invests in livestock mobility and rangeland restoration of 275,000 ha of land, which will improve the resilience of pastoralists to climate shocks.

Two more projects directly related to the GGWI are still in the pipeline. One is the SURAGGWA, for which the FAO developed a draft concept note. It is intended to scale up SAP019 from Sudan to eight other interested countries, which have yet to come up with co-financing in cash and/or in kind. It will complement an EU-funded project already under implementation. The second one, under preparation by the AFD, is the "Contribution to the Great Green Wall Initiative" in six west African countries under the Climate Resilience for Rural Africa Initiative. Its further development has reportedly encountered some difficulties and was not advancing at the time of writing.

B. KEY FINDINGS

1. RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

The GCF's involvement in the GGWI is highly relevant and responsive to the challenges of the region, countries, and communities. The Secretary of the *Observatoire du Sahara et du Sahel* (OSS) based in Tunis recently stated:

> The latest IPCC report comes once again as a reminder of the disastrous effects of climate change on the Sahara-Sahel areas, which have registered persistent drought for more than three decades, permanently weakening ecosystems and accelerating desertification. This renewed warning bell reminds us of the urgent actions to undertake and the need to find concrete, joint, doable and effective solutions. The socio-economic impact of this situation is being felt. Today, more than 135 million inhabitants whose livelihoods are mainly based on farming face food insecurity and migrations to the South are increasingly growing.[13]

This statement summarizes well the urgency of actions needed to adapt to and reverse the effects of climate change in the GGW countries. The AU, the PA-GGW, and the GGW member countries

[12] Green Climate Fund (2021c) and United States Agency for International Development (2017).

[13] *Observatoire du Sahara et du Sahel* (2022).

created the GGWI in 2007, which started slowly but has been supported by the GCF and other donors since early 2021 in a much more intense and coordinated way.

Most GCF FPs directly related to the GGW focus on smallholder farmers and provide them or plan to provide them with innovative tools, like a combination of loans and grants, as well as technical advice through projects which are regionally expanded. One project also specifically includes risk assurance which is aimed at stabilizing income and food supply to counter increasing risks from agricultural revenue variations. Another one aims at diversifying income sources through an expanded production of traditional but underused products. Rangeland restoration aims to improve the resilience of pastoralists to climate shocks. These are highly relevant to the needs of a region in which the majority of people are engaged in agriculture.

2. Coherence, complementarity and coordination of donor agencies

The GCF operates in an environment of several global, regional, multilateral, and bilateral climate funds and agencies with climate projects, each with their own objectives and varying characteristics related to scope, scale, governance arrangements, funding mechanisms, and organizational processes. The purpose of this section is to identify the current status of complementarity, coherence, and cooperation between the GCF and other leading climate-related finance institutions, in relation to the GGWI. In particular, this concerns the GCF's coordination with the GEF; the two entities share a cooperation agreement formalized in the Long-term Vision on Complementarity, Coherence and Collaboration (LTV).[14]

The GCF's projects with most relevance to the GGW are planned and implemented in close coordination with the GEF and involve entities accredited by both institutions. A new GEF project providing USD 10 mln in regional support to the GGWI has been approved by the 32nd Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) Council in June 2022. It will be implemented by IFAD, which also manages the GCF's IGREENFIN1 (recently approved in March 2022 as FP183) within its regional support Component 3.[15] FP183 follows up on an earlier Inclusive Green Financing project of the GCF, also implemented by IFAD in the Niger (as SAP012, IGREENFIN, approved in November 2019),[16] and is part of a larger effort to scale and replicate the work in all GGW countries. It will finance a regional support programme to facilitate the coordination, coherence and knowledge sharing of the GCF's transformational projects in the Sahel. The project was developed by the GCF in collaboration with IFAD and the UNCCD as part of an effort to increase the impact of its projects in the GGW countries. It is also called the GGW umbrella programme, aimed at increasing and formalizing the collaboration between several projects implemented in GGW countries, which are currently implemented in silos, by deploying experts responsible for creating bridges between countries and projects. IGREENFIN1 covers Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal, as well as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, which are not GGW members yet. IGREENFIN2 is planned to cover the remaining GGW countries: Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sudan.[17]

These nearly parallel approvals of the GCF and GEF projects provide optimum conditions for effective coordination among the two projects, which were already coordinated in the drafting and negotiation stage. Component 3 of FP183 will soon start dispatching experts and building a regional knowledge data base, which will help to share technologies and lessons learnt. These efforts will be shared with and supported by the GEF project.

[14] Global Environment Facility (2021).
[15] Green Climate Fund (2021d).
[16] Green Climate Fund (2021a).
[17] Green Climate Fund (2021d), p. 4.

The GEF also has a predecessor project for supporting the GGWI by strengthening the capacity of the PA-GGW (with a funded amount of USD 2.5 mln). United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) is implementing this project, in parallel with the support of the ADA to UNCCD, again for donor and country coordination work for the GGW. The link between the two GEF projects is that they both work to advance the GGWI, the first in strengthening its coordination work via capacity building for the PA-GGW, and the second in working directly with the national GGW agencies and promoting their exchange of experiences. The latter is in close coordination with Component 3 of FP183, as mentioned above.

This package of well-coordinated projects, which builds on close cooperation between the GEF, the GCF, IFAD, UNEP, the ADA, and UNCCD for planning and monitoring under the GGW Accelerator, is a very good example of interagency cooperation, including a learning process from small beginnings to sizable and geographically extended projects. Staff continuity and continuous commitment and discussions by several staff members in the Secretariat of the GCF, GEF, IFAD, and UNCCD for over a year helped to develop creative project designs that are expected to bear fruit in the coming years. The GEF/LDCF funding is 100 per cent grant money, while the GCF and IFAD contributions are partly concessional loans for on-lending by local banks to farmers and other local stakeholders. As such, these contributions are complementary to each other.

UNCCD and UNEP, with funding from ADA and GEF respectively, also support the capacity development of the PA-GGW. UNDP, which was interested in becoming involved in the regional support programme of IGREENFIN1, proposed to focus on strengthening good governance at national level, possibly as a sub-contractor to IFAD, but could not come to agreement with the IFAD Dakar office. As a result, UNDP is now developing its own programme and looking for funding from other sources. The AFD and the FAO have submitted their own GGW-related project proposals to the GCF, where they are still under review.

Regarding operational complementarity, the GCF engages with several accredited entities (AEs) on other projects simultaneously. The GCF operates differently to the GEF, which utilizes lead agencies and child projects being implemented by other agencies, often using national executing entities (EEs) that receive funding through the lead agency. The GCF has multi-country projects, with only one AE at a time holding an FAA. However, one AE can engage one or several other international and/or national agencies as EEs, as happened in FP162 where the AfDB, WFP, and ARC are EEs for IFAD.[18,19]

GCF EEs are not required to be accredited, and in most cases have not sought accreditation. They can be government agencies, research entities, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example. The EE serves as a subcontractor to the lead AE, which is ultimately responsible for project implementation. While EEs do not need to be accredited, they do need to meet numerous requirements, and an assessment is performed on their technical and financial capacity, which is verified by the Secretariat.

The modalities used by the GEF look similar to those used for some GCF projects, where one AE involves other AEs as EEs. However, this is rare for the GCF while it is common at the GEF for multi-country projects.[20] The main point and lesson to draw is that strong leadership by one AE is helpful for coordinating project implementation among involved agencies, which might be accredited AEs or EEs without accreditation.

[18] Green Climate Fund (2021c).
[19] It would require further comparative analysis, including of the legal aspects, to determine which of these cooperation models are more effective and under which circumstances.
[20] The implications of these different modalities will be part of a study recently commissioned by the GEF Secretariat on how the different GEF and GCF procedures support or hinder cooperation between the two organisations.

3. COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

All 11 GGW countries have established national GGWI agencies, usually located within their ministries of environment. They are headed by Directors General, and their staff numbers vary. These agencies are, or should be the base for national ownership of GGW projects as they are responsible for initiating and coordinating with other ministries regarding all projects related to the GGWI, whether financed with internal and external resources. Information on the national focal points is presented on the website of the PA-GGW.[21]

In the margins of UNCCD Conference of the Parties (COP)15 in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire in May 2022, an FGD was organized by the evaluation team in which leading staff of the PA-GGW and several heads of national GGWI agencies participated. FGD participants widely agreed that the national GGWI focal points faced great difficulties in effectively coordinating with other relevant ministries such as those of agriculture, livestock, water, and transport, as well as with the ministries of finance and planning. Being situated mostly in the ministries of environment, the GGWI focal points typically have less power and resources than other ministries. Moreover, the general difficulty of multi-sector planning was emphasized, as the various stakeholders tend to work in silos while competing for resources. This creates problems for the preparation and implementation of all international and national projects for the GGWI, including those funded by the GCF, as it is necessary to involve several government departments.

Also during the FGD, another constraint to country ownership emerged relating to the ways in which donor agencies – particularly multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the AfDB, the World Bank, and the EIB – have been working. They tend not to inform the GGWI focal points of their project ideas and expectations, and they usually do not meet them on country missions, instead pursuing discussions with ministries of finance and/or planning. Ministries of finance and planning generally have the best-trained staff to develop bankable proposals (often employing former MDB staff, notably from the AfDB), with only weak linkages to the ministries of environment. As a result, the ministries of environment that generally have the focal points for the GCF, GEF, UNFCCC, etc., are often not the ones to coordinate in-country and with international agencies.

The national consultation groups created in all GGWI countries are a step toward increased country ownership and have started to function to varying degrees in different countries. These consultation groups are not institutions, but instead ad-hoc meetings called for and organized by the GGWI focal points/national GGWI agencies. In 2022, several groups convened virtually. The UNCCD Sahel team, which manages the GGW Accelerator, supports each national GGWI agency in organizing the meeting with the preparation of concept notes, agendas, email invitations, and technical support, as well as the list of contacts of technical and financial partners.[22] In fact, the UNCCD steps in to fulfil the coordination role the PA-GGW is supposed to play. The national GGWI agencies gather contacts at the ministry of finance, ministry of agriculture, ministry of environment, ministry of energy, ministry of research, representatives of civil society, local leaders of the GGW regions, national banks, and micro-loan institutions. The situation in each country is different in terms of the strength and involvement of the national GGW agency. While these meetings are a step forward in facilitating project preparations by the various national stakeholders, they are still sponsored by an external agency, the UNCCD.

[21] Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (2018).
[22] UNFCCC national focal point (NFP); Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) primary NFP; Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA (of CBD)) NFP; UNCCD; GEF; GCF national designated authority (NDA); FAO focal points; UNDP country office focal point; AfDB country office focal point; Sahel and West Africa Program (SAWAP) focal point; AFD; EU Delegation; EIB; AfDB; World Bank; IFAD; United Nations agencies.

The political weight of these national consultations and their follow up depend largely on the support received from the top levels of government. While this high-level political support exists from the President of Senegal, for example, it is not forthcoming in all countries and several are only recently stepping up to strengthen their national GGW focal point and establish coordination mechanisms with other government ministries and institutions. UNCCD is also planning the presentation of a study on the mobilization of non-state actors, which includes mapping and proposals to better take into account these important actors.[23]

Under the auspices of the AUC, more countries have recently joined the GGWI, though without participating in the PA-GGW for which membership is voluntary and requires an annual fee. The total GGWI group now consists of more than 20 countries, including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, The Gambia, and Tunisia. Moreover, the 16 Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries of Southern Africa are also joining, themselves affected by climate change and in particular droughts, heavy storms, and floods.

While the AUC has an inclusive approach to the GGWI, the PA-GGW seems to prefer to focus on its present constituency of majority Francophone members from West Africa. Several GGW national focal points are critical of the performance of the PA-GGW and the services they receive from it, which they consider as incommensurate to the annual membership fee. Each of the 11 member countries is supposed to pay *Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine* (FCFA) 100 mln (equivalent to around USD 151,500) per year into the budget of the PA-GGW, though several countries are in arrears. Nigeria, which took over the presidency of the PA-GGW in December 2021 for two years, promised to make available additional funding and staff.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF INVESTMENTS

According to the Great Green Wall Implementation Status and Way Ahead to 2030 report, the first comprehensive status report of the GGW, over 18 mln ha of land have been restored (representing 18 per cent of the target), over 350,000 jobs have been created (3.5 per cent of the target), and around USD 90 mln in revenues have been generated from 2007 to 2018 through GGWI activities. The report also states that land restoration positively impacts 15 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[24] However, the report also states that these achievements were falling far short of the planned results, and that the speed of implementation had to increase quickly to achieve the ambitious targets for 2030. Based on this assessment, initiative was taken at the One Planet Summit in Paris in January 2021 to create the GGW Accelerator programme, with major donor agency pledges being made.

The 10-year priority investment plan prepared by the PA-GGW also contains some monitoring data of results achieved in each member country, and of the PA-GGW itself.[25] It points to achievements made in sustainable management and land-use planning, biodiversity conservation, integrated water resources management, local economic development, and community adaptation and resilience. An earlier report of the PA-GGW included detailed information on each of the 11 GGW countries and a list of achievements that included institutional strengthening, capacity building, and resource mobilization.[26]

UNCCD stated in late 2021 that 10 mln people have been trained on sustainable land and water management, and that 20 mln trees have been planted in the GGWI intervention zones. This

[23] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2022c), p.6.
[24] Climatekos (2020).
[25] Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (2021).
[26] Pan African Agency for the Great Green Wall (2018).

provides country data of land areas restored and assisted for natural regeneration.[27] Another highlight is the production and release of the GGW documentary film produced in collaboration with the Oscar-nominated filmmaker Fernando Meirelles and Malian singer Inna Modja.

In June 2022, the UNCCD Accelerator Unit presented its substantial third technical brief with extensive information on the progress achieved regarding the programming and results management framework, and impact measurement.[28] According to the 2022 GGW progress report:

- 20 mln ha of land have been restored
- The restored area will sequester more than 300 mln tons of carbon dioxide (CO_2) by 2030, which would represent about 30 per cent of the Initiative's target
- To reach the restoration target of 100 mln ha of land by 2030, an average of 8.2 mln ha of land per year will be restored with an annual financial investment of USD 4.3 bln.[29]

The report also contains detailed data on the achievements realized by the individual member countries, which show significant progress, although there is still a long way to go to reach the 2030 overall target figures.

Regarding the effectiveness of GCF projects directly related to the GGW, there are two to consider that are in advanced implementation. These are SAP019 (GAMS) and SAP012 (IGREENFIN). In view of the promise of positive results, both projects are foreseen to expand their successful approaches to several other GGW countries in the region: the first one called SURAGGWA was submitted by FAO and is still being considered by the GCF Secretariat, while the second one developed by IFAD has been approved as IGREENFIN1 at the thirty-second meeting of the Board (B.32) and will soon start implementation. More details are shown in Table A - 2 of section 6 above.

The PA-GGW and UNCCD continue to work on indicator systems to measure the progress of land restoration, job creation, and other data. In the framework of the regular donor conferences held by the UNCCD Accelerator Unit, these indicators are discussed with the intention to harmonize them with those in use by the various agencies to measure adaptation impact. While some progress has been made, adaptation indicators are notoriously difficult to define in an unambiguous manner, especially in a way that excludes double counting, as multi-causal mechanisms are often at work and data are difficult to come by. A package of 40 indicators recently developed and presented by the PA-GGW is considered by several donor agency experts as being too complex and in need of further work.

5. PARADIGM SHIFT

In view of the huge amounts of donor funding pledged, the GGWI has the potential to become a game changer in the Sahel. In combination with those of other agencies, GCF projects will contribute to this to the extent that they are innovative in mobilizing various stakeholders, in particular the private sector by providing blended finance through local financial institutions, thus enabling increased activities by small scale farmers and other stakeholders on the ground. This is particularly true for IGREENFIN1, which also plans to work hand in hand with a GEF project to establish a regional knowledge generation and management system offering technical advice and spreading lessons learnt about successful technical and management solutions for adapting to climate change in the region. However, it is too early to make a more concrete assessment, as the IFAD regional projects have hardly started, and those of the FAO and the AFD are still in the pipeline.

[27] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2021).
[28] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2022c).
[29] Ibid., p.10.

While high expectations have been created by the GGW Accelerator, access to the necessary amounts of funding depends on the preparation and approval of bankable projects that satisfy the criteria of the funding agencies involved. In addition to the stakeholder consultation meetings in all participating states, valid concept notes now need to be developed for presentation to the MDBs as well as to the GCF. Scale up and paradigm shift will likely require the MDBs to get more involved, with or without the GCF, although MDBs can serve the role of AE for GCF projects. The AfDB and World Bank are in the lead, followed by the EIB.

However, the debt service capacity of the countries concerned will quickly become a limiting factor, as most of the funds pledged by the MDBs are potential loans. It is far from sure that the national authorities will acquire further external debt for land restoration and similar projects with little or only long-term financial returns to the treasury. Here, the GCF can come in with grant funds to provide better conditions, even when blended with concessional loans, increasing its ability to contribute to a paradigm shift.

6. Gender equity and social inclusion

Both GCF projects implemented by IFAD (FP162 and FP183) have been prepared and approved with gender assessments and gender action plans. For FP183, targets have also been formulated for the participation of youth in an effort to advance social inclusion beyond gender issues. The gender action plans for both projects include indicators defining the percentage of women, usually 40 per cent or 50 per cent, to benefit from the planned activities. The target percentages formulated for youth for FP183 are often combined with the percentages for the participation of women, which makes both the specific target as well as the strategy for avoiding double counting unclear.

There is no mention of indigenous peoples (IP) as a separate category in the GCF project documents nor in the investment plan of the PA-GGW for 2021 to 2030. In the view of many African countries, IPs are largely limited to forest tribes and traditional hunters and gatherers. However, the GCF's IP policy document does consider pastoralists and nomadic groups as IPs,[30] although it is not obvious why pastoralists should be considered as being more indigenous than local farmers. Nevertheless, such groups are likely impacted by GCF and other GGWI projects, but are not being referred to.

7. Unexpected and unintended results

There are no unexpected and/or unintended results to report in this case study.

8. Sustainability, replication and scalability

In addition to the financial management considerations regarding loans and debt service limitations for the GGW Accelerator mentioned earlier, the differences in understanding between the AUC and the PA-GGW about the extension of membership beyond the current 11 GGW member states will limit the replication and scaling up of this work to other countries. As an extension would be a very political decision by the AU at the highest level, the outcome of the on-going discussions on extending the membership of the GGW to other countries is hard to predict.

Moreover, the institutional weaknesses of the PA-GGW will also limit its role as a coordinator of the GGW, in particular regarding the inflow of the pledged funding and cooperation among member countries. It is not likely that these weaknesses can be overcome in the short term, even with added means for capacity building. The basic idea of UNEP and AfDB is to strengthen the professional staff of the PA-GGW while continuing to work with its current leadership. The AfDB has developed

[30] Green Climate Fund (2018).

a draft TOR and would provide funds for an audit of the PA-GGW, but there are ongoing discussions about its scope and transparency with respect to using the audit report once finished.

The transfer of the GGW Accelerator Unit to the PA-GGW foreseen for 2023–2024 is uncertain if major upgrades to the agency have not been made by then. On the other hand, continuing the present coordination role assumed by UNCCD is not sustainable in the longer term. A solution to this dilemma might be found in further capacity building for the PA-GGW, but the form this would take and the likely results are uncertain. UNCCD has commissioned an evaluation report on the GGW Accelerator, which is intended to make recommendations in this respect.

Some GCF projects show promise for sustainability, replication and scalability. As mentioned in sections 4 and 5 above, IGREENFIN1 and the planned IGREENFIN2 build off of the previous IGREENFIN's success. These projects also include good governance work to support the sustainability of the project's outcomes as well as capacity building and knowledge sharing work that could support the replication and scaling of the work. Other ongoing capacity building support provided by UNCCD and UNEP may also contribute to the sustainability of GGW efforts. However, challenges do exist. These include the PA-GGW's institutional weaknesses, which have led IFAD to focus on the national level rather than to work closely with the PA-GGW, and pose a challenge to long-term scalability and replicability.

9. Efficiency

The creation of the Accelerator Unit at UNCCD has been a substantial step forward in increasing the efficiency of donor coordination by compensating for the weaknesses of the PA-GGW. The two-day seminar on access to donors organized by UNCCD in Abidjan in the lead up to COP15 for the national GGW focal points provided them with useful information about how to address the main donor agencies, which all presented their approaches and access channels. The GCF did not participate as it works through its AEs rather than directly with GGWI agencies. However, delegating the project formulation to AEs is not enough to enable the countries to come up with bankable projects in the short period of several months set by their Heads of States. This extends also to in-country coordination. While the recent organization of several national consultations by UNCCD was good for coordination, it remains a first step, and follow up is not assured in all countries where top-level political support is limited.

Regarding the preparation of IGREENFIN1, the coordination work with the countries and UNCCD as well as the GEF was mainly done by IFAD, but the GCF Secretariat participated in over a year of discussions among project officers to develop an innovative approach to farmer and private stakeholder outreach, as well as the planning of an expert team for developing a regional knowledge management system, thus combining financial and technical assistance in one project, which is new for the GCF.

C. Conclusions

In general terms, coordination, cooperation and complementarity happens on three levels for advancing the GGWI: international, regional and national. At the international level, significant progress has been achieved with the creation of the GGW Accelerator programme. Over USD 19 bln has been pledged for future project funding, mostly by MDBs and bilateral donors, with the AfDB, World Bank, EIB, and the European Commission (INTPA) leading in terms of funding volumes. Much of the pledges are loans however, which will be difficult for many countries to take up. Moreover, the capacity of GGW countries to develop bankable projects is very limited. The UNCCD, where the Accelerator Unit is currently located, has taken the lead in organizing virtual

donor conferences for coordinating pledges, sharing information, and developing indicators and reporting standards. It has also organized a series of meetings with national GGW focal points and supported them in implementing national consultations.

At the regional level, the AU has the leading political role, having created the GGWI back in 2007, as well as with the establishment of the PA-GGW in 2010, which is supposed to coordinate the efforts of its 11 member countries. Some progress has been achieved, notably by preparing the priority investment plan 2021–2030 and drafting an indicator system for measuring national progress on the ground. However, some GGW member countries are not satisfied with the services rendered by the PA-GGW, and current management is not recognized by the donor community as providing sufficiently strong leadership. Also, frictions persist between the AUC and the PA-GGW regarding plans of the former to expand the GGWI membership beyond the current 11 members to include countries from Southern and Northern Africa.

At the national level, it appears, that the GGWI focal points and agencies are in most cases situated in the ministries of environment and are not well connected with the finance and/or planning ministries. While the latter have good contacts with donor agencies and capacities in developing bankable projects, this is not the case with the majority of the GGW focal points, which are often ignored by the MDBs and other donors, even during country missions. Efforts have been made by UNCCD to bridge this gap at a recent regional workshop in Abidjan, but further steps are needed to enable the countries to come up with concrete and well-prepared concept notes that allow them to tap into the large funding amounts pledged for the GGW. The national consultations recently organized by UNCCD also need to continue and turn into consensus-building platforms on investment programmes with national, regional and international funding support.

In light of this, the GCF has continuously participated in donor conferences organized by the UNCCD and has recently approved additional innovative projects, which were developed in close coordination with the GEF and with intense consultations also with IFAD, the responsible AE. Further projects are under preparation by the FAO and the AFD. IGREENFIN1, with its flexible combinations of grant and loan funding for on-lending to small farmers and other stakeholders combined with capacity building on regional and national levels, appears promising for increasing the future role of the GCF in supporting and accelerating the implementation and scaling up of the GGW. This will be helped along by the planned recruitment of experts for developing a regional knowledge management system regarding technologies and lessons learned, and by providing TA to the national stakeholders of the GGW.

Appendix 1. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

Approved ref.	Acronym	Year of approval	Project name	Country	Is under implementation	GCF (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
FP003	CSE	2015	Increasing the resilience of ecosystems and communities through the restoration of the productive bases of salinized lands	Senegal	Yes	7,610,000	546,000
FP012	World Bank	2016	Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali Country Project	Mali	Yes	22,750,000	8,250,000
FP021	AFD	2016	Senegal Integrated Urban Flood Management Project	Senegal	Yes	15,060,241	56,224,900
FP027	Deutsche Bank	2016	Universal Green Energy Access Programme (UGEAP)	Ethiopia	No	13,600,000	37,672,000
				Nigeria	No	13,600,000	37,672,000
FP049	WFP	2017	Building the climate resilience of food insecure smallholder farmers through integrated management of climate risk (R4)	Senegal	Yes	9,983,521	
FP058	MoFEC	2017	Responding to the increasing risk of drought: building gender-responsive resilience of the most vulnerable communities	Ethiopia	Yes	45,002,759	4,958,095
FP074	World Bank	2018	Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso Country Project	Burkina Faso	Yes	22,500,000	2,500,000
FP078	Acumen	2018	Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund (ARAF)	Nigeria	Yes	6,500,000	7,500,000
FP092	AfDB	2018	Programme for integrated development and adaptation to climate change in the Niger Basin (PIDACC/NB)	Burkina Faso	No	6,942,091	14,558,171
				Chad	No	7,273,506	15,253,177
				Mali	No	9,207,776	19,309,510
				Niger (the)	No	7,805,532	16,368,882
				Nigeria	No	12,601,220	26,425,859

FP093	AfDB	2018	Yeleen Rural Electrification Project in Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	Yes	24,397,590	28,915,663
FP095	AFD	2018	Transforming Financial Systems for Climate	Burkina Faso	Yes	3,156,627	5,432,028
				Nigeria	Yes	20,313,253	34,955,723
				Senegal	Yes	3,132,530	5,390,562
FP099	FMO	2018	Climate Investor One	Djibouti	Yes	5,556,000	40,086,540
				Ethiopia	Yes	5,556,000	40,086,540
				Nigeria	Yes	5,556,000	40,086,540
				Senegal	Yes	5,556,000	40,086,540
FP102	BOAD	2019	Mali solar rural electrification project	Mali	Yes	26,072,904	8,316,862
FP103	GIZ	2019	Promotion of Climate-Friendly Cooking: Kenya and Senegal	Senegal	Yes	8,287,651	3,610,266
FP105	BOAD	2019	BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up Solar Energy Investments in Francophone West Africa LDCs	Burkina Faso	Yes	10,207,701	10,207,701
				Mali	Yes	10,207,701	10,207,701
				Niger (the)	Yes	10,207,701	10,207,701
FP128	MUFG Bank	2020	Arbaro Fund – Sustainable Forestry Fund	Ethiopia	Yes	2,777,750	19,444,250
FP136	World Bank	2020	Resilient Landscapes and Livelihoods Project	Ethiopia	Yes	16,523,7592	13,200,0000
FP138	BOAD	2020	ASER Solar Rural Electrification Project	Senegal	No	75,748,169	123,741,974
FP139	UNDP	2020	Building resilience in the face of climate change within traditional rain fed agricultural and pastoral systems in Sudan	Sudan	Yes	25,6451,14	15,540,000
FP148	Acumen	2020	Participation in Energy Access Relief Facility ('EARF')	Nigeria	Yes	6,660,000	6,660,000
				Senegal	Yes	1,260,000	1,260,000
FP151	IUCN	2020	Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility	Burkina Faso	Yes	440,485	226,195

				Mali	Yes	440,485	226,195
				Mauritania	Yes	440,485	226,195
				Nigeria	Yes	440,485	226,195
				Senegal	Yes	440,485	226,195
FP152	PCA	2020	Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity	Burkina Faso	Yes	3,571,500	14,286,000
				Mali	Yes	3,571,500	14,286,000
				Mauritania	Yes	3,571,500	14,286,000
				Nigeria	Yes	3,571,500	14,286,000
				Senegal	Yes	3,571,500	14,286,000
FP162	IFAD	2021	The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme: Building the resilience of smallholder farmers to climate change impacts in 7 Sahelian Countries of the Great Green Wall (GGW)	Burkina Faso	No	11,835,937	8,639,744
				Chad	No	11,835,937	8,639,744
				Mali	No	11,835,937	8,639,744
				Mauritania	No	11,835,937	8,639,744
				Niger (the)	No	11,835,937	8,639,744
				Senegal	No	11,835,937	8,639,744
FP163	World Bank	2021	Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility	Mali	Yes	39,998,000	183,347,975
FP168	AfDB	2021	Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) Framework	Ethiopia	No	32,471,000	149,910,000
				Nigeria	No	47,852,000	220,920,000
FP176	BOAD	2021	Hydro-agricultural development with smart agriculture practices resilient to climate change in Niger	Niger (the)	No	30,259,811	15,466,308
FP178	AfDB	2021	Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility	Burkina Faso	No	35,385,000	192,663,399
				Chad	No	33,555,000	182,699,459

				Mali	No	37,050,000	201,728,951
				Mauritania	No	22,005,000	119,812,296
				Niger (the)	No	22,005,000	119,812,296
FP183	IFAD	2022	Inclusive Green Financing Initiative (IGREENFIN I): Greening Agricultural Banks & the Financial Sector to Foster Climate Resilient, Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture in the Great Green Wall (GGW) countries – Phase I	Burkina Faso	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Chad	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Djibouti	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Eritrea	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Ethiopia	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Mali	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Mauritania	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Niger (the)	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Nigeria	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Senegal	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
				Sudan	No	8,064,194	5,643,072
SAP012	IFAD	2019	Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture	Niger (the)	Yes	8,534,137	2,986,948
SAP019	FAO	2020	Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan (GAMS): Enhancing adaptive capacity of local communities and restoring carbon sink potential of the Gum Arabic belt, expanding Africa's Great Green Wall	Sudan	Yes	997,5000	

Source: Green Climate Fund Tableau Server as of B.33.

Appendix 2. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	POSITION/ TITLE	ORGANIZATION
Abakar	Zougoulou	Scientific and Technical Director	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Afful-Koomson	Timothy	GCF focal point and Coordinator, Climate and Green Growth Division	African Development Bank
Ahamat	Haggar	Director General Great Green Wall Chad	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Aoki	Chizuru	GEF Lead Environmental Specialist, Programming Unit	Global Environmental Facility
Bako	Amadou Mamane	Administrative and Financial Director	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Bare	Sidi	Great Green Wall Agency Cameroon, *Secretaire Executif*	*Comité Interrégional de Lutte contre la Sècheresse dans le Nord*
Baroudy	Ellysar	Lead Carbon Finance Specialist	World Bank
Bouhari	Adamou	Technical Advisor for Capacity Building at Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall	United National Environmental Programme
Dahich	Diallo	Resource Person from Senegal	SEFCCS
Dickinson	Chris	Ecosystems Management Senior Specialist, DMA	Green Climate Fund
Diop	Gora	Director Great Green Wall Senegal	ASEGNV
Djea	Koffi Behira Francois	Team Assistant and Consultant, Climate and Green Growth Division	African Development Bank
Dorsouma	Al Hamndou	Ag. Director and Manager, Climate and Green Growth Division	African Development Bank
Doulkom	Adama	GGW Agency Burkina Faso, *Coordinateur National*	*Ministère de l'Environnement* (Burkina Faso)
Garreau	Jean-Marc	Senior Staff Member – Dakar Office	SOS Sahel
Guedez	Pierre Yves	Senior Climate Finance Specialist	International Fund for Agricultural Development
Julien	Helene	*Responsable Équipe, 'Développement Territorial'* Project	*Agence Française de Développement*
Kabishi	Tshilumba	Regional Manager, DCP Africa Division	Green Climate Fund
Kgomotso	Phemo	Senior Technical Advisor, Sustainable Land Management and Restoration	United Nations Development Programme (Istanbul)
Kulthoum	Omari	Coordinator for the African Group of Negotiations on the Africa Adaptation Initiative	African Group of Negotiations
Lamizana-Diallo	Birguy	Senior Programme Officer, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification Bonn; Head, Great Green Wall Accelerator Team	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

Nakoulima	Moussa	Investment Officer	European Investment Bank
Nordheim-Larsen	Camilla	Senior Officer, Coordinator Private Sector Activities	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
Ouedrago	Gilles Amadou	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) Bonn, Great Green Wall Accelerator Team	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
Pananditigri	Nabasnogo Roch	Great Green Wall Agency Burkina Faso, *Responsable suivi-evaluation, Coordination Nationale de l'Initiative de la GMV pour le Sahara et le Sahel*	*Ministère de l'Environnement* (Burkina Faso)
Pitaud	Thomas	Disaster and resilience specialist with CRISIS	United Nations Development Programme (Dakar)
Pouakouyou	Daniel	Task Manager for FP011 and SAP005	United Nations Environmental Programme (Kenya)
Rioux	Janie	Senior Officer, Division for Climate Finance and Environment	International Fund for Agricultural Development (Rome)
Rulliere	Sandra	*Responsable Adjointe, Division Agriculture, Développement Rural et Biodiversité*	*Agence Française de Développement*
Sacande	Moctar	International Projects Coordinator	Food and Agriculture Organization
Said	Brahim	Executive Secretary	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Sanou	Marcelin	Head of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Information Management	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Sayed	Muhammed	Climate Change Specialist	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Schuller	Stefan	Team Member	Both Ends
Sene	Amath Pathe	Regional Hub in Abidjan	International Fund for Agricultural Development
Soumare	Arona	Principal Climate Change and Green Growth Officer, Climate and Green Growth Division	African Development Bank
Sow	Ibrahima	Regional Coordinator for Africa, Programs Unit	Global Environmental Facility
Tangem	Elvis Paul	African Union Commission, GGWSI Coordinator	African Union
Thiam	Skhoudia	Head of RD Service	Pan African Agency of the Great Green Wall
Toumany	Diallo	Director General Great Green Wall Mali	*Agence Nationale de la Grande Muraille Verte* (ANGMV)
Toumi	Sarah	Programme Management Office, Bonn, Great Green Wall Accelerator	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
Troni	Jessica	Portfolio Manager, Adaptation Unit	United Nations Environmental Programme (Kenya)

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Chapter 2. FRAGILE, CONFLICT- AND VIOLENCE-AFFECTED SOCIETIES

CONTENTS

TABLES

FIGURES

BOXES

A. Background and context

1. Overview of the Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established by 194 governments in 2010 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to contribute to the global response to climate change. The GCF's mandate is to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries, and to help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Today, the GCF is considered to be a key institution in the global architecture for responding to the challenges of climate change.

The GCF aims to provide equal funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation. Its support is delivered across the following four adaptation results areas, namely: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; and (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. It is also delivered across the following four mitigation results areas: (v) energy generation and access; (vi) transport; (vii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (viii) forests and land use.

The GCF's Governing Instrument (GI) identifies least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing States (SIDS) and African States as being particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, the GCF has provided special considerations for these countries, as reflected in its approach generally, and in the prioritization of programme and project delivery more specifically. Key among these is its allocation of resources for adaptation, which ensures a minimum floor of 50 per cent for LDCs, SIDS and the African States (decision B.06/06).

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The present "Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States"[31] is part of a broader effort by the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of interventions in vulnerable states, including in Africa, LDCs and SIDS.

This evaluation assesses whether and the extent to which GCF approaches and investments are effective in contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC, and promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. The evaluation considers effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and whether positive impacts are likely to be sustained. Moreover, the evaluation was undertaken with consideration for diverse stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. It also considers matters of innovation, replicability and scalability. Finally, the evaluation recognizes the heterogenous situation of African countries and explores how these differences have informed, enabled or constrained their engagement with the GCF.

Five case studies were prepared as part of this evaluation. Three thematic case studies were undertaken to explore areas of particular interest, including: case study 1 on the Great Green Wall (GGW), with a field mission in the Côte d'Ivoire; the current case study 2 on African States affected by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV),[32] with a field mission to Africa Climate Week (ACW) 2022 in Gabon; and case study 3 on countries without a single-country funded project (FP), with a

[31] The "Evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States" was undertaken with the support of a team of consultants provided by Universalia.
[32] This is in line with World Bank language, which also refers to fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) in reference to "low- and middle-income countries that are affected by fragility and conflict". For simplicity, FCV is used throughout this evaluation report.

field mission in Tunisia. Two country-specific case studies with related field missions to those countries were undertaken to better explore the GCF's work and impact on the ground, including: case study 4 on Kenya; and case study 5 on South Africa.

