



Independent  
Evaluation Office  
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY



# GEF Support in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations



January 2024



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Evaluation Report No. 151  
January 2024



Independent  
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GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY



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# Foreword

**T**he intricate dynamics of conflict and fragility pose significant challenges to environmental programming and, consequently, to the Global Environment Facility's (GEF's) initiatives. Despite substantial investments in conflict-affected and fragile regions, encompassing over a third of its portfolio, the GEF has yet to establish a comprehensive framework for navigating these complex environments. This evaluation, the first of its kind conducted by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office across the GEF portfolio, delved into this critical issue.

The evaluation focused on assessing the impact of conflict and fragility on the design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and results of GEF projects. Through a mixed-methods approach that included an extensive literature review, a portfolio analysis of over 4,000 projects, and interviews with more than 55 experts and practitioners, the evaluation analyzed the extent, characteristics, and outcomes of GEF-funded projects in countries affected by fragility and major armed conflict, drawing comparisons with projects in other contexts. The evaluation also examined seven specific fragile and conflict situations and examined individual projects at the most granular level. The findings provide insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with operating

in these complex environments, identify and present a typology of conflict-sensitive approaches drawing upon the GEF's experience, and offer guidance for conflict-sensitive programming across the project life cycle. The report concludes that by recognizing the unique challenges posed by conflict-affected and fragile situations, the GEF can refine its strategies, policies, and processes to adapt better and respond to conflict-affected situations, contributing to sustainable development and peacebuilding efforts.

The evaluation's findings were presented to the 59th GEF Council in December 2020. The Council acknowledged the conclusions and endorsed the recommendations, taking into account the GEF management response. The evaluation lessons were also published in an open-access book, [\*Conflict-Sensitive Conservation—Lessons from the Global Environment Facility\*](#); and the findings were presented in several international forums, including the 2021 European Evaluation Society Conference.



Juha I. Uitto  
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# Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank	PIF	project identification form
AfDB	African Development Bank	PMIS	Project Management Information System
CEO	Chief Executive Officer	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
COP	conference of the parties	STAP	Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel
DfID	UK Department for International Development	UN	United Nations
ELI	Environmental Law Institute	UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
GEF	Global Environment Facility	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank	UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
M&E	monitoring and evaluation		
MEA	multilateral environmental agreement		
NGO	nongovernmental organization		

## GEF replenishment periods

<b>Pilot phase:</b> 1991–94	<b>GEF-5:</b> 2010–14
<b>GEF-1:</b> 1995–98	<b>GEF-6:</b> 2014–18
<b>GEF-2:</b> 1999–2002	<b>GEF-7:</b> 2018–22
<b>GEF-3:</b> 2003–06	<b>GEF-8:</b> 2022–26
<b>GEF-4:</b> 2006–10	

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# Executive summary

**C**onflict and fragility affect environmental programming—and programming of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)—in diverse ways. The environment can interact with conflict across the conflict life cycle, because natural resources can act as a source of grievances, provide revenues to rebel groups during conflict, and can serve as a mutual starting point during peace negotiations. Environmental interventions also interact with conflict and fragility in multiple ways. Challenges associated with security threats to project staff, hiring staff, and accessing project sites can undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of an intervention; and environmental interventions themselves can aggravate tensions or conflict. Recognizing both the potential effects of conflict and fragility on environmental projects and the effects of environmental projects on conflict and fragility, a growing number of institutions—including GEF Agencies—have adopted conflict-sensitive measures to manage risks associated with conflict and fragility.

The GEF has funded thousands of interventions in areas experiencing armed conflict or fragility; more than one-third of its global portfolio is invested in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict. The prevalence of conflict and fragility in GEF-target countries/economies suggests that

conflict and fragility should be considered essential contextual factors affecting the GEF's ability to achieve large-scale, sustainable impacts and initiate fundamental change.

Despite its substantial investment in programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations and the multiple effects of those situations on GEF interventions, the GEF does not yet have a definition, policy, or procedures for designing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Literature on conflict-sensitive programming emphasizes the importance of institutional instruments in providing normative direction and practical guidance. Without such institutional statements, efforts to be more conflict-sensitive will remain ad hoc and uneven and continue to expose the GEF to institutional risk that could otherwise be managed.

Several evaluations by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office—including those on GEF support to land degradation, mainstreaming biodiversity, and least developed countries/economies—have provided evaluative evidence on how conflict and fragile situations affect the outcomes and sustainability of GEF support. These evaluations have emphasized that fragile and conflict-affected states should be given due consideration in project

design. Even though fragility and conflict are a key factor influencing project delivery and performance, there has not been an independent assessment of GEF interventions in such situations. This is the first such evaluation conducted by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office to look at this topic across the GEF portfolio.

This evaluation assesses the impacts of conflict and fragility on the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of GEF interventions at the global scale, the country/economy and regional levels, and the individual project level. This report analyzes how conflict and fragility affect GEF project outcomes at these three scales, determines the extent to which GEF-supported projects consider the broader conflict context in their design and implementation, and assesses whether consideration of these factors affects project outcomes. Based on these findings, it offers recommendations for improving conflict sensitivity in GEF-sponsored projects.

## FINDINGS

**The majority of GEF projects are in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** As of July 2020, the GEF has invested over \$4.0 billion in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict (i.e., conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths), accounting for 29 percent of its global portfolio. In total, 45 percent of GEF investments have been in projects implemented in at least one conflict-affected country/economy. Of all GEF-funded projects, 33 percent have been implemented in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict and 11 percent in mixed contexts. Fragility is even more widespread: 88.3 percent of the GEF's country/economy-level projects were in fragile situations, categorized as either alert (very fragile) or warning (of concern).

**There is a statistically significant impact of major armed conflict on the likelihood that a project will**

**be canceled and dropped; this relationship is also seen for fragility.** Moreover, at all scales of implementation, the country/economy's conflict status had a statistically significant impact on the duration of a project's delays.

**A country/economy's fragility classification is associated with a negative and statistically significant impact on project outcomes, sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, implementation quality, and execution quality.** The most significant impacts were for projects in countries/economies classified as alert (i.e., very fragile). For stable vis-à-vis warning classifications, sustainability and M&E implementation ratings were statistically affected by fragility.

**The conflict context of a project's country/economy also had a statistically significant impact on the terminal evaluation report ratings.** Globally, the presence of major armed conflict in a project country/economy correlates with a lower score for sustainability. This suggests that projects taking place in conflict-affected sites are on average less sustainable than projects taking place in nonconflict contexts. At the regional level, major armed conflict can have a statistically significant impact on the sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, and overall ratings of a project—although results vary by region.

**Conflict and fragility affect GEF projects through five key pathways: physical insecurity, social conflict, economic drivers, political fragility and weak governance, and coping strategies.** Issues related to physical insecurity include difficulties in accessing sites because of the potential targeting of project staff and partners and because of the risks associated with unexploded ordnance. Physical insecurity has made it difficult to hire staff, undertake planned activities, and carry out evaluations. Social conflicts and mistrust between and within local communities and government institutions often affect the performance of GEF projects.

Social conflicts relating to land tenure are particularly common. The macro- and microeconomic consequences of conflict and fragility can affect GEF project implementation in various ways, from competing over resource extraction (often illicit) to currency depreciation. Political fragility, weak governance, and limited institutional capacity have affected GEF project implementation and sustainability. Limited government capacity can make it difficult to enforce policies, presenting barriers to project execution; while political instability can harm project sustainability. Changes in natural resources driven by coping strategies can generate social tensions and instability that can affect projects, as can influxes of refugees and climatic stressors.

**Conflict and fragility affect project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.**

Armed conflict and fragility can shift the focus and priorities of a state and community away from environmental and other initiatives that require cooperation, and toward efforts that directly affect conflict dynamics or provide relief. At the same time, conflict can enhance the relevance of GEF projects, particularly those designed to be conflict-sensitive that address livelihoods, food security, cooperation, and basic services. Conflict and fragility can also undermine the effectiveness of GEF projects by blocking access to target sites, creating security risks for project staff, and—in extreme cases—causing them to be canceled or dropped. The efficiency of projects can also be affected by conflict and fragility; for example, by requiring project restructuring, delays, or additional costs for security. Finally, project sustainability is undermined by conflict and fragility, particularly by sociopolitical instability and outbreaks of violence.

**Despite the risks and effects of conflict and fragility on GEF projects, the GEF has so far not developed the conflict-sensitive safeguards, policies, and guidance necessary to systematically**

**manage those risks.** GEF Agencies and projects have innovated a variety of approaches, but these are either implemented only by the particular projects or Agencies. As a result, many GEF projects continue to not be conflict-sensitive or to reinvent approaches without the benefit of learning from past experiences.

**Notwithstanding the absence of direction from the GEF, GEF projects have innovated and employed five conflict-sensitive strategies to manage risks posed by conflict and fragility: acknowledgment, avoidance, mitigation, peacebuilding, and learning.**

Many projects have acknowledged the presence of armed violence and insecurity in the project area but do not articulate any strategies to manage conflict-related risks. A growing number of projects both acknowledge risks associated with conflict (and to a lesser extent fragility), and then propose measures to manage those risks. To reduce the level of risk that conflict poses to a project, some projects deliberately focused on areas that were unaffected by conflict. This reduces the risk to the project, albeit with the potential implication that the areas most needing assistance are not addressed. Other projects employed mitigation strategies such as capacity building, monitoring the security situation, participatory approaches, dispute resolution mechanisms, partnerships with local communities, and adaptive management approaches. A small but growing number of projects actively embraced the peacebuilding opportunities presented by the conflict or fragile situation through methods such as promoting heightened political will, rebuilding livelihoods, and reintegrating ex-combatants and displaced persons. Many GEF projects implemented in fragile and conflict-affected settings also learn from both their own experiences and from other programming.

**Although conflict and fragility pose risks to GEF projects, to date, identification of conflict-related risks has not been consistent, and identification**

**of fragility-related risks to GEF projects has been almost nonexistent.** Fifty-nine of 62 projects in conflict-affected countries/economies reviewed identified various risks, and 56 proposed initial measures to manage risk. Only 39 of these projects identified conflict as a risk, even though all 62 projects were situated in a country/economy with an ongoing or past major armed conflict—and less than half of these projects proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks. None of the 62 projects reviewed mentioned fragility. It is difficult to plan for or manage risks that are not identified.

**The COVID-19 pandemic reinforces the need for substantively and financially adaptive approaches to GEF programming.** The widespread repercussions of COVID-19 have halted development efforts and reversed decades of progress toward more sustainable development. COVID-19 can undermine conflict resolution and crisis management mechanisms, erode the social order, and overwhelm already overextended public health systems. Reforming the GEF rules and procedures to allow for more adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations can make GEF programming more resilient in pandemics and other crises. Several key informants working in fragile and conflict-affected countries/economies noted that while the country/economy had fewer resources to cope with the pandemic, the ability and disposition to navigate compounding crises that had been developed working in the fragile and conflict-affected settings may have improved the ability of projects to navigate the pandemic.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks.** The GEF should use the project review process to integrate consideration of fragile

and conflict-affected contexts. Project reviews provide an opportunity for the GEF to identify risks that could affect project success and for proposing measures to mitigate those risks. This would help ensure that recognizing and addressing such risks is more consistent.

**To improve conflict-sensitive programming while providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.** This guidance could address measures across the programming life cycle, from design to implementation and closure. GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw upon both the commonalities and innovations of the guidance that has been developed by 10 GEF Agencies.

**To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, and M&E of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance.** These platforms are designed to effectively foster learning and exchange, build capacity, and provide specialized assistance. Since conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue, lessons learned should be exchanged on existing knowledge platforms supported through programs such as the integrated approach pilots, the impact programs, the Global Wildlife Program, and planetGOLD, among others, as well as on the online GEF Portal.

**The current GEF environmental and social safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.** At least 11 GEF Agencies have incorporated consideration of conflict and fragility into their respective safeguards. The GEF has adopted environmental and social safeguards that seek to minimize potentially adverse environmental and social impacts from projects. However, these safeguards mention conflict only once and lack a holistic recognition of the

way that conflicts might be linked to the environment and natural resources. As it has done when updating safeguards regarding gender, the GEF could consider the more detailed provisions incorporated by GEF Agencies as it considers whether and how to expand its safeguards to more effectively address conflict sensitivity.

**The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected**

**situations.** The circumstances on the ground in these situations can change rapidly. Yet GEF policies and procedures can make it difficult to adjust projects to adapt in a timely manner. Incorporating adaptive management into GEF policies and procedures could provide a more flexible and adaptive environment, enabling projects to adapt more quickly and more efficiently to changes resulting from conflict or fragility, as well as other difficult situations.

# Introduction

The environment, fragility, and conflict are often intertwined, and attention to these linkages and their implications for peace and conflict is essential to effective programming. Environmental organizations have increasingly recognized how their projects are often affected by peace and conflict dynamics and vice versa. Since its inception, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has funded thousands of interventions in areas that have been or are currently affected by armed conflict and fragility. The GEF’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) noted that 77 countries, accounting for over half of GEF recipients, had experienced armed conflict since 1991 (GEF STAP 2018). More than \$4 billion—accounting for more than one-third of the GEF’s global portfolio—has been invested in countries affected by major armed conflict, and more than one-third of “GEF members (64 countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while major armed conflict was ongoing” (Morrow 2018, 7). As such, a substantial portion of the GEF portfolio is exposed to conflict-related risks. Even more are affected by fragility (see [section 3.2](#)).

Several evaluations by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)—including on GEF support to land degradation (GEF IEO 2018c), biodiversity (GEF IEO 2018a, 2019), and least developed countries

(GEF IEO 2022b)—have provided **evaluative evidence on how conflict and fragile situations affect the outcomes and sustainability of GEF support**. These evaluations have emphasized that fragile and conflict-affected states should be given due consideration in project design. Despite their being a key factor influencing project delivery and performance, there has not been an independent assessment of GEF interventions in conflict and fragile situations. This is the first evaluation conducted by the GEF IEO that looks at this topic across the GEF portfolio.

Despite substantial investment in programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations and the multiple effects of those situations on GEF interventions, **the GEF does not yet have a definition, policy, or procedures for designing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations** (GEF IEO 2022c). Literature on conflict-sensitive programming emphasizes the importance of institutional instruments in providing normative direction and practical guidance (e.g., UNDP and UNEP 2015; International Alert et al. 2004). Policies provide clarity of direction, protocols steer practices pursuant to policy, and safeguards provide enforceable protections.

**Without such institutional statements, efforts to be more conflict-sensitive will remain ad hoc** and uneven and will continue to expose the GEF to institutional risk that could otherwise be managed. Nevertheless, a 2018 report produced by the STAP concluded that the GEF “does not appear to have addressed environmental security in an integrated manner across its program areas” (GEF STAP 2018, 5). As a result, interventions in fragile and conflict-affected areas may be exposed to risks that are not adequately taken into account or mitigated.

In the absence of a formal definition, policy, and procedures, **individual projects and some GEF Agencies have started to account for fragile and conflict-affected contexts** in their design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). As the GEF continues to support interventions in a range of fragile and conflict-affected situations, the partnership can learn from current and past approaches to designing and implementing projects and programs in such situations and can identify ways to better manage the particular risks in these areas. Experience with diverse conservation organizations suggests that managing conflict-related risks would make GEF interventions more effective in meeting the interventions’ conservation objectives (CI 2017; Hammill et al. 2009).

**This evaluation aims to assess GEF projects and programs in fragile and conflict-affected situations**—in short, to determine whether and how GEF interventions are conflict-sensitive, and the implications thereof. The evaluation surveys guidance from relevant conferences of the parties (COPs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with respect to conflict; examines the design, implementation, and M&E of GEF-funded projects and programs, focusing on interventions since 2002 (the start of GEF-3) in seven situations affected by conflict and fragility; assesses the implications of projects’ and programs’ degree of conflict sensitivity by considering how the performance and outcomes may have been influenced by the conflict context;

and, with reference to international best practice, identify recommendations for improving future GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations.

This evaluation seeks to answer four questions:

- Does the conflict or fragile context affect the outcomes of GEF-supported projects?
- To what extent do GEF-supported projects take into account the conflict or fragile context in their design and implementation?
- Does consideration of the conflict or fragile context (or failure to consider it) affect project outcomes?
- What conflict-sensitive measures could the GEF, GEF Agencies, and partners adopt to improve the performance and outcomes of GEF-supported interventions?

Policies, guidance, and analyses on conflict-sensitive programming variously address “conflict-affected,” “fragile,” and “violent” “situations” and “countries.” There are many dimensions to conflict-affected and fragile situations, and there are diverse articulations of conflict and fragility. This evaluation will follow well-established framings and definitions for the key terms ([box 1.1](#)).

## 1.1 Methodology

**This evaluation assesses the impacts of conflict and fragility on the design and implementation of GEF interventions at three scales: globally, at the country/economy and regional levels, and at the project level.** It also assesses the impacts of efforts to make GEF interventions conflict-sensitive. The analysis draws on both quantitative and qualitative methods.<sup>1</sup>

At the **global level**, the evaluation examined the full GEF portfolio, looking at a variety of dimensions.

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<sup>1</sup>Additional information on the methodological approach is available in [section 3.1](#) and annexes [E](#), [F](#), [G](#), and [H](#).



### Box 1.1 Definitions of key terms

For purposes of this analysis, the following definitions are used unless otherwise indicated:


- **Conflict-affected** refers to contexts that are experiencing or have experienced armed conflict, which is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program website, [UCDP Definitions](#)).
- **Major armed conflict** is an armed conflict in which there are at least 1,000 battle deaths overall (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008).
- **Fragility** is “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies” (OECD 2106).
- **Conflict sensitivity** refers to “the capacity of an organization to: (i) understand the context in which it operates; (ii) understand the interaction between the organization’s interventions and the context; and (iii) act upon these understandings to avoid negative impacts (do no harm) and maximize positive impacts” (UNFPA 2020).
- **State** refers to a UN member state.
- **Situation** refers to a location and may include a state, a subnational area, an area that includes portions of two or more states, or an area that includes multiple states.

It considered the extent, nature, and results of GEF-funded interventions in countries affected by fragility and major armed conflict vis-à-vis other countries. This analysis included projects that were dropped, canceled, and withdrawn. The projects in the GEF’s full portfolio were sorted by country/economy to compare terminal evaluation scores, delay

times, and cancellation rates in countries affected by major armed conflict compared with other countries. The evaluation also explored the GEF’s engagement over time in countries listed in the [Fragile States Index](#) and the World Bank’s [List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) to look at fragility more broadly beyond major armed conflict. The evaluation surveyed the approaches to conflict and conflict sensitivity adopted by the GEF Agencies, the secretariats of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that it serves, and other peer institutions. Safeguard policies, guidance documents for operating in conflict-affected settings, and peacebuilding initiatives from the GEF Agencies and MEA secretariats were reviewed for conflict-sensitive approaches among GEF-associated institutions. Toolkits, guides, and gray literature from other organizations involved in international development, and specifically environmental programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility, were examined with particular attention to conflict-sensitive strategies. The quantitative results of the global analysis are presented in the [chapter 3](#), and the qualitative results inform [chapter 4](#).

The evaluation selected **seven situations of focus** using the criteria of regional diversity, presence of major armed conflict since 1989, geographic scope and temporal aspects of conflict, number of GEF projects and amount of GEF support, diversity of GEF projects, involvement in GEF-7 impact programs, and diversity of situation scales. Based on these criteria, **Afghanistan**, the **Albertine Rift** (including parts of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), the **Balkans** (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia), **Cam-bodia**, **Colombia**, **Lebanon**, and **Mali** were selected as the seven situations of focus ([figure 1.1](#)). In each situation, the evaluation team reviewed the available project documents for all projects in the situation and then selected 6–10 illustrative projects for further analysis. The findings from this analysis are presented chiefly in [chapter 4](#).

**Figure 1.1** GEF case study situations and conflict (1989–2020)



**Source:** GEF IEO, using conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (through October 2020).

**At the most granular level of analysis, the evaluation reviewed individual projects in depth.** For each of the illustrative projects selected for a particular situation, it examined project documents, analytic review of data, materials from GEF Agencies, coverage by third parties, and conducted interviews with key personnel. The review sought to understand the project context, ascertain how the project managed (or did not manage) the various risks associated with conflict and fragility, and determine how conflict and fragility affected the project. The findings from this analysis are presented chiefly in [chapter 4](#).

## 1.2 Structure of the report

**This evaluation is divided into five chapters.** Following this introductory chapter, [chapter 2](#) surveys the linkages between environmental programming, conflict, and peace, as well as the emergence of conflict-sensitive programming; examines

how the MEAs and the SDGs address conflict; and then reviews the linkages between the GEF theory of change, focal areas, impact programs, and fragility and conflict. [Chapter 3](#) presents the results of a portfolio review of GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations. [Chapter 4](#) presents findings of in-depth research into GEF programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility. This chapter presents findings along four key lines: (1) key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects; (2) the resulting effects of conflict and fragility on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of GEF projects; (3) the various ways GEF projects are seeking to be more conflict-sensitive; and (4) entry points for conflict sensitivity in the GEF project cycle. In addition to the specific recommendations for improving conflict sensitivity in GEF projects presented in [chapter 4](#), [chapter 5](#) presents five overarching recommendations for improving the conflict sensitivity of GEF projects.

# Linkages between the environment and fragility and conflict

A large and growing body of academic and practitioner literature establishes the diverse connections between the environment and peace, conflict, and security (e.g., CI 2017; Rüttinger et al. 2015; Hammill et al. 2009; UNEP (2009); UN OCHA (2009)). This literature addresses the relationship across the conflict life cycle, including the environmental causes of conflict, environmental impacts of armed conflict, financing and environmental drivers of conflict, environmental factors in the negotiation and conclusion of peace agreements ending conflict, and environmental dimensions of postconflict peacebuilding (figure 2.1). It also addresses the potential for the conflict context to affect the successful realization of environmental initiatives (Bruch et al. 2019). In any year from 1946 to 2008, at least 40 percent of all intrastate conflicts were linked to natural resources; in some years, the share was as high as 65 percent (Rustad and Binningsbø 2010). Conflicts that are linked to natural resources are more likely to relapse than other conflicts, and they do so twice as quickly; this is particularly true for conflicts related to the allocation of land and high-value natural resources such as minerals, oil, and gas (Rustad and Binningsbø 2010).

**Figure 2.1** Environmental risks and opportunities across the conflict life cycle



Source: Bruch et al. 2019.

**Conflict and fragility are widespread, and they have been worsening.** With increased internal armed conflict and the proliferation of nonstate armed groups, the world is experiencing its highest rate of violent conflicts in 30 years (World Bank 2020e; see also ACLED 2018). A Tulane University researcher found that “about 20 percent of conflict-affected GEF recipient countries experienced more than 20 years of conflict including Turkey, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Uganda and the Russian Federation” (Morrow 2018, 9). Fragility—like conflict—is often persistent and pernicious, with almost 30 states experiencing chronic fragility

in the past decade (OECD 2018). The World Bank has projected that “By 2030, more than half of the world’s extreme poor will live in countries characterized by fragility, conflict, and violence” (World Bank 2020e, 2).

**Competition for valuable or scarce natural resources can be a contributing cause of conflict.** Competition for control over valuable natural resources and their benefits can lead to reduced economic, political, and social performance; this is known as the “resource curse” (e.g., Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Ross 2004, 2015; Collier and Venables 2011). Many have also argued that competition over scarce natural resources, such as land and water, can drive conflict (e.g., Westing 1986; Elliott 1991; Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994). Serious pollution and other burdens resulting from natural resource extraction and processing are other conflict drivers. For example, in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, the lack of benefit sharing and severe water pollution from the Panguna gold and copper mine drove a secessionist movement that escalated to civil war (Regan 2017).

**Climate change is widely considered to be a conflict risk multiplier and conflict accelerator (see, e.g., GEF STAP 2018; CI 2017; CNA 2014; CNA Military Advisory Board 2007; Nordås and Gleditsch 2007; NRC 2013).** Climate change degrades natural capital and livelihood assets, damages infrastructure, weakens food security, threatens lives, and can drive migration (Adger et al. 2014; Rüttinger et al. 2015; Rigaud et al. 2018; UN OCHA 2009). As such, climate change can increase fragility and aggravate tensions (UN OCHA 2009; Rüttinger et al. 2015). Moreover, increases in temperature have been shown to measurably increase both interpersonal conflict and intergroup conflict (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015). The World Bank estimated that “Under the pessimistic reference scenario...the number of climate migrants could reach more than 143 million by 2050” (Rigaud et al. 2018, 110). There is also evidence that climate

change may directly amplify the effects of conflict. Somalia, for example, experiences a “double exposure” to both climate-induced environmental impacts and protracted conflict, which together have caused the displacement of over 2.6 million people within the country and further entrenched drivers of conflict (Krampe 2019, 3). Similarly, in Gaza, analyses have highlighted how predicted changes in climate risks can exacerbate the effects of conflict (Mason, Zeitoun, and El Sheikh 2011).

**Recognizing that poor environmental governance and fragility can underpin grievances, conflict prevention increasingly focuses on improving environmental governance and social resilience.** Research has shown that the risk of conflict relapse in countries/economies with good governance drops rapidly after conflict, while those characterized by poor governance are substantially more vulnerable to conflict relapse (Hegre and Nygård 2015). A World Bank background paper notes:

Of the 103 countries that experienced some form of civil war between 1945-2009 (from minor to major conflict), only 44 avoided a subsequent return to civil war. That means that 57 percent of all countries that suffered from one civil war during this time period experienced at least one conflict thereafter. This confirms what Collier and Sambanis (2002) have called the “conflict trap;” once a country experiences one civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence. (Walter 2010, 1)

Efforts to prevent conflicts related to natural resources often emphasize transparency (e.g., the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; see Sovacool et al. 2016; Epremian, Lujala, and Bruch 2016), equity (e.g., benefit sharing; see Binningsbø and Rustad 2012), and other good governance principles. In resilience-based framings, environmental governance, sustainable livelihoods, institutional capacity, and strong community relationships all contribute to the social resilience that can prevent conflict (UNEP 2014; Rüttinger et al. 2015).

**Armed conflict causes environmental damage and degradation through three main pathways: targeting, coping strategies, and the breakdown of environmental governance.** Targeting of the environment includes, for example, scorched-earth tactics (such as poisoning wells or leveling forests to remove cover); the use of particular weapons; and the release of chemicals and waste from the bombing of industrial sites and infrastructure, creating environmental hotspots (see e.g., Westing and Pfeiffer 1972; Austin and Bruch 2000; Zierler 2011; Certini, Scalenghe, and Woods 2013). Examples include the devastating impacts of the use of Agent Orange on plant and animal life during the Vietnam War (Westing 1971, 1976; Zierler 2011) and the widely documented increase in animal poaching that occurs in times of war (Daskin and Pringle 2018). During conflict, people often liquidate natural assets, flee to camps or other settlements, and otherwise adopt new coping strategies—all of which have environmental implications (UNEP 2009). Conflicts also disrupt state institutions, policy coordination, and social relationships between resource users, undermining environmental governance and leading to a proliferation of illegal and criminal exploitation of natural resources and the loss of land tenure security (UNEP 2009; Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols 2016).

**Natural resources often provide financing necessary to sustain conflict.** Since 1990, at least 35 major armed conflicts—that is, those with at least 1,000 battle deaths—have been financed in part through the extraction, trade, or illicit taxation of conflict resources ranging from diamonds and gold, to timber and charcoal, to bananas and coca (Bruch et al. 2019).

**Conflict resources and other natural resource dynamics can transform the conflict narrative.** Rather than being a civilian object protected by international law, conflict resources become a military objective that might be attacked, seized, or destroyed to deprive the other side of their benefits

(Bannon and Collier 2003; Ross 2004; Le Billon 2013). Moreover, once conflict resources take root in a conflict economy, it can be difficult to control extraction and trade in these resources, even after the conflict has ended.

**Increasingly, peace negotiations and the resulting peace agreements have incorporated provisions related to natural resources and the environment more broadly.** Historically, less than one in six peace agreements addressed natural resources or the environment (Blundell and Harwell 2016). From 1989 to 2004, this share rose to just over one-half of peace agreements (Mason, Gröbli, and Sguaitamatti 2016). And since 2005, all major peace agreements contain such provisions—and often multiple provisions. There are four primary reasons that parties to a peace agreement decide to include provisions related to natural resources and the environment (Dawes 2016):

- Grievances over natural resources were a contributing cause of conflict (as in Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan).
- Natural resource revenues helped finance conflict (as in Angola, Cambodia, and Liberia).
- Natural resources were damaged by the conflict (as in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo).
- The environment can be used collaboratively to build confidence and trust.

**After conflict, the environment and natural resources underpin four broad peacebuilding objectives.** In a series of reports on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General emphasizes four core areas: establishing security, delivering basic services, restoring the economy and livelihoods, and rebuilding governance and inclusive political processes (e.g., UNSG 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014). Each of these postconflict peacebuilding objectives relies on natural resources and the environment,

and sound environmental management can improve postconflict peacebuilding, while ignoring the environment can undermine postconflict peacebuilding efforts (e.g., Lujala and Rustad 2011; Jensen and Lonergan 2012; Unruh and Williams 2013; Weinthal, Troell, and Nakayama 2014; Young and Goldman 2015; Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols 2016).

## 2.1 Environmental interventions, conflict, and fragility

Environmental interventions can interact with conflict and fragility in three ways:

- The intervention can be negatively affected by conflict and fragility.
- The intervention can inadvertently worsen conflict and fragility.
- The intervention may help address the drivers, dynamics, and impacts of conflict and build peace.

In other words, a project can both be affected by and affect the conflict situation. This report highlights the fact that the first two categories of intervention can occur when conflict dynamics are not managed effectively—and, by contrast, that applying a conflict-sensitive lens in project design and implementation can support the final scenario.

**Conflict and fragility can present challenges to projects through several pathways.** These include, for example, through security threats to staff, difficulty with hiring, and challenges to accessing resources and areas (GEF STAP 2018; Morrow 2018; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012).<sup>1</sup> Conflict may directly threaten those working on the project. This occurred during implementation in

Cambodia of Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains (GEF ID 1086) when poachers murdered two park rangers, injured a local villager, and pillaged a ranger substation in the Phnom Aural Wildlife Sanctuary project area, a former Khmer Rouge stronghold (MacKay 2005). Short of such tragic outcomes, interventions in conflict-affected areas may have difficulty hiring staff, as was the case for Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management in Afghanistan, which eventually had to be canceled because of issues with staff recruitments and other “challenging security conditions,” according to the GEF Agency cancellation note. As with humanitarian efforts, environmental programming can legitimize certain groups or leaders by partnering with them, shift local markets with an influx of resources, and effectively replace governance functions or structures (UNDP 2016c). Moreover, impacts of conflict on the environment can directly affect a project’s implementation, and they can more broadly affect the environmental benefits such projects may seek to achieve.

**Conflict can make it unsafe to try to access project sites.** During implementation of the Congo Basin Strategic Program’s Forest and Nature Conservation Project (GEF ID 3772) in the Albertine Rift, project staff were, as noted in the terminal evaluation, unable to collect data on project indicators because of the presence of armed groups in the area. In such circumstances, some projects may choose or be forced to move their project sites entirely; such was the case for the Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project (GEF ID 1253) in Mali, where military operations forced project relocation. Project staff fled the site and took refuge in southern Mali or neighboring countries, according to the terminal evaluation. Institutional weakness during times of conflict may also affect project implementation, especially where government cooperation is a necessary component of project activities. The Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory

<sup>1</sup> See [section 4.1](#) for a fuller typology of the ways conflict and fragility can affect GEF projects.

Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Inner Niger Delta and its Transition Areas, Mopti Region project (GEF ID 1152) faced nearly 40 months of delays and economic inefficiencies, according to the project completion report, because the project team could not reach an agreement with the National Investment Agency for Local Communities when conflict broke out in Mali in 2012.

**Environmental interventions can aggravate tensions or conflict.** If it is unaware of ongoing tensions and conflict dynamics, an organization designing and implementing a project can inadvertently exacerbate existing grievances or perceptions of injustice. For example, a planned hydroelectric dam project in Santa Rita, Guatemala, funded through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's Clean Development Mechanism, would have threatened neighboring Mayan communities' access to water, food, and sacred sites. Given the legacy of the Guatemalan civil war; a project that threatened their existence; and the lack of free, prior, and informed consent, disputes over the project escalated to violence, resulting in seven deaths and the eventual cancellation of the project (Filzmoser 2017; Neslen 2015).

**Environmental projects may restrict access to land, forests, and other natural resources, generating grievances.** This is frequently the case in wildlife-related projects, where recovering wild-life populations expand and infringe on neighboring communities (IUCN 2016). In East Africa, tens of thousands of Maasai were evicted from their ancestral lands to create the Serengeti National Park and other national parks (Mittal and Fraser 2018). It is estimated that 70 percent of Africa's rural population "has been hurt by the conservation policies of colonial powers and independent governments" (Veit and Benson 2004). Human-wildlife conflict continues: in the areas surrounding Kenya's Tsavo East National Park, for instance, ranchers lost an estimated \$290 for every lion attack (Patterson et al. 2004).

Environmental and natural resource projects can also introduce new burdens or result in inequitable distribution of benefits and burdens (Hammill et al. 2009; RRI 2015). Where there is little trust of authorities, the perception of these injustices may worsen tensions. Conservation projects can also inadvertently facilitate violence when park guards are militarized, particularly in areas already affected by armed conflict or where protected areas are located on lands historically occupied by indigenous peoples (Duffy et al. 2019). In Cameroon, for example, park eco-guards—who were recruited, trained, paid, and outfitted in Lobéké National Park by a conservation nongovernmental organization (NGO)—were reported in 2015 to be conducting violent nighttime raids in which they looted and beat villagers in neighboring Baka communities (see Baker and Warren 2019; Lang 2017; Vidal 2016, 2020).

**Even where benefits and burdens are shared equitably, conservation projects can backfire.** In the Mikeno sector of Virunga National Park in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, community members who were compensated for helping build walls to prevent buffaloes from raiding crops became targets of armed groups which looted their homes for food and money (Crawford and Bernstein 2008).

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, efforts to empower park rangers to address poaching backfired. When the rebel M23 militia forces started using the Virunga National Park (home to the eastern mountain gorilla) as a base, the local park rangers were out-gunned and out-maneuvered. A conservation group sought to address this by providing them with military-grade automatic weapons and training them in both military techniques and anti-poaching strategies (Rice 2006). The rangers received extra pay for the risks in confronting the rebels. However, interviews with subject matter experts indicated that after the training was completed and the rangers returned to the park, the

government stopped providing this extra pay. Some of these rangers were then recruited by the M23 and helped M23 take over park tourism, which in turn helped fund their efforts in the ongoing conflict (Jones 2012).

**Environmental projects can use their intervention as an opportunity for peacebuilding.** One example of this took place in the Emerald Triangle, a forested area that encompasses land along the borders of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Thailand. The biodiverse area has faced various threats, particularly from illegal wildlife trade and habitat fragmentation, challenges which require substantial transboundary cooperation to address. Such cooperation was historically difficult because of tension and conflict over contested state borders in that area. The International Tropical Timber Organization initiated a project to improve biodiversity conservation in the transboundary region and strengthen cooperation between the three governments (Suissey 2012). Project documents noted improved conservation and collaboration outcomes (ITTO 2010). In addition to promoting cooperation between combating groups, these types of conflict-sensitive interventions have the potential to improve the outcomes and sustainability of the intervention itself.

## 2.2 Growing attention to conflict sensitivity

**Institutions around the world, including some GEF Agencies, have begun to address the linkages between their interventions and the conflict dynamics in which they operate.** These include a broad range of environment and development interventions. The efforts to address the linkages include adopting conflict-related policies and guidelines; instituting conflict analysis processes; integrating conflict-related measures into project design and implementation; adapting monitoring, evaluation, and learning protocols;

instituting conflict-related training and allocating staff time to implementing changes; and developing relevant resources and guidance related to conflict sensitivity.

Conflict sensitivity first emerged in humanitarian assistance as a way of helping actors achieve positive outcomes and understand the unintended consequences of aid (ITTO 2010). In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, genocidaires exploited humanitarian relief to launch attacks, and development agencies aggravated tensions between social groups by recruiting primarily Tutsi local staff (ITTO 2010). After this, international development agencies acknowledged that aid is not necessarily neutral, and they started developing, implementing, and revising approaches to be more conflict-sensitive.<sup>2</sup>

**The growth of conflict sensitivity in the humanitarian and development sectors, coupled with the growing recognition of the linkages between environment, conflict, and peace, led to the development of conflict-sensitive environmental programming.** The first major guide on the topic was the 2009 International Institute for Sustainable Development publication “Conflict-Sensitive Conservation: Practitioners’ Manual” (Hammill et al. 2009). The Wildlife Conservation Society, Conservation International, and other environmental organizations have adopted toolkits, protocols, and guides for operating in fragile and conflict-affected settings. UN agencies adopted a series of guidelines on conflict-sensitive conservation (UNFPA 2012a; UNDG 2013), as well as guidance on preventing and managing conflict related to natural resources (UNFPA 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) adopted a similar series of guidance notes (USAID 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2014), and the UK Department for International

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<sup>2</sup> For a review of the development of conflict-sensitive programming, see [annex I](#).



Development (DfID) produced “Back to the Basics: A Compilation of Best Practices in Design, Monitoring & Evaluation in Fragile and Conflict-affected Environments” to highlight best practices throughout a development program’s cycle (Corlazzoli and White 2013).

**Conflict analysis is the prevalent tool for conflict-sensitive programming.** It can be undertaken at the institutional, program, or project level, and it explores the connections between a given institution’s interventions and the conflict context in which it operates. Many institutions have developed their own conflict analysis processes and procedures to reflect their particular programming areas and modalities (e.g., FAO 2019b; CI 2017; UNICEF 2016; USAID 2012a, 2012b). The findings from conflict analysis guide organizations in adapting their design and implementation to the particular context in which they operate.

**International organizations and bilateral aid agencies have adopted a variety of measures to operationalize their policies and toolkits on conflict-sensitive programming.** The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Organization of American States, and others have trained staff and partners on conflict sensitivity tools and processes (e.g., FAO 2012; Soto 2016; CI 2017). Others have appointed a focal point for conflict sensitivity or created a taskforce to streamline relevant initiatives, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-Operation (OECD DAC 2000). Beyond operationalizing conflict sensitivity within their own programs, many organizations share lessons learned, as exemplified by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme’s “Lessons Learned: Conflict and Gender Sensitive Programming in Fragile and Conflict Affected Contexts” (NSRP 2017), or develop broader guidance, as the International Institute for Sustainable Development and

Conservation International have done (Hammill et al. 2009; CI 2017).

## 2.3 Multilateral environmental agreements and conflict

Some MEAs have specific provisions on armed conflict. Under article 11(4) of the [1972 World Heritage Convention](#), natural heritage that is threatened by the outbreak or threat of an armed conflict can be included in the list of World Heritage in Danger, a list of property for which major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been requested. The preamble of the [Convention on Biological Diversity](#) provides that “ultimately, the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity will strengthen friendly relations among States and contribute to peace for humankind.” Some MEAs specifically provide that they do not apply during armed conflict,<sup>3</sup> or that their application may be suspended by state parties.<sup>4</sup>

**Regardless of whether an MEA has provisions explicitly addressing armed conflict, the parties often have to address the effects of armed conflict, fragility, and violence on achieving the objectives of the convention.** COPs have adopted a range of resolutions, plans, and other measures that recognize the risks and opportunities related to armed conflict. Examples include the Convention on Biological Diversity,<sup>5</sup> the Ramsar Convention

<sup>3</sup> For example, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (article 4[5][a]); and the 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL; article 3[3]).

<sup>4</sup> For example, the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL; article XIX[1]).

<sup>5</sup> [Decision 14/8](#), annex IV, para. 5(g); [Decision XI/2](#), para. 27; [Decision XI/3](#), Strategic Goal D, Target 14; [Decision X/35](#), para. 10(a); [Decision X/42](#), para. 24; [Decision VII/5](#),

on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat;<sup>6</sup> the World Heritage Convention;<sup>7</sup> and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).<sup>8</sup> In addition, COP reports include comments by countries/economies and others experiencing challenges in meeting MEA commitments because of conflict.<sup>9</sup>

**Some MEA secretariats have developed significant initiatives related to peace and conflict.** For example, the Secretariat of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) has launched three major initiatives.

- In 2007, UNCCD and the African Union launched the [Great Green Wall Initiative](#). By planting trees, restoring degraded land across the Sahel, sequestering carbon, and creating millions of green jobs, the initiative seeks to address resource-driven conflict and migration.
- In 2016, UNCCD helped launch, and serves as the secretariat for, the [Sustainability, Stability and Security Initiative \(3S Initiative\)](#) an inter-governmental effort to address the root causes of instability in Africa, focusing on migration and conflict-related degradation of

natural resources. The 3S Initiative seeks to create 2 million green jobs for vulnerable groups through investment in restoration and sustainable land management, strengthening access to land and tenure rights in fragile areas, and preventing displacement by improving preparedness and early warning systems for drought and other natural disasters (UNCCD 2018).

- In 2020, UNCCD and the Korea Forest Service launched the [Peace Forest Initiative](#) to support postconflict peacebuilding through cooperation and development of forest-related livelihoods (UNCCD 2020).

The Convention on Biological Diversity launched the [Peace and Biodiversity Dialogue Initiative](#) in 2015, which highlighted the value of peace parks in conserving biodiversity and fostering conditions that help alleviate conflict. It sought to strengthen transboundary management systems and the establishment of regional networks, one of the objectives of [COP Decision VII/28](#). More broadly, this initiative supported efforts to prevent and resolve tensions, including those over access to natural resources; and promoted the resolution of armed conflict and postconflict reconciliation. Among its many activities, the initiative prepared and delivered a massive open online course, [Peace Park Management and Development](#), in which more than 1,000 people enrolled.

**Key global environmental declarations have, like MEAs, long emphasized the importance of peace to environmental protection and sustainable development, and decried the destructive impacts of war.** Paragraph 6 of the preamble to 1972 [Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment](#) emphasizes the “three basic goals of mankind – protection of the human environment, peace and worldwide economic development,” and in Principle 26 calls for the “elimination and complete destruction of” nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Principle

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Priority 3.1; [Decision VII/27](#), Action 2.3.3; [Decision V/23](#), Activity 8 (c); [Decision VII/2](#), Activity 8(c); [Addis Ababa Principles](#); [Whakatane Mechanism](#).

<sup>6</sup> [Draft Resolution 18.19](#), para. 52; [Resolution XII/6](#), para. 10; [Resolution XI/12](#), ann. 1; [Resolution X/19](#), paras. 33 and 231; [Resolution X/3](#); [Resolution VIII/31](#), para. 5; [Resolution VIII/36](#), para. 12.

<sup>7</sup> For example, 42 COM 7 (Emergency Situations Resulting from Conflicts).

<sup>8</sup> For example, [Conf. 17.4](#); [Conf. 10.10](#).

<sup>9</sup> For example, Ramsar [COP 9](#), paras. 48 (Nepal) and 67 (Democratic Republic of Congo); Ramsar [COP 6](#), para. 71 (Angola); Basel [COP 14 Bureau](#), para 5; Basel [COP 8](#), VI, para. 44; [COP 7](#), VIII, para. 180; Minamata [COP 2](#), I.B, para. 16 and V.D., para. 75; Stockholm COP 8, V.C, para. 94 and D.

24 of the 1992 [Rio Declaration on Environment and Development](#) declares warfare to be “inherently destructive of sustainable development.” The 2002 [Johannesburg Declaration](#) pledges, under Principle 19, to place particular focus on fighting conditions that pose severe threats to sustainable development, including armed conflict, terrorism, and foreign occupation, among others. The 2012 Rio Declaration (“The Future We Want”) reaffirms “the importance of freedom, peace and security” and emphasizes the need to devote specific attention to countries/economies in situations of conflict (UNCSD 2012, articles 8 and 32).

## 2.4 The SDGs, conflict, and peace

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasizes the central role of peace to the achievement of the SDGs: “There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development” (UN 2015, pre-ambles). SDG 16 seeks to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.” This is considered a cross-cutting goal, underpinning and reinforcing all the other SDGs (UNDESA 2019).

To understand the nature and scope of the relationship between the SDGs and peace and conflict, the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) analyzed each target for the 17 SDGs—a total of 169 targets. For each, ELI considered whether (1) environmental peacebuilding activities advance the specific target, and (2) activities undertaken to achieve the target advance environmental peacebuilding. In the analysis, the team referred to the literature on and the practice of environmental peacebuilding. A conservative view of environmental peacebuilding was adopted, focusing on violent conflicts. It was recognized that education and health care are important factors in people’s ability to govern and manage natural resources and the environment in a way

that supports peace, but this research focuses on more direct links. If the link is direct, partial contributions were recognized. For instance, SDG 1 seeks to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere.” Environmental peacebuilding might not tackle all the forms of poverty, nor does it do so everywhere; but it does help to generate sustainable livelihoods and helps to end poverty in specific ways and specific places. The results are shown in [figure 2.2](#), with the detailed results in [annex J](#).

**Each SDG is affected by environmental peacebuilding, and every SDG affects the outcomes of environmental peacebuilding.** The strongest links (100 percent in both directions) are with SDG 6 (water and sanitation) and SDG 13 (climate change and its impacts). The weakest linkages are with SDG 3 (healthy lives and well-being), which still has a 22 percent relevance in both directions. Eight of the 17 SDGs have at least a 70 percent synergy with environmental peacebuilding.

**The vast majority of linkages between SDGs and environmental peacebuilding are mutually reinforcing.** However, in two instances, SDG targets could negatively affect peace and stability, depending on how they are implemented. For example, target 12.c is to “Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions...including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies...” (UN 2015). Though important to sustainable development, phasing out harmful subsidies—which has the effect of raising the price of gasoline—needs to be done with sensitivity, because doing so has prompted riots and instability in a range of countries/economies.<sup>10</sup> Target 17.11 is “Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling

<sup>10</sup> For example, Arab Republic of Egypt (MEE 2019), Iran (Fassihi 2019), Mexico (Godoy 2017), Nigeria (Parker 2012), and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (Helman 2014).

**Figure 2.2** Linkages between the Sustainable Development Goals and environmental peacebuilding



**Source:** ELI and GEF IEO.

**Note:** This figure shows the percentage of targets for a particular SDG that affect environmental peacebuilding (inner ring) and the percentage of targets for that goal that are affected by environmental peacebuilding activities (outer ring).

the least developed countries' share of global exports by 2020" (UN 2015). Though this is often important to peacebuilding, a political priority on rapid, large-scale extraction of natural resources can lead to land grabbing for commercial agriculture (Ndi 2017; Dell'Angelo, D'Odorico, and Rulli 2017; FAO 2016b), conflicts with local communities over forests (e.g., Altman, Nichols, and Woods

2011; Lamb, Moore, and Smith 2009), and conflicts with small-scale miners (e.g., Katz-Lavigne 2019). These potential tensions between specific measures to advance sustainable development and overall peace highlight the importance of including peace in the conceptualization of sustainable development.

## 2.5 GEF Agency policies, safeguards, and toolkits

The GEF executes its mandate through partnerships with designated GEF Agencies, which develop project proposals and implement projects in collaboration with governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders at the project site. These partnerships are central to the GEF theory of change (GEF 2009). While the GEF Agencies are accountable for fulfilling projects according to the GEF’s principles and theory of change, they follow their own policies and safeguards and use their own tools (GEF 2019b).

**At least seven GEF Agencies have sought to learn from their experiences in fragile and conflict-affected situations, undertaking evaluations of their own programming and producing flagship reports.**<sup>11</sup> One example is the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD’s) “Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations—Corporate-Level Evaluation” (IFAD 2015). Learning from programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations is discussed further in [chapter 4](#). As a result of these evaluations, many GEF Agencies have recognized that working in fragile and conflict-affected settings requires additional considerations and sensitivity.

**Half (nine) of the GEF Agencies have adopted policies, strategies, and toolkits guiding programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** [Box 2.1](#) lists some of the more prominent examples. The World Bank’s operational model includes a policy on development cooperation and conflict that lays out the importance of managing conflict-related risks to its mission, its work in relation to conflict, and the principles of operation in such contexts (World Bank 2014). Some GEF Agencies have developed operational plans,

<sup>11</sup> See [box 4.1](#) and “[Managing conflict risks by learning](#)” in chapter 4.

including the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB’s) “Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB’s Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations” (ADB 2013b). Others have released guides focusing on environmental issues, such as “Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management,” developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and other agencies through the UN Development Group (UNDG 2013). Some agencies have also released more specialized trainings, as exemplified by the FAO’s Programme Clinic on Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions (see FAO 2002).

**At least 11 GEF Agencies have started to incorporate considerations of conflict and fragility into their safeguards and associated procedures.**<sup>12</sup> This is in part because populations in fragile and conflict-affected situations are more vulnerable. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Environmental and Social Policy Framework cautions that:

In conflict and post-conflict areas, the risks and impacts described in this ESPS may be greater. The risk that a project could exacerbate an already sensitive local situation, leading to an increase in the risk of personal or communal conflict, or stress scarce local resources, should be considered carefully, as it may lead to further conflict and increased threats to human security (IDB 2020).

It also notes the particular risk of gender-based violence in situations of communal conflict (IDB 2020). The African Development Bank (AfDB) safeguards require conflict to be considered in

<sup>12</sup> These include ADB, the African Development Bank, ADB, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, IFAD, UNDP, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the West African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the World Wide Fund for Nature.

## Box 2.1 Conflict-sensitive strategies, policies, and toolkits of GEF Agencies

A growing number of GEF Agencies have adopted strategies, policies, toolkits, and other instruments informing the development of projects in situations affected by conflict and fragility. Following is an illustrative list.

### African Development Bank

- [Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States](#) (ADF 2008)

### Asian Development Bank

- [Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) (ADB 2013c)
- [Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) (ADB 2013b)
- [A Peacebuilding Tool for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development: A Pilot Initiative in Nepal](#) (ADB 2012)

### Conservation International

- [Environmental Peacebuilding Training Manual](#) (2017)

### Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

- [Guide to Context Analysis Informing FAO Decision-Making: Approached to Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts](#) (2019)
- [The Program Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions – Approaches to Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts](#) (2019)
- [Corporate Framework to Support Sustainable Peace in the Context of Agenda 2030](#) (2018)
- [Collaborative Conflict Management for Enhance Nation Forest Programmes \(NFPS\)](#) (2012)
- [Conflict Management Over Natural Resources](#) (2006)
- [Community-Based Forest Resource Conflict Management: A Training Package, Vol. I, Vol. II](#) (2002)

### International Fund for Agricultural Development

- [Disaster Early Recovery Guidelines](#) (IFAD 2011)
- [IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery](#) (IFAD 2006)

### International Union for Conservation of Nature

- [Environment, Conflict, and Security – TECS Conflict Sensitive Adaptation Series](#) (IUCN 2014)

### United Nations Development Programme

- [The Peace Promise](#) (UNDP 2016b)
- [Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings](#) (2013) (through UN Development Group)
- [Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management](#) (2012) (through UN Framework Team on Protective Action)
- [Conflict-related Development Analysis \(CDA\)](#) (UNDP 2016d)

### United Nations Environment Programme

- [Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings](#) (2013) (through UN Development Group)
- [Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management](#) (2012) (through UN Framework Team on Protective Action)
- [Integrating Environment in Post-Conflict Needs Assessment](#) (2009)

### World Bank

- [World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2050](#) (World Bank 2020e)
- [A Practical Handbook for Environmental Regulations and Legislators Working in Situations Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Extreme Violence \(FCV\)](#) (World Bank 2018)
- [Strategic Environmental Assessment: Capacity Building in Conflict-Affected Countries](#) (World Bank 2005) (with Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment)

the development of country strategy papers and regional integration strategy papers (AfDB 2015). IFAD requires consideration of the conflict context when preparing a social, environmental, and climate assessment procedures preparatory study for results-based country strategic opportunities programs (IFAD 2017).

**Several GEF-funded projects that raised safeguard issues were implemented in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** An earlier evaluation by the GEF IEO found that the World Bank Inspection Panel received five complaints that GEF projects had not complied with World Bank safeguards (GEF IEO 2018d). All five were in fragile situations (although the IEO did not comment on that fact).<sup>13</sup> Similarly, recent GEF projects that triggered complaints with UNDP’s Social and Environmental Compliance Unit were also in fragile states (GEF IEO 2018d).<sup>14</sup> These complaints were regarding safeguards that did not relate directly to conflict sensitivity; but it is noteworthy that all seven complaints on GEF projects violating GEF Agency safeguards were in fragile situations.

**GEF Agency safeguards recognize that projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations can aggravate tensions and generate conflict.** For example, UNDP’s Social and Environmental Screening Procedure provides that environmental and social impacts that “may give rise to significant social conflict” are categorized as critical (highest risk rating) during the screening process (UNDP 2016a). UNDP’s Social and Environmental Risk Screening Checklist asks, “Is there a risk that the Project

would exacerbate conflicts among and/or the risk of violence to project-affected communities and individuals?” IFAD (2017) highlights a range of linkages between conflict and disease, climate change, and the environment, and notes that projects can lead to conflicts—sometimes serious—for example, over resource rights.

**GEF Agency safeguards also recognize that it may be difficult for normal procedures and approaches to be undertaken in contexts of fragility and conflict.** For example, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) notes that “particular challenges” in times of conflict and crisis may, for example, mean that UNIDO’s commitment to transparency may be mitigated and “sensitive information relative to the political/economic contexts may need to remain confidential” (UNIDO 2017, 23). ADB similarly recognizes that usual processes and documents may not be “feasible” in “fragile and conflict-affected environments,” and provides for alternative means of meeting the relevant safeguards (ADB 2013c, para. 51; ADB 2009, 67).

**GEF Agency safeguards pay particular attention to incorporating consideration of fragility and conflict into risk analyses and screening.** For example, IDB (2020) and the World Bank (2017) include conflict as a factor in determining project risk classification, and AfDB (2015) includes conflict as a factor in determining social vulnerability. In risk analysis for due diligence, the World Bank requires consideration of “threats to human security through the escalation of personal, communal or interstate conflict, crime or violence” and “risks related to conflict or contestation over land and natural resources” (World Bank 2017, 4; also see 19–20). In categorizing risk, “considerations relating to stability, conflict or security” are considered (World Bank 2017, 6). Conflict is also a factor in the initial environmental and social screening under AfDB safeguards (AfDB 2015). UNDP’s Social and Environmental Screening Procedure

<sup>13</sup> Specifically, Brazil (warning situation as per the [Fragile States Index](#)), India (warning situation), Kenya (alert situation), Mexico (warning situation), and Peru (warning situation).

<sup>14</sup> Cameroon (alert situation), Republic of Congo (alert situation), India (warning situation), and Myanmar (alert situation). See, e.g., Accountability Counsel and Conservation Alliance Tanawthari (2019).

provides that changes in the project context, such as armed conflict, that affect the project's risk profile may necessitate amending completed screenings (UNDP 2016a). IDB requires consideration of "stability, conflict, or security" and "risks related to conflict or contestation over land and natural resources" during risk analysis (IDB 2020). Other safeguards—and the screening procedures designed to ensure compliance with the safeguards—flag conflict-affected situations as high risk. For example, the Development Bank of Latin America includes conflict as a factor that automatically indicates high environmental and social impact potential (CAF 2015), UNDP includes conflict in a list of critical (intensity level 5/5) social impacts (UNDP 2016a), and the World Wildlife Fund deems projects in fragile or conflict-affected situations to be "special consideration cases" (WWF 2019, 17). Some GEF Agencies specifically query how conflict affects indigenous communities.

**GEF Agency safeguards encourage the use of conflict analysis.** For example, the World Bank (2017), UNDP (2016a), and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA 2020) call for the use of social and conflict analysis, with IFAD (2017) calling for an "in-depth" conflict analysis.

**GEF Agency safeguards call for stakeholder consultation and engagement to manage risks related to conflict and fragility.** For example, IFAD calls for consultation to manage conflict-related risks (IFAD 2017). Consultation can affect conflict-related risks; it can also be affected by conflict (DBSA 2020).

**Some GEF Agencies provide that the safeguards applying to involuntary resettlement do not apply to people displaced by conflict.** The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development notes that Performance Requirement 5, which covers involuntary resettlement, does not apply to "the settlement of refugees, internally displaced persons, and victims of natural disasters, conflict,

crime or violence," and that "In cases where there has been displacement as a result of conflict prior to Project-induced displacement, the involuntary resettlement process will be guided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)" (EBRD 2019, 42). The World Bank has a similar provision in its safeguards (World Bank 2017). More broadly, AfDB considers local conflicts in relation to relocation (AfDB 2015).

**At the same time, GEF Agencies provide that their safeguards for indigenous peoples apply to those who have been forcibly displaced by conflict.** Examples include the World Bank (2017), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD 2019), IDB (2020), and the West African Development Bank (BOAD 2015).