A total of 26 stakeholders were consulted in preparing this case study (see Appendix 3). Individual interviews were conducted with 15 people, while group interviews were undertaken with stakeholders from *Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement* (BOAD), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and Pegasus Capital Advisors L.P. (PCA).

3. Overview of FCV states

FCV states present multiple and unique challenges related to climate adaptation and mitigation given their overall if varying insecurity and instability. FCV states are identified annually by the World Bank according to their security status and institutional markers, and include both conflict-affected societies, determined by the number of conflict-related deaths relative to the country's overall population, and institutionally and socially fragile countries. The latter includes countries facing deep institutional crises, where there is poor transparency and government accountability, and/or where there is weak institutional capacity. According to the World Bank's fiscal year (FY) 2022 list, 29 countries were classified as FCV states, 20 of which were located in Africa. As such, Africa represents two thirds of countries classified as FCV states. Among these 20 countries, one was classified as experiencing high-intensity conflicts (Somalia), 13 were classified as having medium-intensity conflicts, and six were classified as having high institutional and social fragility. The list varies annually given the fluidity of FCV contexts.

FCV increases vulnerability to shocks and constitutes a critical development challenge.[,] FCV states are often characterized by displacement, high levels of poverty, weak political governance, inadequate infrastructure, high climate stress, and poor access to healthcare. Fragility and conflict often lead to the collapse of basic services, insecurity in food and water, a rise in poverty, the weakening of government and state functions, and degraded security situations.

In recent years, the global fragility landscape has significantly worsened, with the highest recorded number of violent conflicts in the past 30 years, and with the number of conflict-affected countries having more than doubled in the past decade. This is accompanied by the largest recorded forced displacement crises, resulting in an estimated 70.8 million (mln) people forcibly displaced worldwide in 2018, 25.9 mln of whom were refugees. In 2021, the number of forcibly displaced persons rose to 89.3 mln. It is further estimated that the number of food-insecure people has doubled. As of 2022, roughly 80 per cent of humanitarian needs are driven by conflict, with projections indicating that two thirds of the population living in extreme poverty could be living in an FCV state by 2030.

As the world is moving away from an extractive economy to a low-carbon economy, there is a strong need for support to be delivered in FCV states to ensure they are not left behind. This is a central component of a "just transition", a principle which involves "maximizing the social and economic opportunities of climate action, while minimizing and carefully managing any challenges" and recognizing the importance of achieving this for all countries, economic sectors and communities – rural and urban alike.

4. Purpose of case study

This case study examines GCF interventions in African FCV states, with a deeper dive in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somalia. This study was also informed by a field mission to Africa Climate Week (ACW) 2022, which was held in Gabon in August–September 2022.

The case study provides an assessment of the GCF portfolio and projects in African FCV states, considering relevance and responsiveness, coherence, country ownership, effectiveness, gender and social inclusion, paradigm shift potential, sustainability and efficiency. It notably explores challenges, barriers, and lessons learnt so as to inform future GCF interventions and approaches in such contexts. Moreover, given the absence of a GCF strategic approach specific to FCV states, this case study aims to inform a consideration of the extent to which such an approach would prove beneficial.

5. GCF PORTFOLIO IN AFRICAN FCV STATES

The GCF has provided support to FPs submitted by accredited entities (AEs) in FCV contexts. There are currently eight AEs in African FCV states that have at least one approved FP. These include six international accredited entities (IAEs), and one national and one regional direct access entity (DAE).

As of the thirty-third meeting of the Board (B.33),[33] the GCF has 38 FPs in African FCV contexts. Nearly half of these FPs are single-country projects, while a third are multi-country projects including only African States, and the remaining are multi-regional projects that include at least one African State and at least one country outside of Africa (see Figure A - 2).

Figure A - 2. Number of projects in African FCV states, by project scope



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

Among the 20 African FCV states, all but two have at least one FP, with Libya and South Sudan being the exceptions. Of these, 11 African FCV states have at least one single-country FP (six of which count two), 13 have at least one multi-country FP, and 11 have at least one multi-regional FP.

Somalia is the only African state that is categorized as experiencing high-intensity conflict, and it is party only to a single GCF multi-country project, FP177 "Cooling Facility". Among the 13 countries classified as experiencing medium-intensity conflict, seven count at least one single-country FP. Moreover, 10 of these countries are participating in at least one multi-country or multi-regional FP. Overall, Nigeria has the most FPs, counting 11, though none are single-country FPs; Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR) count the least, with two and one FPs respectively.[34]

Finally, among the six countries with high institutional and social fragility, four count at least one single-country FP and four count at least one multi-country or multi-regional FP. Overall, Comoros

[33] B.33 took place in Incheon, Republic of Korea from 17–20 July 2022.
[34] It should be noted that Libya and South Sudan both have no FPs.

counts the most FPs, with four, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, and Guinea-Bissau count the least, with one FP each.

The total value of FPs in African FCV states stands at just over United States dollars (USD) 4 billion (bln), with USD 1.2 bln in approved GCF financing, representing 31 per cent of total GCF approved financing. Nearly half of the financing provided to African FCV states is directed towards single-country FPs, and over a third is directed towards multi-country FPs (see Figure A - 3). Finally, the majority of this financing is directed towards mitigation-related results areas (i.e. energy generation and access; transport; building cities, industries and appliances; and forests and land use), representing 59 per cent of approved GCF financing in African FCV states.

Figure A - 3. GCF-approved financing for projects in African FCV states, by project scope



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

The GCF has provided 63 readiness activities through the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP) in African FCV states, valued at USD 46.3 mln. In addition, four activities under the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) were approved in African FCV states, valued at USD 3.1 bln.

An overview of the portfolio of the three deep dive countries is presented in Appendix 1.

B. KEY FINDINGS

1. RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

a. Alignment with international agreements

GCF interventions in African FCV states are well aligned with international agreements. First, the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 seeks to limit global warming to levels below 2 degrees Celsius, and reaffirms the need for financial assistance to be provided to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. The GCF shows alignment with these objectives through its sole focus on providing climate financing for adaptation and mitigation to developing countries, including African FCV states. Moreover, the alignment of FPs with countries' nationally determined contributions

(NDCs) is considered during FP selection.[35] The NDC is a national strategic document required under the Paris Agreement, which outlines planned actions to reduce GHG emissions and to build resilience to adapt.

The GCF also finances several FPs that address disaster risk reduction (DRR), in alignment with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (herein 'Sendai Framework'). The Sendai Framework adopted in 2015 seeks to substantially reduce disaster risk and loss of lives while protecting livelihoods, health and assets. The GCF contributes to this objective in African FCV states through FPs that support early warning systems (e.g. FP012 'Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali Country Project,' and FP162 'The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme: Building the resilience of smallholder farmers to climate change impacts in 7 Sahelian Countries of the Great Green Wall (GGW)'). Its contributions are further evident through activities that support the integration and mainstreaming of solutions into long-term climate and DRR planning (e.g. FP177, 'Cooling Facility').

Through its climate focus, results areas[36] and cross-cutting priorities (such as gender and inclusion), the GCF is well aligned with several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outlined under Agenda 2030, such as SDG 13: Climate Action, and SDG 7: Affordable and Clean Energy, among others. Moreover, FPs are required to contribute to at least one co-benefit in the economy (e.g. poverty alleviation – in alignment with SDG 1: No Poverty), social (e.g. access to education – in alignment with SDG 4: Quality Education), environment (e.g. conservation and biodiversity – in alignment with SDG 15: Life on Land), and/or gender empowerment spheres (e.g. SDG 5: Gender Equality).

Deep-dive activities reflect this alignment, for example with FP102 "Mali solar rural electrification project", which is strongly aligned with SDG 13, SDG 7 and SDG 5 as it plans on "promoting rural electrification through isolated solar photovoltaic (PV) green mini-grid systems as a low-carbon and resilient solution to the effects of climate change in the energy sector of Mali", with specific actions and considerations for women and women-run enterprises.[37]

b. Alignment with needs and priorities of African FCV states

The GCF portfolio in African FCV states is largely focused on mitigation (around 76 per cent of total project value), particularly on energy generation and access (see Figure A - 4**). This is despite FCV states generating only a small proportion of global GHG emissions.** While energy access is important both for economic development and for building resilience, Africa is considered one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change[38] and remains in dire need of adaptation financing. According to Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-Gain) scores,[39] African FCV

[35] Green Climate Fund (2019i). As outlined in the Investment Criteria Indicators, under Country Ownership, submitted FPs must demonstrate alignment with NDCs. Notably, "Project proposals should clearly describe how the proposed activities align with the country's NDC and other relevant national plans, and how the funding proposal will help to achieve the NDC or these plans by making progress against specific targets defined in national climate policies and strategies, such as nationally appropriate mitigation actions and national adaptation plans".
[36] The GCF portfolio is guided by eight results areas, four of which are related to adaptation and four related to mitigation. The adaptation results areas include: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. The four mitigation results areas include: (i) energy generation and access; (ii) transport; (iii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (iv) forests and land use. See "Areas of work" on the GCF website for more details. Available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/themes-result-areas.
[37] Green Climate Fund (2019d).
[38] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022).
[39] An overview of ND-Gain scores and definitions of vulnerability and readiness areas are provided in Appendix 2.

states are slightly more vulnerable[40] and less ready to face climate change compared to other countries.[41] Vulnerability scores indicate greater vulnerabilities related to adaptive capacity (i.e. availability of social resources for sectoral adaptation), public health (i.e. spread of disease and access to health services), and food security (i.e. food production, demand, nutrition and rural populations).[42] Readiness scores related to the economy (i.e. business environment) and governance (i.e. political stability, control of corruption, and regulatory quality, among others) are also lower when compared to African non-FCV states.[43] The continent's pressing need for adaptation financing was reflected at Conference of Parties (COP) 26, where pledges to double climate adaptation financing by 2025 were made. Key informants consulted reiterated the importance in investing in adaptation, in Africa and in African FCV states more specifically.

Figure A - 4. Distribution of project value in African FCV states, by results area (mln)



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

Moreover, while the GCF is supporting countries in reaching their NDC GHG emissions reduction targets, its portfolio has gaps in financing for key, vulnerable sectors, as identified through ND-Gain scores and in NDCs. Notably, agriculture is identified as a vulnerable sector in all African FCV states' NDCs, with the exception of Niger (see Appendix 2 for an overview of African FCV states' NDCs, as per the NDC Explorer). This is followed by water, and health, with these sectors identified as vulnerable in 14 and 13 of the African FCV states, respectively. Furthermore, nearly all countries identify the water sector and the agriculture sector as priorities, and have included related actions, plans and strategies in their NDCs.[44] Despite this, the GCF's health, food and water security results area only accounts for 8 per cent of project value in African FCV states.

[40] Average ND-Gain vulnerability score of 0.57 in African FCV states compared to 0.50 in African non-FCV states and 0.43 globally (excluding African FCV states) – with a score of 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability and 0 representing no vulnerability.
[41] Average ND-Gain readiness scores of 0.26 in African FCV states compared to 0.35 in African non-FCV states and 0.45 globally (excluding African FCV states) – with a score of 1 representing the highest level of readiness and a score of 0 representing the lowest level of readiness.
[42] Average ND-Gain vulnerability score of 0.75, 0.71 and 0.65 for adaptive capacity, public health and food security respectively for African FCV states (compared to 0.65, 0.62 and 0.55 respectively for African non-FCV states).
[43] Average ND-Gain readiness scores of 0.28 and 0.26 for economy and governance respectively for African FCV states (compared to 0.36 and 0.43 respectively for African non-FCV states).
[44] DRC is the only country not to identify water as a priority sector, while Nigeria is the only country not to identify agriculture as a priority sector.

Finally, as African FCV states face challenges related to conflict and social unrest, country priorities are often geared towards increasing country stability and security. While the GCF does not directly seek to achieve these outcomes, certain FPs have the potential to generate these co-benefits. This is the case with FP105 "BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up Solar Energy Investments in Francophone West Africa LDCs". Here, when investments are made, they are perceived as creating a growing tide of disincentives for local populations to participate in anti-government movements.

2. COHERENCE

There is evidence of potential coordination and complementarity of GCF FPs in African FCV states with other initiatives, as reflected in FP proposals and therefore considered during project preparation. This is noted both in terms of complementarity with previous initiatives and, to a larger extent, with ongoing initiatives.

GCF interventions in African FCV states are found to complement ongoing initiatives, as together, these support countries and organizations, from pipeline preparation to financing. This is notably the case for FP177 "Cooling Facility", a multi-regional FP which includes the participation of Somalia. The facility will provide concessional financing with the aim to foster the adoption and/or scaling-up of the deployment of sustainable cooling technologies, appliances and business models in two target areas: space cooling and cool/green surfaces; and refrigeration, cold chains and logistics.[45] This FP is complementary to the Efficient, Clean Cooling Program (ECCP) of the World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), as the facility will make financing available for pipeline projects prepared through the ECCP. The ECCP provides technical assistance (TA) to support the development of pipeline projects related to efficient clean cooling and seeks to develop a strategic partnership to help mobilize additional funding.

Similarly, potential complementarity is noted between FP178, "Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility", and the Global Center on Adaptation's (GCA) Masterclass on Climate Resilient Infrastructure for G5 Sahel Countries. The GCF-supported Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility will finance solar energy projects in G5 Sahel countries. The GCA will seek to provide the knowledge and skills required to develop projects that can be submitted to the Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility. It should however be noted that the development of the GCA masterclass does not appear to have been considered during the preparation of the GCF project, given that the masterclass was developed subsequently by the GCA. As such, while the GCA saw a need for this masterclass to support applications for the Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility, the evaluation has not found evidence of the GCF's involvement in the masterclass or the masterclass having influenced the design of the GCF project. Reiterating an earlier point, it is however expected that the GCA will influence project applications to the Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility.

Complementarity is further noted in instances where GCF-supported programmes, coupled with external programmes, seek to ensure businesses of all sizes in a given sector can access financial support. Under the multi-country project FP148 "Participation in Energy Access Relief Facility" (EARF),[46] the GCF intends to provide energy access to companies with low-interest, unsecured junior loans to maintain staff and supply lines and to be better positioned to drive the post-COVID-19 recovery. As such, EARF is intended to provide support to medium to large enterprises, but is less well suited for smaller enterprises for whom non-reimbursable financing is better suited. Better-

[45] The first target area, space cooling and cool/green surfaces, includes cooling equipment, building automation and controls, as well as solar and vegetative roofs and walls, among others. The second target area, refrigeration, cold chains and logistics, includes refrigeration, storage, and distribution activities, and related equipment and logistics.
[46] Nine African States – including three African FCV states – are participating in this FP, namely Uganda, Nigeria, DRC, Kenya, Senegal, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Zambia.

suited support for these actors is intended to be made available by the Global Association for the Off-grid Solar Energy Industry (GOGLA), the Clean Cooking Alliance (CCA), and the African Minigrid Developer Association (AMDA), which are working with other sector actors to create a fully grant-funded facility of USD 35 mln for these very small companies to access grants.

Some evidence of coordination is noted with other initiatives, particularly where GCF projects aim to address data gaps. Once addressed, the available data has the potential to support the implementation of initiatives brought forward by other organizations. This is seen in FP012 "Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali Country Project", which seeks to improve hydromet and early warning infrastructure and enhance service delivery and warning to communities. During implementation, coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiative "*Appui à la mise en oeuvre de la Stratégie Nationale Changement Climatique du Mali* (ASNaCC)" is expected. ASNaCC seeks to support disaster prevention and preparedness for major risks (particularly floods) across seven municipalities. Thus, coordination between the GCF and UNDP is intended to ensure stations are installed in areas where there is the most need and value added, therefore providing the required information for warning systems essential to reduce community vulnerability.

Beyond project-level complementarity, organizations are providing support to African FCV states to build capacity and increase their abilities to access GCF financing. This is notably the case with the GCA, which is working closely with the DRC, Burkina Faso, the Niger, and Nigeria with the aim of supporting national entities to secure accreditation and the development of a pipeline of FPs for GCF submission.

3. Country ownership

There are noted challenges related to country ownership of engagement with the GCF in African FCV states. The Country Ownership Framework[47] developed as part of the evaluation finds that these countries have notably lower country ownership of engagement with the GCF when compared to African non-FCV states, with 25 per cent of African FCV states considered as having "weak" country ownership. In comparison, only 12 per cent of African non-FCV states score similarly. This trend is largely driven by African States with high institutional and social fragility and those with high-intensity conflict, with these respectively recording average country ownership scores of 13.83 and 10, compared to 16.92 for countries with medium-intensity conflict, and 17.91 for non-FCV states (noting the framework allows for a maximum score of 32, reflecting the highest level of ownership).

African FCV states experience particular challenges in the area of "Role of the national designated authority (NDA)". While also being noted as the most challenging area for African non-FCV states, challenges appear to be more pronounced in African FCV states, with a score of 0 for a country experiencing high-intensity conflict (i.e. Somalia), and average scores of 3.5 for countries experiencing medium-intensity conflict and 2.5 for countries experiencing high institutional and

[47] The Country Ownership Framework developed for this evaluation builds on the Framework developed as part of the "Independent evaluation of the Green Climate Funds's country ownership approach". The framework notably assesses country ownership of engagement with the GCF as per four key areas, namely: (i) the role of the NDA – particularly as it relates to national DAEs, stakeholder management and their role as executing entity; (ii) the presence of country strategies – including NDCs, national adaptation plans and country programmes; (iii) the provision of RPSP and PPF support; and (iv) access to climate finance – both GCF and external financing. Country ownership scores obtained under this framework range from 0 (lowest level of country ownership) to 32 (highest level of country ownership). Scores at 10 or below were considered to indicate "low" country ownership. Scores between 11 and 22 were considered to indicate "moderate" country ownership, while scores above 22 were considered to indicate "high" country ownership. A more detailed description of the Country Ownership Framework can be found in volume I of the Factual Report.

social fragility. These are compared to average scores of 4.6 for African non-FCV states (see Table A - 3).

Table A - 3. Average scores under 'Role of NDA' indicator category by FCV states classification

INDICATORS	MAX SCORE	HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT	MEDIUM-INTENSITY CONFLICT	HIGH INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL FRAGILITY	NON-FCV STATES
NDA acting as an executing entity for approved funding proposals	1	0	0.08	0.33	0.12
Country acting as a co-financier of the GCF-approved project	3	0	1.85	1.17	2.18
Number of entities nominated for accreditation	2	0	1.15	0.33	1.38
Number of national DAEs accredited	3	0	0.08	0.17	0.44
Stakeholder engagement: Engagement of the NDA at the project design or preparation phase	1	0	0.38	0.50	0.47
Total role of NDA	**10**	**0**	**3.54**	**2.50**	**4.59**

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab, Country Ownership Framework. as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

Challenges related to the leadership and capacity of NDAs/focal points were also highlighted in key informant interviews. Key informants report that certain FCV states experience challenges in supporting their NDAs/focal points (notably in terms of financing), which have in some cases reportedly led to high turnover rates. Key informants also note a lack of understanding of GCF processes and mechanisms (see section 9 for more on procedural challenges). These factors have created challenges in moving initiatives forward, and these challenges are reflected by IAE informants, who notably highlight the lack of responsiveness of some NDAs/focal points and the difficulty in acquiring no-objection letters (NOLs).

Efforts to support NDAs/focal points in African FCV states are nonetheless noted. All African FCV states have received at least one RPSP grant for NDA/focal points strengthening, with 17 (85 per cent) receiving more than one. RPSP support is delivered by GCF-authorized delivery partners to strengthen institutional capacity, governance mechanisms, and planning and programming frameworks. There are notable benefits in external partners providing such support as it facilitates the participation of a range of diverse stakeholders, including government bodies, civil society organizations (CSOs), and private sector organizations (PSOs), thus overcoming the isolation of actors in the countries to a certain extent. As such, external partners push for a united government voice to overcome fragmentation in policy, and use of resources, among other challenges experienced in African FCV states in particular.

This is the case in Somalia, where the Global Water Partnership Organization (GWPO) is supporting the Government under an RPSP. The GWPO is working with Somalia to build government capacity, increase internal government coherence and communication, and increase engagement with a diversity of stakeholders, ultimately helping prepare the country to directly access GCF grants. This builds on GWPO's longstanding and thorough efforts in the water sector in Somalia. Accordingly, they have contributed to building NDA/focal point leadership and the capacity and willingness of

the NDA/focal point to work with other actors, both within and external to government (such as with CSOs and youth), while seeking gender equality.

Beyond NDAs/focal points, pronounced challenges are noted in relation to DAEs in African FCV states. Three indicators in the Country Ownership Framework relate to DAEs, all of which indicate challenges in obtaining accreditation and in DAE capacity (see Table A - 4). There are notably only two African FCV states with a national DAE, namely the Ministry of Finance and Development of the Federal Cooperation Republic of Ethiopia (MoFEC) and the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ). MoFEC is the only national DAE with an approved project, as IDBZ is currently pending the signature of its accreditation master agreement (AMA). Moreover, only three FPs in African FCV states submitted by regional DAEs have received approval, all of which were submitted by BOAD. As such, 89 per cent of approved FPs in African FCV states are led by IAEs.

Table A - 4. Average scores of indicators related to DAEs, by FCV states classification

INDICATORS	MAX SCORE	HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT	HIGH INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL FRAGILITY	MEDIUM-INTENSITY CONFLICT	NON-FCV STATES
Number of entities nominated for accreditation	2	0	0.33	1.15	1.38
Number of national DAEs accredited	3	0	0.17	0.08	0.44
DAEs' capacities to develop projects (approved project from national DAE)	3	0	0	0.15	0.47

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab, Country Ownership Framework. as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).
Note: High-intensity conflict countries (i.e. Somalia) were not included as a score of 0 was obtained for each indicator.

There is a noted desire to increase the number of DAEs, with some countries highlighting in their NDCs the need to increase the number of DAEs to achieve climate-related objectives (e.g. Mali). Increasing the number of DAEs has the potential to increase country ownership of interventions and ensure FPs are better attuned to the diversity of local realities and challenges. While important across the continent, being attuned with local realities is particularly important in African FCV states, given the heterogeneity of these countries and regions within these countries, as well as the diversity of challenges they face. For example, the strength of the central government in FCV states can vary greatly, as can the government's presence across the territory (e.g. Nigeria, where parts of the country are controlled by rebels) and government structures (e.g. Somalia, which has strong tribal presence). A strong understanding of these realities is required to develop well-suited projects. The use of DAEs is also noted by stakeholders as having the potential to reduce procedural burdens, a challenge which is often seen with large IAEs who, in addition to GCF processes, often have their own lengthy and heavy processes for approval.

Finally, participation of CSOs is particularly important given their proximity to local communities. In the African FCV states, CSOs perceive engagement of civil society in project preparation and approval as adequate. Indeed, CSO informants note efforts made to ensure participation and inclusivity, while highlighting the need for measures to ensure participation in the preparation processes of funding proposals. Similar CSO survey respondents report being primarily familiar with GCF work in African FCV states.

However, while CSOs are consulted during project preparation, key informants observe challenges in the direct involvement of CSOs in the technical design of projects and in submitting their own

projects. This was attributed to the complexity of GCF processes, with one CSO informant illustratively noting "the GCF is a headache to access. It is impossible to access resources beyond the national focal point […]. Civil society validates projects, but does not conceptualise them. We are aware of the projects, but we are not involved technically in their design" (see section 9 for more on procedural challenges). In this regard, the limited accessibility of GCF resources inhibits the transformative potential of GCF projects and the GCF more broadly.

4. Effectiveness of investments

a. Effectiveness of funded projects

The GCF has for its objective the promotion of a "paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways in the context of sustainable development and make a significant and ambitious contribution to the global efforts towards attaining the goals set by the international community to combat climate change".[48]

While it is currently too early to assess the extent to which GCF investments are effective in achieving this objective, the design of projects provides an indication of whether the GCF is likely to reach its objectives in African FCV states. Single-country FPs in African FCV states are expected to reach 55.6 mln beneficiaries, including 14.4 mln directly and 41.2 mln indirectly. These projects are also expected to lead to carbon dioxide (CO_2) reductions of 73,404,391 metric tons CO_2 equivalent (MtCo2eq), and to improve the management of and/or reduce salinization on 22,752 hectares (ha) of land or forest area, while creating 13,540 jobs. For nearly all outputs and outcomes, single-country FPs in African FCV states are expected to surpass achievements in African non-FCV states (see Table A - 5).

Table A - 5. Average impact and sustainable development potential per single-country FP, by FCV states classification

Output/outcome	African FCV states	African non-FCV states
Expected beneficiaries	3,273,096	1,862,015
Direct beneficiaries	848,131	542,658
Indirect beneficiaries	2,424,965	1,356,006
Jobs created[49]	796	4,175
Expected MtCo2eq reduced in lifetime	4,317,905	3,150,569
Ha of land or forest with improved management or reduced salinization	1,338	32,954

Source: Green Climate Fund. Funding proposals; and World Bank (2021).
Note: These values only consider single-country FPs, as multi-country projects and multi-regional FPs do not provide a country-specific breakdown of outcomes.

Exceptions are noted in the category of "jobs created" and "Ha of land or forest with improved management or reduced salinization". While nine projects in African FCV states are intended to create jobs, only two projects specified the targeted number of jobs. These include FP058 "Responding to the increasing risk of drought: building gender-responsive resilience of the most

[48] Green Climate Fund (2021j).
[49] Note that the number of jobs is not specified for all FPs that reported job creation as being a co-benefit.

vulnerable communities",[50] in Ethiopia that intends to create 2,240 jobs. Job creation is notably expected as a result of the establishment and upgrading of nurseries. The second project is FP159 "PREFOREST CONGO – Project to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from forests in five departments in the Republic of Congo",[51] which intends to create 11,300 jobs in agroforestry and forestry. On the other hand, 24 projects in African non-FCV states are intended to create jobs, 12 of which have provided a specific target. These include FP073 "Strengthening Climate Resilience of Rural Communities in Northern Rwanda", FP026 "Sustainable Landscapes in Eastern Madagascar", and FP011 "Large-scale Ecosystem-based Adaptation in the Gambia: developing a climate-resilient, natural resource-based economy", with targets of 86,000, 28,300, and 11,550 jobs respectively.

In terms of land or forest with improved management or reduced salinization, only two projects in African FCV states have reported potential impacts within this area. This includes FP127, "Building Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Agricultural Livelihoods in Southern Zimbabwe,"[52] which aims to increase the number of hectares under climate-proofed irrigation and to increase the number of rain-fed hectares exhibiting water harvesting and climate-resilient water management measures. The second project is Simplified Approval Process (SAP) 012, "Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture",[53] which aims to rehabilitate and lead to the sustainable management of land, degraded forests and pastoral land as well as increase the number of hectares of land or forests under improved and effective management that contribute to CO_2 emission reductions. On the other hand, 10 projects in African non-FCV states include targets related to improved management or reduced salinization of land or forest. These include FP026 "Sustainable Landscapes in Eastern Madagascar", FP003 "Increasing the resilience of ecosystems and communities through the restoration of the productive bases of salinized lands," and FP167 "Transforming Eastern Province through Adaptation", with objectives of reaching 655,832 ha, 373,000 ha, and 99,345 ha respectively.

While these targets provide insights as to the foreseen outputs and outcomes of single-country projects in African FCV states, the extent to which multi-country and multi-regional projects will lead to concrete impacts on the ground is unclear. Key informants interviewed report it is common practice for AEs to collect NOLs in a mix of countries to get programmes approved but only move forward with sub-projects in a handful of countries, based on those countries' risk profiles and opportunities. The extent to which disbursements from these multi-country/regional projects are made within African FCV states cannot, therefore, be assessed at this stage, given disbursements are tracked by project rather than by country. This is alarming given that multi-country and multi-regional projects play a prominent role in African FCV states' portfolios, with the prominence of these projects increasing in recent years (see Figure A - 5). Indeed, between 2016 and 2020, the number of single-country projects and multi-country/regional projects that were approved remained similar. However, a noted shift has been seen in 2021 and 2022, with much more multi-country/regional projects being approved. As of B.33, multi-country/regional projects represent 55 per cent of approved projects in African FCV states, and account for 82 per cent of project value (see Figure A - 6).

[50] The project has for its overarching objective to "increase the resilience of the targeted rural communities to the adverse impacts of climate change by introducing new approaches to water supply and management systems capable of increasing the productive capacity of the community and the carrying capacity of the water ecosystems" (GCF, 2017c; and GCF, 2021l).
[51] The project has for its overarching objective to "reduce carbon emissions, while also providing important adaptation co-benefits, focusing its action on three deforestation and forest degradation hotspots" (GCF, 2021m).
[52] Green Climate Fund (2020g); and Green Climate Fund (2021k). The project has for its overarching objective to "strengthen the resilience of agricultural livelihoods of vulnerable communities, particularly women, in southern Zimbabwe to increasing climate risks and impacts".
[53] Green Climate Fund (2019g). The project has for its overarching objective to "increase the resilience of smallholder farmers to adverse impacts of climate change".

Figure A - 5. Number of approved FPs in African FCV states, by year and project scope



Source: Green Climate Fund. iPMS as of B.33.; and World Bank (2021).

Figure A - 6. Distribution of projects and financing, by project scope and FCV states classification



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

The stability of countries is found to have an important effect on their ability to attract investments and therefore achieve outcomes. A stable investment environment is paramount for attracting financing, particularly from organizations that make risk-based decisions. As such, FCV states have faced ongoing challenges in attracting climate finance given the high level of risk of investments due to security and political instability. The importance of country stability is reflected in the GCF portfolio, where more stable countries have more projects. Indeed, African non-FCV states count on average 5.33 projects with average GCF financing of USD 84.6 mln, while African FCV states see on average 4.5 projects with average GCF financing of USD 69.3 mln.

African FCV states also experience greater challenges in attracting co-financing, averaging USD 138.6 mln for FCV states as compared to USD 168.8 mln for non-FCV states. African FCV states also have lower in-country capacity to financially support projects. Co-financing from within project countries remains very low in African FCV states, representing 3 per cent of total co-financing, thereby increasing their reliance on the international community for financing.[54] Indeed, co-financing in these countries is largely dependent on multi-donor trust funds and the international community, such as the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations. Limited co-financing from governments, multilateral development banks (MDBs), international financial institutions (IFIs), and the private sector is noted.

The high level of risk makes investments in African FCV states particularly challenging for the private sector, given the prominence of risk-based decision-making. To date, the private sector has invested in 11 projects within at least one African FCV state. Among these, only two were single-country projects, while five were multi-regional projects.[55] The GCF plays an important role in de-risking investments, and this has the potential to crowd-in greater private sector financing. This can be achieved through the use of non-debt financing instruments, such as equity and guarantees, where the GCF positions itself as a first-loss equity or first-loss guarantee provider. To date, no significant difference in GCF's use of financial instruments in African FCV states and non-FCV states is noted (see Figure A - 7). Indeed, 54 per cent of approved GCF financing in FCV states is planned though non-debt instruments (i.e. equity, grants and guarantees), the majority of which will be provided through grants; this is compared to 49 per cent for African non-FCV states (with grants also being the preferred instrument). However, given the level of risk faced when investing in FCV states, there is greater need for investments to be de-risked in these countries to attract additional financing from the private sector as well as other actors. As such, the instruments used by the GCF to invest in these contexts should reflect these realities.

Figure A - 7. Distribution of GCF-approved financing by financing instrument



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

[54] Financing from project-country governments is particularly low in African FCV states when compared to African non-FCV states, with an average per project standing at USD 8.3 mln compared to USD 31.8 mln per project in African non-FCV states. Similarly, co-financing from the private sector of project countries stood on average at USD 24.6 mln per project in African FCV states, compared to USD 54.9 mln in African non-FCV states.
[55] Note that the remaining four projects were multi-country projects, i.e. include only countries in Africa.

The high level of risk also means GCF projects must adopt appropriate measures to mitigate such risk. An overview of mitigative measures adopted in FCV states is provided in Box A - 1 below.

Box A - 1. Risk management in FPs of African FCV states

Given the high level of risk in operating in FCV states, the assessment of risks and the development of related mitigative measures is highly important. Thirty-eight approved funding proposals in African FCV states were checked to identify risk mitigation measures related to fragility and institutional instability, and whether projects were scaling up existing activities. The aim was to assess whether projects in African FCV states are structured differently.

Among projects in African FCV states, fragility and institutional instability related risks were identified in 19 of the projects. Out of these funding proposals, 13 had risk mitigation measures proposed, while six did not have any proposed risk mitigation measures. Among the 13 projects with risk mitigation measures, only three were multi-country/regional projects, while the rest were single-country projects. Eight single-country and 17 multi-country/regional projects did not have any risk mitigation measures identified.

Generally, the proposed risk mitigation measures were:

- Reliance on less risky stakeholders; experience of implementing projects in fragile states by the accredited and executing entities
- Implementing activities in non-conflict and less fragile regions of the countries
- Security measures and dependence on ongoing security and military interventions for security
- Applying good practices such as transparency to foster confidence of the local communities in the project
- Planned use of project outcomes to de-escalate conflict
- Tailoring the planned intervention to address the source of the conflict
- Concessional contracts to address expropriation

For some of the projects such as FP078 "Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund" (ARAF), FP105 "BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up Solar Energy Investments in Francophone West Africa LDCs", and SAP012 "Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture", risk mitigation measures were not proposed despite fragility having been identified as a risk. In these three funding proposals, the risks were not explicitly listed as fragility-related but as legal, expropriation, and political risks, respectively. For FP163 "Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility", the risk mitigation measure proposed in the funding proposal does not seem to directly address conflict risks but could be relevant in addressing issues that may drive conflict and fragile conditions. In addition, the funding proposal explicitly mentions the need to develop private sector capacities in countries, including those facing fragile and conflict-affected situations. Other associated risks such as fire that may result from riots were identified as risks that were likely to disrupt project activities.

b. Effectiveness in building capacity and bringing projects to approval

Country capacity also plays an important role in bringing projects for approval and in project financing. As previously discussed, NDA/focal point capacity and leadership are challenges in certain African FCV states where limited in-country resources to support to the NDA/focal point are available. Given the important role of NDAs/focal points in project development, strong NDA/focal point capacity is essential for the effectiveness of investments. The GCF supports such capacity building through the RPSP. To date, the GCF has approved 63 readiness activities in African FCV states, valued at USD 46.3 mln, representing 34 per cent of the approved RPSP amount directed towards the African States. As such, African FCV states have received slightly less support compared to African non-FCV states, with an estimated average per country of USD 2.3 mln and USD 2.6 mln respectively. While all African FCV states have approved readiness support for NDA/focal point strengthening, only 10 have approved readiness support to develop their national adaptation plan (NAP). An additional seven have a readiness activity for this purpose in the pipeline, four of which currently have no NAP.

Moreover, while 20 PPFs are approved in the African States, only four include at least one African FCV state, and only one of these is provided to a DAE (BOAD). Moreover, half of PPFs approved

in FCV states are for multi-country projects, which receive 68 per cent of the total PPF approved amounts, while all PPF activities in African non-FCV states are single-country. As previously noted, the extent to which multi-country projects will lead to impacts in African FCV states can be limited given the high level of risk. As such, while PPF support is being delivered to projects involving African FCV states, the extent to which the FPs being developed with this support will lead to actual disbursements in African FCV states may be limited by comparison to non-FCV states.

Finally, there are noteworthy differences between African FCV states where national and regional DAEs are active and those without any DAEs: countries with active DAEs having stronger portfolios overall. As previously mentioned, only four projects approved in African FCV states were submitted by DAEs. African FCV states included as part of these projects are among African FCV states with the highest number of projects and with the highest investment values, with the exception of Guinea-Bissau.[56] These include:

- Ethiopia, where FP058 is approved, has 7 projects, valued at USD 818.1 mln.
- Mali, where FP102 and FP105 are approved, has 10 projects, valued at USD 507.6 mln.
- Burkina Faso, where FP102 is approved, has 10 projects, valued at USD 379.5 mln.
- The Niger, where FP105 and FP176 are approved, has 7 projects, valued at USD 296.1 mln.

In comparison, FCV states without DAEs have on average 3.5 projects, valued at USD 131.5 mln.

5. Unexpected and unintended results

Given the early stages of projects, the evaluation has found no evidence of unexpected or unintended results related to FPs in selected deep-dive countries. Among the 13 approved FPs in these countries, annual performance reports (APRs) are only available for two projects. The FP012, "Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali country project" submitted an APR in February 2021. However, as political turmoil and the COVID-19 pandemic have delayed project activities, no results have yet been reported.

Similarly, no results have yet been reported under FP105 "BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up Solar Energy Investments in Francophone West Africa LDCs", the other project that has submitted an APR. While project activities are moving forward, COVID-19 resulted in delays, and no sub-projects have been approved under the BOAD Climate Finance Facility as of the publication of the APR in 2020. Key informants interviewed also note it is too early for results to be observed.

6. Paradigm shift

As previously noted, the GCF seeks to enable a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. To achieve such a paradigm shift, in the form of a "just transition", investments in FCV states need to focus on adaptation and on building resilience. The GCF portfolio in African FCV states currently focuses primarily on the results area of energy generation and access. African FCV states have lower levels of electricity access, with an average of 40 per cent of the population having access to electricity, compared to 64.8 per cent of the population for African non-FCV states. Investments under this results area focus on African FCV states with lower access rates, particularly through single-country projects, indicating these have the potential to provide much-needed infrastructure.[57] However, while energy access is important for building resilience,

[56] It should be noted that Guinea-Bissau is the only country featured among FCV countries with a DAE project approved that is also an SIDS, and the only one experiencing high institutional and social fragility.
[57] Some 49 per cent of approved financing for African FCV states under the result area of energy generation and access, is geared towards countries with an access rate below 20 per cent. Moreover, 21 per cent of financing going towards single-country FPs in African FCV states is geared towards energy generation and access, over half of which targets countries where less than 20 per cent of the population has access to electricity (with DRC and Burkina Faso receiving the most).

there remains an important gap in ensuring African FCV states can adapt to climate change and build resilience in other key sectors.

Conversations with key informants in African FCV states highlight areas of interest for such a paradigm shift to take place in these countries. Notably, while the GCF provides appreciated financing, the level of financing provided is not at the levels required to influence such a shift. With an initial objective to leverage USD 100 bln in climate financing annually, the GCF has committed only USD 10.8 bln globally since its launch, and only USD 1.2 bln in African FCV states, with even lower amounts being disbursed. As such, the GCF's role in crowding-in financing becomes highly important. There is agreement among key informants of the further need for de-risking investments in FCV states to attract the level of resources required.

The type of financing provided and attracted is also an important factor to consider. Indeed, some of the most fragile states, like Burkina Faso and others, are heavily indebted and thus unprepared to take on more debt. As previously noted, a large proportion of GCF financing in African FCV states will be provided through debt instruments. Moreover, approximately 59 per cent of the co-financing leveraged in African FCV states will be provided through debt instruments (with 57 per cent of the total co-financing provided through senior loans). This is noted as an important challenge under the GGW initiative, for example, which includes eight African FCV states[58] and where the majority of financing is offered through loans rather than grants.

Moreover, in line with a "just transition", there is a need to strengthen FCV states' economies, particularly strengthening and increasing participation of the local private sector. The current GCF model is noted as being ill-suited for engaging with the private sectors of developing countries, which are primarily composed of smaller businesses. While the GCF has developed funding streams that are accessible to the local private sector in theory, the complexity of the accreditation process and the dominance of the IAEs pursuing larger FPs and/or multi-country/regional FPs[59] has limited the extent to which smaller businesses can engage with and access GCF resources. Indeed, a gap in accredited private sector AEs is noted, with no private sector national or regional AE based in an African FCV state.[60] It is nonetheless recognized that several financing facilities receiving GCF support intend to provide financing to the private sector through concessional financing, loans, etc., which are well suited for smaller local businesses.

7. Gender equity and social inclusion

As required for all GCF applications, all FPs in African FCV states have undertaken a gender assessment and developed a gender action plan. Gender action plans include a series of outcomes, outputs, and activities with a gender-focused lens. These action plans also include related indicators and targets for each gender-related activity, with gender disaggregation where possible.

Beyond the inclusion of targets and measures to create benefits for women, youth, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups, FPs in African FCV states address gender and social inclusion via several angles. Among projects in deep-dive countries, there is a focus on training – including training related to gender-inclusion, gender-based violence, and other related themes – as well as broader capacity building. Specific measures are also identified to support women-led

[58] These include Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan.
[59] Some 61 per cent of FPs in African FCV states are either large or medium, and more importantly, 50 per cent of FPs in FCV states are large or medium multi-country/regional projects.
[60] There is one private sector DAE in Africa, the Attijariwafa Bank, which to date has no approved FP or FPs in the pipeline (whether it be in African FCV or non-FCV states).

enterprises, as seen under FP163, SRMI Facility,[61] where the facility will seek to support women and girls in accessing sources of low-risk income and entrepreneurship opportunities. Awareness-raising and advocacy work are also included to mainstream gender in policies, both in the public and private sectors. For example, the FP178, "Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility" seeks to establish a national gender-responsive energy policy and a gender action plan within the Ministry of Energy to be used within the national electricity companies and utilities. Finally, facilities that intend to provide financial support to projects have also included specific criteria to ensure gender is considered in financed projects.

Given the early implementation stage of projects and delays experienced due to COVID-19, very limited gender-related activities have taken place and results are not yet available. Gender-specific activities have only been reported under the FP012 "Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali country project". These activities include the training of 90 women in September 2019 on the conceptual framework related to disaster risk management, weather and climate information, and early warning systems. This training particularly focused on raising awareness related to the implementation of gender actions, gender-specific communication, and considerations in the planning, design and implementation of early warning systems. Moreover, a project implementation manual was prepared, which includes the gender-based violence management mechanism and the grievance redress mechanism, among other components.

8. SUSTAINABILITY, REPLICATION AND SCALABILITY

As part of its funding proposal, the GCF requires all applicants of FPs to provide an exit strategy outlining "how the project/programme will successfully exit once implementation is completed, including how results and benefits will continue beyond the project/programme period and how the contribution to paradigm shift will be maintained".[62] As such, thinking related to post implementation is required from the start, including for projects in African FCV states. While it remains too early to assess the extent to which benefits are sustained, and the extent to which intervention replication and scaling takes place, a review of these exit strategies provides an indication of approaches used in FCV states.

The most widely adopted approach is capacity building and/or institutional strengthening, with nearly all projects in case study countries including such a component to favour the sustainability of the FP. This includes training for community and sectoral users (e.g. FP012 'Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali country project', where users will be trained to use the hydromet system) and training for key staff within key institutions (e.g. FP178 'Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility', where component 3 will seek to build the capacity of grid operators and regulators).

FPs also include measures to enhance the enabling environment by supporting the strengthening of country frameworks (e.g. FP163), the operationalization of current policies and regulatory frameworks (e.g. FP178), and the definition of national strategies for financing climate risk (e.g. FP162). Various approaches are also planned with the intent to attract private sector participation and for the creation of public-private partnerships. Such approaches include supporting the

[61] The SRMI facility seeks to "support the eligible countries to shift to low-emission sustainable development pathways and increase access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy to its populations". It seeks to achieve this through the provision of technical assistance (i.e. the development of plans integrating variable renewable energy (VRE), capacity building, transaction advisories, and preparatory studies for solar and wind), public investments (i.e. provision of loans to host countries to finance solar and wind park infrastructure; for VRE-integrated grid upgrades and grid reliance; and for electrification), and risk mitigation (i.e. the use of guarantees and reimbursable grants).
[62] Green Climate Fund (2022c).

development financing models to favour public-private partnerships (e.g. FP162), improving business models and services to attract private interest (e.g. FP012), and providing financing to private sector actors through GCF-supported facilities (e.g. FP178).

Finally, 30 FPs in African FCV states[63] indicated that the projects would be scaling up pre-existing project interventions. The remaining eight FPs[64] did not indicate the scaling up of any activity, or indicated scaling up was not deemed relevant. A review of projects in case study countries shows that projects primarily seek to achieve replication and scaling through information sharing. This is planned to take place through events (e.g. FP177) and through sharing lessons learnt (e.g. FP148). Other initiatives have positioned themselves as "proofs of concept" (e.g. FP096) and have put in place measures to facilitate the replication of their processes. This is seen for FP148, where Acumen intends for various fund processes and tools (such as eligibility criteria, requirements, monitoring, tenor, terms, among others) to be open sourced to facilitate the replication of the relief fund's structure.

9. Efficiency

The GCF is generally regarded as a very complex institution, largely maladapted to operate in African FCV states. This complexity and associated lengthy processes, as well as the lack of flexibility and rigid requirements applied universally with little consideration for in-country realities, have created challenges for FCV states to access financing and have situated the GCF as a barrier to financing rather than as a partner of choice. Moreover, key informants from francophone African FCV states unanimously decry the challenges of language posed by the GCF, given that the only working language is English.

Countries with fragility as well as low capacity (e.g. Somalia) have therefore needed to focus on developing their capacities simply to engage with the GCF appropriately and effectively. Certain organizations have developed an approach for supporting African FCV states (as well as others) to navigate the complexity of the GCF, as a bridge. These include the GWPO, the GCA, and others, each with their specific focus (see section 3 and section 4 for more detail on the nature of the support provided by these organizations).

As previously noted, there is a desire to increase the number of DAEs, which are perceived as more efficient, and with potential benefits related to country ownership and projects being better attuned to local realities. However, there are challenges in reaching accreditation in African FCV states. Only one national DAE with an effective AMA is based in an African FCV state, and it took 622 days to receive accreditation following submission (compared to an average of 524 days for African non-FCV states). Key informants highlight challenges in accessing accreditation, with some noting they have been seeking accreditation for over three years and have not received updates on their application for over a year. As noted earlier, certain entities in African FCV states (e.g. in Somalia and DRC) are receiving support from other organizations to complete the accreditation process.

Moreover, the process to access financing through the various modalities is lengthy throughout Africa, and FCV states are no exception. Approval of RPSP support has taken on average 362 days from submission, despite the need for capacity building to access financing. While PPFs have reached approval fairly quickly compared to other modalities (averaging 171 days), only two country-specific PPF activities have been approved in African FCV states. Finally, FPs with at least

[63] Including 0 FPs in countries with high institutional and social fragility, 19 in countries with medium-intensity conflict, and one in a country with high-intensity conflict.
[64] Including eight FPs in states with medium-intensity conflicts and one in a highly institutionally and socially fragile state.

one African FCV state were approved on average 335 days after submission.[65] However, a review of the current pipeline indicates that on average, projects awaiting approval with at least one African FCV state were submitted 700 days prior to B.33.

Disbursement rates are also particularly low across Africa and in African FCV states. Indeed, FCV states have seen approximately 20 per cent of approved amounts for single-country projects disbursed (compared to 32 per cent in African non-FCV states) (see Table A - 6). While disbursements for projects by national DAEs are the highest, this only includes one project approved in 2017. The low disbursement rate has created issues, and in some instances has affected institutional trust. This is the case in one Central African country, where extensive consultations took place at the country level, bringing multiple stakeholders on board for GCF projects, and building expectations. Since the approval of the country's first FP in 2018, no disbursements from the GCF have been forthcoming. This has resulted in a loss of social and institutional capital for the NDA/focal point and led to perceptions of the GCF as failing to keep the FPs with IAEs moving in a timely way.

Table A - 6. Disbursement rate by AE type

		International	Regional	National	Total
FCV states	Count	14	2	1	17
	GCF budget approved	$425,625,476	$56,332,715	$45,002,759	$526,960,950
	Disbursed	$82,601,499	$1,096,335	$23,766,434	$107,464,269
	Disbursement rate	19%	2%	53%	20%
Non-FCV states	Count	26	2	9	37
	GCF budget approved	$780,316,969	$175,748,169	$226,927,645	$1,182,992,783
	Disbursed	$292,667,804	$5,127,350	$77,408,856	$375,204,009
	Disbursement rate	38%	3%	34%	32%

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33; and World Bank (2021).

Finally, while the GCF has a risk-based approach to screen and categorize GCF financed activities, the guidance note on the matter does not include any FCV state considerations. Indeed, the only screening for conflict-related factors is with respect to indigenous peoples and the matter of community-based conflict.[66] As previously noted, FCV states face particular challenges related to conflict and security. These conflicts pose important risks related to project implementation, with heightened risks of negative impacts of projects in cases where there is inadequate and/or poor planning. As such, screening for and assessment of risks related to in-country stability is highly important to ensure adequate mitigative measures are adopted to reduce any potential negative impacts of FP implementation.

[65] These include single-country FPs, multi-country FPs, and multi-regional FPs with at least one African FCV state. Average approval times of FPs by scope were as follows: 369 days for single-country FPs in African FCV states, 321 for multi-country FPs including at least one African FCV state, and 291 days for multi-regional FPs including at least one African FCV state (compared to 406, 156, and 231 days respectively for African non-FCV states).
[66] Green Climate Fund (2019i).

C. CONCLUSIONS

GCF interventions in African FCV states are overall well-aligned with international agreements. These interventions are also largely complementary to previous and ongoing initiatives. There are notably several cases in which GCF interventions, in combination with external initiatives, provide support from project preparation to financing. However, while GCF interventions have the potential to support countries in reaching their GHG reduction objectives through heightened support on mitigation – particularly the result area of energy generation and access – there remains an important gap in financing for adaptation.

Moreover, country ownership remains challenging in African FCV states, particularly related to the role of NDAs/focal points and DAE capacity. Notably, there are very few accredited DAEs in FCV states, with marked challenges in achieving accreditation. The importance of increasing the number of DAEs was strongly emphasized by national-level key informants. While there are efforts to build NDA/focal point capacity through RPSP grants, accessing these resources is observed to be challenging given the complex and lengthy nature of the processes.

It is currently too early to assess the extent to which the GCF investments are effective in achieving intended results and the extent to which results are sustained. With only 20 per cent of approved amounts disbursed and projects largely at early stages of implementation, no results have been reported to date. Nonetheless, concerns are noted regarding the extent to which the GCF will reach its objectives in African FCV states. While single-country projects in African FCV states are ambitious, the GCF portfolio in these countries is largely composed of multi-country and multi-regional projects, and the extent to which these projects will lead to the implementation of activities in FCV states remains unclear. Moreover, African FCV states face challenges in attracting co-financing given insecurity and political instability. With limited country capacity, investment from the local public and private sector is also constrained in these contexts, increasing reliance on the international community to finance projects. All of this highlights the importance of de-risking investments to attract the level of financing required.

The GCF is largely maladapted to operate in African FCV states given its complex and lengthy processes, as well as its lack of flexibility and rigid requirements. This has led to the GCF being perceived as a barrier to financing rather than as a partner of choice. It has also resulted in a loss of social and institutional capital for the NDA/focal point in some instances. The complexity of processes has also required African FCV states to seek capacity building support from other institutions to effectively engage with the GCF and to access GCF financing.

Overall, the limited financing going to African FCV states, the focus on mitigation, and the difficulty for the local private sector to access GCF financing in African FCV states limits the extent to which the GCF is positioned to achieve a paradigm shift in these countries. Nonetheless, approved interventions (both RPSPs and FPs) and expected outcomes and outputs indicate a likely positive impact in African FCV states.

Appendix 1. PORTFOLIO INFORMATION

All data was extracted in August 2022 and includes approved projects as of B.33.

FP portfolio: an overview of GCF's FP portfolio in selected countries

PROJECT NAME	CASE STUDY COUNTRY	STATUS	THEMATIC FOCUS	AE	GCF FINANCING (USD)	CO-FINANCING (USD)
FP177 – Cooling Facility	Somalia	Under implementation	Cross-cutting	World Bank	17,427,000	80,235,240
FP012 – Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali Country Project	Mali	Under implementation	Adaptation	World Bank	22,750,000	8,250,000
FP092 – Programme for integrated development and adaptation to climate change in the Niger Basin (PIDACC/NB)	Mali	Under implementation	Cross-cutting	AfDB	9,207,776	19,309,510
FP102 – Mali solar rural electrification project	Mali	Under implementation	Mitigation	BOAD	26,072,904	8,316,862
FP105 – BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up Solar Energy Investments in Francophone West Africa LDCs	Mali	Under implementation	Mitigation	BOAD	10,207,701	10,207,701
FP151 – Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) –TA Facility	Mali	Under implementation	Mitigation	IUCN	440,485	226,195
	DRC				440,485	226,195
FP152 – SnCF Global – Equity	Mali	Under implementation	Mitigation	PCA	3,571,500	14,286,000
	DRC				3,571,500	14,286,000
FP162 – The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme	Mali	Approved	Cross-cutting	IFAD	11,835,937	8,639,744
FP163 – SRMI Facility	Mali	Under implementation	Mitigation	World Bank	39,998,000	183,347,975
	DRC				39,998,000	183,347,975
FP178 – Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility	Mali	Approved	Mitigation	AfDB	37,050,000	201,728,951
FP183 – Inclusive Green Financing Initiative (IGREENFIN I): Greening	Mali	Approved	Cross-cutting	IFAD	8,064,194	5,643,072

FP096 – DRC Green Mini-Grid Program	DRC	Under implementation	Mitigation	AfDB	21,000,000	68,000,000
FP148 – EARF	DRC	Under implementation	Mitigation	Acumen	810,000	810,000

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

PPF portfolio: an overview of GCF's RPSP portfolio in selected countries

PPF	Project name	Case study country	Status	Delivery partner	Delivery modality	Thematic focus	Approved amount (USD)
PPF038	IGREENFIN project and GCF Umbrella Program for the Great Green Wall Initiative	Mali	Under implementation	IFAD	Standard PPF funding	Cross-cutting	1,302,753
PPF050	Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund (ICRF)	Mali and DRC	Approved	AFC	Standard PPF funding	Adaptation	835,500

Source: Green Climate Fund. iPMS as of B.33.

RPSP portfolio: an overview of GCF's PPF portfolio in selected countries

RPSP name	Country	Status	Delivery partner	Agreement type	Approved amount (USD)
Country Programming	Mali	Completed	Sahel Eco	General grant agreement	41,165
NDA Strengthening + Country Programming	Mali	Completed	Sahel Eco	General grant agreement	162,245
Preparing Mali-Folkecenter Nyetaa's (MFC) application for direct access accreditation to the GCF	Mali	Disbursed	Mali	General grant agreement	183,000
Request ID: 1805-15261	Mali	Disbursed	Mali	General grant agreement	594,749
Strengthening the integration of climate risks in development planning for implementation of low-carbon & climate-resilient priorities in Mali	Mali	Disbursed	Mali	General grant agreement	209,912
NDA Strengthening + Country Programming	DRC	Completed	CSE	General grant	298,630

				agreement	
Medium term investment planning for adaptation in climate sensitive sectors in the Democratic Republic of Congo : Advancing the NAP process	DRC	Disbursed	UNDP	Framework agreement	1,397,000
Support for direct access entities	DRC	Disbursed	*Bureau Central de Coordination*	General grant agreement	265,211
Readiness Support to Access Finance for DRC (Area 4)	DRC	Disbursed	FAO	Framework agreement	299,718
Supporting the Creation of "REDD+ Catalytic Fund"	DRC	Disbursed	COMIFAC	General grant agreement	499,970
Technical guidance and support for conducting Technology Needs Assessment for Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC	Disbursed	UNIDO-CTCN	Framework agreement	326,689
Green, Resilient Recovery Rapid Readiness Support in Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC	In legal processing	*Bureau Central de Coordination*	General grant agreement	299,950
National Readiness to enable strategic approaches for 30x30 investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	DRC	In legal processing	WCS	General grant agreement	100,000
Support for Establishing a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Process for the Federal Republic of Somalia	Somalia	Disbursed	UNDP	Framework agreement	2,957,213
NDA strengthening, country programming support and project pipeline development in Somalia	Somalia	Disbursed	GWPO	General grant agreement	785,102

Source: Green Climate Fund. iPMS as of B.33.

Appendix 2. SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION

Average ND-Gain readiness score by FCV states classification

VULNERABILITY AREA	AFRICAN FCV STATES	AFRICAN NON-FCV STATES
Economic	0.28	0.36
Governance	0.26	0.43
Social	0.23	0.25

Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022), and World Bank (2021).

Average ND-Gain vulnerability score by FCV states classification

VULNERABILITY AREA	AFRICAN FCV STATES	AFRICAN NON-FCV STATES
Adaptative capacity	0.75	0.65
Public health	0.71	0.62
Food security	0.65	0.55
Human habitat	0.61	0.56
Ecosystem services	0.53	0.48
Exposure	0.49	0.45
Sensitivity	0.48	0.41
Fresh water supply	0.46	0.36
Infrastructure	0.35	0.38

Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022), and World Bank (2021).

Definition of readiness areas

READINESS AREA	DEFINITION
Economic	"The score of Economic readiness captures the readiness of a country's business environment to accept investment that could be applied to adaptation in the form of business formation and maintenance. A simple multi-factor index, Doing Business Index from the World Bank is the measure of economic readiness."
Governance	"The score of Governance readiness captures the institutional factors that enhance application of investment for adaptation. Indicators include: political stability and non-violence, control of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of law. All come from the World Governance Indicators (WGI)."
Social	"The score of Social readiness captures the social factors that enhance the mobility of investment to be converted to adaptation actions. Indicators include: social inequality, Information and Communications Technology infrastructure, education and innovation."

Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022).

Definition of vulnerability areas

VULNERABILITY AREA	DEFINITION
Adaptative capacity	"The availability of social resources for sector-specific adaptation. In some cases, these capacities reflect sustainable adaptation solutions. In other cases, they reflect capacities to put newer, more sustainable adaptations into place."

Public health	"The Health score captures a country's vulnerability of public health to climate change, in terms of the spread of communicable diseases and provision of health services. Indicators include: projected change of deaths from climate change induced diseases (diarrhea and malnutrition), projected change of malaria hazard, dependency on external resource for health service, slum population, medical staffs, and access to improved sanitation facilities."
Food security	"The Food score captures a country's vulnerability to climate change, in terms of food production, food demand, nutrition and rural population. Indicators include: projected change of cereal yields, projected population growth, food import dependency, rural population, agriculture capacity, and child malnutrition."
Human habitat	"The score of Human habitat captures a country's vulnerability of human living conditions to climate change, considering weather extremes, urban development, demography, and transport infrastructure. Indicators include: projected change of heatwave hazard, projected change of flood hazard, urban concentration, age dependency ratio, quality of transport and trade infrastructure, and paved roads."
Ecosystem services	"The score of Ecosystem services captures the vulnerability of natural capital to climate change, the ecological resources that humans rely upon to support lives and livelihoods. Indicators include: projected change of biome distribution, projected change of marine biodiversity, natural capital dependency, ecological footprint, protected biome, and engagement in international environmental conventions."
Exposure	"The nature and degree to which a system is exposed to significant climate change. A component of vulnerability independent of socio-economic context."
Sensitivity	"The extent to which a country is dependent upon a sector negatively affected by climate hazard, or the proportion of the population particularly susceptible to a climate change hazard."
Fresh water supply	"The Water score captures a country's vulnerability of fresh water supplies to climate change. Indicators include: projected change of annual runoff, projected change of annual groundwater recharge, fresh water withdrawal rate, water dependency ratio, dam capacity, and access to reliable drinking water."
Infrastructure	"The infrastructure score captures the vulnerability of coastal and energy infrastructure to climate change, primarily general preparedness to climate-related natural disasters, coastal hazards, and energy supply challenges. Indicators include projected change of hydropower generation capacity, projected change of sea level rise impacts, dependency on imported energy, population living under 5m above sea level, electricity access, and disaster preparedness."

Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022).

Sectoral vulnerability in African FCV states

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab, NDC Explorer; and World Bank (2021).

Priorities of African FCV states



Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab, NDC Explorer; and World Bank (2021).

Appendix 3. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	POSITION/TITLE	ORGANIZATION
Ababio	Kwame	Head of Environment and Climate Change	African Union Development Agency
Albertani	David	Chief Executive Officer	R20 Regions of Climate Change
Alfa Nafo	Hussein (Seyni)	Coordinator, Africa Adaptation Initiative	Republic of Mali
Amany	Damit Serge Didier	*Directeur de l'Évaluation des résultats de développement des projets*	BOAD
Assima	Rahamatou	*Chargé d'Évaluation*	BOAD
Balo Akakpo	Olade	Regional Officer, Africa Regional Desk (francophone), DCP	GCF
Banga	Josue	Operational Assistant Consultant, Africa Regional Desk (francophone), DCP	GCF
Cheruiyot	Collins	Chief of Party, IUCN Kenya	IUCN
Corfield	Tim	Operating Partner	Pegasus Capital Advisors
Djamba	Hans Andre	National Coordination of the GCF	Government of DRC
Fall	Amadou Lamine	Senior Managing Consultant – Climate Policy, Finance and Carbon Markets – Africa	South Pole
Friedman	Brian Lawrence	General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer at Pegasus	Pegasus Capital Advisors
Gani	Ronen	Operating Partner	Pegasus Capital Advisors
Name withheld, requested anonymity	Name withheld, requested anonymity	ESG Specialist	(Private sector organization)
Karangwa	Charles	Regional head, Land Systems, Country Representative Rwanda	IUCN
Naba	Yempabo	*Sociologue Principale, Spécialiste en Genre*	BOAD
Noura	Dr. Zeinabou Maman	Member	*Association Nigérienne des Scouts de l'Environnement*
Pouya	Celestin	Head of Advocacy and Communication Department	WaterAid – Burkina Faso
Shah	Parth	Vice President	Pegasus Capital Advisors
Soto-Abril	Dario	Executive Secretary and CEO	Global Water Partnership Organization
Sow	Mohamadou	*Directeur Adjoint*	*Gouvernement de la Mauritanie, Climat et Économie Verte*
Tshilumba	Kabishi	Regional Manager, Africa, DCP	GCF

Welling	Rebecca	GEF/GCF Portfolio Manager, Multilateral Finance and Business Development Team	IUCN
Weruku	Sarah	Community Leader, Uganda	Slum Dwellers International
Yasuda	Kaori	Country representative (Kenya), Strategic Partnerships & Programme Development Coordinator	IUCN

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Chapter 3. COUNTRIES WITHOUT A SINGLE-COUNTRY FUNDED PROJECT

CONTENTS

FIGURES

A. Background and context

1. Overview of the Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a key institution in the global architecture for responding to the challenges of climate change. It advances and promotes a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development, supporting countries and their development partners in doing so as per the targets set by the global community. The GCF delivers support to fulfil its mission through three modalities: funded projects (FPs), readiness activities under the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP), and preparatory activities under the Project Preparation Facility (PPF). These activities are either country-specific or multi-country, and can span across sub-regions, regions and continents.

FPs are prepared and submitted by accredited entities (AEs) in collaboration with countries and their national designated authorities (NDAs). These projects target eight results areas, four of which fall under the adaptation thematic focus and four under the mitigation focus. Adaptation results areas include: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; and (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. Mitigation results areas include: (i) energy generation and access; (ii) transport; (iii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (iv) forests and land use.

Beyond FPs, the GCF also provides support through the PPF and the RPSP. Both the PPF and the RPSP focus on capacity building within countries and AEs, particularly for regional and national AEs, that is, direct access entities (DAEs). The RPSP provides support for strengthening institutional capacities, governance mechanisms, and planning and programming frameworks in alignment with the transformational long-term climate action agenda. Both NDAs and DAEs are eligible to apply for support under the RPSP. The PPF provides project and programme finance proposal preparation support directly to AEs. This support is provided through a range of independent consultancy firms and aims to address capacity constraints in developing

2. Purpose of case study

This case study explores GCF interventions in three African States where the Fund has not supported single-country projects: Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and Tunisia. These countries were selected to ensure their diversity in country classification, level of income, level of GCF support received, and linguistic diversity. As such, this case study includes one low-income country (LIC), one lower-middle income country (LMIC), and one upper-middle income country (UMIC). It also includes a Spanish-speaking country, a French-speaking country, and an Arabic-speaking country. Additionally, it includes one of the biggest oil producers on the continent, Equatorial Guinea, which produced an estimated 153,000 barrels per day in 2021. Finally, the sample includes one country with no FPs, one country with four FPs (valued below USD 50 million (mln)), and one country with seven FPs (valued at over USD 100 mln), with all projects being multi-country. Other countries that do not have single-country projects supported by the GCF include Nigeria, Angola, and South Sudan, among others. While considered for this case study, several countries were not responsive to the evaluation team's interview requests, and as a result were not included due to a lack of data. A detailed overview of similarities and differences in the three case study countries is described below in section 3, while an overview of GCF's portfolio in these countries is provided in section 4.

The evaluation team conducted a review of key documents and key informant interviews related to all three case study countries, with an in-person field mission to Tunisia. Key informant interviews for the two other countries were undertaken virtually.

3. Overview of the selected countries

a. Geographical, political and socio-economic context

Geography and climate: Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and Tunisia border the ocean or sea, with Tunisia counting 1,300 km of coastline along its eastern and northern borders, Guinea counting 320 km of coastline along its western border, and Equatorial Guinea counting 296 km of coastline along its western border. The locations of these countries lead to noteworthy differences in climate. Located in Northern Africa, Tunisia experiences a hot desert climate in its south, progressing into a hot, semi-arid climate and cold, semi-arid climate, to reach a hot-summer Mediterranean climate in its north. The country's northern region is mountainous, which transitions to dry plains and arid desert when moving south.

Located on the West African Atlantic coast, Guinea experiences an overall tropical climate comprising two seasons: the dry season and the rainy season. Guinea is also characterized by a very dense hydrographic network, with 1,166 rivers divided into 23 watersheds (14 of which are international).

Finally, Equatorial Guinea, located in Middle Africa in the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ICZ), is comprised of two regions: one continental and one insular, composed of two main islands (Bioko, where the capital city of Malabo is located, and Annobon) and a number of smaller islands. The ecology of Equatorial Guinea is mainly defined by four mountain systems (20 per cent of the country's total area), has an abundance of water sources in the form of rivers, lakes and waterways on the mainland and islands, and is rich in biodiversity (including several endemic species on the islands), with 62.5 per cent of its total area covered by dense tropical forest.

Demographic:[67] The population varies among the case study countries, ranging from just under 13.5 mln (2021) in Guinea, to just over 11.9 mln (2021) in Tunisia, and just over 1.4 mln (2021) in Equatorial Guinea. Similarly, population density ranges from 77 people per km^2 in Tunisia to 52 per km^2 in Equatorial Guinea and 48 per km^2 in Guinea. As opposed to the other case study countries, a significant proportion of the population of Guinea lives in rural areas, at approximately two-thirds. On the other hand, both Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea have approximately three-quarters of their populations living in urban areas. In the case of Equatorial Guinea, nearly two-thirds of its population lives in slums. Finally, nearly half of the population of Guinea is aged below 15, while this demographic represents just over a third of the population of Equatorial Guinea, and approximately a quarter of the population of Tunisia.

Politics: All three countries experience some form of political tension. Guinea saw its first presidential elections in 2010 and first legislative elections in 2013. However, critics have noted irregularities with opposition parties alleging fraud, despite the result being upheld by the Supreme Court. A constitutional referendum in March 2020 passed, changing presidential term limits to allow for a third term and sparking massive protests. A September 2021 military coup established the National Committee for Reconciliation and Development (CNRD) and suspended the constitution and legislature. The National Transition Council (CNT) was established in January 2022, acting as the legislative body for this political transition. In August 2022, the council dissolved the main opposition coalition. Guinea has also experienced significant population displacement as a result of

[67] World Bank Website (n.d.2). All data presented in this section are from the World Bank's Open Data.

political conflicts in regions bordering Liberia and Sierra Leone, resulting in the death of over 1,000 people.

In Equatorial Guinea, the political system is seen as being riddled with corruption, as having a weak judicial system under presidential control, and as having an absence of democratic reforms. According to Freedom House metrics,[68] Equatorial Guinea receives a score of zero (indicating low freedom) on its electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, associational and organizational rights, and rule of law. It received a score of one (indicating high freedom) in the areas of freedom of expression and belief (with the exception of a score of zero for the subcategories of media and discussion of political topics) and personal autonomy (with the exception of a zero in the enjoyment of equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation).

Finally, while Tunisia was moving towards democracy after the Arab Spring, the President suspended parliament in 2021, dismissing the Prime Minister to consolidate power and assume executive authority. This has placed democracy in crisis in Tunisia, with the threat of a return to authoritative rule. This comes after the country, being a one-party state controlled by the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), experienced a national uprising in 2011, leading to the first presidential elections in October 2014.

Economy: As of 2021, the size of the economies of the case study countries varied greatly, with a GDP ranging from USD 46.84 billion (bln) in Tunisia to USD 15.85 bln in Guinea and USD 12.27 bln in Equatorial Guinea. Similarly, levels of income vary greatly, with Equatorial Guinea seeing the highest GDP per capita at USD 8,462, followed by Tunisia (USD 3,924) and Guinea (USD 1,174).[69] The economy of Guinea is largely driven by its vast natural resources, led by its mining sector (26 per cent of its GDP), and agriculture (20 per cent of GDP). The latter is notably the main source of employment, employing 52 per cent of the workforce. In Equatorial Guinea, the oil industry is the largest GDP contributor. The country has experienced economic growth in recent decades due to the expansion of its historical mercantile base as well as a tenfold increase in oil extraction over the past decade from 6,000 barrels per day in 1995 to 360,000 in 2005. In Tunisia, political liberalization has similarly allowed for economic liberalization, and where oil, agricultural food products, phosphates, automobile parts manufacturing, and tourism are historically important sectors. In 2019, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, tourism generated around USD 2.68 bln in Tunisia, with 9.4 mln tourists representing 6.4 per cent of its GDP.

b. Climate change context

Historically, Tunisia has emitted more greenhouse gas (GHG) than Guinea and Equatorial Guinea. However, GHG emissions sharply decreased between 2015 and 2016, reaching levels lower than that of Guinea (see Figure A - 8). While oil is the leading industry in Equatorial Guinea, the country accounts for the smallest proportion of GHG emissions among the case study countries. The leading sector for CO_2 emissions in Tunisia is electricity and heat production (9.0 metric tons (Mt) of CO_2), followed by transport (7.0 Mt CO_2) and industry (5.0 Mt CO_2), with some emissions from residential (2.0 Mt CO_2), commercial and public services (1.0 Mt CO_2), and agriculture (1.0 Mt CO_2). On the

[68] Freedom House rates access to political rights and civil liberties, with high scores indicating freedom and low scores indicating lack of freedom. The rating is determined through an analysis of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, the functioning of the government, freedom of expression and of belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Assessments are undertaken by external analysts based on on-the-ground research, consultations with local contacts, and information from news articles, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, among other sources. The conclusions drawn by analysts are subsequently vetted by expert advisers and regional specialists.
[69] World Bank website (n.d.4).

other hand, 97.1 per cent of CO_2 emissions in Guinea are from liquid fuel consumption.[70] In Equatorial Guinea, the energy and land use and forestry sectors generate the most GHG emissions. However, it should be noted that there are issues with data availability, with the nationally determined contribution (NDC) of Equatorial Guinea reporting that "the information available at the national level is still much dispersed and lacks the level of detail necessary for the estimation of all emissions".[71]

Figure A - 8. GHG emissions by country, between 1990 and 2019 (in Mt CO2)



Source: World Bank website (n.d.2)

In Guinea, the main source of electricity is hydropower (2.47 terawatt hours (TWh) and 76.23 per cent of electricity production), followed by oil (0.75 TWh and 23.15 per cent of electricity production), with a marginal contribution (0.62 per cent) from solar power (0.02 TWh). Guinea has seen a shift toward renewable energy (both energy production and energy consumption), as the nation's share of electricity from low-carbon sources has been growing over the past few decades, from 45.98 per cent in 2003 to 76.85 per cent in 2020.[72] By comparison, electricity production in Equatorial Guinea in 2020 was largely dominated by oil, which comprised 89.38 per cent of electricity production, followed by low-carbon sources such as hydropower, which accounted for 10.62 per cent. While there has been a downward trend in the use of oil to produce electricity, there was a sharp increase in 2018.[73] Finally, in Tunisia, energy is mainly produced through oil (95 per cent), followed by wind and solar (2 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively).