**The GEF safeguards make only one mention of conflict, and it lacks detail.** The current GEF safeguards have numerous provisions regarding grievance and conflict resolution (GEF 2018c). These are important provisions, but they focus on conflicts around a project, rather than the conflict context in which a project is designed and implemented. The sole mention of conflict context is in Minimum Standard 9, on Community Health, Safety, and Security, which provides that

Agencies demonstrate that they have in place the necessary policies, procedures, systems and capabilities to ensure that: (a) Where the screening or assessment processes described under Minimum Standard 1 identify risks or potential impacts to the health, safety and security of project- or program-affected communities, further assessments are carried out, considering: ...(iii) The particular risks that may be present in a conflict or post-conflict context... (GEF 2018c, annex I.A, para. 17[a][iii])

This safeguard lacks a holistic recognition of the way that conflicts might be linked to the environment and natural resources. It provides no procedures for identifying, evaluating, or deciding



how to manage the risks in a conflict or postconflict context. It provides no standards regarding management of the conflict-related risks. It is silent on the risks associated with fragility, thus failing to provide any safeguards relevant to fragility in situations that are not conflict or postconflict. The safeguard seems to apply only during the design stage, whereas situations affected by conflict and fragility are dynamic and can change rapidly, and it is necessary for conflict sensitivity to apply throughout the project life cycle.

## 2.6 GEF objectives and theory of change

**The GEF seeks to assist countries/economies in implementing their commitments under specific MEAs and thereby advance global environmental benefits (GEF 2012).** The GEF was established in 1991 as a financial mechanism to support implementation of the various emerging agreements and conventions, especially in developing countries/economies. The GEF initially provided assistance in four focal areas: climate change, biodiversity, ozone depletion, and international waters. The basic mission then was “to provide concessionary and additional funding of the incremental costs for achieving global environmental benefits” in these four focal areas (GEF 2016). The scope of GEF programming has since expanded to include additional focal areas and impact programs.

According to the GEF-7 Programming Directions, the “GEF’s mission is to safeguard the global environment by supporting developing countries in meeting their commitments to multiple environmental conventions and by creating and enhancing partnerships at national, regional and global scales” (GEF 2018a, 2). The GEF’s formal mandate, however, remains to operate

as a financing mechanism under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD),

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Minamata Convention, and the Stockholm Convention, and [to support] countries with economies in transition in their implementation of the Montreal Protocol. (GEF 2018a, 2)

While the GEF does not serve as a financial mechanism for the SDGs, its activities advance the SDGs and are linked to them through their synergies with the conventions (GEF 2018a).


The GEF IEO developed a general framework for the GEF’s theory of change based on past evaluative evidence, which states:

GEF support is provided to activities that directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of environmental status and/or address drivers of environmental degradation. Based on past evaluative evidence, the framework classifies the contributions of GEF support into three main categories: knowledge and information, institutional capacity, and implementing strategies. These areas of GEF support interact, complement, and reinforce each other; and collectively contribute to impact, usually at a low scale (i.e., only at sites within the project’s direct influence), in the form of environmental stress reduction and improved environmental status. In many cases, the GEF contributes to putting in place conditions enabling progress toward impact. Impact may occur immediately as a result of project activities, but more often than not, the social or ecological system the project aims to influence may manifest change years or even decades after the project is completed, especially if large-scale impact is the aim. (GEF IEO 2014, 47–48)

The framework for the GEF theory of change ([figure 2.3](#)) assesses how GEF activities affect the causality chain leading to global environmental benefits, links GEF activities to other activities and actors, and identifies constraints on further GEF contributions to progress toward global environmental benefits (GEF IEO 2013).

Guidance from the GEF STAP suggests the establishment of focal area-specific theories of change based on a systems approach such as the

**Figure 2.3** General framework for the GEF theory of change



Source: GEF IEO.

Resilience, Adaptation Pathways, and Transformation Approach framework that emphasizes the “GEF’s goals of being transformative and durable” (GEF STAP 2019, 6).

**With respect to the theory of change, conflict and fragility are most often potential constraints.** Conflict and fragility can interact with projects both through (1) their impacts on a project’s implementation and (2) the effects that a project may have on the conflict or fragile context. While the GEF recognizes that many contextual factors are beyond its control, GEF programs are intentionally selected and “designed to support fundamental changes” and cause “a large-scale and sustainable impact, subject to the quality of implementation/execution and supportive contextual conditions,” according to the theory of change (GEF IEO 2018b). This evaluation highlights the numerous ways that conflict and fragility can affect GEF projects and their outcomes, as well as the ways that GEF projects can

affect the context in which they are operating—for better or worse.

**The STAP highlights that given the prevalence of fragility and conflict in the GEF portfolio countries/economies, conflict and fragility should be considered an essential contextual factor affecting the GEF’s ability to achieve fundamental change or large-scale and sustainable impact.** In 2018, the STAP published “Environmental Security: Dimensions and Priorities” following its 2014 recommendation that the GEF give more attention to the issue of environmental security. The report notes that “conflict, irrespective of its source, affects the viability or sustainability of investments in environmental protection” (GEF STAP 2018, 3), concluding that “addressing environmental security in an explicit, consistent and integrated manner is essential to delivering global environmental benefits, including the long-term sustainability of project investments” (GEF STAP 2018, 4). The STAP report also recommends that the GEF:

(1) Explicitly address environmental security in project and program design...; (2) Assess conflict risk routinely among investment risks beyond the scope of GEF intervention...; (3) Evaluate the relationships between environmental change and vulnerability within GEF interventions through the use of tools such as the Resilience, Adaptation Pathways and Transformation Assessment (RAPTA) framework...; [and] (4) Contribute to conflict prevention through environmental cooperation. (GEF STAP 2018, 4)

**To achieve the desired transformational change and advance global environmental benefits, the GEF works through GEF Agencies and national partners (GEF 2019b), which have increasingly recognized the importance of conflict and fragility to environmental programming.** As this evaluation emphasizes, environmental programming and fragility and conflict are linked in many important ways, and the GEF Agencies increasingly (but not uniformly) recognize these linkages and have adopted means for conflict-sensitive programming. However, the GEF does not yet have any policies, toolkits, or institutional mechanisms to help interventions be more conflict-sensitive and thus achieve their desired impacts.

## 2.7 GEF interventions and conflict

In accordance with its mandate to support countries/economies in implementing their commitments under specific conventions, the GEF supports projects in five focal areas. Focal area strategies are established for each GEF replenishment period and incorporate guidance from the conventions (GEF 2018a), recommendations from the GEF's overall performance studies, and the national priorities of recipient countries/economies (GEF 2015). In addition to the focal areas, impact programs contribute to the GEF's aim of supporting transformational change by addressing cross-cutting challenges and integrated solutions that do not correspond narrowly to one focal area


(GEF 2018a). In GEF-7, there are three impact programs: food systems, land use, and restoration; sustainable cities; and sustainable forest management (GEF 2018a). The focal areas and impact programs in which the GEF operates are exposed and sensitive to risks posed by conflict and fragility. Drawing on the focal area strategies as expressed in the GEF-7 Programming Strategy document and experiences from the field, this section illustrates how programming in each focal area may interact with conflict dynamics.

## BIODIVERSITY FOCAL AREA

In the biodiversity focal area, projects are designed to “mainstream biodiversity across sectors as well as landscapes and seascapes; address direct drivers to protect habitats and species; and further develop biodiversity policy and institutional frameworks” (GEF 2018a, 15). Biodiverse areas have high overlap with conflict. From 1950 to 2000, more than 80 percent of major armed conflicts (i.e., conflicts with at least 1,000 battle deaths) took place in biodiversity hotspots, and more than 90 percent of these conflicts took place in countries/economies with biodiversity hotspots ([figure 2.4](#)) (Hanson et al. 2009). These biodiversity hotspots cover 2.3 percent of the Earth's surface, but they host half of the endemic species (Mittermeier et al. 2004). Though conflict can harm biodiversity, peace agreements are often followed by opening of biodiverse territory to in-migration by people seeking livelihoods and food security, as has been witnessed in Colombia following the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (GEF IEO 2019; Armenteras, Schneider, and Dávalos 2018; Prem, Saavedra, and Vargas 2020).

**Of the 1,458 country/economy-level biodiversity projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 567 (38.9 percent) were in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, and 1,202 (82.4 percent) were in fragile situations (263 in**

**Figure 2.4** Conflict hotspots and Location of GEF projects and GEF-supported protected areas (1989-2020)



**Source:** GEF IEO, using conflict data (through October 2020) from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](#), project locations from GEF IEO data, and protected area boundaries from the World Database on Protected Areas. The map shows 1230 GEF supported protected areas and 202 land degradation and multi-focal area projects that could be precisely located.

**alert situations and 939 in warning situations).**

For example, several of the national child projects of the GEF-funded Global Wildlife Program (Phases 1 and 2) are in conflict-affected and fragile situations identified on the World Bank Harmonized List of Fragile Situations; some of these were delayed or otherwise affected by conflict (e.g., World Bank 2020c, 34 [Mali]).

**Efforts to conserve biodiversity can exacerbate tensions with communities, especially when those communities are excluded from protected areas and when enforcement agents are militarized.** This occurred, for example, during the [above-discussed project in Cameroon](#) (not financed by the GEF), where eco-guards outfitted with weapons by the project were found to be conducting violent nighttime raids in the surrounding communities. Tensions can also be exacerbated when biodiversity conservation activities take

place on land that contains minerals or other natural resources that people want to use. The results of such aggravations can be observed throughout the course of the GEF project in Cambodia's Cardamom Mountains. As noted [above](#), the project took place in an area formerly controlled by the Khmer Rouge in which there were existing conflicts over land appropriations, corruption, and illegal resource extraction. The terminal evaluation found that the project had not sufficiently addressed the limited institutional capacity, rivalries over illegal logging, or the incorporation of conservation into the development agenda (UNDP Cambodia 2007). The subsequent rivalry and lack of coordination between governmental authorities as well as gang activity caused regular conflict at the site, leading to several project delays, activity cancellations, and the deaths of two park rangers.

## CLIMATE CHANGE FOCAL AREA

GEF climate change interventions aim to “promote innovation and technology transfer for sustainable energy breakthroughs; demonstrate mitigation options with systemic impacts; and foster enabling conditions for mainstreaming mitigation concerns into sustainable development strategies” (GEF 2018a, 36).

**Of the 1,836 country/economy-level climate change projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 810 (44.1 percent) were in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, and 1,574 (85.7 percent) were in fragile situations (379 alert situations, 1,195 warning situations).** Many conflict-affected countries/economies are particularly vulnerable to climate change: of the 10 countries/economies with the most peacekeeping personnel, 8 are classified as most exposed to climate change (Krampe 2019). As this report details, GEF interventions are often affected by the fragile and conflict context, and a substantial number of GEF climate change interventions are in these settings—particularly in least developed countries/economies.

**Climate change interventions can also affect a fragile situation and exacerbate conflict.** Both adaptation and mitigation measures can result in “winners” and “losers” (Dabelko et al. 2013). These may inadvertently lead to disputes over access to benefits (such as revenues) and burdens (such as forests that can no longer be harvested); such measures may also lead to land grabbing (Dabelko et al. 2013). There is evidence too that climate change may directly amplify the effects of conflict.

## INTERNATIONAL WATERS FOCAL AREA

GEF interventions in the international waters focal area have a unique mandate to “support trans-boundary cooperation in shared marine and

freshwater ecosystems” (GEF 2018a, 55), recognizing the centrality of multinational collaboration to achieving its objectives of “strengthening Blue Economy opportunities...; improving management in the Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ); and enhancing water security” (GEF 2018a, 55). Even as international waters interventions seek to advance global environmental benefits, this emphasis on cooperation around mutual interests is unique among the GEF focal areas. **Of the 84 country/economy-level international waters projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 29 (34.5 percent) were in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, and 70 (83.3 percent) were in fragile situations (9 alert situations, 61 warning situations).** The numbers of country/economy-level projects are relatively low, because most international waters projects are regional or global.

**GEF programming in both freshwater and marine areas often brings together states that have fought with one another, and there are frequently residual tensions.** Many international basins where the GEF supports projects—including those of the Jordan, Nile, and Sava Rivers—encompass countries/economies affected by conflict or in tension with one another. The GEF also frequently supports efforts in large marine ecosystems that are affected by tensions and conflict, such as in the South China Sea, where evaluations have identified conflict as a challenge to effective project implementation (GEF IEO 2012).

The GEF-7 Programming Directions recognize that water scarcity is linked to “risk multipliers leading to destabilization, violence and migration as well as possible ground for radicalization spurring further conflict on national and regional levels,” and recognize the need to prioritize investment in cooperation initiatives that seek to diminish water-related conflict (GEF 2018a, 54). The GEF-7 strategy directly orients itself to supporting environmental security by enabling investments in

fragile and conflict-affected countries/economies in transboundary basins so as to “support actions by which decreasing natural resource pressures and water stress can contribute to decreasing fragility...hence contributing to preventing larger regional conflict” (GEF 2018a, 65).

## LAND DEGRADATION FOCAL AREA

The land degradation focal area strategy for GEF-7 has three main goals of

aligning GEF support to promote UNCCD’s land degradation neutrality (LDN) concept through an appropriate mix of investments; seeking effective integration within the Impact Programs for generation of multiple benefits; and harnessing private capital and expertise to finance investments in sustainable land management, in particular in co-operation with the LDN fund and other innovative financing mechanisms. (GEF 2018a, 47)

The strategy acknowledges the “increasing evidence of the complex interactions between climate change, food and water insecurity, extreme events—such as e.g. prolonged and repeated droughts—, and their link to fragility, armed conflict and migration” (GEF 2018a, 51) and seeks to “positively [reinforce] the linkages between human well-being and the health of ecosystems” (GEF 2018a, 51). The strategy also directs investments toward

(i) decreasing fragility and risks through enhancing governance of natural resources, including e.g. tenure and access rights (including potential uneven rights across gender and ethnic groups) and/or decreasing resource pressures and enhancing natural resource based employment and livelihoods; (ii) restoring governance and degraded lands and water sources in post-natural disaster and/or conflict prone or conflict affected areas (with special attention to unemployed youth, women and other vulnerable or marginalized groups); and (iii) global early warning to identifying early signs where a combination of environmental risks are contributing to fragility and conflict vulnerability and sharing

this knowledge to promote preventive or remedial actions as appropriate armed conflict and migration. (GEF 2018a, 52)

As with other focal areas, land degradation and efforts to address land degradation can be affected by conflict and fragility, and they can affect conflict and fragility (e.g., Solomon et al. 2018; Barbut and Alexander 2016; van Schaik and Dinnessen 2014). **Of the 315 country/economy-level land degradation projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 115 (36.5 percent) were in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, and 260 (82.5 percent) were in fragile situations (69 alert situations, 191 warning situations).**

**GEF interventions that advance alternative land use schemes have faced challenges in areas where land use is disputed, affecting both project effectiveness and sustainability (GEF IEO 2018c).**

Conflict between the Tuareg ethnic group and the government of Niger erupted while a GEF-funded project on Sustainable Co-Management of the Natural Resources of the Aïr-Ténéré Complex (GEF ID 2380) was ongoing, according to the terminal evaluation. Although land commissions had been put in place to improve governance and management of localized land-based tensions, there were no measures to manage larger-scale armed conflict. As a result, project costs increased substantially, causing the project activities to be scaled back, weakening coordination between project stakeholders, and reducing profits for local cooperatives as a result of free food distribution. Ultimately, questions were raised about the sustainability of project outcomes in an area affected by weak institutions and conflict (Morrow 2018).

## CHEMICALS AND WASTE FOCAL AREA

The GEF-7 strategy for the chemicals and waste focal area is organized around four programs: the Industrial Chemicals Program, the Agriculture

Chemicals Program, the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States Program, and the Enabling Actions Program. GEF-7 is the first replenishment since the Minamata Convention entered into force; as such, various programs emphasize its implementation. For example, several countries/economies participating in the GEF-supported flagship planetGOLD program on artisanal and small-scale gold mining have identified conflict as an issue. **Of the 157 country/economy-level chemicals and waste projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 63 (40.1 percent) were in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, and 144 (91.7 percent) were in fragile situations (29 alert situations, 115 warning situations).**

**Chemicals and waste interventions can interact with fragile and conflict-affected situations by being affected by the situation, by affecting the situation, and by addressing impacts of the situation.** As with other focal areas, GEF-supported chemicals and waste projects can be affected by fragility and conflict in many ways (discussed in [chapter 4](#)). When pollution from chemicals, waste, oil, mining, and other toxic substances is substantial, widespread, or severe—especially where the impacts are inequitably felt—it can catalyze social or violent conflict.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, pollution and governance breakdowns associated with armed conflict have provided motivation for a number of GEF projects.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> For example, as in Côte d'Ivoire (New Humanitarian 2006); the Niger Delta (Babatunde 2020); and Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (Regan 1998).

<sup>16</sup> For example, Preparation of the POPs National Implementation Plan under the Stockholm Convention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (GEF ID 3160), PCB Management Project in Lebanon (GEF ID 4108), and Implementation of Phase I of a Comprehensive PCB Management System in Jordan (GEF ID 4124).

## INTEGRATED APPROACH PILOTS AND IMPACT PROGRAMS

**Several GEF integrated approach pilots recognize conflict and fragility as an issue.** For instance, the Food Integrated Approach Pilot: Fostering Sustainability and Resilience for Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa—An Integrated Approach (GEF ID 9070), focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, has several child projects in countries/economies with insecure and conflict situations, such as northern Ethiopia. The Taking Deforestation out of Commodity Supply Chains Integrated Approach Pilot (GEF ID 9072), where postconflict Liberia has a child project, recognizes different dimensions of conflict.

**The GEF impact programs as well as their geographic emphases on the Amazon, drylands, tropics, and Congo Basin all have linkages to conflict and fragility.** There are three impact programs in GEF-7: the Food Systems, Land Use, and Restoration Impact Program; the Sustainable Cities Impact Program; and the Sustainable Forest Management Impact Program. Considering the substantial percentage of the GEF portfolio—as measured both by the number of projects and overall expenditure—that are in fragile and conflict-affected situations, it is likely that many impact program interventions will be in these types of situations. As such, they will interact with conflict drivers through the same mechanisms as do the focal areas.

The **Food Systems, Land Use, and Restoration Impact Program** aims to address the “underlying drivers of unsustainable food systems and land use change through supporting countries to take a more holistic and system-wide approach that is in line with their specific needs for generating Global Environmental Benefits” (GEF 2018a, 80). Many fragile and conflict-affected countries/economies struggle with unsustainable food systems and land use change.

The **Sustainable Cities Impact Program** seeks to promote integrated urban planning to address the manifold sustainability challenges confronted by and created in urban areas. The GEF-7 strategy for this program acknowledges that conflict and climate-induced displacement has accelerated urbanization, exacerbating the interlocked social and environmental issues that erupt in cities (GEF 2018a). Cities present a variety of sustainability challenges; they also provide an opportunity for programs to adopt an integrated approach capable of addressing both social and environmental factors.

The **Sustainable Forest Management Impact Program**, particularly with the GEF's geographic focuses in the Amazon, drylands, and the Congo Basin, illustrates the high overlap of biodiverse areas and conflict hotspots. The variety of roles forests can take on in armed conflict—including as a source of financing (e.g., Price, Donovan, and De Jong 2007), as cover for guerrilla groups (e.g., FAO 2005; Price 2003), as refuges and sources of

fuel and food for displaced persons (e.g., FAO and UNHCR 2018, and as targets of war (e.g., Westing 1971; McNeely 2003; Jongerden, van Etten, and de Vos 2006; Metreveli and Timothy 2010)—can complicate the design and implementation of forest-related interventions in conflict-affected situations. One example of this is the way in which rebel M23 forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo took control of gorilla tourism in the Virunga Mountains to finance their operations (Jones 2012). The GEF-7 strategy for this impact program acknowledges conflict in its discussion of the Congo Basin Sustainable Landscapes Program, noting that “violence, fragility, insecurity, and various related traffics severely [weaken] the rule of law, and [have] devastating effects on capacities to manage forests, protected areas, and protect wildlife” (GEF 2018a, 122). It also proposes establishing “landscape level mechanisms...for conflict resolution between different land users and across national boundaries” (GEF 2018a, 123).



# Portfolio analysis

This chapter examines the prevalence of fragile and conflict-affected situations in the GEF portfolio and summarizes the results of quantitative analyses of the effect of fragility and major armed conflict on the performance of GEF projects.

## 3.1 Methodology

The research team examined the data set of projects provided by the GEF IEO via the Project Management Information System (PMIS), which includes both projects that do and do not appear in the GEF's public online database,<sup>1</sup> so as to gain a broad understanding of the GEF-supported interventions in countries/economies of varying states of fragility. The project used the [Fragile States Index](#) produced by the Fund for Peace, which has used a consistent [methodology](#) since 2004. The Fragile States Index includes the vast majority of countries/economies receiving GEF funding. (By contrast, the World Bank's [List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) has a more limited

<sup>1</sup> Though the GEF's public online database has a substantial amount of information and documents, the evaluation team found that some documentation was missing and sometimes dates and other information on the public online database were out of date or missing.

geographic scope and its analytic methodology has changed repeatedly.)

As noted below, the Fragile States Index has four broad categories of fragility: alert (very fragile), warning (of concern), stable (mostly stable), and sustainable (very stable). The research team analyzed 149 of the 164 countries/economies receiving GEF funding ([annex E](#)).<sup>2</sup> The team then examined whether there was a statistically significant relationship between its fragility classification (significant, stable, warning, and alert) and its performance (including whether a GEF project was canceled or dropped<sup>3</sup> and the binary scores received for evaluation criteria in the terminal evaluation reports).

### **For the analysis of the effect of fragility on GEF projects, a preliminary review of the fragility**

<sup>2</sup> Fifteen countries/economies receiving GEF funding were not categorized in the Fragile States Index: Cook Islands, Dominica, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

<sup>3</sup> In all, 1,003 projects were dropped and 115 were canceled; in addition, 1 project was classified as rejected, and 1 was deferred.

**classification over the period 2006–19 was performed, and the country/economy was assigned the most commonly occurring classification.**

Through June 2019, there were 4,136 country/economy-level projects in the database in 149 countries/economies classified as significant, stable, warning, and alert. No country/economy had a “significant” classification that predominated over the time period of interest, so only the three remaining classifications were used: 12 percent (500 projects) were in stable situations, indicating that the countries/economies were mostly stable; 67 percent (2,787 projects) were in warning situations, indicating countries/economies of concern; and 21 percent (849 projects) were in alert situations, indicating that the countries/economies were very fragile. There were 1,176 GEF projects in these countries/economies with terminal evaluation reviews, including 164 (14 percent) in alert countries/economies, 843 in warning countries/economies (72 percent), and 169 in stable countries/economies (14 percent).

**To assess whether a GEF project was more likely to be canceled or dropped based on its fragility classification, a cross-tabulation and a Pearson’s chi-square test of independence were performed.**

To assess the GEF project outcomes’ distribution across the countries/economies classified as stable, warning, and alert, a Pearson’s chi-square test of independence, a two-sample test of proportions, and ordinary least squares models with robust standard errors were performed. This was done for countries/economies classified as stable vis-à-vis warning, stable vis-à-vis alert, and warning vis-à-vis alert.

**The team also examined the data set of projects provided by the PMIS to gain a broad understanding of the GEF-supported interventions in countries/economies affected or not**

**affected by major armed conflict since 1989.**<sup>4</sup>

Countries/economies affected by major armed conflict are defined as those experiencing at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.

**Projects in the database were classified as conflict, nonconflict, mixed, and not specified.**

Projects for which the target country/economy was affected by major armed conflict (or, if the project took place in multiple countries/economies, all countries/economies were affected by major armed conflict) were tagged as conflict. Those projects for which the target country/economy was not affected by major armed conflict (or, if multiple countries/economies, none are affected by major armed conflict) were tagged as nonconflict. Those regional projects that included both countries/economies affected by major armed conflict and other countries/economies were tagged as mixed.

Where country/economy information for regional projects was not available in the database, the research team consulted project documents to discern which countries/economies were involved in the given project to classify their conflict status. The information was frequently unavailable for global projects, but it was beyond the present scope to consult and classify these projects.

Projects whose country/economy information was not discernible from project documents were marked as not specified. This was often the case in projects that had been canceled or discontinued early in the approval or implementation process and that therefore did not have published documentation in the GEF’s online database. The not specified projects are not included in the statistical analysis for this project.

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<sup>4</sup>The year 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and saw a dramatic change in the dynamics between environment, conflict, and peace, and how those dynamics were addressed [Bruch et al. 2019]. It is also shortly before the establishment of the GEF in 1991.

To assess whether GEF project outcomes differed between countries/economies classified as conflict (i.e., affected by major armed conflict since 1989) and nonconflict (i.e., not affected by major armed conflict since 1989), a two-sample test of proportions was performed on terminal evaluation review binary scores and dropped or canceled projects data, and a two-sample t-test and a Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test were performed on project delays data.


## 3.2 Prevalence of fragile and conflict-affected situations in the GEF portfolio

**The vast majority of GEF projects are located in fragile countries/economies.** The Fragile States Index provides a comprehensive listing of fragile countries/economies around the world and has used a consistent methodology since 2004 with values ranging from alert (very fragile), to warning (of concern), to stable (mostly stable), to sustainable (very stable). From 2006 to 2019, the 164 countries/economies and territories receiving GEF funding have had a total of 2,086 listings on the Fragile States Index (i.e., 14 × 149), with 15 countries/economies not listed. Of these 2,086 listings, 21 percent have been at alert status, 60 percent at warning status, 18 percent at stable status, and less than 1 percent at sustainable status ([annex F](#) and [figure 3.1](#)). Of the 164 countries/economies and territories, 134 were categorized as either very fragile or of concern at some point, and 15 were stable or sustainable the entire period;<sup>5</sup> 15 were not listed during this time period as noted in [footnote 2](#).

**It seems that there are about the same amount of countries/economies at alert status across this**

<sup>5</sup> These were Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Oman, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, and Uruguay.

**Figure 3.1** Fragility of countries/economies receiving GEF funding, 2006–20



**Source:** ELI and GEF IEO, drawing on data from the Fund for Peace's [Fragile States Index](#).

**Note:** Not all countries/economies receiving GEF funding are included in the Fragile States Index.

**time period: 32 in 2006 and 31 in 2019.** There are, however, more stable situation countries/economies in 2019: 30 compared with 19 in 2006. There also appear to be more warning situation countries/economies: 73 in 2006 and 89 in 2019.

**It is more difficult to distill trends from the World Bank's List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations because of its more limited geographic scope and repeated changes in methodology.** Nevertheless, a few general observations may be noted. First, fragility tends to be multiyear: if a country/economy appears on the list, it tends to appear at least once again.<sup>6</sup> Fifteen countries/economies have been on the list every year from 2006 to 2019.<sup>7</sup> Most of the fragile countries/economies listed are located in Africa and Asia. There is

<sup>6</sup> Of the 63 countries/economies that appear on the list across all years, only 8 (Dominican Republic, Malawi, Mauritania, Nauru, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago) appear only once.

<sup>7</sup> These are Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, and Togo.

also a subset of nations in the South Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea, that consistently appear on the list. Additionally, the list includes countries/economies in a special category that are considered politically fragile by their country policy institutional assessment score but do not have a sufficiently low gross national income to qualify fully for International Development Association (IDA) aid.

**Since its inception, a substantial portion of the GEF's global portfolio has been invested in situations affected by major armed conflict.** As of July 2020, the GEF had invested over \$4.0 billion, accounting for 29 percent of its global portfolio, in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, with an additional \$2.2 billion, or 16 percent of the portfolio, invested in mixed contexts.<sup>8</sup> In all, 45 percent of GEF investments have been in projects implemented in at least one conflict-affected country/economy ([figure 3.2](#)). Available data for GEF-7 projects that have already received Chief Executive Officer (CEO) endorsement ( $n = 25$ ) indicate that 22 percent of the GEF-7 portfolio is invested in conflict-affected countries/economies and 14 percent in mixed contexts, accounting for 36 percent of the funding allocated in the current replenishment. An additional 11 percent of the GEF-7 portfolio has been invested in situations not affected by major armed conflict and 25 percent in unspecified contexts. In addition, there are several proposed projects for GEF-7 that have not yet received CEO endorsement, including many in countries/economies affected by major armed conflicts.

<sup>8</sup>This is according to the amount committed at the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) endorsement stage and does not account for additional costs that may have accrued during project implementation, nor costs avoided because of project cancellations or changes after this stage.

Of all GEF-funded projects, 33 percent ( $n = 2,153$ ) have been implemented in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, 11 percent ( $n = 710$ ) in mixed contexts, 49 percent ( $n = 3,188$ ) in countries/economies not affected by major armed conflict, and 7 percent ( $n = 426$ ) are not specified based on available country/economy information.<sup>9</sup> This is captured in [figure 3.2](#). Although many projects remain in the project proposal phase for GEF-7, the PMIS indicates that 35 percent ( $n = 54$ ) would take place in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict, 14 percent ( $n = 22$ ) in mixed contexts, 5 percent ( $n = 8$ ) in unspecified contexts, and the remaining 46 percent ( $n = 71$ ) in countries/economies not affected by major armed conflict. Based on this information, at least 49 percent ( $n = 76$ ) of the projects in the GEF-7 portfolio have been proposed for implementation in at least one country/economy affected by major armed conflict. This would constitute a slight increase in GEF-7 compared to the total proportion for the entire GEF portfolio.


These findings are consistent with those of the STAP, which found that

half of GEF recipients (77 countries) experienced armed conflict since the GEF's inception in 1991, and over one-third of GEF recipients (61 countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while armed conflict was ongoing somewhere in the country. Nearly one-third of all GEF funding has been invested in projects during years when recipient countries experienced conflict. (GEF STAP 2018, 4)

Similarly, an unpublished report for the GEF on conflict sensitivity found that more than one-third of "GEF members (64 countries) proposed and

<sup>9</sup>These numbers are for projects through GEF-6 found in the PMIS database (downloaded May 2019).

**Figure 3.2** GEF Investments in situations affected by major armed conflict (Pilot–GEF 6)



Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS.

Note: “Conflict” refers to major armed conflict (conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths).

implemented GEF projects while major armed conflict was ongoing.”<sup>10</sup>

**The GEF’s ability and willingness to fund projects in conflict-affected situations can be catalytic in generating additional funding.** Interviews with key informants highlighted the fact that the GEF was often one of the few organizations willing to support projects in areas affected by conflict. In a number of instances, the GEF has provided the initial funding necessary to pilot projects and lay the ground for additional, larger investments by other institutions that expand and extend the impacts of the GEF funding (for an example, see [box 3.1](#)).

**This catalytic role is particularly important as the GEF aims to be catalytic in scaling up action to deliver global environmental benefits.** While this role can be difficult to measure, in the context of the GEF’s role as a funding agency, it means that “given the limited amount of money available for projects, the GEF hopes to design projects in such a way so

as to attract additional resources, pursue strategies that have a greater result than the project itself, and/or accelerate a process of development or change” (NCSTE 2009, 1). The GEF’s catalytic role has been increasingly emphasized as environmental challenges grow more dire, and as the GEF focuses on “radical transformation” (GEF 2020a). The GEF-7 Programming Directions notes that

The GEF needs to seize opportunities to make a bigger difference. Going forward, the GEF must strategically focus its investments in areas where it can help catalyze the necessary change in key systems and leverage multi-stakeholder coalitions in alignment with countries’ demand and commitment under the various multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) for which the GEF serves as financial mechanism. (GEF 2018a, 2)

**A greater portion of the GEF portfolio is now implemented in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict than in earlier GEF replenishment periods.** As shown in [figure 3.3](#), the percentage of the GEF portfolio in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict remained relatively stable between the pilot phase and GEF-3, but starting in GEF-4, jumped about 10 percentage points to encompass 44 percent

<sup>10</sup>Morrow (2018), 7. These statistics include projects supported by the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.

### Box 3.1 GEF catalytic funding in conflict-affected situations: Sapo National Park in Liberia

GEF-supported programming in postconflict Liberia illustrates the catalytic potential of GEF programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility. After the end of the second Liberian civil war in 2003, the World Bank was not programming in Liberia because of the insecurity related to the immediate aftermath of conflict (IEG 2012).

Approved in 2004, the Establishing the Basis for Biodiversity Conservation on Sapo National Park and in South-East Liberia project (GEF ID 1475) marked one of the earliest GEF-funded projects in postwar Liberia. The World Bank implemented the project, and Flora and Fauna International executed it in collaboration with the Forestry Development Authority of Liberia between 2005 and 2010. This marked the start of the World Bank's re-engagement in Liberia.

Sapo National Park is the country's only national park and a biodiversity hotspot within the Upper Guinea Forest—and is the largest national park in the area. The project document noted that under the baseline scenario of business-as-usual management based on the contemporary situation in Sapo National Park, "conservation and forest & wildlife management would remain low national priorities" and that international NGOs currently operating in the area would reduce their aid. The project applicants noted that the GEF funding would catalyze funding that would not otherwise be made available.


The project was deemed successful, and the project implementation completion report noted that "implementation occurred within a period of profound governance, environmental, institutional and societal changes in Liberia following a decade and half of civil instability."

Since then, the GEF has supported various projects in Liberia in different focal areas. Two of these—Consolidation of Liberia's Protected Area Network (GEF ID 3284) and Biodiversity Conservation through Expanding the Protected Area Network in Liberia (GEF ID 3837)—were also implemented by the World Bank. Executed by the Forest Development Authority of Liberia, both projects built on GEF investments in Sapo and focused on biodiversity conservation, protected area management, community participation, and reducing rural dependence on forests and wildlife.

Drawing on lessons from its earlier GEF projects in Liberia, the World Bank continued its engagement with forests and protected area interventions in Liberia, expanding the protected area system and strengthening capacity to maintain it. Ultimately, the government of Liberia received grant funding of \$37.5 million through the World Bank from the government of Norway for the 2016–23 Liberia Forest Sector Project, which expanded substantially on the initial GEF work (World Bank 2016). This project supports priority investments to strengthen on-the-ground management of Sapo National Park, including physical demarcation, provision of vehicles and equipment, and updating of the park's management plans (World Bank 2016).

Remote sensing analysis results (figure B3.1.1) indicate minimal forest loss, with close to zero deforestation within the park boundary (flat green line); this could be explained by the prohibitions enacted on all economic activities, including mining, within Liberia's national parks, as per Liberian legislation.

**Figure B3.1.1** Deforestation trends in Sapo National Park



The results indicate how efforts to protect Sapo National Park's resources during the initial project have been sustained beyond the project duration and supported through subsequent interventions.

This trend inside Sapo National Park contrasts with the dramatic increase in forest loss outside the park (figure B3.1.2), mainly driven by illegal activities such as


(continued)

**Box 3.1 GEF catalytic funding in conflict-affected situations: Sapo National Park in Liberia** *(continued)*

mining and logging, in postwar Liberia [see, e.g., IMF 2008; Small 2012]. There are also legal mining concessions in the buffer zone. The two dips in the forest loss outside the park (around 2005 and 2010) coincide with the eviction of illegal gold miners and settlers in Sapo National Park, as noted in the project implementation completion report; the Liberian government used the term “voluntary departure”

to describe the 2010–11 removals. The lack of financial, technical, human resources, and capacity and conducive legal environment in Liberia to effectively monitor artisanal and small-scale mining sites and other illegal activities also explain forest loss in the Sapo National Park’s buffer zone (World Bank 2020d).


**Figure B3.1.2** Satellite images of Sapo National Park and adjacent buffers (2001, 2019)



**Source:** GEF IEO based on UMD GLAD data set.

**Note:** Deforested areas are visible in red color around the national park, and adjacent 15 km and 30 km buffers.

**Figure 3.3** Projects by conflict status for each GEF replenishment period



**Source:** ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS and the World Bank’s [List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#).

of the portfolio.<sup>11</sup> This finding aligns with those by Morrow (Morrow and Hudson 2017; Morrow 2018, 2020, n.d.), who noted greater numbers of projects in conflict-affected countries/economies as well as larger financing envelopes.

In most instances, the allocation of projects across GEF focal areas is comparable in situations affected by major armed conflict, mixed situations, and those not affected by major armed conflict ([table 3.1](#)). Aside from international waters (discussed in the following paragraph), there has also been a slightly higher percentage of **climate change** projects in situations affected by major armed conflict: 38 percent, compared to 34 percent in nonconflict situations.

**International waters** projects have frequently been in mixed contexts: 24 percent, compared to 2.1-3 percent for conflict and nonconflict countries/economies and the GEF portfolio average of 5.8 percent. This is logical, given that international waters focal area projects by their nature engage multiple countries/economies that border a body of water, and the mixed category exclusively contains multi-country/economy projects. However, it should also be noted that international waters is the only GEF focal area that has an explicit orientation toward improving cooperation and communication between different actors, and therefore is positioned to consider and address conflict-related issues in its projects.

**By modality**, the proportions of enabling activity projects, full-size projects, and medium-size projects were relatively similar for countries/economies affected by major armed conflict and for those that were not. As shown in [table 3.2](#), mixed situation projects occur in a substantially larger percentage of full-size projects and in a smaller percentage of enabling activities. This is to be

<sup>11</sup> These percentages include both conflict and mixed projects.

expected because projects in mixed situations are regional projects that include both countries/economies affected and not affected by major armed conflict.

### 3.3 Statistical analysis of project results vis-à-vis fragility

The team conducted several statistical tests analyzing the binary evaluation ratings in project terminal evaluation reviews to explore the extent to which project ratings depended on the fragility classification (alert, warning, or stable). It should be noted that not all projects have terminal evaluation reviews. To minimize the interference of confounding factors that can occur when comparing country/economy-level projects with regional and global projects—as well as the fact that many regional and global projects did not list the countries/economies in which they operated—tests were conducted for country/economy-level projects only.

**An increasing fragility classification is associated with a negative and statistically significant impact on project outcomes, sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, implementation quality, and execution quality.** A Pearson's chi-square test of independence showed a negative and statistically significant impact on the terminal evaluation review scores for outcome, sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, implementation quality, and execution quality ([table 3.3](#)). These represent every terminal evaluation review criterion, except the terminal evaluation overall quality. Ordinary least squares models with robust standard errors replicated this finding ([table 3.4](#)).

**The most significant impacts were for projects in countries/economies classified as alert.** The two-sample test of proportionality shows statistically significant impacts for stable countries/



**Table 3.1** Conflict status of GEF projects across focal areas, 1991–2019

Focal area	Nonconflict	Mixed	Conflict	Not specified	Total	Total (n)
	Percentage					
Biodiversity	29	23	27	21	27	1,762
Climate change	34	17	38	24	33	2,118
International waters	3	24	2	18	6	378
Land degradation	6	8	6	7	6	405
Ozone-depleting substances	1	1	<1	1	1	37
Persistent organic pollutants	8	9	7	7	7	495
Chemicals and waste	3	3	3	1	3	196
Multifocal	16	17	17	21	17	1,086
Total	100	100	100	100	100	6,477

**Source:** ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS data.

**Note:** Conflict refers to major armed conflict. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number. Numbers include dropped and canceled projects.

**Table 3.2** Conflict status of GEF projects by project modality, 1991–2019 (%)

	Nonconflict	Mixed	Conflict	Not specified
Enabling activity	26	5	24	2
Full-size project	49	70	54	54
Medium-size project	25	25	21	44
Total	100	100	100	100

**Source:** ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS data.

economies vis-à-vis alert—which is not particularly surprising (table 3.3). For stable vis-à-vis warning, there were two statistically significant relationships: sustainability and M&E implementation. In contrast, for warning vis-à-vis alert, all criteria except the terminal evaluation overall quality exhibited a statistically significant relationship. This indicates that as a country/economy moves from stable to warning, there are some impacts (particularly for sustainability and M&E implementation); the transition from warning to alert raises many more challenges, with the challenges for sustainability and M&E implementation seen in warning situations becoming more widespread.

**A country/economy’s fragility classification is associated with a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of projects being canceled or**

**dropped.** Out of 4,136 country/economy-level GEF projects,<sup>12</sup> 1,122 projects were canceled or dropped, with an additional 1 deferred and 1 rejected. Of these 1,124 projects that experienced difficulty, 10.6 percent were in stable countries/economies, 69.6 percent were in warning countries/economies, and 19.8 percent were in alert countries/economies. When comparing projects in stable and warning countries/economies, both the independent 2-test sample of proportions and the ordinary least squares model with robust standard errors showed that increasing fragility had a statistically significant impact on whether a project would be canceled or dropped (e.g., table 3.5).

<sup>12</sup> Through June 2019, there were 4,136 country/economy-level GEF projects in the 149 countries/economies listed on the Fragile States Index.

**Table 3.3** Impacts of fragility on terminal evaluation review binary scores for country/economy–level GEF projects, 1991–2019

Variable	Stable avg.	Warning avg.	Alert avg.	Number	Std error	p– value
<b>Pearson chi sq</b>						
Outcome	0.84	0.80	0.70	1,162	0.030	0.01*
Sustainability	0.73	0.62	0.46	1,115	0.029	0.00*
M&E design	0.65	0.68	0.53	1,114	0.031	0.00*
M&E implementation	0.75	0.66	0.54	1,037	0.031	0.00*
Implementation quality	0.85	0.81	0.72	1,011	0.032	0.02*
Execution quality	0.87	0.81	0.73	1,021	0.032	0.01*
Overall quality	0.83	0.85	0.81	1,042	0.030	0.12
<b>Two-sample test of proportionality</b>						
Outcome	0.84	n.a.	0.70	331	0.044	0.00*
Sustainability	0.73	n.a.	0.46	315	0.055	0.00*
M&E design	0.65	n.a.	0.53	316	0.054	0.04*
M&E implementation	0.75	n.a.	0.54	297	0.055	0.00*
Implementation quality	0.85	n.a.	0.72	283	0.047	0.01*
Execution quality	0.87	n.a.	0.73	288	0.046	0.00*
Overall quality	0.83	n.a.	0.81	331	0.041	0.71
Outcome	n.a.	0.80	0.70	994	0.039	0.01*
Sustainability	n.a.	0.62	0.46	957	0.043	0.00*
M&E design	n.a.	0.68	0.53	952	0.044	0.00*
M&E implementation	n.a.	0.66	0.54	888	0.045	0.01*
Implementation quality	n.a.	0.81	0.72	871	0.040	0.04*
Execution quality	n.a.	0.81	0.73	876	0.040	0.03*
Overall quality	n.a.	0.85	0.79	885	0.035	0.32
Outcome	0.84	0.80	n.a.	999	0.032	0.17
Sustainability	0.73	0.62	n.a.	958	0.039	0.00*
M&E design	0.65	0.68	n.a.	960	0.041	0.51
M&E implementation	0.75	0.66	n.a.	889	0.040	0.02*
Implementation quality	0.85	0.81	n.a.	868	0.034	0.18
Execution quality	0.87	0.81	n.a.	878	0.032	0.09
Overall quality	0.83	0.85	n.a.	899	0.033	0.58

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS data.

Note: \* statistically significant variable; n.a. = not applicable.

There is a 4.9 percent greater likelihood of being dropped or canceled if a project is in a warning country/economy compared to being in a stable country/economy. This was the only statistically significant difference: a Pearson’s chi-square test of independence showed that there was no

statistically significant relationship between a country/economy’s fragility classification and whether the project would be canceled or dropped when all three classifications were considered.

**Table 3.4** Effect of country/economy fragility on terminal evaluation review binary outcome variables (warning baseline)

Variable	Stable		Alert		Constant (warning)		R <sup>2</sup>	Number
	Coefficient	Std error	Coefficient	Std error	Coefficient	Std error		
Outcomes	0.044	0.032	-0.096*	0.039	0.795***	0.014	0.01	1,162
Sustainability	0.113***	0.039	-0.163***	0.043	0.621***	0.017	0.02	1,115
M&E design	-0.027	0.041	-0.143***	0.044	0.675***	0.017	0.01	1,114
M&E implementation	0.094*	0.040	-0.118**	0.045	0.658***	0.017	0.01	1,037
Implementation quality	0.045	0.034	-0.085*	0.040	0.805***	0.015	0.01	1,011
Execution quality	0.055	0.032	-0.087*	0.040	0.814***	0.014	0.01	1,021
Overall quality	-0.034	0.032	-0.064	0.034	0.856***	0.012	0.00	1,169

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS data.

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.005$  (two-sided).

**Table 3.5** Effect of country/economy fragility on likelihood of project cancellation (warning baseline)

Project status	Stable		Alert		Constant (warning)		R <sup>2</sup>	Number
	Coefficient	Std error	Coefficient	Std error	Coefficient	Std error		
Canceled, dropped, deferred, rejected	-0.048*	0.021	-0.020	0.017	0.282***	0.009	0.00	4,136

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on PMIS data.

Note: \* statistically significant variable.

### 3.4 Statistical analysis of project results vis-à-vis conflict

The team conducted several statistical tests to explore the extent to which project ratings depended on whether the project was in a situation affected by major armed conflict. As noted at the beginning of [section 3.3](#), not all projects have terminal evaluation reviews. To minimize the interference of confounding factors that can occur when comparing country/economy-level projects with regional and global projects, the team conducted tests along four distinct aggregations: country/economy-level projects only, regional projects only, regional and country/economy-level projects, and all projects.

**Globally, the conflict status of a project’s country/economy had a statistically significant impact**

**on its terminal evaluation review sustainability rating at all levels of aggregation ( $p = 0.00$ ).**<sup>13</sup>

The presence of major armed conflict in a project country/economy correlates with a lower score for sustainability, suggesting that projects taking place in conflict-affected sites are on average less sustainable than projects taking place in nonconflict contexts.

**At all scales of implementation, the country/economy’s conflict status had a statistically significant impact on the duration of a project’s delays ( $p = 0.04$ ).**<sup>14</sup> This measure was also almost statistically significant at the regional and country/

<sup>13</sup> Using a two-sample test of proportions for country/economy level only, and a Pearson chi-square for all other scales of aggregation.

<sup>14</sup> Using a two-sample t test with equal variances for the country/economy level only, and the Kruskal-Wallis

economy scale ( $p = 0.07$ ). Examples of how conflict can delay projects are discussed [earlier](#) in this chapter and in [chapter 4](#). One example of fragility and tensions causing project delays may be found in the Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin through Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme (GEF ID 2929). This project began in August 2009 with a planned closing date of July 2013, but was actually completed in December 2014. Tensions between the two project countries—Haiti and the Dominican Republic—built throughout the project’s lifetime. According to the project’s terminal evaluation, the worsening relations, combined with other issues, undermined achievement of the project’s ultimate objective. Although the parties had signed a binational agreement to facilitate the integrated management of the watershed by both governments, meetings were canceled at critical moments. With the worsening bilateral relations, the project team worked hard and arguably successfully to maintain communication between governments and ministries. During its latter stages, the project benefited from assistance from the government of Mexico, which facilitated training and exchange of experiences on how to manage a binational water source.

**The conflict context (particularly major armed conflict) had a statistically significant impact on the rate of dropped and canceled GEF projects.**<sup>15</sup>

This was true at all levels of aggregation except for the regional-only scale. Use of a logistical regression model showed that projects in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict had 1.26 higher odds of being dropped or canceled than projects in other countries/economies.

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equality-of-populations rank test for all other scales of aggregation.

<sup>15</sup> Using a two-sample test of proportions for country/economy level only, and a Pearson chi-square for all other scales of aggregation.

To see whether there were regionally discernible impacts of major armed conflict on GEF projects, a set of statistical tests were performed on country/economy-level data for GEF projects in four regions: Africa, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>16</sup> The results are provided in [annex G](#).

**Although the details vary for each region, the regional analysis of terminal evaluation review ratings reveals that major armed conflict can have a statistically significant effect (or almost statistically significant effect) on projects in five ways.** These are sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, overall, and the likelihood that a project will be dropped or canceled. For the Africa and Asia regions, the analysis showed a statistically significant difference in terminal evaluation review sustainability ratings between countries/economies affected by major armed conflict and other countries/economies. For the Latin America and the Caribbean region, results showed terminal evaluation review M&E design and M&E implementation binary ratings between conflict and nonconflict countries/economies were statistically significantly different. Although not technically statistically significant, for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, terminal evaluation review overall and sustainability binary ratings were close to being statistically significantly different between countries/economies affected by major armed conflict and other countries/economies, respectively. Additionally, the Asia region exhibited a statistically significant difference in dropped or canceled projects between countries/economies affected by major armed conflict and other countries/economies. The analysis showed no statistically significant difference in project delays.

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<sup>16</sup> Countries/economies in regions reflect World Bank country groupings.

## 3.5 Conclusions

**Statistical analyses of projects in the GEF portfolio show impacts of fragile and conflict-affected situations on several dimensions of project performance and outcomes.** Fragility has a statistically significant impact on all terminal evaluation review indicators. It is noteworthy that, although there are some statistically significant impacts comparing stable and warning situations, the impacts are even more clear and widespread when comparing warning and alert situations.

**There is a statistically significant impact of major armed conflict on the likelihood that a project will be canceled and dropped, but this relationship is not observed for fragility.** While fragility (especially countries/economies classified as alert situations) does affect many aspects of project implementation and success, there was no statistically significant impact of fragility on the likelihood that a country/economy-level project will be canceled or dropped. It appears that, barring major armed conflict, projects are able to continue navigating the challenging context with effects on the project short of termination.

# Findings

This chapter presents the findings from the evaluation in five sections:<sup>1</sup>

- The [first section](#) provides a typology of the key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects.
- The [second section](#) considers the resulting impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects, particularly with respect to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.
- The [third section](#) provides a typology of the approaches to conflict-sensitive programming that GEF projects have innovated, in the absence of a broader GEF approach to managing conflict- and fragility-related risks.
- The [fourth section](#) takes a more granular approach, examining opportunities for integrating conflict and fragility considerations into the project life cycle.
- The [fifth section](#) looks at cross-cutting issues, specifically human rights, indigenous peoples, gender, the private sector, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>1</sup> These findings are largely drawn from review of project documents, terminal evaluations, and terminal evaluation reviews, and interviews with implementing Agency staff.






## 4.1 Key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects

There are five key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects: **physical insecurity, social conflict, economic drivers, political fragility and weak governance, and coping strategies**. These pathways are illustrated in [figure 4.1](#). This typology draws upon analysis of the numerous projects reviewed for this evaluation. This section explores each pathway in turn, with illustrative examples.

### PHYSICAL INSECURITY

**Issues related to physical security were the most common issues affecting project performance, implementation, and results.** Physical insecurity tended to manifest itself in one of two ways: (1) the presence of land mines and unexploded ordnance, and (2) the potential targeting of staff and partners. These challenges have had the effect of making it difficult for GEF projects to hire staff, consult affected communities, undertake project activities, and conduct the necessary activities to evaluate projects. For the LGGE Energy Efficiency Code in

**Figure 4.1** Key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects

	PHYSICAL INSECURITY	SOCIAL CONFLICT AND MISTRUST	ECONOMIC DRIVERS	POLITICAL FRAGILITY AND WEAK GOVERNANCE	COPING STRATEGIES
					
Negative impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impedes access to project site</li> <li>Physical safety of project staff and partners</li> <li>Difficulties hiring staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Land tenure issues</li> <li>Sensitivities hiring project staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Illicit extraction and trade of natural resources</li> <li>Competition over resources can drive conflicts and put staff and parties at risk</li> <li>Currency depreciation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutional capacity and legitimacy</li> <li>Financial capacity</li> <li>Corruption and rule of law</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conflict between internally displaced persons/refugees and local communities</li> <li>Decreased carrying capacity</li> <li>Vulnerability enhanced by climatic stressors</li> </ul>
Positive impact		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Projects designed to increase cooperation among groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Projects focused on livelihoods and sustainable natural resource management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Projects designed to align with governmental priorities, including implementation of peace agreement</li> </ul>	

Source: ELI and GEF IEO.

Buildings project (GEF ID 3828) in the Syrian Arab Republic, the suspension notice stated that the “deteriorating security situation in Syria is not conducive to project implementation. Travel to parts of the country is difficult and unsafe, and there are reports that buildings/sites that were intended to be energy efficiency demonstration projects under the GEF projects have been damaged or destroyed in the ongoing civil unrest.”

Similarly, Delivering the Transition to Energy Efficient Lighting (GEF ID 5152) in the Republic of Yemen was canceled because of challenges with access and procedural issues. The cancellation notice states that “given the situation of civil unrest and the UN security phase in Yemen, we have been unable to send staff to the country to hold consultations and finalize the documentation for some time now.” In Chad, the terminal evaluation review for SPWA-CC: Promoting Renewable Energy Based Mini-Grids for Rural Electrification and Productive Uses (GEF ID 3959) reported that “Towards the end of the project some project sites were difficult to reach because of the threat of Boko Haram in the area, and those political and security threats remain in the country now.”

**Difficulty accessing project areas is particularly common in situations of active and protracted conflict.** For example, unexploded ordnance from the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War was noted by one interviewee as a security threat constraining access to the project site for the SFM Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon’s Woodland Resources Project (GEF ID 3028) in Lebanon. In Mali, staff members for the Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project were forced to relocate when the project area was occupied by military groups in March 2012.

**In many instances, physical insecurity can compel a project to stop work in particular locations.** For example, the Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Production Processes project (GEF ID 3418) could not include sites from southern Lebanon because of the security risk posed by unexploded cluster bombs from the 2006 war, which reduced the area of project implementation. And, prior to implementation of the Integrated National Adaptation Plan: High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia’s Caribbean Insular Areas and Human Health (GEF ID 2019), one of the identified project areas was abandoned on the rise of a “delicate public security situation,”

according to the terminal evaluation, that made it impossible for project staff to access the area. Also in Colombia, the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region project (GEF ID 774) encountered difficulties in accessing the project area during implementation. One project staff member, blaming project design, specified that the project area was under FARC control and the risk posed for the crew was too high for the project to continue there.

**Land mines and unexploded ordnance can pose a serious threat in certain countries/economies.**

A number of GEF projects in Cambodia have been affected by the presence of land mines. For example, a project document for the Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Pilot Project for the Virachey National Park (GEF ID 621) reported that the 6–9 million remaining land mines hindered data collection, conservation activities, and operations to tackle illegal logging. Similarly, the project brief for Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains notes that, while the presence of land mines impeded access for conservationists, illegal hunters and loggers continued to operate in the area.

**Notwithstanding physical security challenges, GEF projects have found ways to continue operating.** For example, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project (GEF ID 2357) in Burundi received satisfactory terminal evaluation ratings for quality of supervision and overall performance despite an “extremely challenging security environment that precluded easy and frequent site access.” And a project document for Mali’s Community-based Natural Resource Management that Resolves Conflict, Improves Livelihoods and Restores Ecosystems throughout the Elephant Range (GEF ID 9661) noted that if the security situation worsened, the project would relocate and adjust its strategy to focus on legal frameworks.

**Rising insecurity and conflict in project areas have affected GEF projects, highlighting the need to look beyond conflict to broader fragility when planning projects.** For example, implementation of the Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project and Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range in Mali were directly affected and halted by a rapidly escalating conflict context. Activities for the former project were suspended following a coup d’état in March 2012 and the subsequent occupation of project areas by military groups, compelling project staff to flee for safety. The terminal evaluation observed that risks such as insecurity and the coup d’état “were not envisioned” in the project appraisal document, and that “even before the military coup, the project area was often vandalized by foreign military groups,” resulting in deep financial losses.

Experience with Mali’s Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range illustrates how physical insecurity can spread within a country/economy. The project aims to restore ecosystems throughout the elephant range. Implementation began in 2018 and is ongoing. However, an interview with project staff revealed that staff members have been unable to begin their work in the Gourma region because of insecurity in the designated project area: the risk of poaching is very high, and poaching is directly attributable to the armed conflict, given that it was nonexistent in the region before. In short, the spread of armed conflict to the region led to poaching, which led to a worsening of physical insecurity, which escalated to such a point that the project had to cease working in the region.

## **SOCIAL CONFLICT AND MISTRUST**

**Social conflict and mistrust (whether between local stakeholders or toward the government) have affected the performance and outcome of numerous GEF projects.** Social competition



for resources can occur in settings where there is a scarcity of arable land, water, and other natural resources upon which people and communities depend for their livelihoods and food security (Young and Goldman 2015; Unruh and Williams 2013; Theisen 2008). Moreover, influxes of refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants can generate social conflict and tensions.<sup>2</sup>

**Social conflicts concerning land tenure are particularly common and can be problematic for GEF projects if not managed.** In Colombia, the Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Matavén Forest project (GEF ID 1020) aimed to support indigenous communities in the Matavén Forest; the project had to be redesigned at implementation because indigenous communities stressed their preference for creating an indigenous *resguardo* or reserve, rather than a national park, so they could retain autonomy over the land. The redesign was necessitated as the conflict escalated, resulting in the death of a park staff member and several indigenous people.

In Mali and Burundi, GEF projects have also had to navigate social conflicts between ethnic groups related to land tenure. The terminal evaluation for the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project in Burundi noted that the conflict exacerbated capacity issues and risks, especially with regard to land tenure, affecting implementation and sustainability. The SPWA-CC: Promotion of the Use of Agrofuels from the Production and Use of *Jatropha* Oil in Mali Project (GEF ID 3699) did consider land tenure conflicts in consideration of agrofuels production, but the request for CEO endorsement noted that the risk had not been adequately addressed.

**Social tensions can present administrative challenges unrelated to natural resources, for**

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<sup>2</sup>This is discussed further under “[Coping strategies](#).”

**example in hiring staff.** Some projects have faced problems—albeit to a lesser extent than tenure-related problems—related to the equal hiring of local staff for project implementation. Interviews with GEF Agency staff reported that some regional projects in the Balkans were affected by mistrust among project participants and staff.<sup>3</sup>In an interview with a former employee of the Sava River Commission, it was noted that cooperation was extremely difficult to sustain, given that there had to be the same number of employees from all participating countries/economies; mistrust affected all cross-border environmental projects in the region after the war. This is not always the case, however; interviews with several NGO and Agency respondents highlighted the fact that notwithstanding the social sensitivities associated with sectarianism in Lebanon, it was usually possible to hire and manage staff without undue burden.