All case study countries are vulnerable to climate change, although to varying degrees. Guinea is placed as the world's 31st most vulnerable country, while Equatorial Guinea is considered the 81st most vulnerable country according to the ND-Gain Country Index. Similarly, both countries are found to be in need of improved readiness (i.e. 'improved ability to leverage investments and convert them to adaptation action'), with Guinea ranking as the 146th and Equatorial Guinea as the 182nd most ready countries. On the other hand, Tunisia is considered the 122nd most vulnerable

[70] World Bank website (n.d.3).
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.

country and among the 100 most ready countries (rank of 81st). As such, while adaptation challenges are noted in the country, Tunisia is considered well positioned to adapt to climate change.

Nonetheless, Tunisia is susceptible to experiencing adverse socioeconomic and environmental consequences of climate change, namely increased temperatures and aridity, reduced precipitation, and rising sea levels, with adverse impacts on water and food security (water resources, agricultural yields and livestock, loss of biodiversity), as well as on the health and tourism sectors. Early knock-on effects are already noted, with the migration of southern populations historically engaged in agricultural and pastoral activities to the capital for better job opportunities. Moreover, the NDC Third National Communication (NC3), projects that agricultural GDP will decline by 5 per cent to 10 per cent by 2030, as a result of the economic consequences of climate change. This trend is especially pronounced for the most vulnerable populations, notably women, of which 32.3 per cent live in rural areas and make up over 70 per cent of active jobs in the agriculture/forestry industry. Rising sea levels are projected to result in the loss of 220 million cubic metres (Mm3) of water resources in Tunisia. Such sea level rises also pose a significant threat to coastlines, agricultural land, infrastructure, and urban areas, exacerbating agricultural and water scarcity and existing related tensions.

Similarly, climate change is expected to have significant impacts on water and food security in Guinea. When examining trends to date, Guinea has seen an increase in its average annual temperatures of 0.8 degrees since 1960, dovetailed with a decrease in average annual precipitation by 5.3 millimetres (mm) per month per decade. As 97 per cent of the nation's agricultural cultivation is rainfed, crop yield levels are highly vulnerable to changes in rainfall; crop yields are projected to decline (particularly maize, with a projected decrease of 5 per cent to 25 per cent, which is anticipated to be especially severe in the southern border areas). Coastal areas are also vulnerable to rising sea levels and increased salinization, erosion, and flooding, resulting in a major loss of rice fields along the coast, a reduction in fish yields, loss of income and protein sources, and saltwater intrusion into river deltas used for recessional crops. Moreover, the abundant renewable water resources of Guinea (estimated at 226 km^3) are vulnerable to the impacts of increasing temperatures and decreasing rainfall, reducing flows of key rivers and waterways. For example, the Konkouré River in western Guinea is projected to have flows reduced by 30 per cent to 50 per cent by the end of the century; this has serious implications for the many dams along the river that are a key source of the nation's hydropower. Water quality is also expected to decline as a result of the increased risk of pollutants due to the intensity of heavy rainfall events washing pollutants (e.g. agricultural fertilizers, human and mining waste) into bodies of water. This is especially concerning for the 30 per cent of the population that does not have access to safe drinking water.

Finally, while Equatorial Guinea is considered vulnerable to food insecurity, this insecurity largely stems from its reliance on imports. Despite more recent efforts to diversify the economy from its dependence on oil toward increasing agricultural production (e.g. cocoa) and fisheries production, the country continues to struggle to achieve food security. Rising sea levels also pose a significant threat from coastal flooding, especially for the islands of Bioko and Annobon. Moreover, the mainland's coastline is home to 45 per cent of the country's population and is thus of great concern.

c. Climate change policies and institutional context

All countries selected as part of this case study have submitted an NDC as well as a series of other strategies and action plans to address climate change.

Tunisia submitted its NDC to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2016. The NDC contains ambitious mitigation goals, with the NC3 submitted in 2019 outlining efforts made to achieve development goals, reduce vulnerability, and increase resilience and adaptive capacity to climate change. Tunisia notably reported putting into place mitigation

policies and measures to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to the impacts of climate change. These included the National Agency for Energy Management's (ANME) energy management policy and a new low-carbon energy transition policy; the implementation of the renewable energy programme; the development of the energy-saving action plan (2017–2030); the development of the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA), and the drafting of five NAMA proposals (cement, buildings, solar plan, forests, and sanitation) with a sixth to be developed on the transportation sector; among others. Overall, the costs of investments required to achieve mitigation targets are estimated at USD 13 bln, and the total financing needed to achieve the goals of the NDC of Guinea through implementation and capacity building is estimated at around USD 353 mln over the 2017–2030 period. The NDC also highlights persistent barriers to gender mainstreaming in national adaptation policies.

Additional policies, strategies, and action plans on climate change and sustainable development include: (1) Tunisian National Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity 2018–2030; (2) Tunisian Sustainable Consumption and Production National Action Plan (SCP-NAP) that addresses Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12.1 in two priority sectors (tourism and agri-food), which was informed by a nationally owned multi-stakeholder process; and (3) Voluntary National Review (VNR) report(s) for Tunisia that detail the nation's commitment to the 2030 Agenda, with a 5-year development plan (2021–2025).

Guinea ratified the UNFCCC in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. It has outlined strategies to adapt to climate change in its NDC, including an updated version of its National Communication submitted on 28 July 2021. The country has set its unconditional target at 2,056 kilotons of CO_2 equivalent (ktCo2eq) per year, representing a 9.7 per cent reduction in its emissions by 2030 compared to the baseline or business-as-usual (BAU), and a conditional objective of 3,929 ktCo2eq per year (a 17 per cent reduction compared to BAU). Additionally, it sets its unconditional objective at 20 per cent of its gross emissions in 2030 as compared to BAU, with the conditional objective set at 49 per cent compared to BAU. The updated National Communication of Guinea reports a number of measures being undertaken, including: (1) the drafting of the *Plan National de Développement Economique et Social* (PNDES 2021–2025); (2) the implementation of the guidelines of the *Comité National Changement Climatique*; (3) the operational monitoring of the implementation and evaluation of the progress made in respect to the provisions of the transparency framework by the *Direction Nationale Pollutions, Nuisances et Changements Climatiques* (DNPNCC); and (4) consideration of the creation of a national agency for climate, environment, and sustainable development. It estimates the cost of implementing its commitments to be at least USD 13.8 mln, with some contributions conditional on the mobilization of funds under the Convention's Financial Mechanism. Regarding adaptation costs, macroeconomic costs are estimated at between USD 713 to 1,922 mln, with estimated measures included in the NDC costing USD 1 bln.

In addition, the following strategies and policies were developed: (1) *Stratégie Nationale de Développement Durable* (SNDD-2019); (2) *Stratégie Nationale sur le Changement Climatique* (SNCC-2019); (3) *Communication Nationale Initiale* (CNI-2002); and (4) *Plan d'Action National pour l'Adaptation* (PANA-2007), among others.

Equatorial Guinea has been a member of UNFCCC – participating in regular Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) meetings – since 1990. The country submitted its first National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2019, outlining key initiatives to mitigate the impacts of climate change that largely pertain to biodiversity conservation and environmental pollution (e.g. diversifying energy and reliance on hydrocarbons, and combatting deforestation and forest degradation). However, the report underscores a weak regulatory and institutional framework as well as limited institutional capacity (to adapt, to act, as well as for climate prediction and early warning for prevention), which limits the implementation of signed agreements and commitments.

As a result of strong public investment in electrical infrastructure and the national electrification programme, the country is undergoing a transformation in its energy sector to increase its electrical capacity. This includes efforts to optimize in-country renewable resources to avoid future energy imports to meet increasing demand. The NDC notes recent trends of greater hydroelectric use on the mainland and solar energy on Annobon island, where it built a 5 megawatt (MW) solar park. Additionally, the Wele River (also known as Benito or Mbini River) has hydropower potential with eight possible installation points for hydroelectric plants (estimated to produce 2.070 MW/year). The report confirms that the 120 MW Djiblho plant is already operational, and the 200 MW Snedje plant is almost complete, with other potential sites being studied at the time of the report. The report also identified preliminary studies of hydroelectric potential on the island of Bioko, where 96 per cent of the island's electricity is produced by gas. It also claimed an energy law would come into force in 2019, accompanied by regulation for renewable energies and guarantees to boost national and foreign investment in the sector.[74] There are also plans to use rail transportation, particularly for the movement of cargo, to minimize oil consumption and road pollution.

In addition, the following policies, strategies, and/or action plans on climate change and sustainable development were developed: (1) National Adaptation Action Plan 2013 (PANA); (2) National REDD+ Strategy (2018); (3) National Investment Plan REDD+ (2019) (PNI-REDD+); and (4) Economic and Social Development Strategy and Plan (in revision), among others.

4. GCF PORTFOLIO AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The NDA in Tunisia is the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, under the leadership of Mr. Chokri Mezghani, Director of the General Directorate of Sustainable Development. In Guinea, the NDA is the National Directorate of the Environment. Currently, the focal points are Mr. Pierre Lamah, Executive Secretary of the NDA of the GCF, with the support of Mr. Mamadou Oury Barry (substitute). Finally, the Equatorial Guinea NDA is the Ministry of Fisheries and Environment, with Mr. Gabriel Ngua Ayecaba, Director-General, Department of Environment, as a focal point, with the support of Dr. Diosdado Obiang Mbomio, Advisor.

Among the three countries, only Guinea has a national DAE that can submit projects to the GCF, namely the *Agence Nationale de Financement des Collectivités Locales*. Tunisia has regional DAEs, which include the Attijariwafa Bank (AWB) and the Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS). AWB is a regional private sector entity headquartered in Morocco, with a large portfolio in sustainable development. The OSS is also a regional entity, which acts as an international framework for partnerships and dialogue to fight desertification and minimize the impacts of drought, as well as in climate change adaptation and biodiversity protection. Finally, Equatorial Guinea has no national or regional DAE.

Appendix 1 provides an overview of the FPs in selected countries.[75] GCF has eight FPs in these countries, including four in Guinea and seven in Tunisia (three of which take place in both countries). No FPs have been approved in Equatorial Guinea as of the thirty-third meeting of the Board (B.33). GCF is providing USD 20.2 mln in Guinea compared to USD 140.7 mln in Tunisia. FPs taking place in both countries largely focus on mitigation, with only three cross-cutting projects (valued at USD 76.1 mln), and no adaptation-specific projects among the 8 FPs.[76] Finally, all of these projects are implemented by international accredited entities (IAEs).

Appendix 1 provides an overview of PPF support provided in the case study countries. Among these countries, the GCF has approved one PPF in Guinea, which is for an adaptation multi-country

[74] At the time of this evaluation, there was no information available confirming the adoption of the Energy Law.
[75] FP overview was extracted in August 2022 and includes FPs approved as of B.33.
[76] Guinea counts one cross-cutting project, while Tunisia counts two.

project valued at USD 835,500. Through this PPF activity, the GCF will support, (1) a pre-feasibility/feasibility study, (2) an environmental, social and gender study, (3) a risk assessment, (4) the development of the GCF FP, and (4) other activities including advisory services and other services to financially structure a proposed activity.

Appendix 1 provides an overview of RPSP support provided in selected countries. The GCF has provided support through 15 RPSPs (valued at USD 8.4 mln), including four in Equatorial Guinea (USD 1.5 mln), four in Guinea (USD 2.5 mln), and seven in Tunisia (USD 4.5 mln). Most are currently underway, with only two completed RPSPs, both in Tunisia. All but two RPSPs are delivered by IAEs. Both RPSPs implemented by DAEs are with OSS, one of which is completed. In Equatorial Guinea, nearly all readiness activities are being implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), while half of those in Guinea are implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Appendix 1 provides an overview of the GCF's pipeline in case study countries. There are 12 FPs in the pipeline of these countries: five in Guinea and seven in Tunisia. In Guinea, USD 95.1 mln is being requested, while USD 237.5 mln is being requested in Tunisia. While the majority of these FPs are multi-country, one FP in Guinea and three FPs in Tunisia are country specific. In Guinea, this FP is cross-cutting and was submitted by UNDP (valued at USD 25.5 mln). In Tunisia, two of the FPs are cross-cutting and one is focused on mitigation. The total value of these projects is USD 121 mln. There are no FPs in the pipeline for Equatorial Guinea. However, two FPs were submitted and subsequently withdrawn, namely Support to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) investments in Africa, and Geeref Next. Both FPs were intended to be multi-country.

B. KEY FINDINGS

This case study explores the GCF support in countries with no approved single-country FPs as well as the bottlenecks that restrain those countries in accessing such support. As further detailed below, a major factor that hinders these countries from accessing GCF support is the lack of national AEs. This, in turn, affects the relevance of GCF interventions in the countries. Other challenging factors include the long and costly processes of the RPSP, for accreditation as well as for project approval, lack of GCF engagement and coordination with countries, lack of capacity at the GCF Secretariat to support countries and its failure to take into account the cultural and economic contexts of countries, and finally language barriers. Clearly, capacities still need to be strengthened to enable countries to develop and submit bankable single-country projects.

1. RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

As described in the "Background and context" section, the three countries considered for this case study are highly vulnerable to climate change and are already experiencing adverse effects. In this context, the GCF is a relevant and necessary institution for contributing to urgent climate change adaptation and mitigation. Single-country projects would help countries reach this goal by focusing entirely on national needs and priorities as opposed to multi-country projects that are typically designed with a broader scope.

Indeed, multi-country FPs in Tunisia are not entirely aligned with national needs and priorities, and a stronger focus on adaptation is needed. According to the NDC Explorer as well as consulted key informants, Tunisia identified floods, droughts, temperature increases, and sea-level rise as major risks. Tunisia further identified in its NDC the agricultural, water, ecosystems, and health sectors as vulnerable, and as such, elaborated on specific actions, plans, and strategies for these sectors.

However, the FPs in Tunisia have largely focused on energy generation and access, as well as buildings, cities, industries, and appliances (see Figure A - 9 and Figure A - 10).

In Guinea, FPs are better aligned with national priorities. Indeed, Guinea identified temperature and sea-level rise as a risk. Further, Guinea identified the agriculture, ecosystems, and water sectors as vulnerable and as priorities, although no actions, plans, and/or strategies were noted. FPs in Guinea have addressed all adaptation results areas, and nearly all mitigation areas, with a slight focus on energy generation and access to forest and land use.

In Equatorial Guinea, the most at-risk sectors to climate change – namely agriculture, ecosystems, energy, water and health – are expected to be affected by increased or decreased rainfall, sea-level rise, and increased temperatures. However, to date, the GCF has no FPs in Equatorial Guinea.

Figure A - 9. Number of projects by results area



Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. Finance_ResultsArea_Long.

Figure A - 10. Value of GCF financing by results area (mln)



Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. Finance_ResultsArea_Long.

In Tunisia, misalignment between GCF projects and national priorities is widely perceived among key informants as being a result of the lack of DAEs and single-country projects. Indeed, while IAEs have the technical expertise to write proposals, manage projects, and administer funds, they have their own programming, which may not completely align with countries' priorities. In particular, multi-country projects cannot take into account the granular specificities of all countries involved.

For example, FP086, "Green Cities Facility", a programme developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in collaboration with the GCF, is being implemented in Tunisia and eight other countries, namely Georgia, Jordan, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Mongolia, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania. Approved in 2018, FP086 aims to enable the transition of cities to low-carbon, climate-resilient urban development, while building the market case for private sector investment in sustainable infrastructure. While the issue of sustainable infrastructure is highly relevant in Tunis, the programme design is not, as it creates significant barriers to implementation. FP086 requires an investment from an entity at the municipal level that will act as executing entity. However, in Tunis, most municipal infrastructure is state-owned, resulting in limited incentives for a municipal-level entity to make an investment in infrastructures. To date, this issue in the programme design is still preventing the programme's launch in Tunisia.

In order to ensure projects' relevance, the Tunisian NDA implemented a no-objection procedure (NOP) to ensure alignment with national priorities and requirements included in national plans, NDCs, and sectoral strategies. The NOP entails that before being submitted to the GCF, a project needs to go through a revision process led by the NDA to get its approval. According to a key informant, the NDA has become stricter in terms of whom they deliver the no-objection letter (NOL) to over the years. For instance, they now require the IAE to have identified an executing entity in Tunisia prior to delivering the letter to avoid issues such as the ones preventing FP186 from being launched in the country. The NOP has been recognized by several stakeholders from the government, as well as by international organizations who went through the process recently, as being highly effective for ensuring project relevance.

2. Coherence

In all case study countries, consultations with key informants from international and regional AEs indicated that the GCF is not seen as an organization that fosters collaboration and synergies with other development partners. Indeed, it was reported that the GCF does not have a structuring approach to enable collaboration and create networking on the ground which, in some cases, has resulted in missed opportunities for the GCF to support relevant single-country projects.

In Tunisia, the GCF is part of an ecosystem that offers strong potential for cooperation and complementarity. However, due to its low engagement in the country, this cooperation has yet to come to fruition. First, in 2018, Tunisia initiated a Management by Objectives Unit within the Ministry of Environment with the support of *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ, German Agency for International Cooperation) and UNDP. The Unit's main role is to implement the Paris Agreement by materializing defined objectives, and to integrate climate change components into development policies.

In addition, the NDA has enabled the creation of an environment conducive to cooperation and synergies. Indeed, the Ministry of Environment has brought together the NDA representatives from several relevant cross-cutting ministries such as finance, planning, and agriculture and industry, amongst others. The NDA also includes focal points from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Adaptation Fund (AF), and UNFCCC, which enables fluid communication and collaboration between focal points. According to the focal points, this setting is useful for establishing cooperation

and channelling climate projects toward the most relevant Funds. Finally, the NDA also includes representatives from financial institutions. Their collaboration is important, particularly in a context where the level of state indebtedness is high and innovative sources of finance are needed.

This network created by the NDA represents an opportunity for the GCF to pick up on small-scale or pilot projects funded by other climate institutions. For instance, key informants who are part of the NDA reported they are trying to establish complementarities between GCF, the *Centre International des Technologies de l'Environnement de Tunis* (CTCN) and GEF projects by taking GEF and CTCN "success stories" and replicating them using larger GCF funds to ensure the sustainability of gains achieved. However, to date, the GCF has not shown interest in taking advantage of these opportunities. Additionally, there are some indications that national entities are becoming less willing to participate in such collaborations with the GCF considering the GCF lack of engagement, as well as the long and heavy processes that this entails.

3. COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

Generally speaking, GCF processes and modalities are not appropriate for fostering country ownership and project submission. The lack of DAEs represents an important if not the most impactful roadblock to single-country project submission. Other factors hindering country ownership and project submission include language barriers, heavy procedures, and a lack of transparency and responsiveness**.**

Lack of direct access entities

The lack of DAEs strongly diminishes country ownership as well as single-country project submission. Indeed, as mentioned in section 1 on relevance, projects that are being implemented by IAEs are likely not to fully align with national priorities, especially in the case of multi-country projects. Additionally, difficulties in garnering interest among IAEs to support single-country projects developed locally have been reported in Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea, where there are no national DAEs. In turn, a key informant from an IAE reported that it is not in their mandate to support small, single-country projects, and that those should be supported by DAEs.

On the other hand, national entities are on the ground and in direct contact with a variety of relevant stakeholders. They are better placed to observe and understand opportunities and challenges, inform on urgent climate matters, and bring the private sector onboard. In addition, national entities can be more flexible and quickly adapt to new needs and priorities as they are typically of smaller size and have a less complex structure. Finally, key informants from both national and international entities highlighted the fact that the lack of DAEs combined with the difficulties encountered by organizations going through the accreditation process highly diminish staff motivation and willingness to work with the GCF.[77]

Language barriers

Language barriers affect the ability to interact and work with the GCF in the three case study countries. In addition to the challenge of direct communication (e.g. emails, phone calls, in-person), the cost incurred for translation represents a significant roadblock. Indeed, GCF documentation is in English, and all key informants involved in the accreditation or concept note submission processes reported the need to translate it all into a local language (i.e. French, Arabic, or Spanish). Conversely, all documentation that needs to be sent to the GCF has to be translated into English. In Tunisia, this often means the first translation from Arabic to French, and the second one from French to English. While a few key informants from national entities mentioned that the language barrier is a challenge they can handle for direct communication with the GCF, all agreed that the

[77] These difficulties are further discussed in section 9 on efficiency.

translation process creates bottlenecks and is done at a cost that exceeds their capacity, whether it is for accreditation or project submission.

Heavy procedures

All key informants reported heavy and complex procedures including conducting detailed studies, translating voluminous documents and complying with the GCF bureaucracy, as well as long delays as a roadblock to benefitting from GCF support. For instance, in Tunisia, two organizations have been in the accreditation processes since 2016. Additionally, a key informant from an AE mentioned they have been in the process of developing a proposal to be submitted to the GCF since 2017. Finally, heavy procedures and long delays were reported by both public and private sector actors as significantly restraining private sector involvement with the GCF.

Lack of transparency and responsiveness

Lack of transparency and responsiveness from the GCF has been reported by most key informants who are actively involved with the GCF. In particular, it was noted that the GCF regularly leaves emails unanswered. This is perceived by several of these key informants as a lack of transparency and a refusal to share information. The physical distance between countries and the GCF headquarters as well as the absence of regional structures also amplifies communication issues.

In addition to these challenges, evidence shows that capacities still need to be strengthened to enable case study countries to engage with the GCF and develop and submit bankable single-country projects. Indeed, there is a need for more local expertise to develop GCF concept notes and conduct preliminary studies that are required by the GCF. Such studies need to be conducted by experts, typically international, who are both difficult to secure and costly. This capacity gap is further enhanced when developing adaptation projects, as demonstrating impact and climate additionality is more challenging compared to doing so for mitigation projects. The RPSP is perceived as an effective way to do so, although processes for accessing such support were also described as too heavy and complex. In Tunisia, consulted key informants who took part in readiness activities reported that these are effective for building capacity and gaining knowledge on the GCF. However, more readiness grants are needed to help the country comply with GCF accreditation and project submission processes.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF INVESTMENTS

Given the absence of single-country FPs in the case study countries, there is not enough evidence to assess the effectiveness of the GCF investments in catering to the potential for transformation within these countries. However, despite its low engagement, the GCF shows potential for mobilizing complementary financial resources. Key informants from the three case study countries noted that because of its credibility as an international climate organization, the GCF has an important leverage effect to attract financing from the private sector, multilateral and bilateral organizations, as well as governments.

As of now, the GCF has provided USD 160.9 mln in financing in Guinea and Tunisia through eight multi-country FPs. These FPs have also received USD 525.6 mln in co-financing. As such, the GCF financing and co-financing ratio stands at 3.27 for these countries; meaning for every dollar provided by the GCF, USD 3.27 is provided in co-financing.[78] Co-financing has been provided through various instruments, although nearly two-thirds has been through senior loans (see Figure A - 11). Other instruments include equity (with nearly a quarter of co-financing), as well as subordinated loans, grants, guarantees, reimbursable grants, and in-kind contributions.

[78] The co-financing ratio varies greatly between FPs, ranging from 0.51 for FP151, "Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility", to 7.22 for FP099 "Climate Investor One".

Figure A - 11. Co-financing by instrument type (mln)



Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. Nature of co-Financing.

Nearly all co-financing was leveraged from other MDBs and the private sector (see Figure A - 12). The private sector has provided around two-thirds of its co-financing through equity and a third through senior loans, while MDBs have mainly used senior loans, with over three-quarters of their co-financing coming from this instrument.[79] Beyond this, funds were also leveraged from the European Union (EU), governments, the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and the GEF.

Figure A - 12. Co-financing by source (mln)



Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. Nature of co-Financing.

[79] Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. Nature of co-Financing.

Generally speaking, as noted in section 3 on country ownership, RPSP support is considered an effective way to foster capacity building in relation to the GCF and climate finance more broadly. However, the extent to which the GCF is delivering such support is too limited compared to needs, which restricts countries' capacities to develop and submit bankable single-country projects. Indeed, all key informants that were asked about RPSP support mentioned that it is insufficient to fill existing capacity gaps.

Among the case study countries, Tunisia counts the most RPSPs, with seven readiness activities totalling USD 4.5 mln. Most readiness support in the country took place before 2020, with one activity approved in 2020. While early readiness support focused on establishing the NDA and capacity strengthening, later RPSP activity helped shape the country's climate change agenda, including through support to draft the country's National Adaptation Plan, support in identifying the food security and agricultural sector priorities, and the development of the strategic framework for upgrading to a smart water network system.[80]

Guinea received support through four RPSPs totalling USD 2.5 mln. Much of this support has been allocated to the Supporting the Achievement of National Development Policies by Building Climate Adaptive Capacity and Planning in Guinea RPSP activity, which required over USD 1.6 mln. Readiness support in Guinea has also recently picked up, with only one readiness activity approved prior to 2020, while half were approved in 2021. RPSP support approved in 2021 aims to develop and submit three high quality concept notes to the GCF, among other things, which is an indication that appropriate support is likely to lead to single-country project submission.

Equatorial Guinea has received four RPSPs, valued at USD 1.5 mln, which represents the lowest value of RPSP support among the three countries. The first readiness activity in the country was approved in 2017 and entailed NDA strengthening and country programming. Subsequent readiness activities were approved in 2018 and 2019, which entailed preparatory support to the NDA (2018) and technical guidance and support to undertake a technology needs assessment and develop an action plan (2019). The last RPSP was approved in 2021, to support the NDA in developing a strategic framework and strengthening its coordination capacity to ensure that COVID-19 response and recovery plans and programmes will contribute to national climate change targets and global commitments.

5. PARADIGM SHIFT

While the GCF has contributed to the inclusion of climate change in countries' political agendas, legislation, and policies, the lack of financial and technical resources remains a major factor that limits realizations on the ground. As a result, GCF support in the three case study countries is currently insufficient for enabling a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.

In Tunisia and Guinea, the GCF is contributing to adaptation mainstreaming in national strategies through RPSP support for the development of a National Adaptation Plan. Entry points for integrating adaptation into national policies and strategies identified in the Tunisian plan include the National Economic and Social Development Plan as well as land-use planning.

Additionally, there is evidence that the GCF accreditation process has forced national entities in Tunisia to reflect on climate change and the structural changes necessary to comply with GCF

[80] This support was delivered through three readiness activities, namely "National Adaptation Plan: Advancing risk-informed development and land-use planning in Tunisia" approved in September 2019, "Food Security and Adaptation Priorities in the Agricultural Sector in Tunisia" approved in September 2019, and "Development of Strategic Framework for upgradation to a smart water network system through technological interventions in Sousse and Monastir in Tunisia" approved in October 2020.

requirements, which has in some cases initiated an internal paradigm shift. Indeed, key informants from the two entities that are currently involved in the accreditation process noted that since they started the process, climate change issues have become increasingly embedded in their organizations' values and vision. One of the entities has also created a social and environmental risks unit.

6. Gender equity and social inclusion

All multi-country projects implemented in the case study countries have been prepared and approved with gender action plans, which specify in some detail how the increased participation of women in project activities will be realized and monitored and set targets for gender-disaggregated output, outcome, and impact.

Further, six of these gender action plans include activities at the national level, which is appropriate in the context of multi-country projects. For instance, gender action plans for projects FP168, "Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) Framework" and FP140, "High Impact Programme for the Corporate Sector" implemented by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and EBRD, respectively, mention that the action plan will be further detailed into national action plans after the completion of country-level gender assessments. Projects FP151, "Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility", FP152, "Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity", FP025, "GCF-EBRD SEFF Co-financing Programme", and FP086, "Green Cities Facility" mention that gender-disaggregated data will be collected at the country level and/or that country-level gender assessments will be conducted.

All projects but one (FP025) have a gender assessment, which seeks to present the issues, gaps, and problems that should be addressed by gender-responsive project interventions. However, only four assessments present a country-level gender-profile overview (FP168, FP140, FP086 and FP092).

With an unemployment rate of around 30 per cent among higher education graduates in Tunisia, renewable energy and green jobs have been highlighted by government and NDA representatives as a sector that could potentially attract this labour force and contribute to their inclusion in the labour market.

There is no mention of indigenous peoples as a separate category in the project documents. In Tunisia, consulted key informants mentioned that there are no such recognized groups in the country.

7. Unexpected and unintended results

There are no unexpected and/or unintended results to report in this case study.

8. Sustainability, replication and scalability

Given the absence of single-country FPs in the case study countries and the lack of data available on multi-country projects, there is not enough evidence to assess sustainability and scalability of results. However, there is some indication that projects are being developed with sustainability and scalability considerations. For instance, in Tunisia, the single-country FP "Towards a Climate Resilient Agriculture and Livelihoods in Southern Tunisia" is currently under development. This project aims to reach vulnerable communities and localities and includes capacity building for project managers as well as local populations, which represents an important entry point for sustainability.

Key informants from international organizations as well as the government involved in the project concept note were very optimistic that projected benefits will last over time, given that the project

targets vulnerable populations and addresses pressing and critical issues of agriculture, livelihoods, and food security. The project has also been designed with great potential for replication and scalability. Indeed, it was developed to be a pilot to test approaches in different contexts, such as grazing lands and olive groves. The zones in which the project will be implemented were selected to be representative of the different contexts found in the south of Tunisia. If successful and provided with appropriate resources, the project could therefore be replicated in similar zones, in Tunisia and other comparable countries.

9. Efficiency

All stakeholder groups consulted for this case study reported significant difficulties in working with the GCF, whether that be on the accreditation or project submission processes. These difficulties strongly challenge the countries' capacities to develop and submit single-country projects to the GCF.

First, as discussed in section 3 on country ownership, two entities in Tunisia have been in the accreditation process since 2016 and are facing important communication issues with the GCF. A reason for this GCF unresponsiveness to the Tunisian organizations is its lack of internal human resources, suggesting that the GCF Secretariat does not have the capacity to support a strong country-driven and owned approach.

Additionally, evidence shows that the accreditation process is not adequately adapted to the different countries' contextual realities. Indeed, organizations involved with the GCF reported that the GCF lacks flexibility and does not take into account the cultural and economic contexts of countries. For instance, less advanced countries do not have the resources to comply with the GCF's requirements for the accreditation process and need more capacity building from the GCF, such as through RPSP support. Differences between Anglophone and Francophone countries' structures and administrative systems have also been reported as creating inequities across countries, to the benefit of Anglophone countries. The language barriers facing non-Anglophone countries also contribute to this inequity. Finally, the GCF imposes the same requirements on national and international entities despite national entities generally having less resources and capacity.

These difficulties facing entities during the accreditation process are significant to the point that they put a damper on their willingness to work with the GCF. In Tunisia, there were initially around ten organizations that started the accreditation process. Six years later, only two are still in the process, and none have been accredited yet. In Guinea, the lack of information on how to access funding has also discouraged entities from starting the process.

Entities involved in the project concept note submission process are also facing similar challenges. First, two AEs reported several delays since they started the process more than four years ago. One of them noted having spent over USD 600,000 for the development of the concept note. Long delays and excessive costs are serious issues that affect project submission rates.

Second, key informants from different categories, including AEs and government representatives, mentioned a lack of clarity and consistency on the GCF requirements and criteria, making it difficult to address them properly in concept notes. Inconsistencies were also reported due to rotations in GCF focal points, whose expectations differed and forced entities to start over to comply with new requirements, creating unnecessary delays.

Third, a disconnection from the field at the GCF was noted during consultations. For instance, an entity reported that the GCF requested them to include time series data on climate rationale that did not exist. The GCF decided to send an external consultant from the United States into the field to confirm the inexistence of such data, which resulted in time lost and represented an inefficient

allocation of resources by the GCF. This was also perceived by the entity as an inexplicable lack of trust.

Finally, evidence shows that the GCF's heavy processes and modalities are not responsive to the needs and urgency of climate action, as the long delays to get a project approved impact a project's timeliness. For instance, as the climate needs and priorities of Tunisia change rapidly, the long period of time that elapses between the beginning of concept note development and the disbursement of funding has resulted in the past in a project being no longer fully relevant at the time of its implementation.

C. Conclusions

While the GCF is a relevant and necessary institution in the context of climate action urgency in Africa, it presents several challenges to strengthening the resilience of vulnerable populations to climate change and to generating a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.

In particular, the lack of DAEs in the case study countries strongly diminishes country ownership and single-country project submission. Multi-country projects that are being implemented by international entities do not entirely align with national priorities. In addition, national entities typically have a better understanding of specific opportunities and challenges in the country, tend to be more flexible, and have the ability to adapt faster. Other challenges to country ownership and single-country project submission include language barriers, heavy procedures, as well as a perceived lack of transparency and responsiveness.

This case study also found that a lack of line of communication between GCF and the NDAs in some of the case study countries is a major problem. Some NDAs are not reachable by email or phone. There are no established relevant working contacts with some of the NDAs, either due to a high staff turnover within GCF when the contacts are lost, or internal changes within NDAs which are not known outside the authorities. The evaluation shows that capacities still need to be strengthened to enable countries to engage with the GCF and submit bankable single-country projects. RPSP support is perceived as an effective way to increase capacity building and ownership. However, the support offered through the RPSP is insufficient and more readiness grants are needed to help countries comply with the GCF accreditation and project submission processes.

All key informants consulted for this case study of countries with no single-country FP, reported significant difficulties in working with the GCF, whether it be on the accreditation or project submission processes. First, there is a lack of responsiveness from the GCF which indicates the GCF Secretariat does not have the capacity to support a strong country-driven and owned approach. Second, organizations involved with the GCF reported that the GCF lacks flexibility and does not take into account the cultural and economic contexts of countries, indicating that GCF processes are not adequately adapted to the diversity of African contextual realities. Third, heavy processes and modalities that generate long delays as well as a disconnection from the field result in the GCF being unable to adapt to countries' climate needs and priorities, and to respond to the urgency of climate action in a timely way.

Appendix 1. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

All data was extracted in August 2022 and includes approved projects as of B.33.

FP portfolio: an overview of GCF's FP portfolio in case study countries

PROJECT NAME	CASE STUDY COUNTRY	STATUS	THEMATIC FOCUS	AE	GCF FINANCING (USD)	CO-FINANCING (USD)
FP092 - Programme for integrated development and adaptation to climate change in the Niger Basin (PIDACC/NB)	Guinea	Under implementation	Cross-cutting	AfDB	5,949,202	12,475,996
FP025 - GCF-EBRD SEFF Co-financing Programme	Tunisia	Under implementation	Cross-cutting	EBRD	60,480,000	161,120,000
FP086 - Green Cities Facility	Tunisia	Under implementation	Cross-cutting	EBRD	9,704,518	19,141,325
FP099 - Climate Investor One	Tunisia	Under implementation	Mitigation	FMO	5,556,000	40,086,540
FP140 - High Impact Programme for the Corporate Sector	Tunisia	Under implementation	Mitigation	EBRD	38,704,500	113,829,000
FP151 - Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility	Tunisia	Under implementation	Mitigation	IUCN	440,485	226,195
	Guinea				440,485	226,195
FP152 - Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity	Tunisia	Under implementation	Mitigation	PCA	3,571,500	14,286,000
	Guinea				3,571,500	14,286,000
FP168 - Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) Framework	Tunisia	Approved	Mitigation	AfDB	22,217,000	102,570,000
	Guinea				10,254,000	47,340,000

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. Finance_ResultsArea_Long.