**Understanding social conflicts can enhance the success of GEF projects, if the projects are designed in a conflict-sensitive way to bring people together.** For example, a project document for Burundi’s Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project foresaw that “land tenure conflicts [were] likely to be a serious issue for the rural population,” exacerbated by the reintegration of returnees after the war. However, the terminal evaluation notes the project’s success in reinforcing social cohesion through producers’ organizations whose members were drawn from among the Tutsi, Batwa, and Hutu. Similarly, Mali’s Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project considered intercommunal conflicts over land management—especially between traditional practices and government-led conservation—as hampering the

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<sup>3</sup>For example, Technology Transfer for Climate Resilient Flood Management in Vrbas River Basin (GEF ID 5604) and West Balkans Drina River Basin Management Project (GEF ID 5723).

project's objective of intercommunal land management. Consequently, the project pursued an approach of generating dialogue and project planning workshops, including conflict resolution mechanisms and grievance redress, enabling local leaders to consider the project as "theirs."

## ECONOMIC DRIVERS

**The economic consequences of conflict can affect implementation of GEF projects.** This is true at both the macro level (national and regional economies) and the micro level (livelihoods). Illicit extraction and trade in minerals, timber, and other natural resources can exacerbate and prolong conflict (UNDP and UNEP 2015). At the same time, economic interest can provide an incentive to make and build peace (UNDP and UNEP 2015). Economic stresses associated with conflict and with postconflict recovery can push a government to quickly generate revenues, leading to natural resource concessions with bad terms or concessions that are illegal. For example, a postconflict review of 70 timber concessions in Liberia found that not a single concession complied with the law (Rochow 2016). Unhealthy concessions can also reduce the domestic value added on exports (Hill and Menon 2014; Sayne, Gillies, and Watkins 2017). Additionally, tensions can arise as people's livelihoods are affected by conflict, climatic stressors, and migration influxes from neighboring fragile situations (OHCHR 2016; USAID 2005b). Though there are instances where economic factors affected a project, GEF projects often do include a component aimed at improving local livelihoods.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> These include projects entailing community-based management (such as Mali's Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project and Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range) and sustainable production landscapes projects (such as Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia's Orinoquia Region [GEF ID 9578]), among others.

### **The profitability of a natural resource combined with low state capacity to govern the resource legally can increase illicit extraction and trade.**

A project document for Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range in Mali's Gourma region, which seeks to advance biodiversity conservation (particularly of the Gourma elephant), noted that the military conflict overwhelmed the "insufficient current environmental policy and IWT [illegal wildlife trade] legal framework, low capacity of the Government...and a lack of universally accepted structures and institutions" and thereby constituted "a limitation to the success of the project."

### **Currency depreciation can also affect GEF projects.**

For example, the Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project was left partly unexecuted, according to the terminal evaluation, because of the depreciation of the Mali franc following the military coup, which resulted in a large portion of the project grant being cut off. This is consistent with observations that conflict may lead to a depreciation in the value of exports, to sanctions, and to expenditure-induced inflation (Serneels and Verpoorten 2015).

### **GEF projects can help manage economic risks by incorporating livelihood components.**

The Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon project (GEF ID 9663) provides an example. An interview with a project staff member revealed that, while the implementation location was fully under rebel control and impossible to access, strategies aimed at improving livelihoods through differentiated production methods (honey, silvo-pastoral approaches, etc.) have so far been successful. The project seems to be strengthening social cohesion, because many ex-combatants have secured jobs in the project sectors. A non-GEF project in Kenya funded by the Catholic Funds for Overseas Development was successful in improving social cohesion between nomadic tribes (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium

2012). This project operated on the assumption that together, improved livelihoods and mainstreaming practices for peacebuilding would address the drivers of conflict. Through the development of a shared market for livestock, project participation increased, drawing different communities closer together; external evaluation deemed the project's sustainability as highly likely (Galgallo and Scott 2010).

## POLITICAL FRAGILITY AND WEAK GOVERNANCE

**Political fragility, weak governance, and limited institutional capacity have affected GEF project implementation and sustainability directly or by creating an environment in which other factors, both predictable and not, can affect projects.**

Where governments are weak and have limited capacity, they may not be able to effectively govern remote areas (where many GEF projects are located), which can lead to reduced legitimacy and increased mistrust. This was the case, for example, in projects in remote areas of Colombia (e.g., the Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation project) and several projects in Afghanistan in regions with low institutional capacity, including the Natural Resources and Poverty Alleviation Project (GEF ID 1907) and Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan (GEF ID 4227).

**In such settings, social conflicts can escalate rapidly.** Corruption and nontransparent governance may adversely affect the natural resources the project seeks to protect. Low administrative capacity may extend a project's end date; while low financial capacity and low capacity of the local executing partner may lead to delays in transferring funds (OECD 2011). A lack of interagency coordination can also undermine GEF projects, as was noted in a project document for Implementation of the Strategic Action Programme Toward Achievement

of the Integrated Management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GEF ID 789).

**Limited government capacity to implement and enforce policies can increase barriers to project execution.** In Mali, Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range considered the armed conflict "a limitation to the success of the project" because of barriers including "insufficient environmental policy, low capacity of the government to implement effective law enforcement," and lack of institutional capacity to mainstream sustainable natural resource management.

**The legacy of colonialism is a factor in some governance challenges.** For example, conflicts related to land tenure (as well as control over other natural resources) can often be traced back to the colonial era (see e.g., Boone 2015). National boundaries drawn during the colonial era can persist as territorial disputes that affect GEF projects. For example, a project document for the Integrated Management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem highlighted concerns related to territorial disputes persisting from colonialism.

**Political instability and weak governance can affect project sustainability.** For example, the terminal evaluation review for Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources stated that the instability in the country and the region threatened the sustainability of project outcomes. Specifically, changes in government at the national and local levels "jeopardize commitments made to the project's objectives." In another instance, the Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains project (GEF ID 1043) in Cambodia was particularly affected by the governance landscape. Despite the project's ability to meet its objectives being deemed "a testament to what can be achieved through the NGO implementation modality," the terminal evaluation stated that "current governance poses an overwhelming risk

to the sustainability of the project”—particularly challenges related to illegal and poorly managed concessions.

**Where a GEF project is a priority to the government, though, governments can prioritize their scarce resources to engage.** For example, the project document for Integrated Management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem, an initiative that involved Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, suggested that the civil strife in Angola might result in a diminished project commitment from that country. In fact, the document noted, interministerial involvement was present at every meeting of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem, given the “growing realization...that environmental sustainability is inextricably linked to food production, tourism, sanitation, population movement and thus, regional stability.”

## COPING STRATEGIES


**During conflict, people often adopt short-term coping strategies to survive that compromise long-term sustainability and prosperity.** There are three common types of maladaptive coping strategies during conflict: liquidation of assets, flight, and resource use by displaced persons. In times of armed conflict, concerns about survival often mean that people liquidate their assets so they can buy food and other necessities, or flee to safety, even if these actions compromise their ability to return. This liquidation of assets often results in rapid and intense exploitation of natural resources, typically at the expense of the resource’s ability to recover, and not always for its highest and best use. For example, livestock can become a risky livelihood asset to hold onto during conflict, since it can be easily stolen or killed. During Burundi’s civil war, many households in conflict-affected areas reported losing livestock to theft and looting (IDMC and NRC 2006; Mercier, Rama, and Verwimp 2020). Accordingly, during conflict, many rural households

sell livestock as a coping strategy, resorting instead to the cultivation of low-risk, low-return crops that can feed their families and are less likely to attract combatants (Rockmore 2020; Saumik 2015; Justino 2012). In Afghanistan, people cut down pistachio orchards and woodlands to use the wood for cooking, heating, and shelter or to sell it to earn a basic income (UNEP 2019).

**Aggregate changes in natural resources driven by coping strategies can generate social tensions and instability that can affect projects.** The terminal evaluation for Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon’s Woodland Resources noted that the sociopolitical sustainability of the project had been compromised by increasing pressures on land, natural resources, and infrastructure resulting from the Syrian refugee crisis, with the consequent destabilization of the project area and the region more broadly. In addition to the stresses on the resources, changes in the critical mass of stakeholders also affected ownership of the project results and undermined the project’s sustainability.

**Impacts from coping strategies are linked to local and regional security, refugee influx, and climatic stressors.** Coping mechanisms are primarily attributed to refugees and internally displaced persons in displacement camps, or those who migrated to urban areas due to violence and conflict. During the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to safety to a region of Guinea known as the Parrot’s Beak (UNEP 2005). Integrating into local villages, many refugee families cut down trees to make space for and build homes. They also took up logging as a means for income. Forests were quickly depleted, as illustrated by the satellite images in [figure 4.2](#). Such events cause strains on natural resources while contributing to the proliferation of informal economies and ethnic divisions—all factors that may exacerbate the impacts of conflict on project implementation (Justino 2012). Coping strategies carried out on

**Figure 4.2** Deforestation in the Parrot's Beak Region of Guinea, 1974 and 2002



Source: UNEP 2005.

a large scale such as illegal mining, hunting, logging, and land use decrease the local carrying capacity, affecting ecosystem services. Moreover, movements of refugees and displaced persons in an unstable region may increase compelling problems such as water scarcity, further intensifying grievances.

**The struggle of managing responses to large influxes of refugees can affect GEF projects as governments reprioritize funding and resources.**

For example, in Jordan, the terminal evaluation review for Implementation of Phase I of a Comprehensive PCB Management System (GEF ID 4124) noted that the intensity of the neighboring armed conflict and the resultant influx of more than 2 million refugees into Jordan posed a significant burden on the government, stating that “the sustainability of the project outcomes is partly affected by the situation as the government needs to prioritize funding” to support the refugees.

**Climatic stressors and environmental security issues may increase movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, potentially heightening risk of conflict.** For example, according to a project document, Mali’s Community-based

Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range project saw increasing social conflict between ethnic groups, between farmers and herders, and between local people and migrants over the use of natural resources that have become increasingly scarce due to climatic stressors. In several instances, conflicts arose over differences in natural resource management practices and values held by different ethnic groups. Additionally, SIP: Transboundary Agro-Ecosystem Management Programme for the Kagera River Basin (GEF ID 2139) in the Albertine Rift considered refugee movements as a “high risk” to project implementation, given the increasing pressure on resources by returning refugees and internal ecological refugees due to climate variability. The project results document noted that the refugee influx indeed “exacerbated the land use management in the country [Tanzania],” resulting in increased violent conflicts between farmers and livestock owners. In response, a successful strategy of participatory land use plans and conflict management was adopted.

## CONCLUSION

This section has highlighted the most common scenarios by which conflict and fragility can affect (and have affected) GEF projects. It should be noted, however, that throughout the projects examined in this report, there is an additional array of less frequently occurring pathways by which conflict and fragility have affected GEF projects. For example, the reduced opportunities to have an effective dialogue space for diverse stakeholders in a project can have long-term implications for the project.

### 4.2 Impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects

**Risks related to conflict and fragility, as well as the ways in which GEF projects respond to those risks, affect project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.** The GEF uses these four criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability—as the cornerstones for evaluation.<sup>5</sup> They are interconnected, and the examples noted in this evaluation illustrate particular impacts on one metric without suggesting that other metrics were not affected in the given project. The data for this analysis are both quantitative (scoring in a terminal evaluation review) and qualitative (from the terminal evaluation review, other documents, and interviews). However, the terminal evaluation review scores are limited in that they do not capture nuance, and not all projects have them. Consequently, this analysis draws on other documents and on interviews for the following examples.

<sup>5</sup> GEF IEO (2022a). The 2010 Monitoring and Evaluation Policy included results/impacts as a fifth evaluation criterion; the 2019 policy incorporates results/impacts into the evaluation of effectiveness.

## RELEVANCE

**Conflict and fragility can affect the relevance of a project—for better and for worse.** The GEF defines the relevance of a project as “the extent to which the intervention design and intended results were consistent with local and national environmental priorities and policies and to the GEF’s strategic priorities and objectives, and remained suited to the conditions of the context over time” (GEF IEO 2022a, 15). Armed conflict can shift the focus and priorities of a state and community away from environmental initiatives and initiatives that require cooperation, and toward efforts that directly affect conflict dynamics or provide relief. Fragility can have similar effects in skewing priorities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, a project document for a GEF enabling activity to support the country in meeting its obligations under the Stockholm Convention (GEF ID 3160) noted that armed conflict had degraded the capacity of public institutions, and “Many ministries...lost their capacity for action on the ground and for national coordination.” Accordingly, the need for the project to support both coordination and on-the-ground action was elevated.

**The shift in priorities associated with conflict can negatively affect the relevance of projects that are not designed to address livelihoods or are not able to adapt to changing priorities.** Armed conflict disrupts livelihoods, food security, social cooperation, and the provision of basic services, which are often top priorities locally and nationally because of their centrality to the quality of life. In Lebanon, for example, a project document for Strengthening of National Capacity and Grassroots In-Situ Conservation for Sustainable Biodiversity Protection (GEF ID 216) noted that, because the violent conflict “took its toll on every resource in the country,...the vast majority of people have been too preoccupied with overcoming the struggles of day to day living to pay much attention to the environment.” A project can languish, or worse, when its goals are not

perceived to be related to current priorities. The revised project document from another project in Lebanon, Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway (GEF ID 9491) noted that countries/economies “now struggling with political and security challenges (including civil war) cannot place much priority on MSBs [migratory soaring birds] which may be seen as ‘someone else’s problem’ and MSB conservation is sometimes seen as a barrier to development and not as an integral part of the process.” In this case, some people perceived the project priorities to be an impediment to achieving development objectives that are critical during conflict.

**Conflict often drives governments to reallocate financial, personnel, and other resources to conflict-related initiatives.** This was the case the Energy Efficiency Code in Buildings project in Syria. The project was canceled after conflict broke out and, as per the cancellation notice, the project’s original objectives (related to energy efficiency in buildings) became a lower priority, as well as an implementation challenge given the deteriorating security situation.

**Changes in state priorities associated with conflict can affect both project relevance and project sustainability.** The terminal evaluation review for Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change (GEF ID 3430) in Sudan, for example, noted that “the secession of South Sudan, which has perturbed the project, has not ended conflict in the region. The ongoing conflict is expensive, drains government resources and undermines the ability of the state to prioritize and allocate resources to poverty reduction and climate change adaptation.”

**Conflict can also enhance the relevance of GEF projects, particularly those designed to be conflict-sensitive that address livelihoods, food**

**security, cooperation, and basic services.** A project document from the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project in Burundi notes that “the prevalence of poverty and history of serious internal conflict in Burundi [means that] there is no other feasible development alternative to reducing poverty than agricultural and rural development,” and that “the immediate priority of the government is the revival of the agriculture sector in order to ensure basic food security and the rehabilitation of the several thousands of displaced persons returning since the cessation of major conflict.” This project was designed to directly address postconflict priorities and was thus highly relevant in the conflict-affected context.

Similarly, the Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia’s Orinoquia Region Project (GEF ID 9578) addressed sectors that were priorities for postconflict peacebuilding and rebuilding. The revised project information document notes that “[b]iodiversity conservation strategies and climate change mitigation efforts in the Orinoquia—in particular those related to agriculture and forestry (AFOLU)—would be aligned with peacebuilding priorities” because the FARC-EP had a strong presence in the region. A GEF STAP review commended the project for seeking “to incorporate the issues of conflict and peace into the design of the project to effectively address the environmental and social issues—both of which are priorities for Colombia following the end of the decades-long civil war.”

**One way that GEF projects enhance their relevance is by leveraging environmental objectives to support peace processes in postconflict contexts.** In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a Restoration Initiative child project, Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-silvo-pastoral Resources in the Pilot Province of South-Kivu Project (GEF ID 9515), was, according to the project appraisal document, designed to align with the Strategy Document for Growth and Poverty Reduction in South-Kivu, which prioritizes peace, and with FAO’s earlier

peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts through food and agricultural initiatives. Similarly, Contributing to the Integrated Management of Biodiversity in the Pacific Region of Colombia to Build Peace (GEF ID 9441) leverages biodiversity management as a tool for peacebuilding, thus increasing the relevance of the project. The project identification form (PIF) noted that the project “is consistent with the Peace Process in the framework of agreement Number 1 of La Habana that addresses the environmental zoning of the territory with the aim of identifying strategic areas for conservation and provision of ecosystem services.”

**The fluid nature of conflict and fragility can change the relevance of a project over time.** This means that a project, once relevant, can become less so. While such changes could happen with any project, the volatility of fragile and conflict-affected situations makes it more likely than in more stable situations. This can be a challenge, because changing the objectives of a project (e.g., to make it relevant in the new conditions) would require approval from the GEF Council.

## EFFECTIVENESS

**Conflict and fragility have an impact on the effectiveness of GEF projects through the channels presented in the previous section.** Effectiveness is “the extent to which the intervention achieved, or expects to achieve, results (outputs, outcomes and impacts, including global environmental benefits) taking into account the key factors influencing the results.”<sup>6</sup> As pointed out [earlier](#), tension and outbreaks of violence can cause restriction of access to project sites, difficulties in hiring, challenges

<sup>6</sup> GEF IEO (2022a), 15. Because this research includes projects completed prior to 2019, it should be noted that this definition from the 2019 Monitoring and Evaluation Policy differs from the 2010 rubric that also included results/outcomes; the 2019 guidelines merge results/outcomes into effectiveness.

between project partners, security risks for project staff and components, destruction of project facilities or resources, and many further complications. Each of these challenges can lead to project cancellation or otherwise hamper the achievement of project outcomes.

**Statistical analyses of the GEF portfolio indicate that country/economy-level projects in conflict-affected contexts were significantly more likely to be dropped or canceled than projects in nonconflict contexts.** Specifically, a log regression of GEF projects globally indicated that projects in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict had a 26 percent greater chance of being dropped or canceled than projects in countries/economies not affected by major armed conflict. A review of cancellation notices revealed that various conflict-related factors were cited as causes for project cancellation, including general insecurity issues, problems with sending staff to the country/economy, barriers to cofinancing, damage to infrastructure, and institutional or political disarray. Project cancellation notices provide insights into the various ways in which conflict can hinder the ability to carry out a project.

**Many conflict cancellation notices note the challenges posed by deterioration or lack of institutional capacity to carry out project activities.** For example, the cancellation notice for the Restoration, Protection and Sustainable Use of the Sistan Basin project (GEF ID 2130), encompassing Iran and Afghanistan, explains that “the Government of Afghanistan expressed their inability to go through the project formulation process despite their keen interest” because of the “capacity limitations and overall constraints imposed by the political and security situation in the country.” In Sudan, the cancellation notice for SIP: Sustainable Land Management for Sustainable Livelihoods in the Toker Area of East Sudan (GEF ID 3389) notes “the uncertainty in terms of institutional and administrative structure resulting from the referendum



and the subsequent separation of the South constituted an additional risk element with respect to national policy level interventions (as required by the TerrAfrica program).” In this case, the institutional ramifications of conflict made it difficult to ascertain whether the national government would be able to perform the policy interventions necessary for the project activities to be carried out.

**Conflict can present financing challenges that prevent project activities from being carried out.** This problem was prevalent in two cancellation notices from the Republic of Yemen. For the Yemen Geothermal Development Project (GEF ID 3474), the notice explains that “from January 2011, a number of attempts by UNEP to restart the project activities were unsuccessful due to the Arab Spring that commenced in February 2011, unrealized co-finance commitments by the partners, claims of compensation by the drilling contractor and disbandment of the executing team following the civil war.” The cancellation notice for Leopards and Landscapes: Using a Flagship Species to Strengthen Conservation in the Republic of Yemen (GEF ID 4201) mentions that “in view of the ongoing situation in Yemen with suspension of disbursements since July 28, 2011, the uncertainties around the likely priorities to emerge in the post-transition/re-engagement period, and the status of project preparation to date and likely future challenges in preparation, it is not feasible to envisage preparation and delivery of the project at this point in time.”

**In some cases, there were multiple conflict-related reasons for cancellation.** For example, the Yemen Geothermal Development Project was canceled because of insecurity issues that arose from the Arab Spring, lack of co-financing from partners, and staff disbandment after the civil war commenced. SPWA-BD: Strengthening the National Protected Area Network in Chad (GEF ID 4081) was canceled because “[s]ufficient co-financing had not been committed by partners and security issues

meant that baseline data could not be collected; as UNDP was engaging with partners to resolve this matter, a number of other issues arose. The Sahel food crisis struck Chad in 2009/10 and 2012—and was compounded by a deterioration in the law and order situation in some areas.”

**Short of leading to project cancellation, conflict can hamper project effectiveness during implementation.** A number of staff members interviewed for this evaluation noted that GEF Agencies are usually reluctant to pursue substantial project changes to address an escalation of conflict, because GEF procedures require substantial changes to a project to be approved by the GEF Council. As a result, interviewees noted, when conflict interrupts project activities, projects often make only marginal changes, rather than propose fundamental changes to adapt to the conflict. In such situations, the project proceeds, albeit with less effectiveness.

## EFFICIENCY

**Conflict and fragility can reduce the efficiency of GEF projects.** Efficiency is defined as “the extent to which the intervention achieved value for resources, by converting inputs (funds, personnel, expertise, equipment, etc.) to results in the timeliest and least costly way possible, compared to alternatives” (GEF IEO 2022a, 15). Complications generated by conflict and fragility can require costly adjustments. For example, the High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia’s Caribbean Insular Areas and Human Health project had to be restructured to respond to the conflict. The terminal evaluation noted that “the location of the activities under Component B, were not implemented in Las Hermosas Massif, as originally planned, but in the Chingaza Páramo and the National Natural Park Los Nevados due to security concerns.” The restructuring, which occurred in 2010, four years after the project was approved, cost an additional \$3.5 million.

According to the available documents, this alternative scenario was not considered or included in the initial project proposal or design.

**Analyses of the GEF’s global portfolio indicate that conflict has a statistically significant impact on the duration of project delays.**<sup>7</sup> Examination of specific GEF projects highlight a number of specific mechanisms by which conflict and fragility hinder project efficiency. Conflict and fragility can increase costs and delays in accessing project sites, necessitate additional costly security measures, aggravate tensions and lack of trust between stakeholders, cause government institutions to refocus attention and resources to address the situation, or require additional time and costs for institution building and decision making.

**When projects require cooperation between stakeholders, tensions between different entities can get in the way of project activities, affecting both efficiency and effectiveness.** Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin through Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme (GEF ID 2929) illustrates this dynamic. Tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the two countries involved, delayed the project’s completion by 17 months. Meetings were canceled at critical moments, and the overall objectives of the project were never achieved. According to the terminal evaluation review, “the political and technical had to be separated and unfortunately this never happened and ended up being perhaps the hardest lesson that was learned by project stakeholders when the ultimate project objective would not be reached.”

**Efficiency can also be affected as institutions shift priorities to address conflict dynamics, as agencies are targeted or have fewer resources to direct**

**to projects.** These developments can generate substantial slowdowns in government action, resulting in inefficiencies if projects are unprepared for them. In Mali, the Mopti Region Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources project faced numerous delays because of political conditions associated with state fragility; these were exacerbated when civil war broke out in 2012. The project experienced delays in implementation of the agreement with the National Investment Agency for Local Communities, a delay in the transfer of funds by the National Department of Agriculture to its regional directorate in Mopti, and a delay in launching the investments. The delay in implementing the National Investment Agency for Local Communities agreement and the political crisis together undermined financing of the microprojects. As a result, following the supervision mission in 2013, 22 contracts amounting to CFAF 110 million were canceled and the project was delayed by nearly 40 months. Ultimately, the terminal evaluation review noted, “the economic rate of return [of the project] is estimated at 39%...the insecurity generated by the socio-political crisis experienced in the region, disrupted the achievement of the project investments in the Mopti region, and therefore had an impact on the efficiency.”

## SUSTAINABILITY

**One of the most common effects of conflict and fragility on GEF projects is to undermine their sustainability.** Sustainability is “the continuation/likely continuation of positive effects from the intervention after it has come to an end, and its potential for scale-up and/or replication; interventions need to be environmentally as well as institutionally, financially, politically, culturally and socially sustainable” (GEF IEO 2022a, 15). The STAP has noted that conflict “affects the viability or sustainability of investments in environmental protection” (GEF STAP 2018, 3). Conflict and fragility can threaten

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<sup>7</sup>See [annex H](#).

sustainability by harming institutional and physical structures needed to continue project outcomes, by affecting relationships between project stakeholders, and by affecting the relevance of the continued project activities.

**Throughout the GEF portfolio, of the four GEF evaluation criteria, sustainability scores in terminal evaluations are the most clearly affected by the presence of armed conflict.** Statistical analyses, summarized in [annex H](#), show a statistically significant difference in measures of sustainability in projects in countries/economies affected by major armed conflict as compared to projects in other countries/economies.

Fragility—and particularly sociopolitical instability—has affected the sustainability of many GEF projects. In these instances, leadership and political priorities pivot away from conservation objectives, undermining the continuous support necessary to a project's outcomes. For example, in Mali, the terminal evaluation review for Household Energy and Universal Rural Access Project (GEF ID 1274) observed that the low sustainability rating was related to the country's political situation following the March 2012 military coup. It noted that the project's accomplishments in key areas were to some extent irreversible and that the main risk was that the political crises would either deepen further or reach a steady state, which would dilute the motivation of the civil service, compel leading staff to search for opportunities abroad, worsen governance in regulatory agencies, and bring the reform process that Mali had embarked upon in the 1990s to an indefinite standstill. This project, which sought to increase household energy access in rural Mali was highly dependent on government will and support for project outcomes and continued investment; these were jeopardized by the coup and change in administration.

**Fragility at both the national and local levels can affect project sustainability.** In Lebanon,

spillover effects from the Syrian conflict undermined the sustainability of the Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources project. The terminal evaluation for the project noted that "There is instability within the country and region, and the Syrian refugee crisis is currently putting pressure on land and natural resources, as well as on infrastructure and social support systems." This instability posed a threat to sustainability of project outcomes, because it led to changes in government at the national and local levels, jeopardizing commitments made to the project's objectives. Additionally, the final project implementation report noted that one of the seven project pilot sites was grazed by local shepherds who claimed rights to the lands. In this situation, the conflict affected both national priorities and local dynamics, such that project outcomes were threatened both institutionally in terms of political support and locally in terms of land competition.

**Land disputes are a common sociopolitical risk for the sustainability of projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources provides one example; Integrated Biodiversity Protection in the Sarstun-Motagua Region (GEF ID 197) in Guatemala is another. This project's terminal evaluation noted that "socio-political sustainability is precarious because Guatemala just came out of a civil war, and it is going through many socio-economic changes, including land ownership conflicts, unresolved land uses issues and other uncertainties that are beyond the scope of the project."

**Outbreaks of violence directly undermine the ability of organizations to continue project activities.** This may directly affect sustainability, if the project area becomes difficult to access. For example, interviewees noted that, during implementation of Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region in Colombia, the project site came under control of FARC rebels, and the project

team was unable to enter the area because the security risks were too high.

**In addition, the threat of violence and weakened governance can drive outmigration and affect local livelihoods.** In Colombia, the terminal evaluation review for Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Western Slope of the Serrania del Baudo (GEF ID 625), noted that “[t]he constant presence of armed guerrilla groups also undermine socio-political sustainability as the [terminal evaluation] mentions that this results in population displacements, rural migration, unemployment, productivity declines and contributes to an overall level of lawlessness and high crime.” While the project focused on the sustainable use of natural resources, criminal networks and activity drove unsustainable (and illegal) resource extraction.

**Fragility and conflict can also undermine the cooperation and collaboration necessary for sustainability beyond the life of the project.** For example, in the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Western Slope of the Serrania del Baudo, the terminal evaluation review mentioned that surrounding indigenous communities, which represent 4 percent of the population but occupy 65 percent of the land in the region, as well as some Afro-Colombian communities, refused to participate in the project. Projects, and project evaluations, are increasingly recognizing these challenges. The terminal evaluation review for Sudan’s Conservation and Management of Habitats and Species, and Sustainable Community Use of Biodiversity in Dinder National Park (GEF ID 534) noted that:

According to the [terminal evaluation], much work still remains to be done with the communities in the area. Although the violent clashes between park scouts and poachers have reduced as a result of the project, relations remain tense. This park conflict is only the “downstream” part of a much wider land use problem in which pastoralists are squeezed out of the areas neighboring the national park states by the

unauthorized expansion in (mechanized) farming. Thus, pastoralists have to move to other areas of the park and the scouts shoot their cattle as it invades park areas. The [terminal evaluation] makes several recommendations to begin more cooperative work with the communities but the results still remain to be seen, thus socio political sustainability is moderately unlikely.