PPF portfolio: an overview of GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP) portfolio in selected countries

Project name	Case study country	Status	Delivery partner	Delivery modality	Thematic focus	Approved amount (USD)
PPF050 - Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund (ICRF)	Guinea	Approved	AFC	Standard PPF funding	Adaptation	835,500

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. PPF_Projects_extraction.

RPSP portfolio: an overview of GCF's Project Preparation Facility (PPF) portfolio in selected countries

RPSP name	Country	Status	Delivery partner	Agreement type	Approved amount (USD)
Preparatory support for GCF engagement in Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Disbursed	FAO	Framework agreement	300,000
Preparatory support to the NDA of Equatorial Guinea to engage with the GCF in early phases of REDD (NMFS and FREL/FRL)	Equatorial Guinea	Disbursed	FAO	Framework agreement	600,000
Technical guidance and support to conduct a technology needs assessment and a technology action plan for Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Disbursed	UNIDO-CTCN	Framework agreement	290,441
Resilient Recovery Rapid Readiness Support in Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Disbursed	FAO	Framework agreement	299,894
NDA Strengthening + Country Programming	Guinea	Disbursed	UNDP	Framework agreement	300,000
Supporting the Achievement of National Development Policies by Building Climate Adaptive Capacity and Planning in Guinea	Guinea	Disbursed	UNDP	Framework agreement	1,629,717
Strengthening Technical and Institutional Capacities of Guinea to respond to climate change	Guinea	Disbursed	ANAFIC	General grant agreement	509,984
Support for accreditation gap assessment and action plan to the *Agence Nationale de Financement des Collectivits* ANAFIC	Guinea	Legal agreement effective	PWC	N/A	39,307
NDA Strengthening + Country Programming	Tunisia	Completed	OSS	General grant agreement	289,880

Tunisia Readiness support for NDA capacity building and Project pipeline development	Tunisia	Disbursed	OSS	General grant agreement	330,000
CDC-Tunisia	Tunisia	Completed	PWC	N/A	28,677
APIA supporting project for the conceptualization and the installation of an E/S risk management unit for the access to climate finance	Tunisia	Disbursed	APIA	General grant agreement	404,285
National Adaptation Plan: Advancing risk-informed development and land-use planning in Tunisia	Tunisia	Disbursed	UNDP	Framework agreement	1,998,520
Food Security and Adaptation Priorities in the Agricultural Sector in Tunisia	Tunisia	Disbursed	FAO	Framework agreement	954,068
Development of Strategic Framework for upgradation to a smart water network system through technological interventions in Sousse and Monastir in Tunisia	Tunisia	Disbursed	UNEP-CTCN	Framework agreement	437,280

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab. RPSP data, iPMS and Fluxx – Grants approved.

Pipeline overview

NAME	COUNTRY	PROJECT NAME	THEMATIC FOCUS	STAGE	AE	DATE OF SUBMISSION	GCF FINANCING REQUESTED (USD)
CATAL1.5° T: Concerted Action To Accelerate Local 1.5° Technologies – Latin America and West Africa	Guinea	Multi-country	Mitigation	FP answered	GIZ	29/06/2019	1,128,892
Enhancing the Resilience of Guinea's Coastal Rural Communities to Coastal Erosion Due to Climate Change	Guinea	Single country	Cross-cutting	CN answered	UNDP	16/05/2019	25,500,000
Hardest-to-Reach	Guinea	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	CN answered	Acumen	22/05/2022	2,954,250
Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund (ICRF)	Guinea	Multi-country	Adaptation	FP answered	AFC	23/09/2021	21,924,123
Staple Crops processing Zone (SCPZ): Promoting sustainable agricultural value chains	Guinea	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	FP answered	AfDB	26/03/2018	43,562,500
EBRD MSME Programme	Tunisia	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	CN answered	EBRD	31/08/2016	4,285,200

Grids for Renewables Framework	Tunisia	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	FP answered	EBRD	18/03/2020	34,996,500
Programme for Energy Efficiency in Buildings (PEEB) Cool	Tunisia	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	FP answered	AFD	N/A	62,028,398
Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility (Phase 2)	Tunisia	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	FP answered	World Bank	N/A	15,238,400
Towards a Climate Resilient Agriculture and Livelihoods in Southern Tunisia	Tunisia	Single country	Cross-cutting	CN answered	Undetermined	21/08/2019	34,000,000
Tunisia Authorization Framework	Tunisia	Single country	Mitigation	CN answered	AWB	5/04/2021	50,000,000
Water, Food and Energy Nexus to address Climate Change impacts in Central Tunisia (NEXUS-CT)	Tunisia	Single country	Cross-cutting	CN answered	Undetermined	21/08/2019	37,000,000

Source: Independent Evaluation Unit DataLab, iPMS-Projects portfolio and pipeline.

Appendix 2. REFERENCES

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COUNTRY CASE STUDY REPORTS

Chapter 1. KENYA

CONTENTS

TABLES

FIGURES

BOXES

A. Background and context

1. Overview of the Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established by 194 governments in 2010 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to contribute to the global response to climate change. The GCF's mandate is to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries, and to help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Today, the GCF is considered to be a key institution in the global architecture for responding to the challenges of climate change.

The GCF aims to provide equal funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation. Its support is delivered across the following four adaptation result areas, namely: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; and (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. It is also delivered across the following four mitigation result areas, namely: (v) energy generation and access; (vi) transport; (vii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (viii) forests and land use.

The GCF's Governing Instrument identifies least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing States (SIDS) and African States as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, the GCF has provided special considerations for these countries, as reflected in its approach generally, and in the prioritization of programme and project delivery more specifically. Key among these is its allocation of resources for adaptation, which ensures a minimum floor of 50 per cent for LDCs, SIDS and the African States (decision B.06/06).

2. Project and scope of the evaluation

The present Independent Evaluation of the Relevance and Effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's Investments in the African States is part of a broader effort of the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of interventions in vulnerable states, including in Africa, LDCs and SIDS.[81]

This evaluation assesses whether and the extent to which GCF approaches and investments are effective in contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC, and promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. The evaluation considers effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and whether positive impacts are likely to be sustained. Moreover, the evaluation was undertaken with consideration for diverse stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. It also considers matters of innovation, replicability and scalability. Finally, the evaluation recognizes the heterogenous situation of African countries and explores how these differences have informed, enabled or constrained their engagement with the GCF.

Five case studies were prepared as part of this evaluation. Three thematic case studies were undertaken to explore particular areas of interest, including: case study 1 on the Great Green Wall, with a field mission in the Côte d'Ivoire; case study 2 on fragile, conflict, and violence-affected (FCV) African States, with a field mission to Africa Climate Week 2022 in Gabon; and, case study 3 on countries without a single-country funded project (FP), with a field mission in Tunisia. Two country-specific case studies with related field missions to those countries were undertaken to better

[81] The "Evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States" was undertaken with the support of a team of consultants provided by Universalia.

explore the GCF's work and impact on the ground, including the current case study 4 on Kenya, and case study 5 on South Africa. A total of 34 stakeholders were consulted in preparing this case study (see Appendix 2).

3. Overview of Kenya

Geography and climate[82]**:** Kenya is located in East Africa, within the Horn of Africa, and its territory encompasses 582,646 km^2. The country's eastern coastal plains rise to mountains and plateaus in the Kenyan highlands. Kenya has a variety of climates, ranging from hot semi-arid and hot desert climate in its north and east to tropical savannahs, tropical rainforests, and temperate oceanic climate in the western regions and south. As such, temperatures and precipitation vary greatly across the country. The highlands experience cooler temperatures, while the lowlands and coastal regions are much warmer. Precipitation ranges from 250 mm annually in northern areas to 1,000 mm annually in high rainfall zones. These zones are notably home to approximately 80 per cent of the country's population.

Demographic: In 2021, the Kenyan population was estimated at 55 million (mln).[83] Between 1960 and 1980, the population doubled, growing at rates of between 3.1 per cent and 3.8 per cent.[84] Population growth has been declining since the 1980s, standing at around 2.2 per cent in 2021.[85] The majority of Kenyans live in the highlands, and just over a quarter live in urban centres. Slightly more than a third (38 per cent) of the population is aged below 15 years old, also representing a decline since the 1980s, when around half of the population was aged below 15.[86]

Economy: Kenya has the largest economy of Eastern Africa[87] and one of the fastest growing economies in Africa.[88] In 2021, Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP) reached United States Dollar (USD) 110.35 billion (bln), representing USD 2,006.80 per capita. Rebounding from a COVID-19 induced contraction in 2020, GDP growth in 2021 was estimated at 7.5 per cent and the unemployment rate at 5.7 per cent, continuing a trend from 2016 when rates began to climb above the 3 per cent mark.[89] Approximately two-thirds of Kenyans earn below USD 3.20 per day, continuing a trend evident since the country's independence.[90] Economic inequality and an important gap between the poor and the rich are noted, with approximately 70 per cent of the population considered vulnerable as a result of poor nutrition, food insecurity, and preventable diseases.[91] Key economic sectors include agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, transport and infrastructure, information and communications technology, and building and construction.[92] In 2021, agriculture – comprised mainly of tea, coffee, flowers, vegetables, pyrethrum, wheat, and maize – remained dominant among them, accounting for about 22.4 per cent of the country's GDP, despite a poor production year due to crop failures. Livestock production is also prominent.[93]

Politics: Kenya is a presidential representative democratic republic. In 2010, the country adopted a new constitution following intensifying calls for a comprehensive review of the 1969 constitution. Efforts to amend the constitution faltered, and agreement was only reached following the outbreak

[82] World Bank (n.d.1).
[83] World Bank website (n.d.5).
[84] In 1960, the population was estimated at 8.1 mln; in 1980 it was 16.4 mln, according to the World Bank.
[85] World Bank website (n.d.4).
[86] World Bank website (n.d.3).
[87] World Bank website (n.d.1).
[88] United States Agency for International Development website (n.d.1).
[89] World Bank website (n.d.6).
[90] United States Agency for International Development website (n.d.1).
[91] Ibid.
[92] Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2022).
[93] Embassy of the Republic of Kenya in Japan website (n.d).

of post-election violence in 2008 and the subsequent intervention of the African Union. At the time of writing, President Uhuru Kenyatta has completed his second five-year term, and Mr. William Ruto has been elected as his successor. This comes after election results were contested by the long-standing opposition leader Mr. Raila Odinga. After a public hearing, the Supreme Court dismissed several petitions seeking to annul the results of the 9 August 2022 election.

4. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT

GHG emissions in Kenya were estimated at approximately 73.4 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCo2eq) in 2019 and have, for the most part, remained at less than average for country emissions in Africa between 1990 and 2019 (see Figure A - 13). According to national data supporting the 2020 update of the nationally determined contribution (NDC) of Kenya, the agriculture and energy sectors are currently responsible for over 90 per cent of the country's GHG emissions.[94] The updated NDC commits to reducing GHGs by 32 per cent below business-as-usual (BAU) projections. As such, it represents a marginal improvement over the targets set in the initial NDC.[95]

Figure A - 13. Kenya annual GHG emissions, 1990 to 2019



Source: Climate Watch (2020)

Agricultural land represents nearly half of the country's land area. Forested areas in Kenya represent approximately 6.3 per cent of the total land area, a figure that has declined from a 7 per cent high in 2000, reflecting the demand for land to support agriculture and urbanization. Taken together, the forestry and agriculture sectors are identified as having considerable emissions reduction potential in the country's updated NDC, through reforestation and the application of climate smart agriculture practices.[96]

[94] World Resources Institute (2022). According to the Climate Watch data portal for Kenya, 2019 data show agriculture at 63 per cent and energy (inclusive of transportation, manufacturing/construction, electricity/heat, buildings, fugitive emissions and other fuel combustion) at 30 per cent of total emissions. Industrial processes make up just over 5 per cent of emissions. The category, Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) presents in 2019 as a carbon sink (i.e. it absorbs more carbon than it emits); this wasn't the case for most of the first two decades of this century.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Climate & Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (2021). Human-caused methane is found to be a significant contributor of GHGs. In the updated NDC of Kenya, climate smart agricultural practices are to be directed toward multiple livestock management systems to reduce methane emissions among other low-emission strategies.

The energy sector in Kenya has grown markedly since 2000, with an estimated 71 per cent of its population having access to electricity as of 2020, up from 15 per cent in 2000.[97] Nevertheless, a large segment of the country's population remains without access to "clean cooking fuels" such as natural gas, ethanol or electric technologies.[98]

Electricity is largely sourced using renewable sources. The country is known as one of the lowest cost developers of geothermal power.[99] This power source features in the country's strategy to address climate change. According to the Country's National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 2020, 44 per cent of electricity generation comes from geothermal sources, 33 per cent from hydro, 11 per cent from thermal, 10 per cent from wind, and the remaining through imports and solar. The energy sector is identified as having the most potential for emission reduction, with the aim of cutting 48.1 MtCO2eq by 2030, representing over half of the total emission reduction potential. [100]

Kenya is already feeling the impacts of climate change. According to the country's National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), increasing temperatures have been noted since the 1960s, as have significant changes in precipitation patterns and the presence of extreme weather events. While long rainfalls have been declining in recent decades, the frequency of heavy rain events causing floods has increased in the region, passing from three per year in the 1980s to ten per year between 2000 and 2006.[101] In 2018, flooding claimed 183 lives and displaced over 225,000 people.[102] Droughts are also noted as having intensified in frequency, severity and coverage. Desertification of arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) is observed to be intensifying and spreading due both to climate change and direct human activity. In 2017, 3.4 mln Kenyans qualified as food insecure, and half a million were unable to access water due to drought.[103]

Climate impact projections offer a worrisome outlook, with significant impacts on livelihoods expected. The livelihoods of many Kenyans will be affected by projected crop yield reductions – up to 45 per cent for maize, rice, and soybean crops by 2100 – with important implications.[104] Moreover, coral bleaching and die-off is already noted, with a corresponding decline in fish populations and diversity of species. In coastal regions, erosion and sea-level rise threaten infrastructure and communities.

5. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Climate change has been on the national policy agenda in Kenya since 2010, as shown in Box A - 2. The foundation of the institutional and legal framework for climate change action is the Constitution of Kenya (2010).[105]

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[97] Our World in Data (2022b). The definition used in international statistics adopts a very low cut off for what it means to "have access to electricity". It is defined as having an electricity source that can provide very basic lighting and charge a phone or power a radio for 4 hours per day.
[98] Our World in Data (2022a). See "What share of people have access to clean fuels for cooking?".
[99] Kenya, Ministry of Energy (2020). p.4-6. Kenya ranks eighth globally in terms of geothermal energy production, with an aggregated capacity of about 865 Mwe and potential to reach over 10,000 Mwe.
[100] Geothermal energy is discussed in the National Climate Change Action Plan 2018–2022; in the Kenya National Adaptation Plan 2015–2030; in the Intended NDC; in the National Climate Change Response Strategy; and the Kenya National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy.
[101] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2018).
[102] Ibid., p.13.
[103] Ibid., p.13.
[104] Ibid., p.55.
[105] Kenya, National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General (2010a), p.13-14. Article 10 of Kenya's constitution sets out national values and principles of governance, such as sustainable development, devolution of government, and public participation, that are mandatory when making or implementing any law or public policy decisions, including climate change. Article 42 provides for the right to a clean and healthy environment for every Kenyan, which includes the right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations.

Box A - 2. Timeline of national policy documents for climate change

2010 – National Climate Change Response Strategy
2013 – First NCCAP - 2013–2017
2016 – Climate Change Act
2016 – Kenya submits first intended NDC to the UNFCCC, and ratifies the Paris Agreement
2016 – Kenya National Adaptation Plan (NAP) - 2015–2030
2018 – Second NCCAP – 2018–2022
2018 – National Policy on Climate Finance
2020 – Kenya submits its first update of the NDC - 2020–2030
2020 – Youth Climate Action Strategy for Kenya (2021–2030)

Source: Kenya, National Treasury and Economic Planning with GNI Plus, KCIC Consulting, Climate Policy Initiative (2021). The Landscape of Climate Finance in Kenya: On the Road to Implementing Kenya's NDC.

A first of its kind for Kenya, the National Climate Change Response Strategy was also published in 2010. Impetus for the strategy hinged on a recognition of the seriousness of climate change for humanity and of evidence of its "intensifying" presence in Kenya with accompanying human costs. It was also premised on the conviction that serious attention to climate change could provide Kenya with revenue generating opportunities to "avoid the high-emission path that developed countries have pursued to attain their present high economic status."[106] Interest at the time was on international carbon-emissions trading and other measures to incentivize emissions-limiting development projects under the Kyoto Protocol.[107] Supported by international donor funds, this foundational document set out an understanding of the international climate regime; assessed evidence for and impacts of climate change in Kenya; identified adaptation and mitigation needs along with needs associated with communications, public education, awareness raising, and research and development; and assessed climate change trends on population groups, infrastructure, the environment and the economy, along with ways to track and report on them. The strategy also analyzed the policy and legal framework of Kenya, and recommended comprehensive climate change policy, related legislation, and a set of institutional arrangements.[108]

The first NCCAP 2013–2017 operationalized the 2010 document with attention to the Kenya Vision 2030 long-term development plan. It also informed the Medium Term Plan (MTP) process of Kenya.[109] The NCCAP document further substantiated the case for mitigation and adaptation and, on the basis of a national consultation, set out priority actions across key sectors along with enabling actions related to legal, policy and legislative matters; knowledge management and capacity development; technology; measurement; and climate finance mobilization.

The second NCCAP 2018–2022 updates and adjusts the NCCAP based on the introduction of the 2016 Climate Change Act and for Kenya's requirements under the Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC to register and report against its NDCs (see below).[110] The current plan places additional emphasis on adaptation, identifying seven priority areas: disaster risk management; food and nutrition

[106] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (2010), p.5.
[107] United Nations Climate Change website (n.d.). The United Nations Climate Change website describes requirements under the Kyoto Protocol, for countries to meet their targets. For the most part, targets are met through the deployment of national measures. However, the Protocol offers them additional means to meet their targets by way of three market-based mechanisms: International Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Joint Implementation.
[108] Up to this point, climate change relevant content had been embodied in the National Environmental Policy (2008), and the Environment Management Coordination Act (1999).
[109] Kenya, National Treasury and Planning (2018b). Kenya is currently finishing its third Medium Term Plan cycle (2018–2022), wherein for the first time climate change is considered a cross-cutting issue and mainstreamed in relevant sectors.
[110] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2018).

security; water and the blue economy; forestry, wildlife and tourism; health, sanitation and human settlements; manufacturing; and energy and transport.

The introduction of the Climate Change Act in 2016 solidified the Government's commitment to climate change.[111] It established the Climate Change Directorate (CCD) under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry as the lead government agency for the coordination of the Government's response to climate change as well as related measurements, monitoring and reporting. The Act required that the Government develop a five-year NCCAP to guide the mainstreaming of adaptation and mitigation actions across sector functions of national and county governments.[112]

In 2015, the national Government developed the Kenya NAP 2015–2030.[113] It elaborates on the adaptation component of the NCCAP, specifying Kenya's planned adaptation actions in the short-, medium- and long-term as well as ongoing project initiatives, budget requirements, and line responsibilities. These are organized across 20 planning sectors, most notably the energy, infrastructure, water and sanitation, population, and urbanization and housing sectors. The NAP also calls for fast-tracking the implementation of the Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework. The programme seeks to strengthen synergies between sectors and agencies while also deepening accountability to the 23 drought-affected communities that fall within its scope.

Kenya submitted an updated NDC to the UNFCCC's NDC registry in December 2020. In this update, Kenya commits to a reduction of GHG emissions by 32 per cent by 2030, relative to a BAU scenario. Key mitigation actions identified include increasing renewable energy production, enhancing energy and resource efficiency, increasing tree cover to reach 10 per cent of land area, developing low carbon and efficient transportation systems, and scaling up climate smart agriculture and efficient livestock management. Key adaptation commitments include mainstreaming climate change adaptation into Kenya's medium term planning processes and county integrated development planning; enhancing uptake of adaptation technologies using inclusive approaches and a combination of scientific and indigenous knowledge; strengthening tools for adaptation monitoring, evaluation and learning; enhancing integration of climate information in decision-making and planning; and exploring innovative livelihood strategies for climate resilience.[114]

The Youth Climate Action Strategy for Kenya 2021–2030 was developed to empower the youth of Kenya to take climate action.[115] The strategy aims to (i) promote the strategic integration of youth in climate action, (ii) build the capacity of youth to take climate action, and (iii) support inclusive youth-led action on climate. The strategy is aligned with other initiatives in the country to involve youth, including those of the African Youth Initiative on Climate Change (AYICC).[116]

Under the legal and policy landscape described above, there has been a proliferation of strategies, plans and regulations. The current NCCAP (written in 2018) catalogues the emergence of these documents in agriculture, blue economy, disaster risk management, drought management, energy, environment, forestry, health, infrastructure, land management, transport, and water. These involve at least eight ministries and multiple other government agencies. At the same time, county governments have begun to integrate climate change responses in their County Integrated

[111] Kenya, National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General (2016).
[112] Specifically, the current NCCAP requires sectoral-level state departments to establish climate change units (CCUs) to support the integration of climate-related actions into sectoral strategies and implementation plans, and the designation of a County Executive Committee Member to coordinate climate change initiatives at the county level.
[113] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2016).
[114] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2020).
[115] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry and National Environment Management Authority (2021).
[116] African Youth Initiative on Climate Change website (n.d). The AYICC was conceived in 2006 during the second International Conference of Youth preceding the UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties 12.

Development Plans (CIDPs) and to set aside funding in annual development budgets to support climate change actions (adaptation, for the most part).[117]

Institutional arrangements for delivering on the climate change related commitments of Kenya have evolved alongside the legal/policy aspects. As mandated in the Climate Change Act, national leadership on climate change is provided by the National Climate Change Council. Tasked to provide policy coordination and oversight, including over the NCCAP, this body is chaired by His Excellency the President and co-chaired by the Deputy President.[118] The Council is comprised of four Cabinet secretaries (each with strategically relevant ministry portfolios), the Chairperson of the Council of Governors, and a representative from each of the private sector, civil society, a marginalized community, and academia.[119] The Cabinet secretary responsible for climate change affairs acts as the secretariat to the Council and is tasked with reporting biannually to Parliament on the status of implementation against international and national commitments. The ministry responsible for climate change affairs serves as the CCD responsible for the implementation of the NCCAP.

The Climate Change Act mandates that government ministries, state departments, and agencies establish climate change units (CCUs) responsible for integrating the content of the NCCAP into strategies and implementation plans. Similarly, county governments are required to establish CCUs, integrate and mainstream climate change actions into CIDPs, to designate a County Executive Committee member to coordinate climate change affairs, and to report on implementation on an annual basis.

The National Treasury and Economic Planning is mandated under the Climate Change Act to develop a strategy and make regulations for the purpose of securing climate finance and monitoring its use. It is also vested with the responsibility of establishing the Kenya Climate Change Fund to be used to support research, provide loans to support innovation, finance mitigation and adaptation actions, and provide technical assistance to county governments. The Treasury is guided in its climate financing role by the National Policy on Climate Finance (drafted 2015–2016) (see Box A - 3).

Box A - 3. Objectives of the National Policy on Climate Finance

- Enhance and streamline the implementation of public finance management in relation to climate financing
- Establish mechanisms to mobilize internal and external climate finance
- Track, monitor, account for, evaluate and report on sources, applications and impacts of climate finance
- Enhance the capacity of the country to mobilize climate change finance to support sustainable development
- Encourage and facilitate private sector participation in climate relevant financing opportunities

Source: Kenya, National Treasury and Economic Planning (2016).

At the time of the policy's issue (March 2018), at least 15 public agencies were providing climate finance, including the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The policy identifies the National Treasury as the national designated authority (NDA) for the GCF and indicates that the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) had already secured

[117] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2018), p.32-34.
[118] Ibid., p.82-83.
[119] Cabinet Secretaries responsible for environment and climate change affairs, national treasury and planning, economic planning, and energy, each have a seat on the National Climate Change Council.

accreditation to implement projects.[120] At this early stage in the relationship with GCF, however, there were no projects underway. The policy document anticipated GCF readiness programming to help the NDA and other actors to prepare for engagement.[121]

Two other government entities are named by the Act to provide services on behalf of the National Climate Change Council. One is the NEMA, carrying responsibilities to monitor and enforce the compliance of climate change interventions, and to integrate risk and vulnerability assessment practices associated with the use of public funds. The other is the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development, with responsibility to integrate climate change into the national education curriculum and to advise tertiary institutions on the same.

When the Government submitted its updated NDC in December 2020, it estimated the cost of implementing identified mitigation and adaptation actions at USD 62 bln from 2020–2030 (roughly USD 6.2 bln per year).[122] This represents an increase over figures presented in the NCCAP 2018–2022 and the initial NDC submitted in 2016. A 2021 landscape report by the National Treasury on Kenya's climate finance flows since the Paris Agreement found that 2018 flows to support climate change action amounted to just under half of the need estimated at that time (i.e. USD 2.4 bln). Nearly 60 per cent of the amount earmarked for that year was public funds sourced domestically (28 per cent of the total) or internationally (31 per cent of the total). The balance was private sector investments, sourced domestically (14 per cent of the total) and internationally (27 per cent of the total).[123]

The report also highlighted that Kenya's climate financing channelled through the Government's central budget is tilted toward mitigation activities (50 per cent) over adaptation (30 per cent), with the remaining amount supporting activities that contribute to both.[124] It pointed out that spending on adaptation amounted to 0.3 per cent of GDP 2017/2018, at a time when climate-induced extreme events were estimated to have caused a GDP loss of 0.4 per cent annually between 1997 and 2016.[125]

In the area of public finance, the National Treasury's examination of 2018 data reveals a significant gap between the amount of international public finance required and that actually received, particularly in the forestry, agriculture, and land use sectors.[126] Tracked contributions by international partners in 2018 amounted to less than one-third of all finance tracked despite Kenya's climate resilience ambitions calling for contribution levels closer to 87 per cent of annual costs over the decade.[127] By contrast, in the area of private sector finance, the 2018 data reveal a preponderance of internationally sourced investment (66 per cent) in projects focused on the renewable energy sector. The more philanthropic forms of private transfer (provided by foundations, professional associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and faith-based organizations) were being used exclusively to support adaptation activities.[128]

On the strength of its climate finance data analysis, the Treasury called for:

- Increased public sector financing for adaptation in Kenya

[120] The Treasury was originally nominated as the NDA in July 2014.
[121] Kenya, National Treasury (2016c).
[122] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2020). The NDC assesses the cost of mitigation at USD 17.7 bln and adaptation at USD 44 bln.
[123] Kenya, National Treasury and Economic Planning with GNI Plus, KCIC Consulting, Climate Policy Initiative (2021).
[124] Ibid., p.27.
[125] Ibid., p.29.
[126] Ibid., p.40. According to The Treasury, multilateral donors made up the largest share of international donors in 2018 (41 per cent). The largest five donor countries were: Japan, China, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, each providing between 2.5 per cent and 9 per cent of the international community's contribution.
[127] Ibid., p.53.
[128] Ibid., p.50. On the basis of publicly reported information (for 2018), the contributions of philanthropic organizations make up around 0.1 per cent of total private transfers.

- Scaled up private sector investments in sectors beyond renewable energy, especially transport and forestry, including with the use of incentives and subsidies
- International (innovative) public finance focused on sectors not receiving private finance at scale (e.g. in forestry, transport, and water)
- Better coordination and reporting between Kenyan actors (ministries and agencies, international development partners, and private sector stakeholders at the national and county levels)
- Systematic finance tracking and reporting to inform impact and scale[129]

The second performance report (2019–2020) on the NCCAP, documents the rollout of Kenya's climate change programming as well as impacts in the seven priority areas as reported by ministries and agencies at the national and county level. Capacity constraints surrounding the collection and reporting of performance data are noted, particularly at the county level, along with coordination issues among different actors that compromised the quality of the aggregated data set. The COVID-19 pandemic was also cited as a constraint. Measures have been identified to develop the quality of subsequent NCCAP reports.

6. Institutional arrangements and GCF portfolio

As mentioned above, the National Treasury is Kenya's interface with the GCF. In addition to the GCF's roster of international accredited entities (IAEs), two national entities have achieved the status of direct access entity (DAE): NEMA (March 2016), and the KCB Bank Kenya Limited (KCB) (November 2020). NEMA is the principal instrument of the Government for the implementation of all policies related to the environment. As such, it has a supervisory/coordination function for lead agencies on implementation; a research/stock-taking role, advising on land use planning; a regulatory compliance role for environmental standards; and a public environmental education role in stewardship and environmental management. NEMA is accredited for projects up to USD 10 mln.[130] KCB is the largest financial institution in Kenya and is accredited for projects in the USD 50 mln to USD 250 mln range. A champion of nine of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), KCB has introduced targets to become carbon neutral in its operations and to increase its green lending portfolio.[131]

A third impact investor entity, The Acumen Fund Inc., achieved the status of a regional DAE in 2015. Acumen sources and executes equity investment opportunities in the clean energy, agriculture, and health care sectors with a focus on reducing carbon dioxide emissions and improving livelihoods. Acumen invests "'patient capital' to bridge the gap between the efficiency and scale of market-based approaches and the social impact of pure philanthropy". It is accredited for projects up USD 10 mln, and its activities typically include the distribution of solar lanterns and other home devices, smoke free cookstoves, and the provision of financial services (micro loans).

Four additional organizations, three national and one regional, are currently listed as nominated for a DAE role. These entities are at various stages in their accreditation process.

Appendix 1 provides an overview of the FPs in Kenya.[132] GCF has 15 FPs in Kenya, valued at USD 231.5 mln. Among these, 11 FPs are currently under implementation; four are approved but are not yet under implementation. The majority of FPs in Kenya are multi-country, with only two country-specific FPs. Consistent with the wider picture of climate financing in Kenya, the GCF portfolio favours mitigation as the thematic focus. Eight FPs address mitigation exclusively (valued at USD

[129] Ibid., p.52.
[130] Key informant interviews; and Kenya, National Environment Management Authority website (n.d.).
[131] Key informant interviews; and KCB website (n.d.).
[132] A funding proposal overview was extracted in August 2022 and includes FPs approved as of the thirty-third meeting of the Board (B.33).

119.3 mln), four projects are cross-cutting (valued at USD 60.9 mln), and three address adaptation exclusively (valued at USD 39.2 mln).[133] These projects are implemented by 10 accredited entities (AEs). Currently, Acumen is the most active AE in the country with three FPs, followed by *Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden* (FMO), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the World Bank, each with two.[134] Among these, the IUCN is the only AE with a country-specific project under implementation.[135]

Appendix 1 provides an overview of support delivered through the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) in Kenya.[136] As of 2022, there was one PPF in Kenya, titled "Devolved climate change governance to strengthen resilience of communities' in target counties", submitted by NEMA, and valued at USD 352,640.[137]

Appendix 1 provides an overview of support delivered through the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP). As of August 2022, the GCF provided support through four RPSPs valued at USD 4.3 mln. This support is provided to NEMA and two IAEs, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC).

B. KEY FINDINGS

1. RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

a. A line of sight from national policy to international commitments

Over the past 10 years, Kenya's commitments to reduce GHG emissions and increase climate resilience have become more explicit and more deeply enshrined in the country's legal/policy and institutional framework. They are anchored in legislation (the Climate Change Act), stated as part of the national vision of Kenya, elaborated upon in the NCCAPs and an NAP, and are operationalized through the country's three-year planning framework. With varying degrees of specificity, these and other documents reference Agenda 2030, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and other international commitments (see section 3 on country ownership).[138]

b. GCF's attractiveness to Kenya stakeholders

With a deepening understanding of the magnitude of the climate financing gap for developing countries like Kenya, key informants recall anticipation upon hearing of the GCF's arrival as a new climate finance actor in Kenya.[139] The GCF's relevance to Kenya was tied to the prospect of it introducing different forms of financing at magnitudes yet unseen. This included "patient capital"

[133] Note that the two country-specific projects are adaptation projects.
[134] Other active AEs in the country include *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), DeutscheBank, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) GmbH, and Pegasus Capital Advisors, L.P. (PCA), each with one project.
[135] The other country-specific project is being implemented by NEMA.
[136] PPF support was extracted in August 2022 and includes support approved as of B.33.
[137] Since B.33, a second tranche of support has been approved for the multi-country project entitled, "Pathways to Dairy Net Zero: Promoting Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Livestock in East Africa (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda)", submitted by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and valued at USD 1,140,671.
[138] Kenya signed the UNFCCC on 12 June 1992, and ratified the Convention on 30 August 1994. It ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 25 February 2005, and the Paris Agreement on 26 December 2016. The country is signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1989), the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (1994), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1998), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2004), and the Minamata Convention on Mercury (2013).
[139] At the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009, developed countries committed to a collective goal of mobilising USD 100 bln per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.

that could be used to de-risk/attract additional financing to advance innovation and scale across the breadth of the GCF's results areas. The Kenya National Green Climate Fund Strategy, published in 2017, was drafted by the NDA to respond to this high level of stakeholder interest. Relevance was also tied to GCF's commitment to building a direct access modality to complement the contributions of international entities (public and private sector) under the principle of country ownership. As one informant put it, "It wasn't just about the money; it was about the roll out."

The GCF was attractive to public sector and development organizations for the perceived support it could provide in adapting to worsening climate conditions in Kenya. Drought responses in the country's ASALs, for example, had typically focused on short-term fixes to address the humanitarian crisis, addressing symptoms but not causes. With the scale of support possible through GCF, there were new possibilities to engage counties in large scale ecosystem management responses capable of addressing community level restoration, rehabilitation, and protection works; value chain development tied to regenerative practices; and higher-level institutional capacities for landscape management (e.g. effective governance, rangeland plans, climate information).[140]

c. The match between 'need' and 'delivery'

As of 2022, growth in the GCF project portfolio of Kenya remains well short of its financing needs and shows an imbalance that favours mitigation over adaptation activities, a situation at odds with the country's priority need for climate adaptation solutions. To illustrate the gap, USD 2.4 bln of public and private capital from all sources was invested in 2018 into climate related activities. This amounts to about a third of the financing Kenya needed to cover the costs of meeting its NDC targets.[141] Regarding portfolio content, currently only three of 15 GCF projects target adaptation, while another four feature adaptation as a cross-cutting theme. The skewing of the portfolio toward mitigation activities is illustrated in the following figures.

Figure A - 14. Number of FPs by results area



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

[140] Green Climate Fund (2019a). The Towards Ending Drought Emergencies (TWENDE) Project (FP113) emerged early in the portfolio's history as drought related project concepts were brought together as a single coherent response.
[141] Kenya, National Treasury and Economic Planning with GNI Plus, KCIC Consulting, Climate Policy Initiative (2021), p.7.

Figure A - 14 above provides an overview of the number of FPs addressing each GCF results area. Note that one project may be addressing more than one results area. It suggests an overall concentration of effort on projects addressing the energy generation and access results area under mitigation. In dollar terms, as per Figure A - 15**,** investments in adaptation initiatives comprise 36.5 per cent of the total portfolio to date.[142]

Figure A - 15. GCF FP financing by results area (million)



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

At the same time, Kenya's NCCAP 2018–2022 positions adaptation for priority attention by citing the known human costs and expected detrimental effects of climate change on future national development. Regarding human costs, the plan cites "devastating impacts of droughts and floods, and the negative effects of climate change on vulnerable groups in society including: women, older members of society, persons with disabilities, children, youth, and members of minority or marginalized communities". In relation to the impacts on development, it links lack of progress on climate action to missed achievement on the goals of Kenya's 2030 plan, and its more immediate Big Four Agenda focused on ensuring food and nutrition security, affordable and decent housing, increased manufacturing, and affordable healthcare.[143]

The top reasons suggested by national stakeholders for the skewing of the GCF portfolio toward mitigation projects include that:

- It is easier to establish financial returns on mitigation projects and, by extension, to attract investors.
- It is more strategic to go for international private sector AEs with deeper pockets and the scope to provide concessional financing.
- It is easier to document the impact of mitigation projects, while adaptation impacts are more diverse, longer term and harder to measure.