**One of the best ways to enhance sustainability of GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations is to build the capacity of civil society.** In assessing lessons from Integrated Biodiversity Protection in the Sarstun-Motagua Region in Guatemala, the terminal evaluation review noted that “[e]nvironmental, social and political sustainability of GEF projects cannot always be achieved in 6-8 years and with an investment of \$5–8 million in countries/economies with low governability, high levels of poverty and serious social conflicts as left after a civil war. In such cases, strengthening civil society institutions such as regional NGOs, can be the best strategy to achieve environmental results and increase the likelihood of their sustainability.” Curiously, the terminal evaluation review framed these issues as “beyond the scope of the project.” Because they speak to the sustainability of the project outcomes, they cannot be beyond the scope of the project. Indeed, there is widespread recognition of important linkages between local ownership, environmental governance, and sustainability (Bruch et al. 2016, 978).

**Another way to enhance the sustainability of projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected situations is to ensure monitoring efforts continue after project closure.** The long-term outcomes of the International Tropical Timber Organization’s 1998 Cordillera del Cóndor project provides lessons in this respect. This project is well known for its success in helping resolve a 150-year-old border conflict (sometimes violent) between Ecuador and Peru through the creation of a transboundary ecoregion (e.g., Westrik 2015; Kakabadse, Cailiaux, and Dumas 2016). However, after peace was

achieved, the ecological benefits of the Cordillera del Cóndor deteriorated as extractive industries and drug gangs became active in the region. Without a proper plan for ongoing monitoring and enforcement, few of its conservation goals had been met 20 years following the project’s closure (Ali 2019).

### 4.3 Typology of conflict-sensitive GEF programming approaches






Conflict-sensitive strategies gleaned from in-depth review of selected GEF-supported projects can be arranged into a five-category typology (figure 4.3). Acknowledgment, the threshold consideration in the typology, demonstrates in project documents that the project is aware of the conflict context. From there, a project may take no further action (simply acknowledging the situation without trying to manage accompanying risks) or, alternatively, may respond to the conflict context through avoidance or one or more mitigation measures. In

some cases, projects actively embrace peacebuilding opportunities in the project’s activities. Projects also can draw on learning from other GEF-funded projects and initiatives from other organizations to improve programming of future projects as well (in some instances) as the one under consideration.

### CONFLICT ACKNOWLEDGMENT

**At the most basic level of conflict sensitivity, many projects acknowledge the presence of armed violence and insecurity in the project area.** In several cases, early project documents such as PIFs acknowledge previous armed conflict (as well as its environmental effects) but do not describe any strategies for managing conflict-related risks. More frequently—especially in projects nearer in time to the armed conflict—acknowledgment of a situation’s conflict context is accompanied by measures designed to avoid or mitigate conflict-related risks, or even to capitalize on peacebuilding opportunities.

Figure 4.3 Typology of conflict-sensitive strategies in GEF projects

ACKNOWLEDGMENT	AVOIDANCE	MITIGATION	PEACEBUILDING	LEARNING
				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acknowledge armed violence/ insecurity in project area</li> <li>• Acknowledge impact on environment and natural resources</li> <li>• Acknowledge risks posed to project success</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project site selection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training</li> <li>• Monitoring and early warning</li> <li>• Participatory approach</li> <li>• Local partners</li> <li>• Dispute resolution mechanisms</li> <li>• Adaptive management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political will</li> <li>• Livelihoods</li> <li>• Environmental restoration</li> <li>• Co-benefits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Applying learning from previous experiences in project design</li> <li>• Learning during project implementation</li> <li>• Learning during M&amp;E</li> </ul>

Source: ELI and GEF IEO.

**Acknowledgment can appear in mentions of several conflict-related phenomena.** These include conflict itself; associated political instability and fragility; and the presence of refugees, displaced persons, combatants, and ex-combatants. The project appraisal document for the Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-silvo-pastoral Resources Democratic Republic of Congo child project, for instance, lists the country’s “succession of conflicts,” including the “war of the Democratic Force Alliance for the liberation of Congo in 1998 [and the] war of the Congolese Rally for Democracy between 1998 and 2003” up to conflicts “still happening today,” when establishing the project’s context. The document acknowledged the history of conflict, but did not indicate specific risks that the conflict posed to the project; nor did it propose measures to manage those risks.

**Where project documents do propose measures to mitigate or otherwise manage conflict-related risks, they tend to provide more specificity about the risks.** For example, some project documents highlight the location of combatants or ex-combatants in relation to the project site. A project document for Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains in Cambodia described the project location by explaining that “[f]rom the early 1970s the region was a central base of the Khmer Rouge and as a consequence experienced long periods of conflict and civil war, which only ceased in 1998.” Beyond the Khmer Rouge presence, the document stated that the “military poses the most significant risk to the project” because of its involvement in illegal logging, large-scale hunting, and wildlife trade. A section on the implications of the 1998–99 Kosovo War in the project brief for North Macedonia’s Mini-Hydropower Project (GEF ID 32) lists refugees among the “[n]egative repercussions” of the war and identifies “transboundary refugee movements” as a potential resulting issue between Albania and Kosovo.

**At the design stage, some projects acknowledge the impact that conflict has had on the environment and natural resources.** Projects may highlight instances of illegal resource use, such as logging, wildlife trade, and poaching, that take place during conflict; one such project is Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range, which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks. Several projects note the lasting impacts of land mines. The project brief for Cambodia’s Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains, for example, mentions that “[l]andmines, armaments and munitions are still widespread” and expresses concern that “the same landmines are then being deployed in the forest to hunt wildlife.” Pollution from an armed conflict has also motivated efforts to address locations suffering from acute pollution (sometimes referred to as environmental hotspots), for example, from “the destruction of electrical and military equipment during regional conflicts, such as the Balkans and the Israel-Lebanon wars,” as noted in a project document for the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean Large Marine Ecosystem-Regional Component (GEF ID 2600), which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks.

**Uncontrolled development is another impact of conflict on the environment with implications for GEF projects.** A project document for Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon’s Woodland Resources, for example, noted that “[u]ncontrolled urban expansion occurred in particular during the civil war, when many people wished to settle away from the urban centres for security reasons.” Project documents have noted the impacts of conflict on ecotourism (e.g., the project appraisal document for Preparation of the Republic of Moldova’s Second Biennial Update Report to UNFCCC [GEF ID 9414], which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks), water infrastructure (e.g., DBSB Water Quality Protection Project under

WB-GEF Strategic Partnership for Nutrient Reduction in the Danube River and Black Sea [GEF ID 2143]), and energy infrastructure (e.g., Energy Efficiency Project in Burundi [GEF ID 4133]).

**In addition to acknowledging the impacts of the conflict on the environment, some projects have recognized that the effects of conflict (and peace processes) on environmental governance pose risks and obstacles to project success.** Some peace agreements create institutional arrangements that can complicate governance. For example, a project document for the Water Quality Protection Project in the Balkans noted that the institutional structure created by the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “while mitigating the potential for inter-ethnic tensions and conflict[,] is rather complicated and a potential source of diseconomies.” Insecurity associated with conflict can make it difficult to physically access project sites, particularly protected areas. Project documentation for the Natural Resources and Poverty Alleviation Project in Afghanistan mentions that “some difficulties could arise in communications routes to/from the protected areas” of focus. After conflict, the political push for economic development can take priority over environmental protection. A project document for Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon’s Woodland Resources identified the “[n]eed for quick reconstruction of the country in the post-war period” as one of the root causes of conversion of woodland. Environmental data are often missing, making it difficult to make governance decisions; this was cited in a project document for Cambodia’s Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Pilot Project for the Virachey National Park, which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks.

The remaining four approaches adopted by GEF projects to conflict-sensitive design and implementation—avoidance, mitigation, embracing the peacebuilding opportunities, and learning—go

beyond simple acknowledgment of the risk and identify measures to manage the risk.

## MANAGING CONFLICT RISKS THROUGH AVOIDANCE

**The simplest approach to managing conflict-related risks is avoidance.** To mitigate the risks posed by a situation’s conflict context, some project proponents have deliberately selected a geographic location for the project that is physically removed from areas affected by conflict. For example, a project document for the Integrated Silvo-Pastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management [GEF ID 947] in Colombia noted that the “Quindio departments face some security problems because of armed insurrection, paramilitary forces and common delinquency,” and subsequently ruled out the possibility of working there. In light of the security risk factors, the “high mountain zones were therefore discarded, even if livestock systems in those higher altitudes” were better suited for the project objectives. Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan and Developing Core Capacity for Decentralized MEA Implementation and Natural Resources Management in Afghanistan [GEF ID 5017] similarly decided to select areas “that have experienced calm and good governance.”

**Although avoidance can help to manage conflict-related risks, it has its limitations.** Many conflict-affected regions are biodiversity hotspots (Hanson et al. 2009). Systematically avoiding those areas because of conflict—rather than taking other measures to manage the risk—may contribute to biodiversity loss and overall lower achievement of the GEF’s desired global environmental benefits, particularly those related to biodiversity and land degradation. Moreover, the geographic range of conflicts can change quickly, so relying solely on avoidance can be shortsighted.

## MANAGING CONFLICT RISKS THROUGH MITIGATION

**Mitigation strategies directly address conflict-related risks in project design and implementation.** Generally, mitigation strategies recognize that the conflict-affected or fragile context presents risks to the project, and then seek to identify them early on and address them before they escalate and seriously affect the project. The reviewed GEF projects adopted six categories of approaches that mitigate conflict-related risks: training, monitoring, using a participatory approach, partnering with local organizations, instituting dispute resolution mechanisms, and using adaptive management.

**Recognizing that environmental staff may lack expertise in conflict management, some projects have sought to build capacity of staff to understand and manage conflict-related risks to environmental projects.** For example, in Mali, Enabling Sustainable Dryland Management Through Mobile Pastoral Custodianship (GEF ID 2193) used training materials on natural resources conflict management that had been produced by FAO (the GEF Agency) and DfID.

**Another approach to mitigating conflict-related risks is to develop mechanisms to monitor security conditions that could affect activities.** Fragile and conflict-affected situations can be volatile, with the security situation changing both dramatically and rapidly. Monitoring enables project staff to detect emerging risks early, before they have escalated. Monitoring often begins with baseline assessments, as in the Mopti Region Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources project. While a project is under way, monitoring can continue to inform risk management and ensure rapid action to reduce the risk of negative impacts.

**Participatory approaches that equitably engage all affected stakeholders have been used as a mitigation strategy, especially where tension exists between different actors.** Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options for Afghan Communities in Panjshir, Balkh, Uruzgan and Herat Provinces to Manage Climate Change-induced Disaster Risks (GEF ID 5202) in Afghanistan, for example, aims to ensure “an inclusive, participatory approach involving all key stakeholders” to mitigate the risk of inter-community conflict. Similarly, the Kagera River Basin project in the Albertine Rift (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) identifies in its PIF “a decentralized, participatory and adaptive management approach” and “extensive stakeholder consultations from local to basin-wide level” in the design stage to mitigate the risk of civil strife and insecurity. With participatory approaches, a project also often strengthens the participation of traditionally underrepresented or otherwise marginalized groups, including “buffer zone and rural communities” and women—as in the Colombian National Protected Areas Conservation Trust Fund (GEF ID 2551) and Columbia’s Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation project, respectively.

A non-GEF project carried out in the Farchana refugee camp in Chad illustrates the importance of consulting with local communities ahead of project implementation. It is speculated that at least one outbreak of violence, leading to the death of two refugees and multiple other injuries, began when an implementing agency “asked the refugees to plant trees” (IRIN News 2004). Across West Africa, tree planting is viewed as a demonstration of land ownership. When the Darfuri refugees were asked to plant trees, they interpreted the request to mean that they were being given the land surrounding the refugee camp and could not expect to return to Darfur. Had the project staff undertaken an earlier consultation with the refugees or others from



the community, they may have been “able to avoid this misinterpretation and its subsequent violence” (Rehrl 2009).

**Consideration of staffing, job creation, and procurement—all of which affect local livelihoods—across social divides can mitigate conflict-related risks.** Such consideration can help ensure that a project does not unintentionally entrench existing inequities. Careful selection of project staff can be important. Project documentation for Conservation of Snow Leopards and Their Critical Ecosystem in Afghanistan, for example, specified that “[p]roject staff employed will be from local Wakhan communities, wherever possible” to reduce the risk of a potential resurgence of conflict. Awareness of conflict dynamics can drive decisions concerning distribution of jobs created by project activities. The project brief for North Macedonia’s Mini-Hydropower Project specified that the project would create “local construction jobs and a very few jobs when the units are operational, which will benefit both ethnic groups,” namely Macedonian and Albanian community members with lingering tensions from the Kosovo War.

**Partnering with local groups and communities has been used to help mitigate conflict-related risks.** Before entering a conflict-affected area, projects can work with in-country/economy and local partners to lay the groundwork for coordinated implementation. In the Albertine Rift, the Kagera River Basin project set out to “obtain full cooperation of local and national government authorities for inter-sectoral processes” to mitigate security risks, according to a project document. Other projects work with local partners to learn from their experiences and so project activities can continue even if security conditions worsen. In the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region project, the World Bank worked with the Humboldt Institute because of its experience in Colombia’s conflict-affected areas, which allowed the project

“to work in rural areas and avoid security problems,” as per the project appraisal document. The PIF for Community-Based Forest Management for Biodiversity Conservation and Climate Change Mitigation in Afghanistan (GEF ID 9090) noted that on-the-ground activities would “be coordinated by local-level authorities so that project activities can be completed in relative independence during times of increased security concerns.” Local partnerships can directly engage combatant groups that affect the project (see, e.g., Pritchard 2015). Support to the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation’s Program for the Rehabilitation of the DRC’s National Parks Network (GEF ID 2100) in the Albertine Rift, for example, explained in a project document that its “proposed integration of Simba communities into project activities is an important element of the project,” given the group’s presence and history of rebellion in the area surrounding the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Maiko National Park.<sup>8</sup>

**Projects have also established dispute resolution mechanisms to peacefully resolve disputes before they escalate to violence or conflict.** These mechanisms can rely on or draw from traditional institutions and practices. Project documents for Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options for Afghan Communities and Mali’s Mopti Region Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources project, for example, both specify that customary dispute resolution mechanisms will be used to mitigate conflict-related risks. Conflict resolution mechanisms can also support a project’s participatory approach. Another project in Mali, Scaling up and Replicating Successful Sustainable Land

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<sup>8</sup> In addition, a project document for Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains proposed working with the Cambodian armed forces, which had integrated ex-combatants from the Khmer Rouge and other combatant groups after hostilities ended.

Management and Agroforestry Practices in the Koulikoro Region of Mali (GEF ID 5746), aims to reduce the number of conflicts in the project area by half through a “conflict resolution mechanism including 30% women as members,” according to a project document. Partners on the ground can also help resolve conflicts when they do arise. The Mali project looks to community-based organizations to “contribute to the conflicts resolution” and to municipalities to “[c]ontribute to the resolution of possible conflicts in the context of the implementation of the project.”

**Lastly, a number of projects have integrated adaptive management approaches into their design.**

Adaptive management relies on monitoring, periodic evaluations, and—most important—an ability to adjust strategies to address new information and developments. Some projects have stated generally that the project will adapt to changing circumstances. The Rehabilitation of the National Parks Network in the Albertine Rift drew on the World Bank’s experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo; a project document noted the importance of keeping project design “simple and flexible.” Project documents can also specify ways in which the project could adapt if security conditions worsen. A project document for Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Matavén Forest in Colombia proposed a general adaptive approach that would allow modification of project activities. This approach included a number of measures, including a conflict resolution mechanism, and “a flexible design that would allow the modification of some activities according to the security situation (e.g., meetings to be held outside of the region), without affecting project development objective.” The PIF for Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options for Afghan Communities indicated that the project would monitor the security situation and “if necessary, project activities will be shifted to more secure districts or management.”

**Occasionally, projects explicitly contemplate the resource requirements of adaptive actions.** That is to say, even when projects referred to adaptive management or adaptation strategies to manage risks of working in fragile or conflict-affected situations, there was rarely any evidence that they had estimated how much the adaptations might cost, let alone included a budget line. One uncommon example was the proposal for Transboundary Conservation of the Greater Virunga Landscape (GEF ID 2888) in the Albertine Rift, which highlighted the need to evaluate “what it will cost now and projected into the future under various scenarios (good security to intermittent security).”

Interviews with project staff indicated that the costs required to respond to a potential conflict flare-up can be listed as a separate budget line without allocated funds in the design phase, making it easier to efficiently reallocate funds if the security situation deteriorates. Specific and detailed planning for adaptive actions and their costs allows projects to more efficiently change course when the security situation demands it.

## **MANAGING CONFLICT RISKS BY EMBRACING PEACEBUILDING OPPORTUNITIES**

**Several projects have gone beyond merely trying to manage the risks of conflict to proactively embracing peacebuilding opportunities presented by the conflict or fragile context.** There are four particular types of opportunities in the reviewed GEF-funded projects: political will, cooperation and confidence building, postconflict recovery, and reintegration of ex-combatants.

**Some projects have observed that the heightened political priority and political will focused on peacebuilding during conflict and postconflict periods create opportunities for the project.** A project document for Cambodia’s Developing an

Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains notes that “[p]ost crisis conditions create a special set of circumstances which represent both a threat and a significant opportunity for the conservation of nature and natural resources.” In particular, the postconflict inflow of international funding allowed for a reexamination of Cambodia’s protected area system and development of effective management plans for existing protected areas. Projects have framed their relevance in part as implementing the peace agreement. The PIF for Integrated Management of Biodiversity in the Pacific Region of Colombia, for example, emphasized the positive implications of the 2016 peace agreement by identifying the GEF’s opportunity to support “the inclusion of environmental management criteria in these updated planning tools.” Projects also identify specific ways that conflict and peace dynamics can contribute to the project. As an example, the project document for Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range in Mali explained that the 2017 ceasefire agreement “could be a boon for elephant protection in Mali, as the security tensions should decrease providing opportunity for this GEF project.”

**Projects in the GEF international waters focal area have cited increased cooperation as a co-benefit.** For instance, a project document for the West Balkans Drina River Basin Management Project (GEF ID 5723) explained that “[i]nter-state cooperation in the [Drina River Basin] has a potential to ease conflicting interests, and provide gains in the form of savings that can be achieved, or the costs of non-cooperation or dispute that can be averted.” Cooperation can even be a motivating factor for countries/economies to participate in projects. Project documents for both tranches of the Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project highlighted that “there is an awareness at the highest political levels of the Nile countries of the possibilities of a ‘cooperation and peace

dividend’ which the broader [Nile Basin Initiative] can leverage” “to achieve cooperation, economic exchange and eventually greater integration and interdependence.”

**Some projects identify how they will rebuild livelihoods, infrastructure, capacity, and ecosystems as part of the broader postconflict recovery process.** A project document for the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project in the Albertine Rift, for example, stated that one of the project’s broad goals was to “help restore productive capacity and livelihoods in a country that is just emerging from severe conflict by revitalizing and diversifying its agricultural production on a sustainable basis.” Technology Transfer for Climate Resilient Flood Management in Vrbas River Basin (GEF ID 5604)—which was implemented “among the worst war devastated communities” in Bosnia and Herzegovina where substantial water infrastructure was destroyed—similarly explained that the project, “by transferring best available climate resilient flood risk management, will...contribute to further reconciliation in a war damaged area.”

**Other projects adopt an approach of building back better with an eye toward future conflict prevention.** A project information document for Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia’s Orinoquia Region stated that “[b]y implementing activities for controlling deforestation hot-spots, it is anticipated that the [integrated land-use planning] component will also contribute to improving State presence in areas affected by violence and illicit activities, thus reducing illegal land acquisition and land related conflicts.” The document claimed that, on a broader level, the sustainable land use and management component “will contribute to reduce the historical disparity between urban and rural areas, one of the structural causes of the Colombian conflict.” Also in Colombia, Conservation of Biodiversity in Landscapes Impacted by Mining in the Chocó

Biogeographic Region (GEF ID 4916) and the GEF Small Grants Programme, according to the PIF, funded community enterprises to process and commercialize nontimber forest products in the biodiverse Chocó Region, providing alternative livelihoods to mining.

**GEF projects have also been designed to engage with processes to reintegrate ex-combatants and displaced persons.**

A project document for the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project noted that the project aligns with the Burundi government's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, which supports "the reintegration of displaced persons and other victims of conflict into agricultural production." Actors in armed conflict—including members of rebel groups—can also serve as partners in project implementation. The Rehabilitation of the National Parks Network Project in the Albertine Rift proposed integrating "Simba communities into project activities" in Maiko National Park. A project document for Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains in Cambodia similarly highlighted that its education program would focus on "awareness and pride in key species conservation" among the "armed forces and at military bases" because the military was among the most involved in illegal natural resource use. During implementation, project staff communicated frequently with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to assess the security situation during the Thai-Cambodian border dispute starting in 2008. Members of the military also escorted project personnel through the forests in the project's area of work in Cambodia's Northern Plains.

**Other GEF projects explicitly note the role natural resource management can play in conflict resolution.**

A project document for the Kagera River Basin project in the Albertine Rift, for instance, argued that reversing land degradation would "reduce conflicts over resources for instance between farmers and herders." Similarly, the project appraisal

document for the Colombian National Protected Areas Conservation Trust Fund noted that "environmental themes may contribute to the solution of the armed conflict." Although these projects did not describe in detail how they might build peace, the acknowledgment of their potential role in the process in itself is notable. Columbia's Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation project appraisal document, in contrast, directly addressed how the project would contribute to peacebuilding, namely by "improv[ing] interinstitutional coordination...and promot[ing] platforms for dialogue and peace building that address the principal barriers that prevent the reduction of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon."

## MANAGING CONFLICT RISKS BY LEARNING

**Many GEF projects implemented in fragile and conflict-affected settings learn from both their own experiences and from other programming.**

Learning in the reviewed GEF-funded projects takes three forms: (1) identification of ways in which conflict or fragility threatened project success, (2) positive assessment of conflict-sensitive strategies used in project implementation that paid dividends in project success, and (3) recommendation of strategies that were not used during implementation but should be used in future programming. Learning can come from within GEF-funded projects, from non-GEF projects implemented by GEF Agencies, and from non-GEF projects implemented by other institutions. For a summary of learning by GEF Agencies on conflict-sensitive programming, see [box 4.1](#).

Project staff have been learning about the negative impacts of conflicts on project implementation, particularly as a precipitating factor in project cancellation, difficulty in carrying out project activities, and limited on-site staff involvement because of risks to personnel. UNDP's Afghanistan office, for

#### Box 4.1 Lessons learned by GEF Agencies

With a growing body of experiences related to programming in conflict-afflicted and fragile situations, GEF Agencies have increasingly examined lessons from these experiences to inform future programming. Some of these reflect broad lessons learned; others focus on particular dimensions such as gender or conflict prevention. Following is a sample of flagship reports and other publications distilling lessons.

##### African Development Bank

- [From Fragility to Resilience: Mitigating Natural Resources and Fragile Situations in Africa](#) (2016)

##### Asian Development Bank

- [Mapping Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations in Asia and the Pacific](#) (2016)
- [Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situation: Pilot Fragility Assessment of an Informal Urban Settlement in Kiribati](#) (2013)

##### Inter-American Development Bank

- [Lessons from Four Decades of Infrastructure Project-Related Conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) (2017)
- [Conflict Management and Consensus Building for Integrated Coastal Management in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) (2000)

##### International Fund for Agricultural Development

- [Fostering Inclusive Rural Transformation in Fragile States and Situations](#) (2017) (with Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services)
- [Fragile Situations \(Rural Development Report\)](#) (2016)
- [IFAD's Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations: Corporate-Level Evaluation](#) (2015)

##### United Nations Development Programme

- [Risk-Informed Development – From Crisis to Resilience](#) (2019) (with others)
- [Local Ownership in Conflict Sensitivity Application – The Case of Nepal](#) (2017) (with others)

##### United Nations Environment Programme

- [Gender, Climate, and Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change](#) (2020) (with others)
- [Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Programme – Final Report](#) (2016)
- [Women and Natural Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential](#) (2013) (with others)
- [The Role of Natural Resources in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Addressing Risks and Seizing Opportunities](#) (2013) (with UNDP)
- [Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations](#) (2012) (with others)
- [Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Analysis and Inventory of International Law](#) (2009)
- [From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment](#) (2009)

##### World Bank Group

- [Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Poverty](#) (World Bank 2020a)
- [Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict](#) (2018) (with United Nations)
- [Strengthening Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Climate Change in MENA](#) (2018)
- [World Bank Group Engagement in Situations for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: An Independent Evaluation](#) (2016)
- [Enhancing Sensitivity to Conflict Risks in World Bank-funded Activities: Lessons from the Kyrgyz Republic](#) (2014)
- [Renewable Natural Resource: Practical Lessons for Conflict-Sensitive Development](#) (2009)
- [Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations](#) (2006)
- [Towards Conflict-Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy](#) (2005)
- [Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions](#) (2003)

instance, requested cancellation of the Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management project “[i]n light of the challenging security conditions in the country in 2009.” Short of cancellation, projects can also face delays because of conflict.<sup>9</sup> The terminal evaluation for Mali’s Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project explained that “[w]ith the exception of some emergency operations, IDA suspended all operational activities in Mali” after the March 2012 coup d’état.

**Even when a project as a whole has continued, discrete project activities may encounter difficulties because of conflict.** For the Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika project (GEF ID 398) in the Albertine Rift, 12 of the project’s 17 quarterly progress reports outlined the ramifications of changing security conditions in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo on project operations. Stated impacts ranged from reduced fishing activity “because of army fears that rebels are using fishing boats to transport raiding parties” to insecurity continuing to “seriously limit activities in the Francophone region” of Lake Tanganyika and field staff being unable to sample all of the project’s river monitoring locations. Reflecting on these challenges, the 1998 and 1999 project implementation reviews assessed as high the probability that the project’s assumption that the lake’s security situation would improve throughout implementation “may fail to hold or materialize.”

**Learning has also highlighted the risks to project staff and affiliated partners.** For example, the terminal evaluation notes that during implementation of Cambodia’s Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains “[s]everal security-related incidents prompted the project to suspend activities and temporarily remove staff from Phnom Aural Wildlife

Sanctuary.” Two rangers in the sanctuary in which the project operated were murdered during the project, which led to a transfer of responsibilities to the Ministry of the Environment.

**Some projects have identified and noted successful strategies from other projects to inform their programming.** One approach that has been highlighted is the use of a simple, flexible project design. Drawing on the World Bank’s work since 2002 in postconflict Democratic Republic of Congo, the Rehabilitation of the National Parks Network project recommended in its design stage that the project team keep its design “simple and flexible.” The terminal evaluation for the Energy Efficiency Project in the Albertine Rift noted that the “project design was kept simple considering the country’s post-conflict environment” and assessed that that was a justified mitigation measure given the conflict-related risks. The STAP review for Integrated Management of Biodiversity in the Pacific Region of Colombia suggested that the project designers ground their assumptions about the project’s peacebuilding potential by making an effort to “learn lessons from post-conflict states and consult with expert organizations such as the Environmental Law Institute and UN Environment’s Expert Group on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding” (GEF STAP 2017, 2).

**Projects also reflect on the importance, particularly at an interpersonal level, of building trust and a common cause between various actors involved in project implementation.** This can start at the project design phase. The Transboundary Conservation of the Greater Virunga Landscape project in the Albertine Rift, for example, looked to the example of the International Gorilla Conservation Program, a joint initiative between Flora and Fauna International, World Wide Fund for Nature, and the African Wildlife Foundation. A project document remarked that this collaboration between Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo “primarily ha[d] worked because it was built

<sup>9</sup> Conflict-related delays are discussed in [section 4.2](#).

at the field level first rather than being imposed from above.” The potential for person-to-person relationships to break through international tensions also appeared in the design of the Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project, Tranche 1 (GEF ID 1094) in the Albertine Rift. Drafters highlighted that the Nile Basin initiative’s past programming showed that “[d]eveloping trust and personal relations among riparian delegations from countries that have often been in conflict for decades or more is a key ingredient to moving the process further.” The Rehabilitation of the National Parks Network project in the Albertine Rift expanded further on the example of the International Gorilla Conservation Program, with a project document noting “it demonstrated that it is possible to achieve effective trans-border cooperation for conservation, even between warring parties, by getting them to rally round a common cause.”

**GEF Agencies and other organizations have learned that engagement with the local community can help projects succeed.** The project document for the Mopti Region Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources project in Mali indicated that it would draw on the successes of an International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) project in the same region, particularly in relying on “the traditional management systems at the sites and project areas in order to involve all the local stakeholders in the processes of designing and implementing the activities.” In the Albertine Rift, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project learned from an earlier GEF-funded project in Lake Tanganyika that was “hampered by civil unrest” (box 4.2) and addressed conflict-related risks in Burundi in part “by supporting close coordination among beneficiaries,” according to a project document.

**Projects have learned that local organizations, too, are valuable partners.** In the Albertine Rift, the Rehabilitation of the National Parks Network

project drew on the World Bank’s experience in postconflict Democratic Republic of Congo, with a project document recommending that the project “empower perennial institutions,” like government agencies, and “engage local NGOs in program implementation.”