[142] Ibid., p.9. The mitigation bias noted in the GCF portfolio is evident in the climate finance figures for the country as a whole. According to the Climate Policy Institute, slightly more than 79 per cent of flows in 2018 were directed to the implementation of climate mitigation measures, while adaptation accounted for about 12 per cent. At the country level, the study observes, "climate finance is disproportionately targeting the renewable energy sector, while other key sectors, like agriculture, forestry and land use, transport, and water management, are dramatically underfunded".
[143] Ibid., p.5.

At the same time, the portfolio shows halting growth of DAEs and a predominance of IAEs, including private sector entities that operate with a more independent stance vis-a-vis national processes. NDA willingness to provide the no-objection letter (NOL) on concepts proposed by IAEs has hinged on an understanding that allowing these projects into the portfolio has no bearing on Kenya being able to also build up its portfolio of adaptation projects. Yet, with private-sector led projects leading public sector ones on a magnitude of 3:1, IAEs leading DAEs on a magnitude of 13:1, and multi-country projects leading Kenya-specific projects on a magnitude of 6:1, there is increasing cause for concern (see section 3 on country ownership).

d. A growing impatience over GCF's role

In its most recent NDC (2020–2030), Kenya highlights floods, droughts, temperature increase, and sea level rise as climate threats; identifies the agricultural, water, and health sectors as being particularly vulnerable; and estimates the cost of addressing its climate commitments at USD 62 bln (i.e. USD 43.9 mln for adaptation, USD 17.7 mln for mitigation), 79 per cent of which the country will seek internationally. These threats and needs highlight a potentially important role for the GCF to play. However, there is emerging impatience across stakeholder groups beyond the NDA, with the GCF's role/contribution (or lack thereof). This is having a dampening effect on its perceived relevance to the efforts of Kenya to combat climate change. Expressions of this impatience are set out below:

- The GCF is "remote" to Africa/Kenya, and its modalities remain poorly understood.
- Institutional/procedural constraints associated with accreditation and project development impede the urgency to act.
- Without explanation, it appears that IAEs with multi-country/region mitigation-focused project concepts are processed by the GCF more quickly than are those of national DAEs.
- In terms of outcomes, there is not a lot to observe for GCF's efforts in Kenya after three to four years.
- It is particularly difficult to know what the IAE multi-country projects are doing and achieving.

2. Coherence

To date, the NDA has not observed climate finance institutions like the GCF cooperating at a project level, despite having overlapping mandates. Table A - 7 highlights the presence of the top four multilateral climate financing mechanisms operating in Kenya.

Table A - 7. Activities and focal points among climate finance institutions

Institution	Focal area	Project provided to Kenya	Focal point/designated authority
Green Climate Fund (GCF) • Operational 2013 • Allocation to Kenya ~USD 231.5 mln	• Health, food, and water security • Livelihoods of people and communities • Energy generation and access • Transport • Infrastructure and built environment • Ecosystems and ecosystems services • Buildings, cities, industries, and appliances • Forests and land use	National: 2 Multi-country: 13 Readiness: 4	National Treasury

Global Environment Facility (GEF) • Operational 1992 • Allocation to Kenya ~USD 1.3 bln	• Biodiversity • Climate change • Land degradation • Sustainable forest management • International waters • Chemicals	National: 50 Regional/global: 100 Small grants projects: 400	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
Adaptation Fund (AF) • Operational 2007 • Allocation to Kenya ~USD 34 mln	• Agriculture and food security • Water/coastal management • Transboundary water management • Disaster risk reduction	National: 1 Regional: 3	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
Climate Investment Funds (CIF) • Operational 2008 • Allocation to Kenya ~USD 74 mln	• Geothermal • Solar • Electricity modernization	National: 4	National Treasury

Source: GCF, GEF, AF, CIF (websites).

Several factors work against cooperation, coherence and complementarity at the country level, according to NDA and DAE stakeholders. These include:

- Differing replenishment cycles among the funds
- The GCF's practice of funding projects without country-level analysis and planning (i.e. not signalling advanced commitment ahead of making actual project funding decisions)
- Institutional anchoring to different parts of government for day-to-day coordination (e.g. NDA does not have the same direct relationship with AF and GEF that it does with GCF)
- Projects of the various funds independently anchoring to different parts of implementing agencies (NEMA provides a case in point)
- Lack of established processes for sharing project information laterally at a country level and timelines for project preparation

That said, the National Treasury retains general oversight on all climate financing (domestic and external) in Kenya and, as such, is able to exercise some coordination at the country level.[144] The principal mechanism for this, the Inter-Ministerial Technical Coordination Committee on Climate Finance (IMTC), has been active in project pipeline development and in the review of project concepts to determine alignment with the NCCAP.

The few stakeholders able to distinguish between the climate finance mechanisms described them as having different strengths and weaknesses. One national entity familiar with both the AF and GCF observes untapped complementarity between the more tailored, locally focused approach of the AF with the scale-focused orientation of the GCF. The experience of one DAE accredited to both the AF and GCF also shows that it is possible to fast-track one accreditation application based on an existing track record with the other entity.

Commentary on country-level coherence among GCF actors indicates foundational strength with operational weaknesses. Relative to other African States, Kenya is recognized by stakeholders as

[144] Acting as the NDA for GCF, the Climate Finance Unit in the National Treasury engages with various line ministries, departments, agencies, CSOs, the private sector, academia, counties and particularly the Ministry of Environment and Forestry-CCD on matters related to technical and policy support. The unit also works with a number of ministries with climate-relevant mandates including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for supporting UNFCCC/negotiations; the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries CCU; the Ministry of Energy-Renewable Energy Dept; the Ministry of Transport; the Ministry of Devolution and the ASAL-Ending Drought Emergencies in the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, amongst others.

having a well-developed legal, policy, and institutional framework to manage climate change, an arrangement that accommodates input from private sector and civil society organization (CSO) stakeholder groups. At the same time, the depth and scope of engagement between government (NDA) and other stakeholder groupings is perceived to be insufficient to bridge deep-seated differences and trust issues among the public sector, private sector, and civil society. Refrains heard from across the stakeholder spectrum include the following:

- Lengthy bureaucratic processes make it difficult for private sector actors to commit resources
- Market driven interventions are not appropriate in contexts involving vulnerable populations
- CSOs are unregulated and unpredictable
- Government officials are susceptible to private sector interests, particularly those of international financiers wanting to engage in Kenya
- International NGOs are doing the work that ministries and agencies can be doing at a project level

More specific factors observed to be working against country-level coherence are noted below.

- The GCF's requirement that full project proposals show co-financing. This is at odds with the government practice of assigning co-financing as part of the medium-term planning cycle. The catch is that assignment of funds to a project requires knowledge that the project will be approved.
- The necessity that national entities simultaneously possess plentiful access to financing while also having sufficient programmatic reach on climate matters. Commercial banks can be well set up operationally to attract funds to address climate change and have ready-made distribution networks, but they lack (or must increase) expertise on the programming side. Conversely, public sector and non-profit entities can be well set up to address climate change programmatically, but they are hard-pressed to have and/or attract the resources.
- Related to the point above, IAEs (in particular, multilateral development banks (MDBs)) have a competitive advantage over DAEs in providing concessional financing to country actors on account of their additional capacities**.**
- Challenges in embracing local-level actors in projects. Climate change mechanisms, in general, struggle to meaningfully incorporate civil society into the project cycle. In comparison to the GCF, the AF is observed in Kenya to have paid closer attention to developing relationships with community-level actors.

More broadly, a 2019 review of climate finance in Kenya highlighted constraints on monitoring flows of bilateral and multilateral climate funds on account of there being no agreed definition of what constituted climate finance and no consistent accounting rules. Pointing out the presence of more than 40 climate funds operating in sub-Saharan Africa, the review also observed constraints on coordination.[145]

3. Country ownership

a. Contribution of GCF readiness support

GCF readiness programming has played an important, though not exclusive, role in establishing the GCF's presence in Kenya and in supporting national efforts to create a sound policy and institutional base for climate action. In 2016–2017, a first tranche of readiness support (USD 1.4 mln) was provided through a United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations Development

[145] Peter Odhengo and others (2019). In the 2019 discussion paper "Climate Finance in Kenya: Review and Future Outlook", Peter Odhengo and collaborators discuss the experience of Kenya to date in establishing a legal/policy framework and institutional arrangements, and in mobilizing resources to tackle climate change in the country.

Programme/World Resources Institute (WRI) readiness programme to set up NDA offices, develop stakeholder awareness and engagement, and to support the accreditation process for candidate national entities. The Kenya GCF strategy document was prepared during this time. In January 2018, the FAO signed on with GCF as a readiness delivery partner to provide up to USD 3 mln in NAP readiness support in Kenya. Activities have focused on technical and institutional capacity for adaptation planning in key ministries. About a third of this allocation has been accessed to date. In 2019, the NDA was successful in securing three-year operational funding support – a precedent for GCF.[146] This tranche of GCF-sourced readiness support (USD 845,000) sets up the NDA to, among other tasks:

- Develop a GCF country programme, vital for identifying country priorities
- Support the accreditation of DAEs
- Revise and finalize the GCF Coordination Strategy to align with NCCAP 2018–2022 and the third MTP cycle (MTP III), and develop NDA operational guidelines (a revision of the original GCF engagement strategy)
- Build the knowledge and skills capacity of NDA staff to effectively carry out its mandate
- Develop a green incentive policy
- Support climate finance related capacity building at the sub-national level (county)
- Develop a tool for tracking climate finance flows among non-state actors
- Engage the private sector and encourage investment in climate action
- Develop a proposal pipeline

Looking back on the evolutionary path of the Kenya NDA, the length of time to negotiate GCF operational readiness support early on negatively compromised the continuity of Kenya's progress on climate action. However, the three-year readiness funding model now in play is seen as an important breakthrough not just for Kenya but for other African states in the midst of establishing their climate finance programming. Annual allocations of USD 300,000 are viewed as sufficient for the current scale of operations in Kenya, although the NDA sees scope for increasing this as the portfolio grows and as the extent to which the NDA takes on additional support functions related to networking/exchange, capacity development, and research/monitoring also evolves. In this vein, the NDA doubts whether the standard minimum allocation of USD 150,000 per year would be enough to support a fledgling NDA. On the question of whether an NDA could ever become self-supporting, key informants from the NDA indicate that while other revenue sources should be sought as its work broadens and matures, it is likely there will always be a supportive role for GCF to play.

b. Stakeholder perceptions of ownership at country level

In Kenya, country ownership is upheld across a spectrum of stakeholders as an important principle to guide the GCF's mandate in Kenya, and the extent to which the NDA has engaged stakeholders external to government is appreciated. That said, key informants in the CSO community and private sector express a desire for more opportunities to engage with the GCF on matters of policy and programming than what is currently being offered. The NDA in Kenya is critiqued by CSO stakeholders for not being proactive in the way it has engaged civil society in readiness activities. They compare Kenya to Nigeria, where they see CSOs gainfully involved in readiness programming and recognized as having constructive roles to play at project level. At the same time, public sector

[146] See Appendix 1, GCF RPSP portfolio in Kenya. One of the two DAEs, NEMA has also been the recipient of preparatory support. The PPF support provided to NEMA, valued at USD 352,640, covered: (i) pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, (ii) environmental, social and gender studies, (iii) risk assessments, (iv) the identification of programme- and project-level indicators, (v) pre-contract services including tender documents, (vi) advisory services, and (vii) other services to financially structure the proposed activity.

key informants indicate there is support for CSOs to play a role in the climate finance mechanism of Kenya, but with an accountability structure in place to accommodate this engagement. Concern expressed by public sector key informants reflects an understanding of CSOs' dual roles as independent observers and potential implementers of community led initiatives.

CSO leaders explain that, while wanting to remain independent, their organizations and networks also like to be firmly recognized for the benefits they can provide around the project cycle in terms of supporting stakeholder engagement, implementation, and project monitoring and evaluation. From this vantage point, the GCF would need to put more emphasis on awareness-raising in civil society about its work and be more open regarding the possibilities for CSO engagement. Additionally, the GCF would need to prioritize CSO capacity development that supports an enhanced level of engagement. CSO leaders describe the merits of small project funding as a means to assist NGOs/CSOs in gaining the skills needed to be meaningfully engaged around the project cycle. At this point, a limited amount of capacity support is provided by international entities like Germanwatch and Care International.[147] Kenya's continuing commitment under NCCAP 2018–2022 to devolve its climate change response to the county level provides additional rationale for supporting organizations with the potential to enable locally led processes.

Private sector interest in engagement is focused on demonstrating the business case for involvement in mitigation and adaptation initiatives across sectors, advocating for greater clarity and simplicity regarding Kenya's private sector participation in climate finance, and for a tempering of the influence of IAEs (i.e. MDBs, private sector financiers) on country programming.[148]

The CSO, public and private sector stakeholders in Kenya identified a variety of ways in which they have experienced diminished country ownership through their engagement with GCF operations and programming. Commonly described situations are listed below:

- Where the ministry as an executing entity (EEs) has insufficient autonomy to implement the project after having been the originator of the project idea
- Where country ownership generates layers of bureaucratic engagement, and with that diversion of funds from end users and uses
- Being "brushed off" by IAEs or their EEs when seeking information on project design/implementation
- Not knowing the criteria by which IAEs pick their EEs for a country
- Where the GCF is putting accreditation standards and requirements outside the reach of national organizations, accreditation of IAEs is occurring much more swiftly, and DAE accreditation applicants are not hearing back from GCF for extended periods
- A notable presence in the Kenya portfolio of "supply driven" projects (multi-country/region)
- Developing a project concept among national stakeholders, but then not being able to find an AE willing, able, and/or appropriate to take up the implementation role (even when county governments have committed resources)

[147] Germanwatch (2019). Germanwatch, CARE and a number of regional entities are engaged in the project, "Civil society readiness for the Green Climate Fund – focus Africa". One output of this collaboration is the "Engaging with the Green Climate Fund: A Civil Society Toolkit".

[148] The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) is the apex organization of the private sector in Kenya (currently comprising over 500 association members and 600 corporate members). KEPSA brings together local and foreign business associations, chambers of commerce, professional bodies, corporates from multinational companies, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and start-ups from all sectors of the economy to enable them to speak with one voice when engaging government. The Environment, Water and Natural Resources Board is one of 16 sector boards active in advocacy. It participates in the IMTC. More information is available at https://kepsa.or.ke/home

Acknowledging resource constraints and the dampening effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as contributing factors, the Climate Finance and Green Economy Unit at the Treasury indicates an intent to strengthen the IMTC's mandate and capacity, while also bringing on board research organizations and other players. At the time of writing, Kenya is organising its first national GCF conference. The NDA expects that such a gathering will provide an opportunity for sharing lessons, unlocking bottlenecks, and building consensus on the country's climate action priorities.

c. No-objection letter (NOL) – necessary, yet insufficient

General agreement among key informants on the strength of Kenya's ownership of the GCF project portfolio is tempered by a widely perceived lack of disclosure on the activities of private sector IAEs operating multi-country projects. While distinct interests and perspectives divide Kenya's GCF stakeholders, there is broad agreement that national interests should be at the forefront when developing projects, and that nationally derived projects are much easier to hold to account against legal, policy, and planning parameters at the national level. The NOL process is felt to be insufficient on its own to secure national interest and alignment for those projects developed externally to country origination processes.

Key informants from the NDA acknowledge the dominant presence of mitigation-focused, multi-country/regional projects in the portfolio. It is aware that its ability to influence the latter stages of project design and implementation is diminished after the NOL is provided. Under consideration is a criterion or framework that will guide the country in prioritizing multi-country projects. Minimum requirements might include local content, a value proposition for Kenya (including allocation), presence of a country office for the IAE, clarity on the number of countries involved, local consultations, and a reporting framework. Clearance from sector ministries might also be put forward as a requirement, effectively making NOL issuance a country-owned decision rather than one that is assigned to the NDA. As it is, the NDA reports generally constructive working relations with private sector AEs and a certain amount of responsiveness to calls already made for more disclosure.

From the perspective of at least one IAE, there is some surprise at the critiques levelled toward multi-country/regional projects. From this particular IAE's perspective, it should be standard practice for an investor to observe the primacy of the no-objection principle, maintain close liaison with government, align with national frameworks, adhere to public-private partnership.

d. Country ownership in GCF governance

While valued by Kenyan/African civil society for the engagement and mutual learning it affords, the accredited observer role is compromised by some of the rules/procedures to which it adheres. The CSO observer role provides a source of insight about GCF operations and ambitions that can be shared in African networks like the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA). It also provides an African CSO voice on the GCF Board on policy, strategy, and project approvals. However, CSO key informants expressed concerns, including that the time to prepare for Board meetings (read through documents) is too short to give the documents the attention they deserve or to engage in discussions among peers. The sequencing of input requests also is not optimal for actually influencing Board decisions. For example, African CSO observers feel like they are providing input on project proposals much too late in the process to engage in decision-making.[149]

[149] Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (2022); and CSO focus group discussion.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF INVESTMENTS

a. Status of the Kenya portfolio

Relative to other African States, Kenya has developed a sizable portfolio of projects, though at this stage all but one are being delivered through IAEs. Given capacity constraints among the two newly accredited DAEs and the complexity of the accreditation process for candidate entities, this pattern of dominance by IAEs seems likely to prevail for some time to come. To date, the GCF has provided USD 231.5 mln in financing in Kenya through 15 FPs (see Appendix 1). The one DAE with an approved FP (NEMA) is solely focused on a single project currently in start-up. Kenya's other DAE (KCB) is advancing just one of several ideas to the FP stage, and both DAEs are constrained to do more at this point. Five more candidate organizations are at various stages of their accreditation process with little or no progress evident. Kenyan stakeholders stress that a consequence of not moving forward with DAE accreditation in a timely way is that sectors are underserved. The energy sector provides a case in point for Kenya: progress in addressing the Kenya energy matrix is affected by not having the Geothermal Development Corporation on board as a DAE.

Kenya has a pipeline of existing nationally derived project ideas, many of which emanate from government departments or counties. For these, the NDA plays a matchmaking role among IAEs.

The GCF has attracted co-financing across projects to varying degrees. In addition to the GCF's own financing, FPs have also received USD 690.8 mln in co-financing, a ratio of 3.15, meaning that for every dollar provided by the GCF, USD 3.15 is provided in co-financing. Co-financing ratios vary greatly between FPs, ranging from 0.05 for FP175 "Enhancing community resilience and water security in the Upper Athi River Catchment Area, Kenya", to 7.22 for FP099 "Climate Investor One". Co-financing has been sourced through various instruments, although over three quarters has been provided through senior loans and equity (see Figure A - 16). Other instruments include grants, guarantees, reimbursable grants, subordinated loans, and in-kind donations.

Figure A - 16. Co-financing by instrument type (million)



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

Co-financing has been leveraged from diverse sources with the bulk coming from the private sector and MDBs (see Figure A - 17).

Figure A - 17. Co-financing by source (million)



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

The private sector has provided around three quarters of its co-financing through equity, while MDBs have mainly used senior loans, with over three quarters of its co-financing coming from this instrument (see Figure A - 18). Governments have also mainly provided co-financing through senior loans and equity. The European Union and other international financial institutions (IFIs) have provided all their co-financing through reimbursable grants.

Figure A - 18. Percentage of co-financing distributed by instrument and source (million)



Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

b. Stakeholder assessment of effectiveness

A combination of administrative delays in formulating and mobilizing projects post-approval on the one hand, and difficulties obtaining up-to-date and consistently specific project updates on the other,

have caused stakeholders and observers to judge the GCF's Kenya funding stream to be slow and opaque. At the time of writing:

- Administrative delays have slowed the start of three projects involving government ministries and agencies in implementing roles (see also section 9, under 'Efficiency').[150]
- With standard lag times in the posting of annual performance reports (APRs), reports for only five of 15 projects are publicly available, and these describe the state of the projects as they were in 2020.[151]
- Inconsistent patterns of public disclosure among IAEs compromise the efforts of the NDA and other observers to assess project and portfolio progress and impact.

Concern around the slow pace of GCF project development and delivery in the Kenyan context was expressed in a 2019 status review of Kenya's climate finance. Written when the GCF portfolio contained eight approved projects valued at USD 2.8 bln, the study cites three items: a lack of technical and institutional best practices that could enhance the writing of competitive proposals; caution about the way project designs were demonstrating uptake of lessons learned under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol; and the rules of engagement with IAEs, including the provision that implementation funds are first transferred to the headquarters of the IAE before being re-routed to the country.[152]

In a focus group discussion, Kenyan CSOs posed the effectiveness question this way: "Is the GCF funding stream flowing quickly enough to the people on the frontlines of climate change?" Their concern is that, currently, the answer is "no". Concerns centre on the pace of project development and approvals, project design (adaptation in particular) being insufficiently locally led, and on the layers of actors involved in delivery and, by extension, the degree to which budget allocations favour programming over overhead or admin costs.[153]

Constraints on the mobilization of GCF resources in Kenya are largely procedural. Among key informants, the most commonly observed constraints on the mobilization of GCF resources in Kenya include:

- The length of time it has taken applicant DAEs to gain accreditation and the arduousness of the process
- The lengthy gestation period of a project from idea to approval
- Securing an AE as an implementing partner (in the absence of an appropriately positioned DAE)
- Establishing financing arrangements with DAEs and EEs at a project level once approved
- An overarching understanding within the country of the GCF's support and requirements (e.g. NDA mentions they are not fully conversant with the value added of the Private Sector Facility in relation to nationally derived project development processes)

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[150] The Second Performance Review (SPR) country case study for Kenya (August 2022) observes that: "Three projects that rely on government departments as EEs or DAEs, have faced administrative delays in the National Treasury to enable project funds to be transferred to that implementing department (FP103, FP113 and FP175). FP113 (TWENDE) has experienced further delays with government agencies then not able to complete service agreements with service providers. Implementation of FP113 is also reportedly slowed by the proposal budget not including ground transportation (a vehicle) for implementers and underestimating the cost per hectare for restoring degraded lands."
[151] These projects are FP005, FP078, FP103, FP095 and FP099.
[152] International Institute for Sustainable Development blog (2021). Lessons learned from the operation of the CDM have been pertinent to the formulation of rules under the Paris Agreement (rule 6). Among other aspects, the discussion of lessons from the CDM has touched on the use of common metrics to ensure transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, and consistency of reporting on GHG emissions, and the deployment of strategies to ensure sustainable development co-benefits beyond attention to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. conservation, poverty alleviation). This blog post by Charles E. Di Leva and Scott Vaughan sheds light on those lessons and how they have been parlayed into the Paris Agreement, to date.
[153] Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (2022), and CSO focus group discussion.

Overall, the paucity of results data from the Kenya portfolio makes an overall assessment of effectiveness difficult. Yet, the information that is available on each project provides insight on the diverse nature of the projects and the modalities in the portfolio. Observations on the status of the portfolio from interviews and a review of the documentation available is set out below:

- Projects of three (multi-country) financier IAEs (FP005, FP078, FP103) have invested in Kenyan businesses researching, developing, and/or producing (among other technologies) climate friendly cooking stoves; solar powered water pumps; dairy processing facilities; modular, clean energy appliances that provide cooling; micro-mobility transport solutions; and bio-gas appliances and mini-grids that address results areas under mitigation and adaptation. The number of lives benefitting, and the volume of emissions averted, is being counted in some instances. Outcome data relating to utilization and benefit is being collected in 2022 to inform APRs for 2021.[154]
- Among the three remaining (multi-country) financier IAEs, one has indicated they will not be investing in Kenya, one has not reported any activity as of the 2020 APR, and one has indicated through an interview that they are actively prospecting for investment opportunities.
- The status of FP113, the "Towards Ending Drought Emergencies" (TWENDE) project, is illustrative of the start-up delays mentioned above. The project has three components, which would ideally roll out simultaneously. Component 1 focuses on rangeland planning enhancements – climate change analysis and data as well as participatory community and county planning (National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)); component 2 focuses on restoration of rangeland resources and sustainable management (Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI) State Department for Livestock); and component 3 focuses on public, private, and community investments (value chain development) (Conservation International (CI)). At this stage, those components led by government executing agencies are lagging due to delays in getting agreements in place. Only component 3 is active, although community activities were in place prior to the TWENDE project.
- There is broad understanding among key informants, and particularly those in CSOs and ministries, that locally led processes are critical to effective delivery and impact. To date in Kenya, these practices are in evidence in the TWENDE project where women's committees at the village level drive land restoration activities. They are less in evidence in the private sector IAE projects (i.e. those with an adaptation or cross-cutting focus) where activities are trained more on suppliers or producers in value chains and where end users tend to be "beneficiaries" more than "drivers".[155]

c. Capacity enhancement at the National Treasury

NDA staff attribute institutional capacity developments at the Treasury to GCF readiness support, noting that their unit has become the "go to" place within government for insight on climate

[154] The SPR Kenya Country Case Study Team paid a visit to the Promotion of Climate-Friendly Cooking Project (FP103). They found a project well underway with a trained, resourced and active network of stove manufacturers, distributors and installers. According to the SPR team, the project's success to date appears to be largely due to the GCF project being an upscaling of a previous project. Therefore, processes and staff were already in place and poised to start the GCF project.
[155] International Institute for Environment and Development (n.d.). In 2017, Germanwatch, CARE, PACJA, and ENDA Energie launched the consortium initiative, "Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Readiness for the Green Climate Fund" with funding support from the German Government. In October 2022, the consortia (now including 11 CSO national and regional networks) produced a thematic brief entitled: Locally Led Adaptation in the Green Climate Fund – Performance Across the Fund's Portfolio in Africa". The study examined the funding proposals of a sampling of 56 adaptation and adaptation-mitigation FPs against the eight principles for Locally Led Adaptation developed by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the World Resources Institute (WRI) in 2021, and found some deficiencies in relation to the eight principles.

finance.[156] As NDA, National Treasury and Economic Planning have gained visibility, influence, and institutional capacity under consistent leadership. Prior to becoming an operational unit in 2017, climate finance matters were managed by individual designates rather than by an office. The NDA currently has seven sanctioned staff positions available (although not filled at this point). A leadership change over the past few months will test the extent to which NDA competencies obtained through NDA readiness support have been embedded. Enhancements notwithstanding, NDA staff describe their institutional ambition as a climate finance focal point constrained by the USD 300,000/year cap and limitations on the use of funds. They also point to a distinctness to the NDA readiness process that is, at present, insufficiently accommodated.

As of June 2020, the National Treasury's Climate Finance and Green Economy Unit has taken up the role on behalf of the Government of Kenya to lead implementation of a 10-year USD 150 mln financing agreement with the World Bank, Government of Sweden, Government of Denmark, and other development partners. The multi-country programme – Financing Locally-Led Climate Action Program (FLLoCA) – supports Kenya in implementing the devolution of climate change programming set out in its NCCAP 2018–2022.[157]

Ambitions related to enhancing its facilitative role include developing a GCF country programme, encouraging devolved structures (counties) to work on project preparation in regional blocks and to broker relationships between those blocks and AEs, and creating more opportunities for national stakeholder interactions. The NDA sees the FLLoCA programme as instrumental in this regard. They describe it as an innovative, multi-donor programme that applies principles of meaningful citizen engagement in climate decision-making. It also builds on the foundations and structures set up through Kenya's devolution efforts to pioneer the first national model of devolved climate finance. FLLoCA is expected to incentivize and strengthen the capacities of sub-national governments to work in partnership with communities to assess climate risks and prioritize local resilience investments. NDA key informants expect FLLoCA to create synergies with other climate funds such as the GCF, as the programme is designed to encourage cross-agency collaboration and vertical linkages from community level up to national level. Employing participatory and inclusive climate risk management in the prioritization, design and implementation of locally led climate actions is key to building synergies.

5. PARADIGM SHIFT

Regarding progress toward a paradigm shift, there is as of yet no firm evidence of FPs playing a catalytic role in relation to big systems changes related to emissions, climate resilience, policy and regulation.[158] Any observed changes in emissions, climate resilience, or systems changes in policy and planning remain mostly within the results domain of each project – that is, at a community level or within a supply chain.

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[156] Key informants from the NDA highlight the following contributions: drafting of National Policy on Climate Finance, a National GCF Strategy (currently under revision), a training handbook on climate finance, Climate Reporting Finance Framework, the Kenya Climate Finance Landscape Review and Outlook (2021), and the development of a green investment policy (in process).

[157] World Bank Live website (2021). The FLLoCA programme seeks to create both an enabling environment and an innovative decentralized approach to tackling climate change impacts. Derived from Kenya's NCCAP, the FLLoCA sets out to strengthen local resilience to climate change by delivering support and enhancements in the following key areas: policy; legal and regulatory framework; capacity building; climate finance; community-led actions; technology and innovation; measurement; reporting; verification and monitoring and evaluation; and emerging climate-related issues.

[158] In GCF documentation, paradigm shift potential refers to the "degree to which GCF can achieve sustainable development impact beyond a one-off project or programme investment through replicability and scalability". This is to be assessed with reference to three dimensions: scale – a quantifiable change in magnitude of results within and beyond the project; depth – extent of uptake by targeted groups or embeddedness in systems, independent of cost; and sustainability – the degree to which the change is supported structurally, culturally and financially such that the change is irreversible.

At the same time, there are signals of paradigm shift potential within the Kenya portfolio. GCF FP proponents are encouraged to consider paradigm shift potential right from the ideation stage of the project cycle. Pathways to higher level impacts are spelled out in project designs and reported on in APRs. The projects in Kenya for which there are APRs for 2020 each set out pathways that depend on technology investments and the market development of products and services that are in some manner supportive of lower emissions and/or helping targeted end users to be more resilient to the effects of climate change.[159] Speaking to this private sector approach, one DAE key informant named the following as determinants of paradigm shift potential: rational expectations, concrete and achievable business plans (i.e. with clear lines of sight to social impact and profit), exemplary communications, and shared understanding and collaboration among public and private sector stakeholders. By contrast, public sector and/or CSO informants tend to conceptualize broader systems-change pathways that harness climate smart policy and public service programming, decentralized governance and planning, and locally led adaptation processes.[160]

The potential to nudge Kenya's projects toward synergistic outcomes (and paradigm shift) is also compromised by the siloed nature of each project and the insufficiency of national efforts to convene, exchange, plan and collaborate. Simply by reading the descriptions of the projects in the Kenya portfolio, it is easy to conceive of cross-connections within and across sectors. As it stands, however, the knowledge that project stakeholders have of other projects in the portfolio is limited.

6. Gender equity and social inclusion

Kenya is among the first African countries to develop legislation and policies that promote the participation of women in climate change activities. Gender and inclusion in relation to climate change are addressed in the Constitution of Kenya, the Climate Change Act, and the NCCAP 2018–2022 as follows:

- Kenya Constitution (2010) – the Bill of Rights (chapter 4) states that, "Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres."[161]
- Climate Change Act (2016) – requires the President to ensure compliance with the "two-thirds" gender principle when appointing members to the National Climate Change Council and obligates the Cabinet Secretary responsible for climate change affairs to formulate a gender and inter-generational responsive climate public education/awareness strategy.[162]
- NCCAP 2018–2022 – considers stakeholder engagement, building stakeholder capacities vis-a-vis climate change responses, climate finance, reporting and monitoring, gender/inter-generational responsive awareness programming, and inclusive approaches to climate change actions.[163]

APRs from 2020 mostly describe projects undertaking gender sensitive stakeholder engagement processes to determine needs and capacities, setting up environmental and social safeguards (ESS) (including gender) competent staffing, training and planning, and putting in place independent redress mechanisms with training while also requiring this within sub-projects. Reports indicate that

[159] Broadly speaking, FP078, FP103, FP005 and FP152 fit this pathway characterization.
[160] Broadly speaking, FP113 fits this pathway characterization, with its focus on integrating multiple enabling systems – land management, climate smart services, application of adaptive technologies for land restoration, local level governance/management arrangements, value chain integration (openings for investment), skills development (technical, business and governance), and concerted attention to gender/inclusion factors at the community level.
[161] Kenya (2010a), section 27(3), p. 20.
[162] Kenya, National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General (2016), sections 7(6) and 8(2c), p.9.
[163] Kenya, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2018a).

gender outcome (co-benefits) data are pending. A sampling of Kenya's climate change actors describes their gender commitments/actions as follows:

- DAE – The institution has a social management performance policy and assesses ESS for all projects above USD 500,000. Its ESS addresses risk management, independent redress mechanisms, and resource utilization; it is currently working with the International Finance Corporation to automate the ESS report.
- IAE (Multilateral) – Rigorous gender and social inclusion provisions are in place, aligned with and, in some instances, advanced beyond GCF requirements.
- IAE (private sector) – The institution uses social impact screens in determining investment potential (with an environmental, social, and governance manager on hand). Proposals are screened by an advisory board to determine whether candidate projects pass the social impact and mitigation thresholds. Locally led adaptation is acknowledged for its impact potential; the catch for commercial entities and investors is to engage in a way that achieves social impact and profit. This requires attention to market opportunities that are in some way supportive of adaptation (i.e. 'proximate opportunities'). Value chain analysis could be helpful in this regard. Engagement of an NGO or CSO technical advisor to accompany an investor project is seen to be a very good way of addressing social impact considerations.
- National entity accreditation applicant – The accreditation process has led to the development of a gender policy.
- Project level – These include working with two women's groups in the TWENDE project (16 expected by project end in three landscapes) on grass seed banks.

7. Unexpected and unintended results

As it happens, Kenya currently has a direct presence on the GCF Board. This has afforded an additional window on the GCF, which has been useful to the NDA. Through this avenue, the NDA has been able to provide inputs on sector guidelines and on the accreditation process.

8. Sustainability, replication and scalability

The GCF's enabling role in shaping Kenya's policy and institutional arrangement for climate finance is described by key informants close to government as significant, matching or even exceeding its contribution to sustainability at a project level. A key consideration here is the extent to which Kenya's legal and policy framework mandates action across government at national and sub-national levels.

As noted in the section on paradigm shift, scalability and replicability are described in project designs and anecdotally in early accounts of progress from the Kenya portfolio. The TWENDE project (FP113) gives a clear indication of a national intention to come to grips with the climate emergency occurring in the country's ASALs. Drought responses in these regions have traditionally triggered humanitarian responses to tackle short-term food security issues. While important in the moment, these approaches have failed to address mounting stresses on fragile ASAL ecosystems. These stresses include overgrazing, loss of vegetation, soil erosion, and reduced evapotranspiration. With IUCN as the AE and the MoAI, the NDMA, and CI as EEs, as well as a number of specialist CSOs operating as service providers (notably: Justdiggit and the Maasai Wilderness Conservation Trust (MWCT)), the five-year TWENDE project is to approach the problem county by county. Following ecosystem management principles, the project will develop landscape management plans and local governance structures, introduce climate smart information services to guide land use management decisions, undertake locally led land restoration activities, commercialize locally produced grass seed used to re-introduce vegetative cover, and invest in local-level production value

chains. Scaling is expected to occur county by county guided by policy and planning, improved extension, and market forces incentivizing sustainable agriculture and livestock management. At the end of the project term, lessons learned from application in 11 ASAL counties are expected to be applied by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Cooperatives and the NDMA in the other 23 counties classed as ASAL.

9. Efficiency

Many of the above-mentioned constraints on GCF operations in Kenya pertain to process efficiency considerations that could be addressed in large part through operational adjustments. Most frequently, key informants identified the following issues as they pertain to accreditation, project development, and the administration of projects once approved:

- There is a paucity of contextualized information and expectation management (beyond the general) to guide organizations applying for accreditation or proposing a project.
- Size differences between DAE sectoral or service specializations indicate there should be greater flexibility in the use of project funding templates.
- Inconsistencies noted between advice given by consultants and feedback provided by GCF staff are time consuming and result in numerous "back and forth" interactions.
- There is perceived inflexibility in adjusting budgets or programmatic and organizational aspects of the approved design as well as concern that decision-making around adjustments will delay implementation and reduce project run times.

C. Conclusions

While variations in opinion are evident across stakeholder groups interviewed in Kenya, the guidance and direction provided through national climate policy and planning and the organization and process support supplied by the NDA and the Inter-ministerial Committee are recognized hallmarks of climate policy coherence and country ownership. Kenya's commitments to reduce GHG emission and increase climate resilience are increasingly explicit and anchored in the country's legal, policy, and institutional frameworks, which is encouraging in terms of setting the stage for GCF investment.

However, expectations surrounding the movement of GCF resources to Kenya have not been met. For those who know the GCF Kenya portfolio, the presence of multi-country projects designed and approved outside of Kenya's own project pipeline process is concerning, as is the focus on mitigation over adaptation and the lack of coherence between and among climate finance institutions. Despite having in place a comprehensive process for assessing the merits of each project under development, issuance of the NOL at the concept stage appears to be an insufficient safeguard of country ownership.

Additionally, the pace, complexity and rigidities of GCF business processes are challenging, and there is a perception that GCF decision-making and communications are opaque. For example:

- Accreditation – a perceived differential in the ease and speed by which IAEs achieve accreditation as compared to DAEs; this has resulted in a queue of project ideas seeking a DAE/AE champion.
- Project design – use of non-differentiated templates, voluminous communication back and forth and excessive attention paid to establishing a climate rationale for investment in settings where this data often doesn't exist.

- Project implementation – delays incurred reconciling GCF and Kenyan government financial management arrangements, and a perceived immutability of the project document when needing to account for changed circumstances.

In the realm of adaptation programming, local ownership and engagement, use of appropriate technologies, and value chain integration are critical determinants for systemic change and climate resilience. Leadership of local authorities and CSOs is also essential to the anchoring of projects to community realities. However, stakeholders report challenges to participation, particularly among civil society and private sector actors. Additionally, government, private sector, and civil society actors view each other with caution. A shared understanding of the GCF is missing, and dialogue across the parties has so far been insufficient to form the synergies necessary for local ownership and the beginnings of a true paradigm shift.

As a result of these factors as well as the paucity of information available about project outcomes, there is a perception that little progress has been made by the GCF in Kenya outside of increasing the institutional and technical capacity of the National Treasury. However, a paradigm shift is possible if project potential is achieved, silos are taken down, and there are increased national efforts to convene, exchange lessons learned, and collaborate.

Appendix 1. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

GCF FP portfolio in Kenya

PROJECT NAME	STATUS	SCOPE	THEMATIC FOCUS	AE	GCF FINANCING (USD)	CO-FINANCING (USD)
FP005 - KawiSafi Ventures Fund	Under implementation	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	Acumen	12,500,000	42,500,000
FP027 - Universal Green Energy Access Programme (UGEAP)	Approved	Multi-country	Mitigation	DeutscheBank	13,600,000	37,672,000
FP078 - Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund (ARAF)	Under implementation	Multi-country	Adaptation	Acumen	6,500,000	7,500,000
FP095 - Transforming Financial Systems for Climate	Under implementation	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	AFD	19,397,590	33,380,020
FP099 - Climate Investor One	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	FMO	5,556,000	40,086,540
FP103 - Promotion of Climate-Friendly Cooking: Kenya and Senegal	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	GIZ	8,287,651	3,610,266
FP113 - TWENDE: Towards Ending Drought Emergencies: Ecosystem Based Adaptation in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Rangelands	Under implementation	Multi-country	Adaptation	IUCN	23,152,082	11,390,900
FP148 - Participation in Energy Access Relief Facility ("EARF")	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	Acumen	12,000,000	12,000,000
FP151 - Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance Facility	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	IUCN	440,485	226,195
FP152 - Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	PCA	3,571,500	14,286,000
FP163 - Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	World Bank	39,998,000	183,347,975
FP168 - Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) Framework	Approved	Multi-country	Mitigation	AfDB	35,889,000	165,690,000
FP175 - Enhancing community resilience and water security in the Upper Athi River Catchment Area, Kenya	Approved	Single-country	Adaptation	NEMA	9,526,603	473,380

FP177 - Cooling Facility	Under implementation	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	World Bank	17,427,000	80,235,240
FP190 - Climate Investor Two	Approved	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	FMO	11,527,500	58,432,500

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

GCF PPF portfolio in Kenya

PPF	PROJECT NAME	STATUS	DELIVERY PARTNER	DELIVERY MODALITY	THEMATIC FOCUS	APPROVED AMOUNT (USD)
PPF010	Devolved climate change governance to strengthen resilience of communities in target counties	Disbursed	NEMA	Standard PPF funding	Adaptation	371,200

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

GCF RPSP portfolio in Kenya

RPSP NAME	STATUS	DELIVERY PARTNER	AGREEMENT TYPE	APPROVED AMOUNT (USD)
Direct Access Entity Support	Completed	PWC	N/A	34,102
NEMA capacity strengthening programme towards accessing climate finance from the Green Climate Fund	Disbursed	NEMA	General grant agreement	431,060
Enhancing capacity for planning and effective implementation of climate change adaptation in Kenya	Disbursed	FAO	Framework agreement	3,000,000
Kenya NDA Capacity Strengthening and Preparation of a Country Programme	Disbursed	Kenya	General grant agreement	845,670

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

Appendix 2. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	POSITION/TITLE	ORGANIZATION
Achoki	Marlene	Global Policy Co-Lead, Climate Change and Resilience	Care International
Adhiambo	Roniance	Chyulu Landscape Coordinator	Justdiggit
Amakobe	Wycliffe	Climate Change and Energy Specialist	Kenya Climate Change Working Group
Aman	Malik	Program Manager, Climate Finance & Green Economy Unit	National Treasury
Bett	Robert	Senior Project Officer	IUCN
Chileshe	Paxina	Adaptation Specialist, Eastern and Southern Africa Region	International Fund for Agricultural Development
Chorske	Michael	Operating Partner	Pegasus Capital Advisors
Gateyu	Anne	National Implementing Entity	NEMA
Isabu	Elija	Sustainability Manager	Kenya Commercial Bank
Karangwa	Charles	Regional Lead for Forests, Landscapes and Livelihoods Programme for Africa	IUCN
Kenenei	Joan	Program Officer, Chyulu Landscape	IUCN
Kilonzop	Philip	Policy Advocacy and Communication Lead	PACJA
Kimtai	Harry	Permanent Secretary, Livestock	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Cooperatives
Kirani	Patrick	Director	BEA International
Kirumba	Wangari	Coordinator, National Implementing Entity	NEMA
Kirumba	Edith	Environment, Climate and Safeguards Specialist, Eastern and Southern Africa Region	International Fund for Agricultural Development
Kishapui	Kunyai	TWENDE Project - Grazing Committee	Olorika, Kajiado, Kenya
Kithinji	Dickson	Environmental Governance Expert and Climate Change Advisor	Care International
Koringo	Obed	Climate Policy Advisor	Care International
Korir	Hillary	Senior Economist, National Treasury and Planning	Republic of Kenya
Lanoi	Charity	Livelihoods Coordinator	MWCT
Leinein	Tipape	TWENDE Project - Grazing Committee	Ilchalai, Kajiado, Kenya
Lumumba	Stephen	Chief Executive Officer	Green Earth Trust
Maina	Ruo	Chair of the Board	Green Earth Trust
Mopel	Ntoiyan	TWENDE Project - Grazing Committee	Olorika, Kajiado, Kenya
Müller	Lana	Program Manager, TWENDE Project	Justdiggit

Muthoni	Sarah	National Implementing Entity	NEMA
Ngige	Faith	Public Private Dialogue Officer, Devolution, Environment, Water, Natural Resources, and SDGs	Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)
Odhiambo	Judith Sidi	Head, Corporate and Regulatory Affairs	Kenya Commercial Bank
Pasha	Isaiya	TWENDE Project - Grazing Committee	Ilchalai, Kajiado, Kenya
Ruo	Tracy	Head of Finance	Green Earth Trust
Sande	Saitabau	TWENDE Project - Grazing Committee	Olorika, Kajiado, Kenya
Solonka	Sonkoi	TWENDE Project - Grazing Committee	Ilchalai, Kajiado, Kenya
Wanjohi	Hamori	National Implementing Entity	NEMA

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Chapter 2. SOUTH AFRICA

CONTENTS

TABLES

FIGURES

A. Background and context

1. Overview of the Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established by 194 governments in 2010 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to contribute to the global response to climate change. The GCF's mandate is to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries, and to help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Today, the GCF is considered to be a key institution in the global architecture for responding to the challenges of climate change.

The GCF aims to provide equal funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation. Its support is delivered across the following four adaptation result areas, namely: (i) health, food and water security; (ii) livelihoods of people and communities; (iii) infrastructure and built environment; and (iv) ecosystem and ecosystem services. It is also delivered across the following four mitigation result areas, namely: (v) energy generation and access; (vi) transport; (vii) building, cities, industries and appliances; and (viii) forests and land use.

The GCF's Governing Instrument (GI) identifies least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing States (SIDS) and African States as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, the GCF has provided special considerations for these countries, as reflected in its approach generally, and in the prioritization of programme and project delivery more specifically. Key among these is its allocation of resources for adaptation, which ensures a minimum floor of 50 per cent for LDCs, SIDS and the African States (decision B.06/06).

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The present "Independent evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States"[164] is part of a broader effort of the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of interventions in developing countries that are in Africa and/or are LDCs and SIDS.

This evaluation assesses whether and the extent to which GCF approaches and investments are effective in contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC, and promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. The evaluation considers effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the vulnerability of local communities and livelihoods to the effects of climate change, and whether positive impacts are likely to be sustained. Moreover, the evaluation was undertaken with consideration for diverse stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. It also considers matters of innovation, replicability and scalability. Finally, the evaluation recognizes the heterogenous situation of African countries and explores how these differences have informed, enabled or constrained their engagement with the GCF.

Five case studies were prepared as part of this evaluation. Three thematic case studies were undertaken to explore particular areas of interest, including: case study 1 on the Great Green Wall (GGW), with a field mission in the Côte d'Ivoire; case study 2 on fragile, conflict, and violence-affected states, with a field mission to Africa Climate Week (ACW) 2022 in Gabon; and case study 3 on countries without a single-country funded project (FP), with a field mission in Tunisia. Two country-specific case studies with related field missions to those countries were undertaken to better

[164] The "Evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund's investments in the African States" was undertaken with the support of a team of consultants provided by Universalia.

explore the GCF's work and impact on the ground, including: case study 4 on Kenya, and the current case study 5 on South Africa. A total of 42 stakeholders were consulted in preparing this case study, with individuals listed in Appendix 2.

3. Overview of South Africa

Geography and climate: Most of South Africa's landscape is made up of high, flat areas called plateaus. These lands are covered with rolling grasslands, called highveld, and tree-dotted plains called bushveld. To the east, south, and west of the plateau lands is a mountainous region called the Great Escarpment. The eastern range, called the Drakensberg, is filled with jagged peaks, some more than 11,400 feet (3,475 metres) high. Much of South Africa's water comes from the snow-capped peaks of Lesotho, a small, landlocked nation within the north-eastern mountain range.

In South Africa itself, snow falls rarely. The climate varies between Mediterranean in the south, continental with mildly cold winters and hot summers on the plateaus, and semi-arid and arid conditions in the northwest, which includes the large Namib desert. South Africa has an average annual rainfall of 464 mm, which is relatively low compared to many other African countries. The rainfall pattern varies between a dry period from November to April and a wet season from May to October with more than twice as much rain. The Western Cape region gets most of its rainfall in winter (June to August), with the rest of the country experiencing the greatest rainfall in summer (December to February).

South Africa is full of wildlife. The country takes up only about one percent of the Earth's land surface but is home to almost 10 per cent of the world's known bird, fish, and plant species as well as about 6 per cent of its mammal and reptile species.[165]

Demography: In 2021, South Africa had a population of 60.04 million (mln) people, with an annual population growth rate of 1.2 per cent.[166] The country's population is projected to reach 66.4 mln people by 2030 and 72.8 mln by 2050. In 2020, the average life expectancy at birth was 64, and the population density was 49 people per km^2. Over two-thirds of the current population resides in urban areas, and this percentage is expected to increase to 72 per cent and 80 per cent by 2030 and 2050, respectively. The percentage of the population with access to electricity in 2020 was 84.4 per cent, with 70 per cent of the population accessing the internet.

Politics: South Africa has a relatively stable political environment. The Africa National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling party since 1994, having won the country's first democratic elections. However, opposition parties have won recent elections in the country's big cities. Meanwhile, the ANC is divided into factions with very different views on many issues of economic policy, ranging from the pro-business attitude of the current President Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa and his supporters on the one hand, to the party's left wing calling for nationalization of the Reserve Bank and the expropriation of large areas of arable land without compensation on the other.[167] Dividing lines between tribes also remain politically salient, particularly between the Xhosa and Zulu.

Economy: In 2021, the country had a gross domestic product (GDP) of United States dollars (USD) 419.95 billion (bln), resulting in a GDP per capita of USD 6,994.[168] South Africa is thus an upper middle-income country (UMIC), resulting in limited access to external grant funding and concessional loans usually reserved for lower income countries.

[165] For this and the previous paragraph see: National Geographic (n.d.); and Greater Good SA (n.d.).
[166] World Bank website (n.d.).
[167] Queenin Masuabi (2022).
[168] World Bank website (n.d.).

GDP growth in the country decreased dramatically between 2018 and 2020, largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns. While GDP growth rebounded in 2021 to 4.9 per cent, South Africa's continued economic growth faces increased risk in the coming months due to a national energy crisis that has seen prolonged and continuing load shedding.[169] Heavy flooding in the Eastern Provinces in Spring 2022 has also taken a toll. As a result, GDP is projected to grow by only 1.8 per cent and 1.3 per cent in 2022 and 2023 respectively.[170] Household consumption and investment remain the main drivers of this growth (with households continuing to benefit from government COVID relief). The commodity prices boom will support exports, and investment will continue to strengthen over the projection horizon. Of note, inflation reached close to 6 per cent in early 2022, and is anticipated to increase further due to higher energy prices before starting to fall.[171]

Poverty and development: South Africa suffers from very high levels of unemployment as well as inequality in income and property ownership. More than 18 mln people are estimated to live on less than USD 1.90 per day.[172] Unemployment has steadily increased over the past 10 years, with national estimates in 2021 at 28.8 per cent.[173] The official unemployment rate was reported as 34.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2022. When including those who have given up looking for work, the figure for youth under 24 is estimated to be 64 per cent and for adults 45 per cent.[174] Many survive in the informal sector and with the support of their families. At the same time, crime of all types is on the rise.

The Gini coefficient of income inequality is assessed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at 62.0, which is among the highest in the world. The median in emerging economies is at 45.9 and 30.3 in advanced economies.[175] About 80 per cent of the country's arable land is estimated to be owned by only 20 per cent of the population, which has led to repeated calls for land expropriation without compensation, including at the ANC Political Conference of August 2022.[176]

4. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT

South Africa has long been heavily dependent on coal, which is abundant, of good quality, easy to access, and hence relatively cheap. About 80 mln tons, corresponding to about 30 per cent of the annual coal production, is exported. Eskom, the state-owned entity producing and distributing electricity, provides 85 per cent of the country's coal electricity, with the remainder coming from some municipalities, imports from neighbouring countries, and a few independent power producers (IPP).[177]

Because of its coal reliance, South Africa is Africa's largest GHG emitter, with 471.6 mln metric tons of carbon (MtC) emitted in 2019, up from 464.4 mln MtC in 2018 (see Figure A - 19). In 2020, it ranked 14th in the world in GHG emissions – disproportionate to the size of its economy (32nd in terms of GDP) and population (24th) – with per capita emissions averaging 7.62 MtC. Libya and Equatorial Guinea followed, emitting around 7.4 and 7.3 MtC per capita, respectively. Africa's average stood at roughly 1 MtC per capita. In absolute terms, South Africa and Egypt (at 213 mln MtC) produced the most emissions in Africa in 2020, followed by Algeria, Nigeria, and Morocco.[178]

[169] Business Tech (2022).
[170] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2022).
[171] Ibid.
[172] Saifaddin Galal (2022a).
[173] World Bank website (n.d.).
[174] Business World (2022).
[175] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2022).
[176] Queenin Masuabi (2022).
[177] Argo Poorun and Jack Radmore (2022).
[178] Mariam Saleh (2022).

Figure A - 19. South Africa annual GHG emissions, 1990 to 2019



Source: Climate Watch (2020).

President Ramaphosa said recently, "South Africa has installed capacity to produce about 46 gigawatts (GW) of electricity, and at peak times we use about 32 GW of electricity. However, only 60 per cent of this installed capacity is available at any given time due to some units going through planned maintenance and others having unplanned outages."[179] In July 2022, 18 GW of generation capacity was inactive for various reasons. This forced Eskom to implement rotational loadshedding (various stages), implying several hours of daily power cuts.[180]

Renewable energies, in particular via solar panels, have recently increased but are still limited in scope with an installed capacity of about 6.2 GW in 2021. This number is rising fast but still far below potential.[181] By 2030, an additional 24 GW of solar and wind capacity are to be installed, to replace 11 GW of aging coal plants and to expand the energy offer, including for the production of green hydrogen.[182]

Vulnerability to climate change impacts: Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, South Africa is recognized as moderately vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 96 out of 181 countries in the 2020 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-Gain) Index. The more vulnerable a country is, the lower the score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience, the higher its score will be.[183] South Africa's score has trended downward over the past 25 years. Some of its worst scores are in the areas of agriculture, education, and social inequality.

Climate vulnerability/projected changes in climate (i.e. increasing temperature, sea-level rise, change in precipitation): South Africa is likely to become hotter and drier in the future, with rainfall variability continuing and temperatures rising. The country is expected to experience more frequent extreme events like droughts, floods, and other climate-related hazards.[184] This will result in more soil erosion, deforestation, recurrent droughts, desertification, land degradation, water and food

[179] Kristen Engel and Quinton Mtyala (2022).
[180] Ibid.
[181] Saifaddin Galal (2022b).
[182] GIZ (2022). Among others, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* – German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) provides support to achieve these ambitious goals through its South African-German Energy Programme – Capacities for the Energy Transition (SAGEN-CET), implemented on behalf of the *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* – Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) with the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE).
[183] Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022)
[184] South Africa, Department of Environmental Affairs (2018).

insecurity, and the loss of biodiversity. These extreme events also pose a serious threat to water quality, affecting the integrity of wetland ecosystems as well as agriculture and livestock communities.[185] Coastal cities such as Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth are also at risk from rising sea levels that could impact infrastructure and important economic sectors, such as tourism and fisheries. Rising temperatures can additionally lead to increased heat-related human health risks, such as heat stress and respiratory illnesses. As flood risks rise, so will the incidence of waterborne diseases common in South Africa, such as cholera, dysentery, typhoid, and other rotavirus infections.

Climate change impact already felt (e.g. economic impact, displacement, food security, etc.): The three most significant drivers of climate-related disasters in South Africa are drought, floods, and wildfires. Drought affected an estimated 15 mln South Africans between 1980 and 2013. The Western Cape struggled in 2018 with one of the worst droughts in 100 years, severely limiting water supplies in urban areas, with South Africa becoming the first country with a major metropolitan area to run out of water, prompting what officials referred to as "Day Zero". Using new high-resolution simulations, researchers from Stanford University and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) concluded that climate change made the Cape Town Day Zero drought five to six times more likely and suggested extreme drought events could become common in southwestern South Africa by the end of the 21st century.[186]

The floods that occurred between 1980 and 2013 affected over 483,000 people. In May 2017, a storm resulted in very heavy rainfall with over 100 mm of rain occurring in the city of Durban within a 24-hour period, with floods forcing evacuations and damaging homes, cars and infrastructure.[187] The floods in KwaZulu-Natal in Spring 2022 were among the worst ever experienced. Severe flooding and landslides caused by heavy rainfall of 350 mm on 11 April to 13 April caused the death of 448 people, displaced over 40,000 people, and completely destroyed over 12,000 houses in the south-east part of South Africa. It also severely damaged infrastructures, including roads, health centres and schools.[188] The extreme rainfall that triggered one of South Africa's deadliest disasters of this century was made more intense and more likely because of climate change, according to a recent "rapid-attribution" study.[189]

Wildfire damage to agriculture and forestry is also significant. Coastal storms impact developments, infrastructure, fishing communities, as well as coastal biodiversity. Annually, these disasters incur approximately USD 163.3 mln in damages.[190]

Climate finance: As per the most recent detailed analysis published in 2021, South Africa's climate financing totalled around USD 3.46 bln for 2017 and 2018, which includes local, national, and transnational financing from public, private, and alternative sources.[191] An annual average of about USD 1.22 bln comes from public finance (or 25 per cent of total climate finance tracked in 2017–2018), more than half of which (55 per cent of tracked public investments) originates from the South African Government. Private finance accounts for an average of USD 1.96 bln of total funds tracked for 2017–2018, with 100 per cent of private investments made in climate mitigation sectors. Blended finance (using development finance to mobilize additional finance for sustainable development) contributed an average of USD 272 mln of funds tracked per year. This was primarily

[185] World Bank (2021).
[186] Danielle Tucker (2020).
[187] Richard Davies (2017).
[188] Relief Web (2022).
[189] World Weather Attribution (2022).
[190] World Bank (2021).
[191] Adila Cassim and others (2021).

for the clean energy sector, although over 45 per cent of tracked investments were for adaptation and cross-cutting uses.

Climate finance experts highlight gaps in some sector policies, with the need to adapt legislation to support shifting and diversifying the portfolio of climate projects. Additionally, the USD 3.46 bln of climate finance tracked for South Africa represents only 10.4 per cent of the total investment needed per year to uphold to the Paris Agreement, with an annual investment gap of USD 29.9 bln. When examining trends in developmental assistance, 27.2 per cent (USD 33 bln) of all bilateral official development assistance (ODA) in 2019 had climate objectives, which represents an upwards shift from previous years. For the 2018–2019 period, 45 per cent of these funds had mitigation objectives (primarily focusing on transport and energy), 25 per cent had adaptation objectives (agriculture, forestry and fishing, water supply, and sanitation), and 30 per cent a combination of both. As per its revised nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (see section B.4 below), South Africa aims to access significantly higher levels of climate finance during its NDC implementation period, with a view to achieving a floor of USD 8 bln per year by 2030.[192]

At Conference of the Parties (COP) 26 in Glasgow, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission of the European Union (EU) agreed to provide USD 8.5 bln to facilitate a Just Transition in South Africa from coal to carbon neutral energies through the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). The outline of this plan both in terms of planned investments and financing tools and sources was revealed just before the start of COP27 on 6 November 2022. "The investment plan envisages $7.6 billion being invested in electricity infrastructure, $700 million in developing green-hydrogen projects and $200 million in an electric-vehicle industry over the next five years… Of the total $8.5 billion, it's envisaged that $5.3 billion of the funding will be in the form of low-cost loans, commercial credits will make up $1.5 billion of the total and guarantees $1.3 billion, according to the plan … Those allocations are well below the $84 billion the government says is required — with $47.2 billion needed for the electricity sector, $21.2 billion for green hydrogen and $8.5 billion for electric vehicles."[193]

The plan's implementation will certainly take many years and the phase-out of coal will likely be slower than, for example, Germany (2039) or Poland (2049). This is in line with an agreement by more than 40 countries at COP26 that bigger economies, in particular industrial countries, will end their coal production and use in the 2030s, with others following suit in the 2040s. It bears noting that some of the largest producers and users of coal such as Australia, China, India, and the United States, did not agree to that deal.[194]

5. Climate change policies and institutional context

National adaptation plan: The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) serves as South Africa's national adaptation plan (NAP). It provides a common vision of climate change adaptation and climate resilience, and it is divided into sets of strategic objectives, strategic interventions, and strategic outcomes with associated actions. The document is directed not only at national government departments but speaks to South African society as a whole, including key relevant sectoral institutions, provincial governments and municipalities, and non-governmental entities including the private sector, the research community, and civil society.[195]

[192] United Nations Development Programme website (2022).
[193] Bloomberg (2022).
[194] Fiona Harvey, Jillian Ambrose and Patrick Greenfield (2021); and UNFCCC website (2021). The number of participating countries is said at COP26 to have reached 190 agreeing in particular to end funding for new coal power plants by public and increasingly also private sources.
[195] South Africa, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (2019).

The NCCAS was prepared by the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) from 2017 onwards with support from the NAP Global Network and in consultation with other departments as well as the Presidential Climate Commission (PCC).[196] It was adopted by the Cabinet in August 2020 and subsequently signed by the President.

Nationally determined contributions: South Africa's NDC was developed by DFFE, the ownership of which sits with the DFFE Minister. South Africa submitted its NDC to the UNFCCC in 2016. It published its Third National Communication in 2018, in support of the country's efforts to realize its development goals and increase its resilience to climate change by enhancing mitigation and adaptation efforts.

Published in September 2021, the country's revised NDC contains updated emission targets, raising ambitions by defining stricter intermediate emission limits on the way to net-zero by 2050. The upper range of the proposed 2030 target represents a 28 per cent reduction in GHG emissions from 2016 NDC targets. It includes plans for reaching the adaptation goals defined in the NAP and identifies the country's risks and vulnerabilities. To support revision of the NDC, DFFE secured support from the NDC Partnership's Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP), which was delivered by SouthSouthNorth (SSN). In building the NDC revision team, South Africa drew on national scientific research capacity (including the University of Cape Town and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)) to dive into the data, prepare projections, and inform the national debate on South Africa's climate agenda.[197] Despite the challenges of COVID-19, the revision process included consultations across government departments, broad stakeholder involvement (including at the youth, community and provincial levels), and finalization with cabinet endorsement.

Additional relevant climate and other policies: In 2019, South Africa's Carbon Tax Act was passed. Companies emitting carbon dioxide (CO_2) beyond certain thresholds were subsequently required to pay a tax (though with certain allowances of up to 95 per cent that limit the scope of the act).[198]

In February 2022, the DFFE Minister introduced the national Climate Change Bill, which is a reworked version of an earlier draft from 2018. At the time of writing, the bill was being considered in Parliament. Seen as an important step towards ensuring the country's transition to a low-carbon economy, it addresses mitigation and adaptation on national and sector levels, while including a GHG emissions trajectory to net-zero by 2050. Companies with emissions would get a carbon budget, after providing emission reduction plans for approval by DFFE. However, so far, drafted enforcement provisions are considered weak, as the maximum fines foreseen are not big enough to deter large companies and public sector entities.[199]

At the end of July 2022, the President announced a liberalization of the energy sector that has thus far been largely monopolized by the state-owned Eskom, providing 85 per cent of electricity generated and distributed in the country. Due to widespread electricity shortages and subsequent severe load shedding on a rotational basis, urgent actions had become unavoidable. In addition to addressing the maintenance problems at the power stations run by Eskom, the restrictions for independent power producers and distributors were lifted. Allowances had stagnated for years at a maximum authorized capacity of 1 megawatt (MW); they were then raised to 100 MW at the end of 2021 and totally abolished in July 2022.[200]

[196] NAP Global Network (n.d.).
[197] NDC Partnership (2021).
[198] Thomas Karberg (2022).
[199] Ibid.
[200] Business Times (2022).

Institutional responsibilities for climate change: By virtue of being the focal point in the Government for climate change, DFFE developed the NDC in consultation with other departments. DFFE also prepared the NAP, Carbon Tax Act, and Climate Change Bill and has a legislative mandate, setting out policies and drafting climate change laws including emission targets. From a legislative point of view, DFFE is considered a strong department. While the DFFE budget is relatively small, it has a strong mandate backed by the President, who pushed hard for the Climate Change Bill, which is currently under consideration by Parliament.

A Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) was created in September 2020 ahead of COP26 and following an October 2018 Presidential Summit, during which partners agreed that a statutory entity should be formed to coordinate and oversee the just transition towards a low-carbon, inclusive, climate-resilient economy, and society.[201] While formally located in the President's office, it is an independent expert body with an advisory role. It has been tasked to consult with all relevant stakeholders on the preparation of an investment plan for the JETP. Of note, the PCC has not involved the GCF in its deliberations and plans.

The PCC is chaired by President Ramaphosa, and its deputy chair is former Environmental Affairs and Tourism Minister Valli Moosa. The Commission comprises government ministers and 22 commissioners that represent diverse perspectives. Commissioners were appointed in December 2020. The Commission meets on a quarterly basis, while ad hoc working groups on various thematic areas meet more frequently. The PCC is supposed to gather available science and come up with conclusions and recommendations for discussions with stakeholders in view of developing a broad consensus about an investment plan to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.

The President has also established a Presidential Climate Finance Task Team (PCFTT), in which DFFE participates in shaping the Just Transition plan. He has appointed Daniel Mminele, the former CEO of Absa Ltd (a financial conglomerate with headquarters in Johannesburg and subsidiaries in several countries in the region) as his envoy to pursue negotiations with donor countries on the USD 8.5 bln pledged, to develop an investment plan, and to report back to the Cabinet.

Institutional arrangements and GCF portfolio: In its relationship with the GCF, South Africa's national designated authority (NDA) is the DFFE. At this time, the focal point is Ms. Nomfundo Tshabalala, Director General, with the support of Mr. Zaheer Fakir, Chief Policy Advisor, International Governance and Resource Mobilisation; Ms. Shahkira Parker, Senior Policy Advisor, International Governance Management; and Ms. Lucia Motloung, Control Environmental Officer, International Governance Management.

In addition to international accredited entities (IAEs), projects can be brought forth by a regional direct access entity (DAE), the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and a national DAE, the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI). Both are based in South Africa, and their accreditation was approved by the Board in 2016. The former is a national development finance institution that finances both private and public sector activities at national and regional levels. The latter is a national research institute that coordinates research, monitors, and reports on the state of biodiversity in the country. It also is responsible for managing the public botanical gardens.

Appendix 1 provides an overview of the FPs in South Africa.[202] GCF has eight FPs in South Africa, with GCF support valued at USD 179.3 mln. Among these, seven FPs are currently under implementation, and one was approved but is not yet under implementation. The majority of FPs in

[201] Presidential Climate Commission (n.d.).
[202] FP overview was extracted in August 2022 and includes FPs approved as of the thirty-third meeting of the Board (B.33).

South Africa are multi-country,[203] with only one country-specific FP. Mitigation is the thematic focus commonly addressed in the country, with three FPs addressing solely mitigation (with GCF support valued at USD 104 mln), three being cross-cutting (with GCF support valued at USD 51.1 mln), and two addressing only adaptation (with GCF support valued at USD 24.2 mln).[204] These projects are implemented by six AEs. Currently, DBSA and Pegasus Capital Advisors (PCA) are the most active AEs in the country, with two FPs each.[205] Among these, the DBSA is the only DAE with a project approved in the country, and the only AE with a country-specific project.[206]

Appendix 1 provides an overview of support delivered through the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) in South Africa.[207] As of August 2022, there were four PPFs in South Africa (with a GCF contribution valued at USD 2.8 mln), including one completed, two disbursed and one for which the Statement of Work (SOW) was signed and is effective. Three of the four PPFs are being delivered with DBSA, while the other is being delivered with SANBI. Finally, two PPF activities are related to mitigation, while the other two are related to adaptation.

Appendix 1 provides an overview of support delivered through the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP). As of August 2022, the GCF has provided support through two RPSPs, valued at USD 1.1 mln. This support is provided by one DAE, SANBI, and one IAE, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

B. KEY FINDINGS

1. RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

In South Africa, the eight GCF FPs either under implementation or approved cover all eight of the GCF results areas (see Table A - 8 below). It is important to note, however, that these designations are for the full FP. Seven out of eight of the FPs in South Africa are multi-country projects, which means it is difficult to tell which of these results areas will be covered specifically in South Africa and with what funding. South Africa receives very limited grant and concessional loan funding from bilateral and multilateral donors as a result of its status as an UMIC country. Thus, while the GCF provides relatively low levels of climate finance to South Africa, and this with very slow disbursements to date, it is nevertheless an important actor for supporting the country in addressing climate change with innovative approaches involving the private sector in selected areas.

Table A - 8. South Africa FP results areas

TYPE	RESULTS AREA	NO OF PROJECTS	TOTAL GCF FUNDING
Adaptation	Health, food, and water security	5	USD 49.1 mln
	Livelihoods of people and communities	4	USD 42.5 mln
	Infrastructure and built environment	5	USD 50.4 mln
	Ecosystems and ecosystem services	2	USD 10 mln

[203] Four of the six multi-country FPs (valued at USD 605.95 mln of GCF's finance partly in loans, partly in grants), aim at providing loans via local financial intermediaries to renewable energy providers.
[204] One adaptation project is mostly for projects with municipalities through a private investment fund, and the other for ecosystem-based adaptation programmes in the Western Indian Ocean.
[205] Other active AEs in the country include Acumen, *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), GIZ, and PCA, each with one project.
[206] The single-country FP106 (EGIP) is currently under implementation. It has received a USD 100 mln loan from the GCF and is supposed to mobilize USD 437 mln co-financing for renewable energy projects (solar and wind).
[207] PPF support was extracted in August 2022 and includes support approved as of B.33.

Mitigation	Energy generation and access	6	USD 622.8 mln
	Transport	1	USD 8.4 mln
	Buildings, cities, industries, and appliances	5	USD 37.5 mln
	Forests and land use	4	USD 6.5 mln

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

The most pressing climate-related challenge facing South Africa relates to the phasing down of fossil-based energy, notably its use of coal for the generation of electricity. South Africa's NDC notes that the country has the most coal-dependent energy economy in the world, although opportunities for renewable energy are abundant.[208] Key informants described needs related to energy grid improvements, affordable access for low-income households, and fair pricing mechanisms for independent energy producers.

The GCF plays a limited role in meeting South Africa's energy needs. It is not involved in supporting the development of an investment plan to phase down fossil-based energy use, which is instead being addressed by a funding package of USD 8.5 bln pledged through the JETP at COP26 (although some key informants describe this funding as slow in materializing). However, six of the eight GCF FPs in South Africa have a component of the "energy generation and access" results area, and this is also the results area with the most funding. As accredited entities (AEs), the DBSA, *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), and PCA work on increasing their funding of renewable energies projects through local financial intermediaries, in particular of solar panels for commercial and industrial properties. In the context of liberalizing the energy market, these projects could soon pick up steam and contribute to an urgently needed increase of renewable electricity generation by independent producers (for additional details of project funding and approaches, see section 4 on effectiveness below).

Still, it is unclear what proportion of that funding South Africa will receive. Whatever the amount, it is limited in comparison to the JETP pledges, which is a separate funding stream. Additionally, some key informants observed that the GCF is not very active in meeting energy-related needs in the country or that its actions are not the most effective ones. For example, one key informant noted that the DBSA is the wrong partner for the GCF given its continued funding of fossil fuels.

In addition to the energy sector, South Africa's NDC notes that the country is already experiencing negative impacts stemming from climate change, including extreme weather and droughts.[209] It describes the importance of a Just Transition that includes workforce development, livelihood creation, new green economic sectors, and social protections. These needs are largely adaptation focused and align with the "livelihoods of people and communities" results area. Two out of the eight FPs approved or under implementation focus solely on adaptation, with an additional three described as cross-cutting. Half of the projects have a "livelihoods of people and communities" element.