**Several projects have learned the value of monitoring and apportioning resources to respond to security conditions.** The project document for Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range in Mali referenced the strategies of the Mali Elephant Project, which kept “informed of the detailed situation across the elephant range through its network of informants that include the 670 eco-guards” and “adapt[ed] their behaviour accordingly,” as a possible measure to mitigate the risk of military conflict and jihadist insurgency. In more concrete terms, the terminal evaluation of the Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project Phase II (GEF ID 2584) stated that the project had responded to insecurity and conflict by providing “necessary resources for security related equipment and escorts.”

**Learning can also reflect on negative experiences and recommend alternative approaches for future programming.** For example, reviewers and evaluators have at times identified steps that future projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings could take to improve their outcomes. This learning often focuses on adequately assessing risks and setting realistic project objectives. The terminal evaluation for the Africa Stockpiles Program (GEF ID 1348) Mali component noted that the project design “was preconfigured at the program-level, and did not reflect any country-specific modifications or lessons learned from previous projects executed in Mali.” As a consequence, “[n]either the PAD [project appraisal document] nor the Operations Manual included risks of delays due to... political instability” in Mali. The terminal evaluation for the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project in the Albertine Rift

#### Box 4.2 Learning from the Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity Project

Running from 1991 to 2006, this project sought to demonstrate an effective regional approach to controlling pollution and preventing the loss of biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika's international waters through collaboration between Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia. Overall, this project was scored favorably in the terminal evaluation and included significant references to conflict sensitivity in project design documents. The project also dealt with significant and frequent insecurity in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo during implementation.

A results and experiences document created in February 2001 dedicated a section to lessons learned by the project for the benefit of future programming in the region and other areas affected by civil war and insecurity (West 2001). It highlighted six key lessons.

- **Remain flexible and seek creative solutions.** This lesson is related to the project's decision to relocate project staff to the Democratic Republic of Congo because of a Phase III UN security rating in Burundi, where the unit was intended to be based. Relocation was deemed less convenient, but the flexibility to relocate immediately paid off after a subsequent Phase IV security rating in Burundi during project implementation. Burundi's increased insecurity would potentially have been "devastating to the project" (West 2001, 110). Additionally, this arrangement allowed the Democratic Republic of Congo to remain more engaged in the project.
- **Maintain a presence.** The project found that when staff could not reside in project areas, a "considerable amount could be accomplished through emails, telephone calls and short-term visits to the country (as UNDP allowed) by regional staff or visits by national staff to other countries to meet with regional staff" (West 2001, 111).
- **Foster regional collaboration.** The project was able to "hold regional meetings, formulate a Strategic Action Programme and draft a Legal Convention during a period of strained relationships among Tanganyika's four riparian nations" (West 2001, 112). This was achieved through close collaboration between project partners on various technical aspects of the project, which "forced participants to see beyond the prevailing political climate and fostered regional collaboration."
- **Remain neutral.** The project specifically found that it was "crucial that expatriate staff and national staff in managerial and coordinating roles be agreeable to collaborating with any and all stakeholders and, moreover, be seen to be impartial" (West 2001, 112). This was relevant because the "government and armed forces in charge of eastern [Democratic Republic of the] Congo changed several times over the project's course," and "Burundi had four national coordinators during the life of the project."
- **Do not underestimate people's good will during difficult times.** The project found that national partners were often "tired and frustrated with the deteriorating political-economic situation that was beyond their control," and "wanted to be a part of something bigger that they perceived to be a good cause" (West 2001, 112). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, local staff were "confident, productive and took a new pride in their work" despite low or nonexistent wages in their roles. Overall, it was emphasized that small incentives for local partners and the feeling of being part of a good cause can help stabilize communities during conflict.
- **Be briefed on security and have contingency plans.** The project found that acting based on the UN's security plans and taking part in "regular security briefing sessions and periodic personal security workshops" (West 2001, 113) combined with good fortune to ensure that project staff were never in immediate danger during the project. Additionally, contingency plans and communication with local staff helped ensure evacuations went smoothly during periods of insecurity.



critiqued the project's objectives, mentioning that the "target set for net profits of 30% [for the project's rural producer beneficiaries] is unrealistically high for these types of operations, particularly in a post conflict situation."

The terminal evaluation noted that during implementation of its Mini-Hydropower Project, North Macedonia was experiencing "a period of turbulence...caused first by the wave of...refugees during the Kosovo War and second by severe civil unrest and tension between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups in the country." Despite the tension, however, the project "encouraged continuing communication and cooperation between the two ethnic communities," a co-benefit. The terminal evaluation review rated the terminal evaluation's "lessons learned" section as moderately unsatisfactory, saying in particular that the section "could have addressed how to overcome ethnic tensions to achieve project objectives in future projects, but failed to do so."

## CONCLUSIONS

The typology of conflict-sensitive approaches to programming advanced in this report—acknowledgment, avoidance, mitigation, peacebuilding, and learning—draws upon GEF innovations and experiences. It was developed organically by the project team, based on the findings of the in-depth analysis of designing GEF projects. Many of the approaches may also be found in the peer-reviewed and gray literature on conflict-sensitive programming (e.g., Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012; Akinyoad 2010).

### 4.4 Conflict-sensitive programming across the project life cycle

This section highlights entry points for conflict-sensitive programming across the project

life cycle. It draws upon GEF documents, experiences with GEF projects (gleaned both from project documentation and from interviews), and the broader literature on conflict-sensitive programming. It includes subsections on project design, implementation, closure, and evaluation and learning.

## PROJECT DESIGN

Conflict-sensitive project design comprises four key steps: context analysis, consultation, the development of specific conflict-sensitive measures, and budgeting. These are discussed below, with particular reference to experience from GEF projects, supplemented by international good practice.

### Context analysis

**Context analysis—including conflict analysis, environmental and social impact assessments, and stakeholder identification and analysis—is essential to informing project design.** Generally, GEF projects already undertake stakeholder identification and analysis and environmental and social impact assessments; conflict analysis is less common. There are several existing tools to guide conflict analysis;<sup>10</sup> these emphasize analyzing the profile (character), causes (structural, proximate, trigger), actors (their interests, goals, positions, capacities, and relationships), and dynamics (current trends, possible scenarios, opportunities for change) of a given conflict. The International Institute for Sustainable Development adds a further dimension, advising practitioners to consider what types of conflict may affect their work; examples include human-wildlife, park-people, institutional, protected area resource access, transboundary, intercommunity, political, and benefit distribution (Hammill et al. 2009). Once categories of risk

<sup>10</sup> See DfID (2012); for a comparison of 15 conflict analysis toolkits, see International Alert et al. (2004), table 3.

are identified, project proponents can create priority criteria and rank their identified conflicts before brainstorming potential mitigation strategies.

**The process for proposing and reviewing GEF-supported projects does not explicitly require project proponents to take account of risks related to fragility or conflict.** Currently, the GEF asks proponents to account for possible risks through the use of risk tables in PIFs. These tables require project proponents to enumerate potential risks to achieving their proposed objectives and strategies for risk mitigation. However, the PIF does not require consideration of risks related to fragility or conflict. As shown in [annex G](#), in a review of PIFs for 62 GEF projects in situations affected by major armed conflict, only 39 PIFs identified conflict as a risk, and only 33 of the projects proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks.

**The GEF Secretariat gives additional attention to conflict-related risks when reviewing projects proposed for funding under the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.** For projects in fragile and conflict-affected states, the GEF Secretariat reviews project proposals to these funds with an expectation of reference to conflict risk and associated mitigation strategies. Interviews with GEF Secretariat staff members indicated that when proposals to these funds lack these elements, the proponent is generally contacted and requested to address conflict-related risks. Such consideration during project review appears to be less common for other GEF funding streams. As a result, the extent to which fragility and conflict are accounted for at this stage of planning remains uneven across the GEF portfolio.

**Some GEF Agencies have created their own tools to standardize conflict risk assessment in project design.** For example, as interviewees noted, the World Bank, ADB, AfDB, UNDP, and Conservation International have found that such tools and

practices are necessary for properly managing risk in their portfolios, applying standardized methods across all projects, including those they have taken on with the GEF. For example, AfDB has systematized the application of a “fragility lens” and a Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment tool to integrate considerations of fragility into country strategy papers and Bank operations (AfDB 2018).

## Consultation

**Agency staff designing GEF projects often consult with stakeholders.** Consultation during project design broadens support for project implementation. It is also important because stakeholders often have contextual information that cannot be obtained through desk research; hence, project design is usually more appropriate when stakeholders are consulted. For example, when implementing Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Production Processes in Lebanon, project staff realized that the sites they had selected during design were actually not suited to their goals. They then had to undertake a thorough study to choose new sites. As part of this study, they involved local communities to inquire about their cultivation practices—an important element of the project’s implementation. They also reached out to the Lebanese military to get more information on the location of cluster bombs. Consultation with the military allowed the project team to avoid sites that would pose major security concerns to their staff.

**Some GEF projects implemented by UNDP have used a participatory process to develop a map of risks and resources.** Such maps are developed using a participatory approach with community members and lay out the significant risks and assets associated with a project site. UNDP Lebanon adapted this mapping tool to create a local version known as Mechanism of Stability and Resilience. This version begins with the same participatory approach but further accounts for

existing tensions in the community identified by the project staff and local NGOs. UNDP has leveraged its experience with this process to create reports encouraging other development agencies to take up similar practices (UNDP 2003).

### Development of specific conflict-sensitive measures

**Based on information from the context analysis—particularly the conflict analysis—GEF Agencies have included a range of conflict-sensitive measures in project design.** In some cases, this has meant modifying the project site or activities; in others, it has entailed the addition of specific measures such as scenario planning and contingency plans. The broad range of conflict-sensitive measures is discussed in [section 4.3](#).

GEF projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected countries/economies have introduced five broad strategies to address risks related to conflict and fragility; these are detailed in this subsection:

- The use of moderate objectives
- Flexible design
- Stakeholder engagement
- Dispute resolution
- Engaging local customary norms and institutions.

**In several instances, GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings have sought to establish realistic project objectives.** Numerous key informants emphasized the importance of setting realistic project objectives, especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Moreover, interviews with key informants stressed that projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings often needed to emphasize institution building, capacity building, and generally creating an enabling environment for interventions.

**Some GEF projects have built in increased flexibility to address shifting dynamics associated with fragility and conflict.** Creating space to be flexible is important to the survival of a given project. The Rehabilitation of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s National Parks Network project provides a useful example of simple and flexible project design. The project was approved in 2007, just a few years following the end of the second Congo war and one year after the adoption of the current constitution (Council on Foreign Relations 2020; Cooper 2013). The project document states explicitly that the “current post-conflict and reunification context of the [Democratic Republic of Congo] calls for simple and flexible project design.” Keeping this in mind, the proponents chose to focus on limited activities in a few locations. They also included time in their projected schedule to hold annual coordination meetings to adapt their project activities to the evolving conflict context. Notably, the choice to pursue this model was influenced by the proponents’ dedication to learning from past projects implemented in this context. The project document explains the rationale for the project design and uses lessons learned from past projects instituted by the World Bank, UNDP, and the GEF to help develop an inclusive and flexible model.

The Burundi Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project also used different mechanisms to build in increased flexibility at the design phase. Like the Democratic Republic of Congo project, the Burundi project underwent a careful selection process for its project sites and tried to limit localities to ensure better manageability. One of the project’s components focused on the selection, funding, and implementation of a variety of subprojects. The project design included an extensive list of criteria to be used in evaluating these potential subprojects. As noted in the project document, one of these criteria was for subprojects to be classified as “lacking in conflict” or stable prior to approval, giving the project

staff the choice to reject subprojects they deemed too risky.

**GEF projects often rely on increased stakeholder participation to address conflict-related impacts.**

Proponents in some projects sought to involve stakeholders throughout the project design and implementation stages. For example, the Congo Basin Strategic Program's Forest and Nature Conservation Project, implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo shortly after the 2008 peace agreement with Rwanda, incorporated local partners heavily into its project design to accommodate the rapidly changing conditions in the country. According to its PIF, the project, recognizing the likelihood of lasting instability, adopted "a simple and flexible design, involving partnerships with local and international NGOs that have continued to work on the ground during the recent conflicts and have the capacity to suspend and restart operations quickly." The project leveraged the experience of local organizations to improve its resilience.

Similarly, the Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-silvo-pastoral Resources child project in the Democratic Republic of Congo identified in its project document that civil insecurity outbreaks would pose a significant risk that "cannot be mitigated by the project." Accordingly, project staff used participatory approaches to address conflict where they could. For example, the staff used a participatory approach to land management that both advanced the project's environmental objectives and sought to decrease the prevalence of conflict resulting from land disputes. Furthermore, project staff stated in interviews that they believed transferring greater ownership of the project to local entities would improve its conflict resilience and its ability to operate in insecure contexts.

Designers of Cambodia's Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains anticipated that project activities might

face risk from the previous "protracted period of political turmoil" in the Cardamom region. The project document also identified concerns that vested interests in illegal logging and wildlife trade might hinder stakeholder support for the project. As a result, interviewees stressed, the project was designed with "stakeholder participation at all levels" as a "cornerstone of project implementation." According to the terminal evaluation, the project was ultimately able to use stakeholder participation to address these risks. The project experienced significant community buy-in and was able to improve law enforcement regarding illegal logging and wildlife trade both through outreach to the Ministry of Environment's rangers as well as through community-level law enforcement efforts.

Also in Cambodia, the Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains project sought to engage with stakeholders who posed potential risks to the project. The project document observed that unavoidable interactions with the Cambodian military posed a significant risk to the project's success. To help manage this, the project document laid out programming to increase investment by the military in the outcomes of the project, including holding "environmental education awareness-raising for armed forces" and increasing military involvement in local law enforcement efforts. Interviews with the project staff revealed that these activities helped create greater loyalty to the project among the members of the military they worked with, aiding in project activities.

**GEF projects sometimes have used peaceful dispute resolution as a risk mitigation mechanism.**

Although projects generally preferred to avoid conflict, some were able to leverage their connections to various stakeholders to actively reduce conflict risks through project design. For example, in preparing for the Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains project, the project staff worked with the

Cambodian government to broker agreements with communities living on the selected project sites. As noted in the project document, these agreements were created with appropriate measures for land management and prevented the outbreak of conflict or disputes within the wildlife sanctuaries. Similarly, the project document for the Tonle Sap Conservation Project (GEF ID 1183) anticipated that the project might face threats from conflict in the form of land and resource disputes. To mitigate this, the designers planned to broker agreements between stakeholder groups in their project design.

**Conflict-sensitive design can draw upon customary approaches and institutions.** Customary approaches to managing natural resources often have locally appropriate and legitimate approaches to conflict prevention, management, and resolution (UNDP and UNEP 2015; UNFTPA 2012a). Projects can thus readily tap into approaches that have been tested and validated. [Box 4.3](#) presents a case study on designing a GEF project that incorporates the Islamic approach of the *hima* in Lebanon.

## Budgeting

**GEF project staff reported numerous difficulties budgeting for contingencies related to fragility and conflict-associated risks.** Key informants noted that the GEF does not allow project budgets to include a line for contingent costs, and new budget lines have to be approved by the GEF Council. As a result, it is difficult to budget for strategies to manage risks that may or may not materialize.

**The GEF does not allow for contingent costs, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.** A number of intergovernmental organizations allow contingency budgeting. The World Bank, UNDP, and others allow for contingency budgeting in their central budgets. UNDP's Regulation 13.10, for example, provides that "the Administrator may utilize the budgetary contingency provision

of 3 per cent of the approved gross appropriations for unforeseen requirements resulting from currency movements, inflation or decisions of the General Assembly" (UNDP 2000). UNDP also provides a means for covering expenses when a contributor defaults or "in the face of unforeseen contingencies" by having the national or regional office covering the unexpected expenses (UNDP 2000, reg. 5.08). The World Bank's budget for fiscal year 2020 included a corporate contingency of \$10 million "to support unforeseen priorities and cost pressures" (World Bank 2019, 58). And while contingency costs are common in construction, military projects, and humanitarian operations, there are relatively few development organizations that currently allow contingency costs as a budget line in a project.

**Outside the GEF context, the growing interest in resilience—and funding for resilience—seems to be driving interest in contingency reserves and contingent budgeting.** Contingent budgeting is a standard practice for disaster risk reduction (IMF 2019, 2018; ADB 2019; WHO 2017; FAO 2016a; Phaup and Kirschner 2010). With the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women provides that

All projects may include a reserve for contingencies not exceeding 4 percent of the direct project activity costs to allow for adjustments necessary in the light of unforeseen requirements resulting from COVID-19, such as currency movements, inflation, special programming and emergency issues on the ground during times of sudden unforeseen crisis. It can be used only with the prior written authorization of the UN Trust Fund, upon duly justified request by the Organization.<sup>11</sup>

The European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (now the Directorate-General for

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women website, [Guidelines](#).

### Box 4.3 Engaging customary approaches for conservation and conflict management: the *hima*

Across the Arab world, the *hima* (or protected area) has been revived as a community-based system of conservation and natural resource management (Serhal 2019). Rooted in Islamic law, the idea of the *hima* extends back to the time of Muhammad, who is said to have established a *hima* in the lands surrounding present-day Medina to preserve the area's natural beauty (Verde 2008). In doing so, the prophet transformed the landscape into a community asset in which all members of the public had a stake and share.

In the latter 20th century, this community-based form of natural resource management was largely overshadowed by Westernized systems emphasizing centralized resource governance. More recently, however, the *hima* has been revived to encourage sustainable resource use, conservation, and the development of friendly relations among all stakeholders. The *hima* is powerful in part because of the importance Islam attaches to environmental preservation, which creates a common starting point for people across the Middle East (Abboud 2018). Its decentralized nature is also significant: the *hima* is predicated on the idea that conflict can be reduced by managing resources at the community level rather than at a more centralized level (EcoPeace Middle East 2012). In the words of Assad Serhal,

director-general of the Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon, “The ultimate goal in creating *Himas* is to bring peace to both humans and wildlife” (Serhal 2019, 85).

The *hima* was introduced into the Lebanon component of Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, Tranches I and II (GEF IDs 1028 and 9491). Recognizing the importance of involving local communities in natural resource management and the conflict resolution potential of the *hima*, the Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon established *Hima Ebel el Saqi* in 2004 in southern Lebanon, and in the following year established *Hima Kfar Zabad* in the central Bekaa region.

To date, more than 15 *himas* have been established under the two projects, covering a total of more than 3 percent of Lebanon's land territory. These community-managed protected areas have served two important purposes: providing migrating birds with a safe habitat; and promoting cooperation among conservationists, hunters, and local people.

By bringing together people with disparate priorities—and a shared religion—and aligning them in the pursuit of a common goal, the *hima* functions as an important conflict management tool. For example, it provides an opportunity for community members to discuss how conservation and related policies should be implemented while simultaneously encouraging a cooperation between groups that is rooted in a common attachment to the land (EcoPeace Middle East 2012). This function is particularly important in a country such as Lebanon, where sectoral conflict has contributed to decades of fragility and conflict. The migratory bird projects have, through *himas*, enabled the engagement of people from disparate backgrounds to proceed seamlessly, even while instability has affected the country.



*Hima Ebel el Saqi*. Source: Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon.

International Partnerships) allows the use of contingency reserves under certain circumstances:

A reserve for contingencies and/or possible fluctuations in exchange rates not exceeding 5 % of the direct eligible costs may be included in the budget for the Action, to allow for adjustments necessary in the light of unforeseeable changes of circumstances on the ground. It can be used only with the prior written authorisation of the Contracting Authority, upon duly justified request by the Coordinator. (EC DEVCO 2014, 65)

EC DEVCO (2014) provides additional guidance regarding the conditions for including and using a contingency reserve.

**Some GEF projects have increased budgetary flexibility through the inclusion of a \$0 budget line.** Key informants mentioned that it is often difficult to add new line items to a project budget once it has been approved by the GEF—even when the escalation of violence and conflict necessitates adjustments. One informant, recognizing this challenge and understanding that the work would likely entail new and different costs, included an appropriate budget line for these costs at the design stage. Because it was not certain whether this issue would arise or whether this budget would be needed, the budget for this line was set at \$0. The inclusion of this line made it much easier to access funds later, because it is easier to move money between budget lines than to request a new line entirely, especially on short notice. Although this strategy is a good workaround, it only works if the right budget lines are envisioned, included, and approved.

**Key informants noted that working in fragile and conflict-affected settings is more expensive, and the GEF’s project budgets do not reflect these realities.** Staff are more expensive, with hazard and fragility pay for locally appointed staff and priority placement premiums for international staff, as well as additional compensation for eligible staff, rest and recuperation benefits to enable

staff to take breaks away from their duty station (e.g., World Bank 2019). The costs for security and logistical arrangements are higher. Many key informants reported that fragile and conflict-affected situations required more time for consultations to build confidence and agreement, necessitating additional labor and security costs. At the same time, key informants repeatedly pointed out that budgets to propose and implement projects in conflict-affected and fragile situations often were not sufficient to cover the additional costs of doing business in those settings.

## IMPLEMENTATION

**Considering the dynamic and fluid nature of fragile and conflict-affected situations, it is important to think beyond conflict-sensitive design to implementation.** Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke famously noted that “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force”—often paraphrased as “No plan survives contact with the enemy” (Barnett 1963, 35). Conservation programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations similarly often struggles in the transition from plan to implementation, requiring ongoing sensitivity, monitoring, and adjustment (e.g., Hammill et al. 2009; UNFPA 2012a; FAO 2019a; Haider 2014; UNDP and UNEP 2015). Conflict-sensitive implementation can help identify conflict-related risks early so they can be addressed before they escalate; it can also help projects adjust to changing dynamic conditions and prevent projects from exacerbating problems.

To account for their dynamic context, GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have employed three broad categories of conflict-sensitive implementation measures: ongoing sensitivity in programming, monitoring and early warning, and adjustment. In contrast with the proactive orientation of conflict-sensitive design and planning, conflict-sensitive implementation

combines both proactive approaches (such as ongoing sensitivity in planning and monitoring) and reactive approaches (particularly, the adjustment of projects). This section outlines these approaches, drawing upon both experiences with GEF projects and the broader literature.

### Ongoing conflict sensitivity

**In fragile or conflict-affected contexts, attention to detail can make large differences to successful implementation.** Extra care in day-to-day implementation can help avoid and mitigate conflict (International Alert et al. 2004).

**Hiring of staff can generate tensions and undermine project legitimacy if not done in a conflict-sensitive way.** In situations with social conflict along ethnic or other identity lines, projects that hire people from only one group can generate tensions (CSC 2012; Hammill et al. 2009; Haider 2104). At the same time, integrating staff from these groups can be delicate, and care needs to be taken—as with the hiring of park rangers in Gorongosa National Park in postconflict Mozambique (Pritchard 2015). Another source of potential tension is hiring for higher-paid (and higher-status) technical jobs, which often go to people who are perceived as outsiders, whether they are from the capital city (and not the community) or from another country/economy (UNDP and UNEP 2015). For these reasons, many GEF projects hire local staff whenever possible, and over time build up the capacity of local staff to manage and otherwise staff the higher-value jobs.

**In fragile and conflict-affected settings, procurement also needs to be undertaken in a conflict-sensitive manner.** Procurement rules often seek to ensure that procurement is efficient (going to the lowest bidder) and has integrity (not supporting corruption); they generally do not consider whether the process is conflict-sensitive (CSC 2012). If members of one group consistently

win contracts to provide food, equipment, or services, procurement can reinforce social divisions and generate tensions. At the same time, efforts to bring in all the necessary materials can create a “compound” mentality, aggravating relations with neighboring communities (UNDP and UNEP 2015). Procurement can be made more conflict-sensitive through local procurement, transparent criteria and selection, inclusion of local community members, and providing feedback to those who did not win the procurement opportunity (CSC 2012).

**Transparency and communication are central to conflict-sensitive implementation.** GEF projects have used a wide range of transparency and communication tools to help stakeholders understand the project (its objectives, activities, benefits, and scope), as well as enabling the project to understand concerns before they escalate to risks that could threaten a project (see [section 4.2](#)). Hence, it is important to note that the most effective communication operates in both directions, from the project to the stakeholders and from the stakeholders to the project (in contrast to public relations and propaganda).

**Participation is also central to conflict-sensitive implementation.** As [noted](#), GEF projects have adopted a wide range of participatory approaches to build support and ownership, embed the project within local institutions and processes, and enhance the long-term sustainability of project outcomes.

**GEF projects have managed unexpected conflict impacts by bringing in new partners.** For example, Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin, which focused on a watershed shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti, faced significant difficulty because of political instability. The terminal evaluation noted that in five years, the project staff saw five changes of environment ministers in Haiti and three in the Dominican Republic.



Additionally, for the duration of the project, external issues regarding the movement of refugees led to increasingly tense relations between the two countries. The project was further impeded by the lack of experience of both countries in approaching a binational process to create a water treaty. To address this experience gap and improve relations, the government of Mexico was called upon to facilitate trainings on such processes for the Haitian and Dominican governments. Assistance from this new partner helped mitigate further conflict between the other parties.

**Security and the potential use of force are among the most challenging aspects of conflict-sensitive implementation.** In specific circumstances, security forces supporting conservation efforts have committed human rights violations, creating serious reputational risk both for the project and for the conservation organization. Efforts to hire ex-combatants as game guards in Mozambique (simultaneously supporting conservation and reintegration) raised serious questions about the risk of the ex-combatants reverting to past behaviors (which had harmed local communities) as well as fighting with one another (Pritchard 2015). Most of the risks were able to be managed, but the park continues to have difficult relationships with neighboring communities that want to use resources in the park. Security must be considered: without security forces, competing demands for resources, armed criminal groups, and others can put project staff at physical risk. But efforts to address these security risks have generated serious new risks—for example, as noted by a subject matter expert, by providing rangers in the Albertine Rift with automatic weapons and paramilitary training, only to see a number of them join a rebel group when the project funding ended and the government did not adequately pay their salaries. Approaches to managing risks related to security forces include defining clear security procedures, providing training in those security procedures, providing a means

for potentially affected people to easily and confidentially submit complaints of abuses, conducting timely independent investigation of complaints, and holding security forces accountable.<sup>12</sup>

## Monitoring and early warning

Monitoring is “the continuous or periodic, standardized process of collecting and analyzing data on specific Indicators to provide decision-makers, managers, and Stakeholders with information on progress in the achievement of agreed objectives and the use of allocated resources” (GEF 2019c, 6). In the context of fragile and conflict-affected states, monitoring is important for three key reasons, all three of which may necessitate adjusting project activities:

- As with other projects, monitoring helps to track whether project activities are proceeding as planned.
- Because the security and social context in fragile and conflict-affected situations can change dramatically in a short period of time, monitoring helps ascertain if and when the security situation degrades.
- Monitoring can help identify any unexpected negative impacts of the project early on, before it becomes a trigger for conflict.

**Some GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have adopted enhanced monitoring systems to track social and conflict dynamics.** More robust conflict monitoring allows project implementers to track the changing dynamics of conflict and respond rapidly, before a situation escalates or before there are devastating impacts. Monitoring often relates to the broader security context, but it can also focus on tensions related to the project. The use of these monitoring systems can give project staff more time to prepare for upcoming crises

<sup>12</sup>See generally IFC (2017).

as well as serve as a tool for contingency planning. For example, the project document for the Promotion of Small Hydro Power for Productive Use and Energy Services project (GEF ID 9056) in Burundi noted that “unstable political conditions” posed a significant security risk to the project. Before commencing implementation, UNIDO, the GEF Agency, planned to “carefully keep tracking the political conditions in the country” as part of its risk mitigation strategy.

**Indicators for GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations may focus more on procedural aspects than environmental outcomes.** As [noted previously](#), GEF projects in such situations have often had to focus on basic institutional capacity building to create the necessary enabling conditions for the environmental benefits to be realized. Indicators for such projects accordingly focus more on procedural and institutional aspects and less on environmental outcomes.

**Real-time monitoring can support enhanced monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected settings.** In situations not affected by fragility or conflict, episodic monitoring may suffice to track progress on a quarterly or annual basis. To be able to respond better to rapidly evolving circumstances, GEF projects could consider adopting a form of real-time monitoring. Real-time monitoring constantly tracks developments, uses both qualitative and quantitative analyses, and draws heavily on local informants (Krummenacher and Schmeidl 2001).

ADB’s experience can provide guidance for real-time monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The ADB Peacebuilding Tool provides a matrix that asks project staff to consider the distribution of power, local acceptance, social capital, traditional institutions, participation of interest groups, inter-group relations, and impacts on differential access to resources (ADB 2012). ADB recommends using this tool to inform monitoring updates during the implementation phase of a project. Project staff can

regularly return to this matrix and assess changes in local conflict dynamics, and (if necessary) create new monitoring criteria that address risks revealed by the updated matrix. This ongoing monitoring can give project staff an opportunity to adjust earlier to evolving issues. In assessing pilot testing of the tool in Nepal, ADB notes various indicators that projects can use to monitor the relative security of an area or relative improvements in the conflict context.