In response to this portfolio of projects, some key informants felt the GCF focuses too much on mitigation and, more specifically, financing for renewable energy. This comes at the expense, they believe, of adaptation needs related to the Just Transition, livelihoods, and other poverty-related issues. For adaptation, scaling up beyond the on-going small Adaptation Fund (AF) project under implementation by SANBI is needed. This requires that the projects under preparation by SANBI are approved and that the multi-country project, FP181 "Catalytic Capital for First Private Investment Fund for Adaptation Technologies in Developing Countries (CRAFT)", implemented by

[208] South Africa, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (2021).
[209] Ibid.

PCA starts operating in South Africa. For the time being, however, adaptation-focused efforts remain limited.

Other challenges to the GCF's relevance include critiques by civil society informants who note there should be more consultation with civil society organizations (CSOs) and vulnerable communities to identify needs at the local level. Other key informants also indicated concern that GCF funding is not making it to the entities and communities who need it most. This includes cities and communities living in poverty.

In addition to projects, key informants report that GCF funding is relevant for other needs as well, particularly capacity development and technical training. However, much more is needed to support the capacity development and core staff resources that institutions, particularly DAEs, need to effectively seek out and implement projects.

2. COHERENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY

Coherence is understood here as the extent to which the different projects funded by the GCF are in line with and complementary to the policies formulated and pursued by South Africa as well as those of other entities active in the climate space. While there is some indication of coherence with South Africa's policy priorities, there appear to be missed opportunities regarding complementarity with other organizations active in the country as well as some challenges regarding internal coherence.

In overall terms, the GCF portfolio in the country reflects the objective of simultaneously addressing both mitigation and adaptation, as illustrated in Appendix 1, which outlines approved and planned FPs and PPFs. The thematic areas addressed are almost equally composed of mitigation and adaptation projects. This is, at a high-level, aligned with the South African Government's objectives formulated in its various strategy documents, including the revised NDC and the NCCAS (which serves as the country's NAP), which emphasize both mitigation and adaptation priorities. In particular, the focus on emissions reduction and increased investments in renewable energy is very aligned with South Africa's desire to shift its energy grid towards being more reliant on sustainable energy. Some misalignments, however, can be observed in the area of adaptation. South Africa has identified economic- and livelihood-focused needs as key to its Just Transition, yet only four of the GCF's FPs address these (see section 1 above).

Additionally, it is not yet possible to quantify the financial investment and impact foreseen, as most of the portfolio will be implemented as multi-country projects, for which the share invested in South Africa is not yet determined. This applies even to the only single country project FP106, "Embedded Generation Investment Programme (EGIP)",[210] which has yet to start due to various implementation obstacles (as explained in more detail in section 4 below).

As for alignment with other funds operational in South Africa, there is some evidence of GCF complementarity with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) portfolio. This is because SANBI has a long history of implementing GEF projects, and the DBSA is also a GEF agency. Coordination happens at the level of the DFFE as well, where the same unit handles GCF and GEF projects and steers national positions in multilateral climate negotiations. Complementarity and coordination are indeed strengthened where both AEs and NDAs play key roles with multiple funding bodies, as in the case of South Africa. Project documents also note complementarity with existing ODA funding, GEF projects, and projects supported by climate funds such as the AF and the Climate Investment Funds (CIF).

[210] Green Climate Fund (n.d.).

Nevertheless, key informants indicated there is also significant additional room for coordination. One person, for example, noted that the GEF could be used for work on South Africa's enabling environment or for pilot testing certain projects, while the GCF could fund scaling of projects. Relatedly, coherence and complementarity beyond the GEF appear limited. Key informants noted a lack of coordination at best, and open discord at worst, among the GCF and other entities operational in South Africa, including the Government, civil society, academia, and international development and financial institutions. Despite this, all the GCF's FPs in South Africa include co-financing of some sort, often from the Government and the private sector.

Regarding the general trajectory of CO_2 emissions in the country, they continue to increase, as discussed above. This is mainly due to the still predominant use of coal for energy generation and the slow development of renewable energies. Whether the USD 8.5 bln investment plan funded by bilateral donors will change that trajectory, and when, remains to be seen. The GCF is not involved in this plan, is not being consulted by the PCC, and thus will likely not be part of it in the future. This means that the most significant emission reductions in the South Africa will be planned with and supported by donors and partners other than the GCF. A country programme outlining the total needs for climate funding and its sources is clearly lacking.

For now, coal continues to provide 85 per cent of the country's electricity and is increasingly exported to meet rising international demand. In parallel, the DBSA finances gas projects in several African countries, again to meet international demands for liquified natural gas (LNG), including from the EU. This has been enabled by a recent change of taxonomy in both the EU and South Africa, resulting in the classification of LNG as green energy when there is a transition plan to phase it out and replace it with renewable energies.

3. Country ownership

While the definition of country ownership is not entirely or clearly articulated by the GCF, there is a strong and widespread impression that South Africa has a high degree of country ownership over its climate change action, including in relation to climate finance as provided by the GCF. This impression is based on a number of factors, as discussed below.

South Africa has long been actively involved with the Board of the GCF. DFFE staff was seconded as a Board Member from 2012 to 2018 and as Co-Chair for 2013, 2016, and again for 2022. In line with that early and continued engagement, two DAEs were accredited in 2016, with the DBSA as regional DAE and SANBI as national DAE. The former has focused primarily on mitigation work and the latter on adaptation. DBSA was re-accredited in May 2022, while for SANBI it will be in 2024.

The NDA is the Director General of the DFFE, with the Chief Directorate: International Governance and Resource Mobilisation of the DFFE supporting decision-making. The Chief Directorate consists of three policy advisors. A Senior Policy Advisor dealing with GCF matters noted a recent and significant increase in workload due to increasing demands from the GCF Secretariat, as well as more efforts required to coordinate with other government departments.

South Africa has a functioning no-objection letter (NOL) procedure. The NDA circulates the request for NOL documents to other ministries, requesting written confirmation on whether they are in support of the request or not. The NDA then processes the NOL based on the responses from key departments.

Once AEs have sent the draft concept note, the NDA advises them on whom they should engage with for consultations (treasury, agriculture, energy, water or others involved with the project, as relevant). The NDA looks at things from the governance perspective, including whether the proposal aligns with national climate policies, while avoiding involvement in the technical aspects of projects

so as not to become a decision maker. Sometimes, this entails writing letters to other departments before the AE meets with their task officers. At other times, the AEs are already engaging with other relevant departments. Notably, the NDA always asks AEs to consult with the treasury. More recently, projects are assessed against South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP 2030), which is focused on advancing national priorities and sectors rather than aligning with entities themselves.

There is no established GCF stakeholder forum in South Africa, and thus consultation is project specific. For example, in parallel to the development of the portfolio of concept notes and related processes, SANBI undertook a programme of work to engage the private sector in South Africa with a focus on adaptation. A Private Sector Reference Group was established to guide the work, and a Community of Practice formed to strengthen the relationships that were established through a series of workshops and events.

The NDA is involved in such stakeholder consultation processes to a limited extent, while trying to stay out of substantive discussions between AEs and various line departments. Higher-level political discussions in the country (in which the DFFE participates, as do multiple other stakeholders) are not on GCF projects but on the Just Transition plan.

An indicator of country ownership is the extent to which DAEs (and other AEs) have FPs being implemented or in the pipeline. In line with this, DBSA has two approved FPs under implementation, one national and one multi-country, with three other countries in the region. It also has two PPF projects, with one already completed. Five other multi-country FPs are being implemented by IAEs: PCA has two, while International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), *Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau* (KfW), and AFD have one each. SANBI has one PPF project under implementation. Three more PPFs await approval (see Appendix 1). Overall, the portfolio shows an active engagement of the country with the GCF, which is an important indicator of country ownership.

South Africa's country ownership is in many ways independent of the GCF. Indeed, GCF support has not been a key source of support for other climate action activities in South Africa. Approved in 2020, the NCCAS (South Africa's NAP) was developed without support from the GCF. The NDC was submitted to UNFCCC in 2016 and updated in 2021. Important climate-related legislative work undertaken by the country independent of the GCF includes the Carbon Tax Act (passed in 2019) and the Climate Change Bill (submitted to Parliament in early 2022; see more details above).

At the institutional level, the creation of the PCC and the PCFTT shows high-level government commitment to define and pursue intermediate steps on a net-zero trajectory, with the support of USD 8.5 bln pledged by several donor countries at COP26 in Glasgow. The GCF has no role in this programme, neither in terms of funding nor in developing the approach to the related investment plan presented at COP27, again demonstrating high levels of country ownership in terms of broader climate action.

Overall, South Africa meets most criteria for strong country ownership for addressing its climate change challenges. Most of the relevant standard policy texts are in place, including NDCs, the NAP, and the Carbon Tax Act. As mentioned in the section on coherence above, South Africa does not have a country programme or a stakeholder forum that includes the private sector and civil society. The consultations are pursued at project level and in an ad-hoc manner. If these were in place, they might help to define the country's overall funding needs beyond the Just Transition plan.

4. Effectiveness of investments

The current portfolio of GCF projects consists of one completed, three ongoing, and three pending PPFs, two approved and one pending RPSPs, and eight FPs (seven of which are under

implementation, and one of which is approved), the latter consisting of one national and seven multi-country projects partly implemented in South Africa. As implementation is still in the early stages for most projects, information on effectiveness is limited and largely focused on project start-up.

The RPSP with SANBI has been completed with no-cost extensions of initially six and then an additional 18 months in agreement with the GCF Secretariat. SANBI prepared a completion report, which was still being discussed with the GCF Secretariat at the time of writing. The main achievements of this RPSP were the submission and endorsement by the GCF Secretariat of a number of concept notes, as follows:

1. Scaling up ecosystem-based approaches to managing climate-intensified disaster risks in vulnerable regions of South Africa. Target: USD 30 mln grant finance. Status: concept note endorsed, PPF services application endorsed, FP currently under development.
2. Ecosystem-based adaptation solutions for transforming smallholder farming systems that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in South Africa. Simplified approval process (SAP). Target: USD 10 mln subject to adjustment. Status: concept note endorsed, PPF services application submitted to the GCF (awaiting feedback at the time of writing).
3. Ecosystem Based Adaptation for Water Security in South Africa. Target: USD 30 mln grant finance. Status: concept note still to be endorsed (currently in the fourth round of comments), PPF services application to be developed and submitted once concept note is endorsed.

An RPSP directed at pipeline development to deploy clean energy technology solutions in South African municipal wastewater treatment works was approved for UNIDO for implementation with the DFFE (grant agreement number ZAF-RS-002). The approved funding is USD 694,927, and as of July 2022, USD 168,486 had been disbursed. Even less has been spent due to challenges with UNIDO's internal systems. Additionally, the procurement of the service provider, Green Cape, took longer than planned. This meant work on the establishment of a National Coordination Platform with the participating municipalities and their representatives in various organizations only began in April 2022. A request for a no-cost extension is foreseen.[211]

The only national FP, FP106 EGIP, under implementation by DBSA was approved in February 2019 after 541 days in the pipeline. The Funded Activity Agreement (FAA) became effective 11 months later on 29 January 2019, opening the way for the first, and so far only, disbursement of USD 5 million, that is 5 per cent of the agreed loan amount of USD 100 mln from the GCF. The target for co-financing from the private sector via loans and equity is USD 437 mln. There are no on-lending projects as of yet, as project implementation was delayed due to COVID-19, with two no-cost extensions being granted, of nine months and then another of five months.[212] Furthermore, there were other problems due to interest rate increases in South Africa and other difficulties discussed in section 9 below on efficiency.

None of the seven multi-country FPs under implementation has yet made significant progress. The disbursements shown in overview in Appendix 1 are for all participating countries and are not available for the South Africa-specific component; funding volumes indicated for each participating country by the IAE are only tentative for the time being. They evolve over time when local partners are found, and sub-projects are developed and contracted with private investors in the country concerned.

The first three projects are investment funds for adaptation (FP181) and mitigation (FP152) in 42 countries (17 of which are in Africa) implemented by PCA, followed by a technical assistance (TA)

[211] United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2022).
[212] Green Climate Fund (2021c) and interview with DBSA staff in Midrand, South Africa on 4 August 2022. In addition, there is also a confidential report describing the difficulties of the project.

project implemented by IUCN (FP151). The concept is to use GCF equity funding of USD 100 mln for FP181 CRAFT to attract USD 400 mln from private investors, and similarly USD 150 mln in GCF equity funding for FP152 "Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity" to mobilize USD 600 mln in private co-financing. For the TA, GCF provided USD 18.5 mln as grants and mobilized USD 9.5 mln in co-financing. These funds are intended to be used mainly for developing feasibility studies for sub-projects. So far, no sub-projects have been contracted with private investors. This is due to the tough competition manifesting through bidding processes for renewable energy investments for FP152 SnCF Global – Equity, and the only recent approval of FP181 CRAFT (in October 2021), with the FAA still being negotiated.

FP098 "DBSA Climate Finance Facility" was approved in October 2018 and became effective in November 2019 with the first disbursements being made in November 2020. It supports the DBSA Climate Financing Facility (CFF) with a GCF loan of USD 55 mln, intent on mobilizing USD 170 mln in co-financing from the DBSA and private investors in South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia. The 2020 Annual Performance Report of the DBSA provides explanations regarding the delays and problems related to COVID-19, as well as the currency hedging and risk aversion of local banks. Thus, there are no active sub-projects yet. For more details of these issues and challenges, see section 9 on efficiency, below.

FP095 "Transforming Financial Systems for Climate" is being implemented by AFD, which builds on its experience with the earlier SUNREF multi-country project funded from other sources. The project was approved in October 2018 for 17 countries in Africa and Ecuador, and the FAA became effective in October 2019. The first disbursements to AFD for all countries were made in February 2021. The funding volume from the GCF is USD 218 mln in loans and USD 32 mln in grants, intent on generating USD 423 mln in private investments as co-financing. The main beneficiary countries are for now Egypt, with a total planned investment volume of USD 154.5 mln, and Ecuador with USD 88.1 mln. For investments in South Africa, USD 100 mln has been reserved; at the time of writing, the local AFD office in Johannesburg was reportedly in active discussions with three commercial banks to conclude sub-projects with South African private investors. Next in line are Morocco and several West African countries. The principal obstacles to moving the project forward have been identified by AFD as the adaptation financing gap, the multi-country character of the project, and the complexity of environmental and social safeguards (ESS) documentation required by the GCF Secretariat.

FP122 "Blue Action Fund (BAF): GCF Ecosystem Based Adaptation Programme in the Western Indian Ocean", is being implemented by KfW. Approved in November 2019, the FAA became effective in April 2021, and the first disbursement to KfW took place in July 2021. In addition to South Africa, three other countries are involved in this project, namely Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Its main purpose is to fund adaptation measures aimed at reducing future flooding events. The total funding volume is USD 57 mln, consisting of a GCF grant of USD 31.1 mln and a KfW co-financing grant of USD 25.9 mln. Implementation is planned to actively involve non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

While the effects of all these projects are yet to materialize, it can be expected that they will contribute innovative approaches for both mitigation and adaptation in terms of institutional set-ups by involving private investors in blended financing schemes, and innovate through their technology developments (e.g. with readiness funding for clean energy technology solutions in municipal wastewater treatment).

5. PARADIGM SHIFT

A paradigm shift away from coal and towards a net-zero trajectory in a low carbon, climate resilient economy is facilitated by the increased use of renewable energies, that has been initiated with the targets defined in the revised NDC, to be further confirmed in the Climate Change Bill under discussion at the National Assembly. For adaptation, the objectives were defined in the NCCAS. Also, the very recent full opening of electricity generation and distribution to independent producers for the production of renewable energies is a significant step in the direction of a paradigm change in South Africa.

The speed of this change is still to be defined. And while the potential international support for a rapid change to renewable energies exists, there are strong inhibiting forces in South Africa. In particular, mining trade unions fear job losses, and the coal industry worries about its future relevance, both factors which should not be underestimated. Difficulties of a Just Transition are aggravated by the fact that 61 of 73 South African coal mines are concentrated in one region (Mpumalanga), with few alternative economic activities.[213] Fitch Solutions, the affiliate of the international Fitch Ratings agency, expects a further increase in coal exports and only a gradual decline of the share of coal in South African electricity generation to about 85 per cent between 2022 and 2030 compared to 90 per cent between 2014 and 2021.[214] Hope remains that there will be a significant reduction when the Just Transition investment plan under preparation is implemented.

In this context, the GCF is a minor player in terms of volume of funding. However, it can and has started to facilitate innovative approaches for both mitigation and adaptation through its institutional set-ups (by involving private investors in blended financing schemes), and technology developments.

Creative approaches will also be needed to involve the generally weak municipalities, which produce the requested co-funding in most cases. SANBI's work with small adaptation projects funded by the AF and implemented in close cooperation with local communities, and also the work of several CSOs in that field, are encouraging. If scaled up, these could lead to a paradigm change in adaptation, as well.[215] The experiences cultivated in these community-based projects are used in the current development of three adaptation projects (as discussed in section 4 above) and will help in implementing them once approved and started.

6. GENDER EQUITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION

All FPs have prepared the obligatory gender action plans, which specify in some detail how the increased participation of women in project activities will be realized and monitored. The indicated measures will have to be implemented by the final beneficiary organizations and/or companies, once on-lending has been contractually agreed upon between them and the implementing IAEs and DAEs, and it has started. The implementing IAEs and DAEs will then collect the relevant information from partners and report on it in their annual reports to the GCF Secretariat. Therefore, further progress in the implementation of the projects is required before the assessment of the gender action plans is possible.

Regarding indigenous peoples, some project documents mention strategies to reduce negative impacts on indigenous peoples and cultural resources or point to the ESS as a tool for ensuring indigenous peoples are considered. Others do not include any mention of indigenous communities. There are no specific provisions addressing the participation of youth. This is regrettable as youth

[213] Business World (2022).
[214] Ibid.
[215] South African National Biodiversity Institute (n.d.2); and South African National Biodiversity Institute (2021).

unemployment is a key social problem in South Africa. Finally, some key informants pointed out that GCF projects are not as yet inclusive enough of marginalized communities, particularly those experiencing poverty. This stems in part from the character of the portfolio in South Africa.

7. Unexpected and unintended results

In view of the early stages of implementation, it is premature to identify any unexpected or unintended results.

8. Sustainability, replication and scalability

Given that GCF FPs have hardly started yet, an assessment of their sustainability is not yet possible. Nevertheless, a few words may be shared on the likelihood of sustainability, replicability and scalability of the projects, with consideration for the projects themselves and the context within which they have been planned and are starting to be implemented.

In terms of adaptation, the RPSP helped SANBI to develop concept notes for three adaptation projects. Before starting activities after approval, a detailed analysis on a case-by-case basis will be needed, in particular regarding the financial and institutional capacity of project partners, which in many cases will need to be local municipalities. The planned private investments to be catalyzed by PCA with FP181, CRAFT, will need to be with the right partners who have some financial capacity. The adaptation projects planned by SANBI will likely be smaller and more suited to the limitations of municipalities with more limited capacities, but they will also face challenges for replication and up-scaling.

The renewable energy sector is in full expansion, domestically, commercially, and industrially, due to the very recent full liberalization of electricity generation and distribution, opening access to independent producers to create additional capacities. While details for the distribution of the additionally generated solar and wind energy will still have to be worked out in terms of grid expansion, access, and feed-in prices, the basic conditions are now present for a rapid expansion of the renewable energy sector. The new policy is creating favourable conditions for the future sustainability of investments in this sector, and also for scaling up the projects planned and slowly implemented by PCA, DBSA, and AFD.

One challenge to sustainability and scalability appears to be the limited number of DAEs as well as their capacities and experience. AE informants describe being limited in capacity to support all the projects needed and note that more institutions would need to become accredited. The internal capacities of these entities also pose a challenge to and an opportunity for sustainability and scalability. While key informants note that accreditation has been an opportunity to strengthen policies, governance and long-term planning that can contribute to transformational change, they also identify a need for additional support for staff. Some projects such as FP151 "Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility" do provide for technical assistance that can build capacities. It remains to be seen how these will be implemented and what impact they will have.

9. Efficiency

Key informants from AEs operating in South Africa reported that difficulties in working with the GCF Secretariat and the Board resulted in important delays in the preparation and implementation of projects. These difficulties surround the process of accreditation and re-accreditation, GCF requirements for projects, and mixed messages from and limited touch points with GCF staff. The limited capacities of AEs themselves also affect the GCF's efficiency.

One example that illustrates multiple challenges is the re-accreditation of DBSA. The DAE saw itself as having worked in a timely manner with the Secretariat and the Accreditation Panel to clarify all issues before submitting its application for re-accreditation to the thirty-first meeting of the Board (B.31) in October 2021. However, at that meeting, requests were made that the DBSA should commit to a net-zero emission objective by 2050. This came as a surprise, as such requests had not been made before to other candidates, and no such policy guidelines had been established. After lengthy discussions between Board members from industrial countries, who argued in favour of such a condition, and Board members from developing countries who were apprehensive about creating a precedent hampering their economic development, the issue was finally settled at the thirty-second meeting of the Board (B.32) in May 2022, after the DBSA had reluctantly accepted that condition at COP26. However, according to key informants, the delay raised concerns with DBSA's private clients, who were worried about the reliability of the investment framework offered by the DBSA. As a result, the reputation of the DBSA as a predictable business partner was questioned. This is not an isolated situation. Indeed, in this and other cases, GCF-related delays have had detrimental reputational implications for key partners, including DAEs, NDAs, and others.

The hedging of currency risks is another major issue that has emerged as being a cause of delays for the start-up of DBSA renewable energy projects already-negotiated with private clients in South Africa and the three neighbouring countries participating in the multi-country FP098 "DBSA Climate Finance Facility" (Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia), as well as for those interested in the national FP106, EGIP. According to the FAAs for both projects, the loans from the GCF are in USD, and the on-lending via the DBSA to its clients also occurs in USD; hence repayments are to be made in USD. However, with the declining exchange rate of the Rand to the USD, the risk of currency losses appears too high and unpredictable for the clients. This has effectively blocked planned investments from going forward, despite the favourable on-lending conditions thanks to the concessional terms of GCF loans in a blended finance scheme. The Secretariat so far maintains that any change to the respective clauses in the FAAs would be a major change, thus needing to be authorized by the Board, which might see this as a risky precedent for other projects and countries. This issue is not yet resolved, and the projects are stuck as the DBSA has not been able to convince potential private clients to sign sub-loan agreements under these conditions.

Another problem for the DBSA in their negotiations with commercial banks is that they want DBSA to be the first to step up when repayment problems occur, thereby minimizing their own risk exposure. Specifically, the commercial banks want DBSA to carry the risk of non-performing loans, rather than assuming all or part of the risk themselves. Thus, as yet, there are no sub-projects (as discussed in section 4 on effectiveness above). Again, the Secretariat is so far not amenable to considering such a change to the FAAs, resulting in a blockage that has not moved since 2020.

COVID-19 reportedly also played a role in the delays due to limitations to holding direct consultations with clients and other stakeholders. The GCF agreed to no-cost extensions of six months to all projects for all countries requesting it, plus further extensions for the DBSA projects in view of the nearly two years of lockdown in South Africa.[216] As another problem for the uptake of on-lending offers by private clients, the DBSA mentioned increasing interest rates resulting from international rating agencies downgrading South Africa.[217]

The general issue raised by some interviewed AEs is that the FAAs are too rigidly formulated, and that they don't allow them to react rapidly to evolving market conditions in South Africa and neighbouring countries. In the case of the DBSA, potential private investors and their counterparts

[216] Development Bank of Southern Africa (2021); and South African National Biodiversity Institute (n.d.1).
[217] Development Bank of Southern Africa (2021). This was also confirmed during an interview held with the Climate and Environmental Finance Unit of DBSA on 4 August 2022 in Midrand, South Africa.

in local banks are not ready to wait months for an uncertain decision (primarily on sub-loan conditions regarding currency hedging and risk coverage), which may or may not be in their favour. Whether the AFD – which under FP095 "Transforming Financial Systems for Climate" is discussing cooperation with three local banks in Johannesburg – will be able to advance rapidly in such conditions remains to be seen. The intention of the AFD to make USD 100 mln available for projects in South Africa, which would make the country the second largest recipient under this multi-country project after Egypt, provides some optimism. PCA likewise is optimistic about the possibility of allocating substantial funding to investors in South Africa in the field of renewable energy. At the same time, they recognize that bidding is very competitive. This concerns FP152, supported with TA under FP151 by the IUCN.

In the adaptation area, SANBI has several projects under preparation. SANBI reported that it needs to invest a lot of staff time to prepare these projects and to react quickly to the various information requests of the Secretariat, which key informants from the NDA office report often vary, depending on who answers on any pending issues. This creates a challenge as SANBI must fund staff salaries for these activities before seeing any funding from project fees that only come in once disbursements are made, which can take two years or more. Fortunately, the Government of Flanders provided a grant to cover the salaries of several key staff who were indispensable for the preparation of the now-pending proposals for PPF projects. SANBI is also worried about how to implement these projects if the current funding of salaries for core staff by the Government of Flanders were to stop at the end of 2023, and wonders whether the GCF could provide such funding, supplementing the budget allocations from the DFFE. For the time being, the GCF does not explicitly provide core salary support to DAEs or governments.

SANBI's readiness project had funding of USD 380,000, which is almost fully disbursed with a small remainder of USD 16,000. The project took 270 pages of submissions and eight rounds of consultations to complete, all handled by SANBI without the help of consultants. They emphasized this point, underlining that they do not need foreign consultants funded by a PPF since they have qualified staff, but are instead short of budget to fund their salaries before the project fees are available. Though SANBI was also accredited by the AF from 2011, its initial GCF fast track accreditation took a lengthy 18 months, from July 2015 to September 2016. Its accreditation master agreement (AMA) execution date was July 2017, becoming effective in October 2019. Re-accreditation is therefore due only in 2024, but there are already concerns about lengthy bureaucratic requirements, placing high demands on already overstretched core staff, without financial compensation.

SANBI has been doing valuable work with its small grants programme funded by the AF, executed by the local NGO SSN, and involving enhanced direct access (EDA) on a pilot basis for later scaling up. Lessons learnt have been documented in two papers.[218] Working with the AF is generally perceived as being faster and less complicated than working with the GCF.

In a separate line of activities not funded by the GCF, SANBI and the DBSA participate actively in regional workshops organized by SSN for national and regional candidates for accreditations. These workshops are highly valued by the participants, although some local banks have now renounced their candidacies, having lost interest in the lengthy and costly processes involved (NEDBANK, Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Landbank, and others). Assistance is also extended at these workshops for the preparation of concept notes for potential projects under the Project-Specific Accreditation Approach (PSAA), or after accreditation. These workshops, which are well

[218] South African National Biodiversity Institute (n.d.2); and South African National Biodiversity Institute (2021).

documented and accessible on the SSN website,[219] are a very good example of support provided by DAEs to potential DAEs, and they address concerns raised by key informants that GCF guidance and touchpoints with staff are limited.

C. CONCLUSIONS

South Africa has a nearly complete set of plans and laws in place to address climate change, the latest piece being the Climate Change Bill currently under discussion in the National Assembly. The NCCAS serves as the country's NAP. The revised NDC was published in September 2021 and contains updated emission targets, raising the country's ambition by defining stricter intermediate emission limits on the way to net-zero by 2050. In 2019, the Carbon Tax Act was passed. Companies emitting CO_2 beyond certain thresholds are required to pay a tax, although with limiting allowances. At the end of July 2022, the President announced a liberalization of the energy sector, which has been so far largely monopolized by the state-owned Eskom that provides 85 per cent of electricity generated and distributed in the country.

The paradigm shift away from coal and towards a net-zero trajectory facilitated by the increased use of renewable energies has been initiated with the targets defined in the revised NDC, to be further confirmed in the Climate Change Bill. The PCC is preparing an investment plan for the JETP, in coordination with the PCFTT, in which DFFE (itself the GCF NDA) participates. The pace of this paradigm shift is still to be defined; while the potential and actual international support for a rapid change to renewable energies is present, there are also strong delaying forces. The GCF is only a minor player in South Africa.

Nevertheless, projects for the GCF are being brought forth by IAEs, a regional DAE, and a national DAE, advancing country ownership in climate action. Both DAEs are based in South Africa, having been accredited in 2016. The current portfolio of GCF projects consists of one completed, three on-going and three pending PPFs, two approved and one pending RPSPs, and seven FPs, the latter consisting of one national and six multi-country projects partly implemented in South Africa.

While not directly involved in the preparation of South Africa's investment plan for a Just Transition, and a minor actor in terms of total funding volume, the GCF has been playing an important role in facilitating innovation. In particular, it has supported innovative approaches for both mitigation and adaptation in terms of institutional set-ups by involving private investors in blended financing schemes, as well as for technology developments (e.g. with readiness funding for clean energy technology solutions in municipal wastewater treatment).

DBSA, AFD, and PCA are increasing their funding of renewable energy projects through local financial intermediaries, especially for solar panels for commercial properties. In the context of the liberalizing energy market, these projects could soon pick up steam and contribute to the urgently needed increase of renewable electricity generation by independent producers. For adaptation, scaling up beyond the on-going small projects under implementation by SANBI is needed. This

[219] The Southern Africa Climate Finance Partnership (SACFP) (2020); The Southern Africa Climate Finance Partnership (2021b); and The Southern Africa Climate Finance Partnership (2021c). A summary on capacity enhancement provided by SSN in the framework of the SACFP is presented in The Southern Africa Climate Finance Partnership (2021a). These measures were addressed to: CRDB Bank Tanzania (CRDB) - recently accredited; Development Bank of Namibia (DBN); FBC Bank Zimbabwe (FBC); Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ); National Development Bank of Botswana (NDB); and Zanaco Bank Zambia (Zanaco). For interesting lessons learnt by the Environmental Investment Fund (EIF) of Namibia concerning their experience with accessing GCF funding via accreditation and projects, see Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia (2022).

requires the projects under preparation by SANBI to be approved and the PCA multi-country project, CRAFT, to start operating in South Africa.

Among several South African key informants, the GCF Secretariat is perceived to be too bureaucratic, slow, inconsistent, and inflexible, while frequently changing the goal posts with regard to preparing and implementing projects in South Africa. The institutional challenges and lengthiness of communication processes appear to create ongoing challenges for the timely progression of projects, while stretching the already strained capacities of DAEs and the NDA.

Appendix 1. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

GCF FP portfolio in South Africa

PROJECT NAME	STATUS	SCOPE	THEMATIC FOCUS	AE	GCF FINANCING (USD)	CO-FINANCING (USD)
FP095 - Transforming Financial Systems for Climate	Under implementation	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	AFD	626,506	1,078,112
FP098 - DBSA Climate Finance Facility	Under implementation	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	DBSA	38,927,000	80,458,000
FP106 - Embedded Generation Investment Programme (EGIP)	Under implementation	South Africa	Mitigation	DBSA	100,000,000	437,000,000
FP122 - Blue Action Fund (BAF): GCF Ecosystem Based Adaptation Programme in the Western Indian Ocean	Under implementation	Multi-country	Adaptation	KfW	7,530,120	6,275,100
FP151 - Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	IUCN	440,485	226,195
FP152 - Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity	Under implementation	Multi-country	Mitigation	PCA	3,571,500	14,286,000
FP181 - CRAFT - Catalytic Capital for First Private Investment Fund for Adaptation Technologies in Developing Countries	Under implementation	Multi-country	Adaptation	PCA	16,667,000	50,001,000
FP190 - Climate Investor Two	Approved	Multi-country	Cross-cutting	FMO	11,542,000	58,506,000

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

GCF PPF portfolio in South Africa

PPF	PROJECT NAME	STATUS	DELIVERY PARTNER	DELIVERY MODALITY	THEMATIC FOCUS	APPROVED AMOUNT (USD)
PPF004	Public and Private Sector Energy Efficiency Programme (PPSEEP)	PPF completed (FP not submitted)	DBSA	Standard PPF funding	Mitigation	318,060
PPF012	Waste Management Flagship Programme	Disbursed	DBSA	Standard PPF funding	Mitigation	1,359,719
PPF029	SA Water Reuse Programme	Disbursed	DBSA	Standard PPF funding	Adaptation	515,411

PPF046	Scaling up ecosystem-based approaches to managing climate-intensified disaster risks in vulnerable regions of South Africa	SOW signed and effective	SANBI	PPF service	Adaptation	606,780

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

GCF RPSP portfolio in South Africa

RPSP NAME	STATUS	DELIVERY PARTNER	AGREEMENT TYPE	APPROVED AMOUNT (USD)
Building SANBI's capacity to develop GCF funding proposals and manage and monitor GCF projects in South Africa	Disbursed	SANBI	General grant Agreement	380,000
Pipeline development to deploy clean energy technology solutions in municipal wastewater treatment works of South Africa	Disbursed	UNIDO	Framework agreement	694,927

Source: Green Climate Fund. Tableau Server, as of B.33.

Appendix 2. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	POSITION/TITLE	ORGANIZATION
Ardinor	Branson	Climate Advocacy Lawyer	Center for Environmental Rights
Barnett	Mandy	Chief Director, Adaptation Policy and Resourcing	South African National Biodiversity Institute
da Costa	Charissa	Regional Climate Policy Specialist	Conservation International
Dava	Gabriel	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP South Africa
Dobson	Blaise	Project Manager	SouthSouthNorth
du Plessis	Wayne	Adaptation Network Member	Southern African Faith Communities Environment Institute (SAFCEI)
Fakir	Zaheer	Chief Policy Advisor	Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment
Fuller	Lorna	Director	Project 90 by 2030
Gerhard	Michael	Project Manager	SouthSouthNorth
Holden	Petra	Researcher	University of Cape Town
Jennings	Mike	Strategic Grant Manager	South African National Biodiversity Institute
Keen	Samantha	Researcher	University of Cape Town
Laurimer	Elin	Researcher	University of Cape Town
Le Page	David	Vice Chair and Coordinator	Fossil Free South Africa
Letlhogile	Lesedi	Graduate Trainee	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Manthatha	Olympus	Head, Climate and Environment Finance Unit	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Mbizvo	Carmel	Head of Branch Biodiversity Science & Policy Advice	South African National Biodiversity Institute
McNamara	Lisa	Director, Knowledge and Global Engagement	SouthSouthNorth
Mogale	Harold	Climate Finance Specialist	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Mokoena	Ndivile	Climate Justice & Gender Equality Advocate	GenderCC
Moosa	Sheenaz	Project Manager	SouthSouthNorth
Motloung	Lucia	Control Environmental Officer	Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment
Myeza	Siya	Project Coordinator	Environmental Monitoring Group
Naidoo	Dhesignen	Senior Policy Advisor	Presidential Climate Commission
Ndiaye	Dethie	Climate Finance Manager, Africa	Global Center on Adaptation
New	Mark	Researcher	University of Cape Town
Nkosi	Olivia	Graduate Trainee	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Nyirenda	Lucy	Head of Government and Technical Services	African Risk Capital

Olvert	Crispian	Head	Presidential Climate Commission
Parker	Azisa	Director, Green Climate Fund Programming	South African National Biodiversity Institute
Parker	Shahkira	Senior Policy Advisor	Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment
Patel	Saphira	Head, Operations Evaluation Unit	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Patrikson	Shela	Public Sector Partnership Coordinator	WWF South Africa
Pretorius	Margie	Chairperson	Sustaining the Wild Coast
Ramaru	Tlou Emmanuel	Chief Director Climate Change Adaptation	Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment
Sayed	Muhammed	Climate Change Specialist	Development Bank of Southern Africa
Scorgie	Sarshen	Climate and Strategy Advisor	Conservation International
Tadross	Mark	Researcher	University of Cape Town and UNDP
Trisos	Chris	Researcher	University of Cape Town
Tsundene	Mpfunzeni	FP Development Support	South African National Biodiversity Institute
Verwey	Nicole	Chief Financial Officer	Fedgroup
von Blottnitz	Harro	Professor	University of Cape Town

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