**GEF projects have used early warning systems in tandem with enhanced monitoring to enable them to know about risks before they have escalated and when adjustment is possible.** Early warning is “a process that (a) alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflict; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflict” (OECD 2009, 22). These early warning measures can enable staff to know about risks and adjust course in a timely manner—whether that is ensuring staff safety, addressing project-related tensions before they escalate, or otherwise adapting. Organizations such as the [Forum on Early Warning and Early Response](#) monitor a series of conflict indicators to help rapidly detect and respond to conflict flare-ups. Some GEF projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts similarly monitor conflict indicators directly or rely on the reports of other groups doing this work. For example, the PIF for the Integrated Management of Biodiversity in the Pacific Region of Colombia project noted that it will rely on the UN Department for Safety and Security’s country risk assessments and will follow its advice regarding the security of project staff.

**Fragility and conflict can make it difficult for GEF project staff to access the necessary sites and people needed for monitoring.** The security risks associated with conflict-affected contexts can sometimes make it difficult or impossible to access a project site regularly. Such irregularities can affect the quality of monitoring data and thus

the potential for early warning. Hence, when planning monitoring criteria and practices for a project in these contexts, project staff should be aware of potential interruptions and suggest alternative criteria and methodologies as contingencies. In some cases, interviewees reported, project staff use remote monitoring via WhatsApp and other modalities to overcome these impediments.

**Some projects that did not account for conflict sensitivity in their monitoring systems faced difficulties during project closure.** Though environmental projects often rely more heavily on quantitative and scientific indicators focused on outcomes in the physical environment, a fragile or conflict-affected context often requires the introduction of more socially oriented indicators: traditional conservation indicators alone may be insufficient. For example, the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region project was implemented by the Instituto Alexander von Humboldt. As a biological research institution, it has more experience in the natural sciences than in development work. The project produced substantial scientific data, but its development outputs, including livelihood improvements, were not as robust. The terminal evaluation noted that the “project design had an ineffective M&E system, and it underestimated key financial and political risks to sustainability.” The ineffective monitoring system weakened the ability of project staff to market and communicate the project results, leading to an inability to secure further funding to help supplement project closure activities.

**There is a lack of standardized tools, processes, and norms for conflict-sensitive monitoring in GEF projects.** Monitoring of GEF projects is conducted pursuant to its Policy on Monitoring (GEF 2019c). While many GEF projects used similar methods of monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected situations, these methods have been often ad hoc, rather than pursuant to a specific GEF protocol. Therefore, the degree to which

projects integrated these considerations while developing their monitoring criteria is uneven, and it is uncommon for projects to readily change monitoring criteria to reflect new knowledge or new dynamics.

**Monitoring of GEF projects for unintended consequences is limited.** Any project can have unintended consequences. Fragile and conflict-affected situations seem to have a greater number of such unintended consequences, however, and many of those are negative. This is due to the greater social cleavages and sensitivities associated with fragile and conflict-affected settings, where modest problems can escalate quickly and in unexpected ways. Monitoring of co-benefits is also limited.

## Adjustment

**One of the most important and difficult steps in conflict-sensitive programming is adjusting projects to reflect developments and learning.** It is important both because fragility or conflict can change rapidly, posing new risks to the project; and because monitoring may highlight that a particular activity or approach is not as effective as previously thought. There is an operational tension between committing to the approved project plan and having the flexibility to adjust to a new reality or better understanding of the reality in which the project is being implemented. The following paragraphs highlight the need to adapt and adjust—especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations—as well as the challenges in doing so.

**Interviews with GEF Agency and GEF Secretariat staff highlighted difficulties that projects faced in trying to adjust their operations to an escalation of violence and armed conflict.** Project staff repeatedly noted that if projects changed the objectives or substantial portions of their activities, it would be necessary to seek permission from the GEF Council for the revisions. Most staff expressed an

understanding that a change in the project objectives was the primary consideration, but there was little clarity on what would constitute such a change.

Thus, staff not only have had to struggle with how to navigate difficulties related to fragility or conflict that arose during implementation, but there was a chilling effect on pursuing necessary measures in a timely manner as the project staff sought to avoid going back to the GEF Council for any reason. GEF projects thus often make only modest adjustments. This works when a situation is of short duration. The strategy means, though, that there are often delays and additional costs, and that measures that might be more effective at managing the risks are not pursued.

**Notwithstanding the challenges of adjusting programming, GEF projects increasingly anticipate at least the possibility of adjustment.** For example, project staff for Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan established two baseline requirements for activities to continue operating in a given area: continuing “local political support for the project” and “acceptable security in project sites,” according to the midterm review. Throughout the duration of the project, staff monitored for both local support and security. By the midterm review, project staff observed that the “security situation...has deteriorated significantly in recent months and it may become difficult or even impossible for the project to engage in this part of Badakshan. In general, in the volatile Afghan context, there is always a certain risk that this can change in the future.” It is not clear whether activities were modified in response to this information, because there was no terminal evaluation available for the project. However, the inclusion of this reflection in the midterm review indicates that project staff did carry out ongoing monitoring of conflict dynamics and did intend to adjust their activities if necessary.

**Some GEF projects have changed project sites.** This is particularly the case when local conflicts began to affect project activities. For example, the High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia’s Caribbean Insular Areas and Human Health project had to relocate and restructure four years after implementation began, in reaction to a growing “situation of social unease.” According to the project’s terminal evaluation, a “public security situation made it impossible for any of the Project’s key partners to work in the area of Las Hermosas.” Consequently, the project had to move operations out of the site specified in the initial project design. The total cost of this disruption and subsequent restructuring was \$3.5 million. Notwithstanding the additional costs, the project was able to conclude with satisfactory outcomes.

**GEF projects have also made adjustments by bringing in new partners and resources.** For example, when political tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic stalled the Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin project, project staff engaged experts from the Mexican government who were able to facilitate the trainings necessary to negotiate and adopt a bilateral water treaty governing the river.

## Conclusions

As in project design, attention to conflict sensitivity in implementation is uneven across the GEF portfolio. However, adjusting implementation in reaction to conflict was a concern in several projects, often leading to delays and additional costs. Adopting conflict-sensitive measures at the outset of implementation—while not guaranteeing avoidance of these scenarios—can allow project staff to be proactive rather than reactive as situations evolve.

## PROJECT CLOSURE

**Project closure practices are important to ensuring the sustainability of a project’s benefits**

**over the long term.** Benefits that are not sustained beyond the life of the project yield few, if any, global environmental benefits. It matters little how many trees are planted to fight land degradation if the vast majority die (the New Humanitarian 2008). While a project may only last a few years, it can take a significantly longer period of time for a project's impacts to be consolidated. For example, the Unlocking Biodiversity Benefits through Development Finance in Critical Catchments project (GEF ID 9073) was budgeted and approved for four years of operation; however, the improvements and impacts on South Africa's biodiversity the project envisioned would likely take 10 years or more (GEF IEO 2019). Closure is particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected situations, where attention often focuses on institution building, capacity building, and otherwise creating an enabling environment. Gains realized during a project must be sustained for its global environmental benefits to be sustained as well (Hammill et al. 2009).

**Conflict-related impacts often delay project closure.** A variety of factors connected to conflict dynamics can lead to delays throughout the life of a project, ultimately leading to delayed closure. Conflict can make it more difficult for project staff to access project sites or make them inaccessible for periods of time. It is often more difficult to build trust in conflict-affected communities.

**Projects need to plan for and create the conditions for a smooth transition.** This includes ensuring that there are local structures in place to sustain the benefits of the project after the project funding ends and project staff leave. Project staff should consider early on when project activities can be transitioned to local organizations or institutions, and work with these partners to create the necessary capacity for the transition. Planning should

start at the design stage, with measures undertaken throughout the project.<sup>13</sup>

**Building relationships with local institutions early on can ease transitions.** When local institutions that can carry on project operations are identified early, project staff have a greater opportunity to orient aspects of the project activities to suit the transition to the future partner (FAO 2006). Similarly, local institutions have more opportunity to become familiar with the activities for which they will assume responsibility. This additional time can help improve the fit between the project and the local community, strengthen local investment in project success, and improve sustainability. Along with building relationships, a project may also need to build the local capacity for problem solving related to project activities. Project staff can collaborate with local stakeholders to create an action plan that includes postclosure activities to prepare for a smooth transition (FAO 2006).

**Communicating the transition strategy to all stakeholders early on can help manage expectations.** Ensuring that all stakeholders are aware of the plan and their potential role in it can help create a smoother transition (FAO 2006). As with early relationship building, communicating and coordinating early in the project can yield additional benefits. A longer timeline for communication creates opportunities for stakeholders to provide feedback and for plans to be adjusted accordingly.

## EVALUATION AND LEARNING

Evaluation of projects in fragile and conflict-affected environments can be particularly challenging (Woodrow and Jean 2019; Pearson d'Estrée 2019b; Nanthikesan and Uitto 2012; Menkhaus 2004). Understanding conflict dynamics requires a complex systems view (Patton 2010,

<sup>13</sup>FAO (2006); UNDP website, [Transition planning process](#).

2020; Pearson d’Estrée 2019a): evaluation must consider multiple actors, interests, and interactions. Attributing the effects of a project can be challenging, leading to a shift of emphasis on contribution rather than attribution (Pearson d’Estrée 2019b; Patton 2020). Moreover, projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings lack counterfactuals (i.e., a comparable situation without fragility or conflict), complicating causality to a particular actor or intervention. Time also complicates evaluations: fragile and conflict-affected situations change frequently and rapidly, and the effects of a project may not manifest themselves or be consolidated until years after a project has closed. For example, in the context of land degradation, the GEF IEO has observed that “A lag time of 4.5–5.5 years was an important inflection point at which impacts were observed to be larger in magnitude” (GEF IEO 2018e, ix).

**Scholars stress the importance of tailoring evaluation to conflict-affected and fragile contexts (Nanthikesan and Uitto 2012; Woomer 2018).** In recognition of the complexity and dynamism of programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations, there has been a shift to using an adaptive management framework for evaluation (Woodrow and Jean 2019). In addition, there has been an increasing focus on theories of change rather than on quantitative metrics (Patton 2020). Evaluators and program people working in these fluid settings have noted that evaluators may miss important considerations if they adhere rigidly to a theory of change constructed in the project design phase, years prior to current conditions. Considering the complexity and dynamic nature of situations affected by fragility and conflict, it may be asked whether rigid theories of change are fit for purpose in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Some evaluators have developed an open theory of change that considers a project’s broader context over time (Uitto 2019).

**Real-time evaluation can help GEF Agencies better adapt projects to fragile and conflict-affected contexts.** Real-time evaluation is “a timely, rapid and interactive peer review of a fast evolving...operation...undertaken at an early phase” (UNHCR 2002, 1). Real-time evaluations provide project staff with quick and immediate feedback that allows them to reconsider how well their project design works in an evolving situation, often one affected by conflict or other disasters. Providing real-time evaluations can create an early opportunity for project staff to make key adjustments. In 2000, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) adopted real-time evaluation for use in conflict zones following experiences in Kosovo. UNHCR considers real-time evaluations a key tool to “provide suggestions for improvement... while they can still make a difference” (UNHCR 2002, 4). UNHCR has since used the process successfully in interventions in Angola, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan (UNHCR 2002, 5).

**GEF projects can have unintended consequences, but evaluation often does not capture them (Nanthikesan and Uitto 2012).** Interviews with GEF Agency staff commented on both unexpected co-benefits and negative impacts. They also noted that evaluations did not always adequately capture the unintended consequences, especially when they were negative. GEF Agency staff commented more broadly on the challenges of adapting indicators to programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. They noted, for example, that programming in such situations tended to emphasize institution building and required a more qualitative approach to evaluation.

**A growing number of GEF Agencies have been learning from experiences in designing, implementing, and evaluating environmental projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** They have taken stock of their experiences and published reports and guidance drawing on these,

often supplemented by best practices.<sup>14</sup> Some, such as the World Bank and Conservation International, have established centers to provide training and technical assistance on conflict-sensitive programming.<sup>15</sup>

## 4.5 Cross-cutting issues

### HUMAN RIGHTS

**The GEF's Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards de facto addresses and protects a number of human rights.** These include rights of indigenous peoples (including free, prior, and informed consent), gender-related rights, labor rights, cultural rights, procedural rights related to stakeholder engagement, and preventing and mitigating involuntary resettlement (GEF 2018c, 2019a). If there is a violation of the protections in the Environmental and Social Safeguards, a person may submit a complaint “to a local or country-level dispute resolution system, a GEF Partner Agency or the GEF Resolution Commissioner.”<sup>16</sup>

A review by the GEF IEO noted several human rights-related gaps in the GEF's Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards (GEF IEO 2018d). Though the 2018 policy did expand protections related to gender and indigenous peoples, it still has notable gaps related to explicit consideration of human rights, nondiscrimination, and equity. Aside from noting these gaps, the 2018 policy does not mention human rights, nondiscrimination, or equity.

**GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have intersected with human rights**

<sup>14</sup> For more on this, see discussion above on [Managing conflict risks by learning](#) and [box 4.1](#).

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, the World Bank's online resources on [Fragility, Conflict, & Violence](#).

<sup>16</sup> Source: GEF website, [Conflict Resolution Commissioner](#).

**considerations at various phases of project design and implementation.** The in-depth analyses of the seven conflict-affected situations underpinning this evaluation include various accounts of projects having both positive and negative impacts on human rights. For example, according to its project document, Capacity Development for Improved Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (GEF ID 9114) in Serbia included consideration of respect for human rights as part of its social and environmental risk screening. Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Matavén Forest is a notable example of a project adjusting to address human rights considerations, particularly indigenous rights to autonomy and governance over their historic lands, as discussed below; also notable in this regard is the Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon project.

### INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

**Consideration of indigenous peoples is important in GEF projects; and in fragile and conflict-affected situations, this consideration becomes even more important.** Throughout the seven fragile and conflict-affected situations examined in detail by this evaluation, as well as other GEF projects considered, there are many instances where a GEF project affected or was affected by indigenous groups. The GEF has long engaged with indigenous groups, funding projects implementing three MEAs that directly affect them (Mulenkei 2020). The GEF Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards was updated in 2018 to reflect best practice standards regarding indigenous peoples (GEF 2018c). Minimum Standard 5 provides a set of procedural and substantive protections ranging from free, prior, and informed consent; to respect for rights to land and other resources; to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These protections are particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected

situations, where weakened government capacity can leave indigenous peoples at greater risk.

**GEF project designs have benefited from consultation with and consideration of perspectives of indigenous communities.**

At “the request of indigenous leaders,” the Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Matavén Forest project in Colombia shifted its original intention after indigenous communities voiced their preference, according to the terminal evaluation. Initially, the project had intended to create a new national park; after consultation, this became a community-managed reserve. Based on the experience of the National Parks Association’s creation of Tuparro National Park, local communities in Matavén Forest “discarded the option of creating a National Park” because the previous case “generated conflict with the region’s indigenous people over the degree of co-management to be allowed and resulted in the death of various indigenous people as well as of the park’s administrator.” The terminal evaluation review states that the project was noteworthy in choosing to support a government initiative to create protected areas under indigenous management instead of a national park that would not involve local inhabitants.

**GEF projects have considered particular vulnerabilities and perspectives of indigenous groups when developing a project’s conflict prevention methods.**

Community-based Natural Resource Management throughout the Elephant Range, set up to protect Mali’s elephants in key sites and enhance the livelihoods of local communities living along elephant migration routes to reduce human-elephant conflict, recognized that the project area had a diverse range of natural resource uses by different ethnicities and communities. To ensure their inclusion in the community’s natural resource plans, the project planned to create an indigenous peoples’ plan to guide the project’s conflict prevention methods.

**Learning from indigenous communities about current resource use and community objectives for land management has been critical in laying foundations for working with the community on resource management issues.**

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Promoting the Effective Management of Salonga National Park through Creation of Community Forests and Improving the Well-being of Local Communities (GEF ID 9802) PIF identified land use conflicts between indigenous communities and park authorities as one of the primary barriers to the project’s achievement. Much of the tensions arose from the origin of the park, when indigenous communities were removed from their ancestral lands. A related source of tension is that indigenous communities continue to use the park for hunting and fishing, pursuant to tradition but in violation of statutory law. In developing simple management plans, the project aimed to understand current economic activities, livelihoods, and aspirations among local communities, including indigenous groups. In order to build a representation system that was rooted locally and could be consolidated on a larger geographical scale, the project involved a local NGO that was well connected to the communities and traditional authorities as well as their administration at all stages of the project design.

## GENDER

**Gender dimensions to environmental management have shown higher negative impacts on women and girls—an issue that can be exacerbated by conflict or fragile settings.**

The GEF’s Gender and Equality Policy was updated in 2017 to promote gender sensitivity and gender mainstreaming in programming through guiding principles, including program elements that do not exacerbate gender inequalities, inclusive engagement with both men and women in relation to their roles associated with the environment, and the implementation of gender-responsive approaches



at all project phases (GEF 2017). The GEF has identified three gender gaps that are of most significance to GEF programming: access to natural resources, decision making, and access to benefits (GEF 2018b).

**Access to and management of natural resources is often unequal when seen in terms of gender differences, and it is one of the GEF’s vital concerns in alleviating gender inequality.** As part of its gender mainstreaming plan, Columbia’s Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation project incorporated efforts to identify the roles of men and women in relation to production, as well as the gendered limits to credit or other incentives. Not only do women have inequitable access to management, but gender equality has been linked to positive economic growth and development. Gender mainstreaming, then, became part of the Promotion of Small Hydro Power project in Burundi to support a sustainable energy initiative, as noted in its PIF. In Improving Women and Children’s Resilience and Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GEF ID 5226), international institutions were engaged to support women’s access to natural resources and their management.

**The decision-making space for natural resource management has historically excluded women, creating an opportunity for GEF projects to promote gender equality.** In some communities, women are essential to natural resource sectors targeted by projects but historically absent from decision making on resource management. The Promotion of Small Hydro Power project, though considered to have limited gender dimensions, ensured that all decision-making processes would be built with a gender consideration as well as engagement with stakeholders at the implementation level concerning gender inequality and women’s empowerment, according to its project document. The Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon project’s

gender mainstreaming plan tackles this gap by identifying female participation in decision making and designing ways to engage women in multi-stakeholder discussions. In Serbia, the Capacity Development for Improved Implementation of MEAs project document set out to alleviate gender disparities by encouraging more gender-balanced participation.

**Another way GEF projects alleviate gender inequality is to make a large percentage of the beneficiaries of project outputs women.** For example, Improving Women and Children’s Resilience and Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change in the Democratic Republic of the Congo set a goal of ensuring 40 percent of project investments would be for women, and the project document for Capacity Development for Improved Implementation of MEAs cited monitoring the gender balance of beneficiaries of project implementation.

## PRIVATE SECTOR

**The private sector is important to GEF programming.** The GEF’s Private Sector Engagement Strategy recognizes this importance in leveraging funding and transforming both markets and economic systems—all of which is necessary to scale up global environmental benefits and ensure that those benefits are sustained (GEF 2020b). Moreover, the GEF’s Policy on Non-Grant Instruments provides guidance for the use of nongrant instruments to strengthen partnership with both the private and public sectors (GEF 2014). The private sector is a key stakeholder in many of the transformations the GEF seeks to achieve, because it is central to trade that drives environmental degradation.

**GEF projects have both sought to engage the private sector and struggled with how to engage with it.** For example, the Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia project (GEF ID 9103) sought to improve livelihoods by improving

smallholders' access to and uptake of renewable energy technologies. The project document noted that the "Cambodian government is actively pursuing private-public contracts to keep consistent streams of capital flowing in." At the same time, key informants noted that there was a reluctance by the government to provide "a playground where [the] private sector can test approaches," which made it difficult to pilot test approaches that could then be scaled up. According to its project document, Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia's Orinoquia Region, which aimed to improve enabling conditions for sustainable and low-carbon landscape planning, sought to strengthen public-private coordination.

**Fragile and conflict-affected situations can undermine efforts of GEF projects to engage the private sector.** For example, the Energy Efficiency Project in Burundi included infrastructure services for private sector development as one of its themes for building local capacity to provide energy efficiency advice to public institutions and private sector companies. According to the terminal evaluation, the project was rated unfavorably overall largely because of the legacy of the past conflict.

## THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

**This evaluation was well under way when the COVID-19 pandemic spread rapidly around the world.** The public health crisis has led to an economic crisis, and the economic crisis is leading to a fiscal crisis. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of adaptive approaches to GEF programming.

**The pandemic has affected GEF projects in many ways.** The disruption to the global economy has had many ground-level consequences, especially in agrarian and natural resource-based economies (ILO et al. 2020). The domestic economies of many GEF countries/economies have been hampered; expectations are that this trend will

continue for several months, if not longer. Government resources are being reprioritized to focus on addressing the pandemic.<sup>17</sup> For both public health reasons and because of the new priorities, government officials (including law enforcement) have a reduced presence in many regions. In this vacuum, there has been an increase in land grabbing, illegal mining, illegal logging, and other illegal or illicit natural resource exploitation (Troëng, Barbier, and Rodríguez 2020; Veit and Quijano Vallejos 2020; Brown 2020). Community leaders and activists defending their lands and resources—that is, environmental defenders—have been targeted (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2020; Macinnes 2020; Global Land Governance Index 2020). This combination of economic downturn, weakened governance, growth of illegal resource exploitation, and targeting of environmental defenders threatens to reverse decades of gains achieved by GEF interventions.

**The travel restrictions due to COVID-19 have hindered GEF project staff from working on the ground, affecting the ability to establish trust with local populations.** Interviews with key informants in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, and Cambodia, among others, highlighted restrictions on travel and meetings as affecting projects. They noted that it is difficult to travel to and within countries/economies. Moreover, it is difficult to hold in-person meetings. Projects focused on agriculture and other resource-based livelihoods seem particularly affected. These restrictions mean that it is more difficult to conduct consultations to develop a project or build public consensus. Where projects can continue, they rely on periodic communications (often by telephone) with partners in remote areas. Monitoring has become more virtual of necessity. Terminal evaluations similarly have had to rely on remote interviews. These

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<sup>17</sup> OECD (2020a, 2020b); Stiglitz (2020); IMF Policy Tracker, [Policy Responses to COVID-19](#).

adjustments work for people who are connected via phone or Internet, but it means that the project is more removed from local communities. Informants also reported adjusting their activities; for example, in some instances, projects shifted away from on-the-ground fieldwork to emphasize national-level policies and initiatives. In one reported instance, the project repurposed funding for project elements that were not performing well to address COVID-19. While some projects are continuing without anticipated delays, several reported they anticipated extending the project by up to six months.

**Interviewees noted that the COVID-19 pandemic can create opportunities.** They noted that the pandemic created an opportunity to shift public opinion toward valuing environmental conservation—particularly where environmental conservation can be linked to pandemic prevention (e.g., with biodiversity and zoonotic diseases). Because COVID-19 is a zoonotic disease, support for land and biodiversity conservation as a global health measure could be strengthened. Inability to rely on global supply chains may spur bottom-up innovations and provide incentives for stewarding natural resources. Informants noted that such a perspective change could increase private financial and political support.

**The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of adaptive approaches to GEF programming.** Informants in particularly challenging situations noted that before the pandemic they regularly navigated crises that prevented them from traveling, from meeting, and from undertaking other activities essential to GEF programming. They noted that the adaptive approaches they had adopted for programming generally enabled them to adapt to the emerging pandemic and thereby continue to advance their projects. In this regard, the STAP has noted that “Reforming the GEF rules and procedures to allow for more adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations can make GEF programming more resilient in pandemics and other crises” (GEF STAP 2018, ix).

# Recommendations

There are five key ways that the GEF could improve project success through conflict-sensitive programming. [Annex K](#) presents some ideas regarding ways the recommendations could be implemented, drawing on the lessons learned from the evaluation. These high-level recommendations supplement and reinforce the numerous discrete opportunities this evaluation has highlighted throughout for improving the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of GEF interventions in situations affected by conflict and fragility. These recommendations emphasize risk management throughout the project life cycle.

**Recommendation 1:** The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks. The GEF should use the project review process to integrate consideration of fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Project reviews provide an opportunity for the GEF to identify risks that could affect project success and for proposing measures to mitigate those risks. This would help ensure that recognizing and addressing such risks is more consistent.

**Recommendation 2:** To improve conflict-sensitive programming while providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming. This guidance could address measures across the project life cycle, from design to implementation and closure. GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw on both the commonalities and innovations of the guidance that has been developed by 10 of the GEF Agencies.

**Recommendation 3:** To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance. These platforms are designed to effectively foster learning and exchange, build capacity, and provide specialized assistance. Since conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue, lessons learned should be exchanged on existing knowledge platforms supported through programs such as the integrated approach pilots, the impact programs, the Global Wildlife Program, and planetGOLD, among others, as well as on the online GEF Portal.

**Recommendation 4:** The current GEF Environmental and Social Safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations. At least 11 GEF Agencies have incorporated consideration of conflict and fragility into their respective safeguards. The GEF has adopted environmental and social safeguards that seek to minimize potentially adverse environmental and social impacts from projects. However, these safeguards mention conflict only once and lack a holistic recognition of the way that conflicts might be linked to the environment and natural resources. As it has done when updating safeguards regarding gender, the GEF could consider the more detailed provisions incorporated by the GEF Agencies as it considers whether and how to expand its safeguards to more effectively address conflict sensitivity.

**Recommendation 5:** The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations. The circumstances on the ground in these situations can change rapidly. Yet GEF policies and procedures can make it difficult to adjust projects to adapt in a timely manner. Incorporating adaptive management into GEF policies and procedures could provide a more flexible and adaptive environment, enabling projects to adapt more quickly and more efficiently to changes resulting from conflict or fragility, as well as other difficult situations.



# Approach paper

*This annex has been lightly edited for style and consistency. Its original annexes have been appended to this final evaluation report and the references updated accordingly.*

## A.1 Introduction

Natural resources and conflict are often intertwined, and attention to these linkages and their implications for peace and economic development is essential to effective programming. Environmental organizations have increasingly recognized how their projects are often affected by peace and conflict dynamics and vice versa. Since its inception, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has funded numerous interventions in areas that have been or are currently affected by armed conflict. Over \$4 billion—accounting for more than one-third of the GEF’s global portfolio—has been invested in countries affected by armed conflict, and more than one-third of “GEF members (64 countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while major armed conflict was ongoing” (Morrow 2018).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> These statistics include projects supported by the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.

Despite the GEF’s substantial investment in programming in conflict-affected situations, the GEF does not yet have a definition, policy, or procedures for designing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations (GEF IEO 2022c). A 2018 report produced by the GEF Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) concluded that the organization “does not appear to have addressed environmental security in an integrated manner across its program areas” (GEF STAP 2018). As a result, interventions that take place in fragile and conflict-affected areas may be exposed to a variety of risks that are not adequately taken into account or mitigated.

In the absence of a formal definition, policy, or procedures, individual projects have started—on an ad hoc basis—to account for the conflict context in their design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in innovative ways. As the GEF continues to support interventions in a range of fragile and conflict-affected situations, the organization can and should learn from current and past approaches to implementing projects and programs in fragile and conflict-affected areas and identify ways to better manage the particular risks in these areas.

The GEF's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is collaborating with the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) to assess GEF projects and programs in fragile and conflict-affected situations—in short, to determine whether and how GEF interventions are conflict-sensitive and the implications thereof. This study will examine the design, implementation, and M&E of GEF-funded projects and programs, focusing on interventions since 2002 (the start of GEF-3) in six conflict-affected situations; assess the implications of projects' and programs' degree of conflict sensitivity by considering how the performance and outcomes may have been influenced by the conflict context; survey the guidance from relevant conferences of the parties (COPs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with respect to conflict; and, with reference to international best practice, identify recommendations for improving future GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations.

This approach paper sets out the contours of conflict sensitivity in environmental programming, the lines of inquiry to be pursued in this study, the proposed methodology for answering the questions, and a planned outline of the final report.

## A.2 Problem description

There is a large and growing body of academic and practitioner literature that establishes the diverse connections between the environment and peace, conflict, and security (GEF STAP 2018). This literature addresses the relationship across the conflict life cycle, including the environmental causes of conflict, environmental impacts of armed conflict, financing and other environmental drivers of conflict, environmental factors in the negotiation and conclusion of peace agreements ending conflict, and environmental dimensions of postconflict peacebuilding (GEF STAP 2018). It also addresses the potential for the conflict context to affect the

successful realization of environmental initiatives (Bruch et al. 2019).

The services, goods, and other benefits provided by ecosystems play a fundamental role in supporting livelihoods and societal well-being. Changes in the availability, accessibility, or provision of such services can increase the risk of conflict. Natural resources are frequently the subject of conflict, and environmental quality often suffers directly and indirectly during periods of insecurity or violence. As such, conflict and the risk of conflict often threaten the viability and effectiveness of environmental investments.

International bodies and policies are beginning to acknowledge these linkages. For example, SDG 16 (which cuts across all other SDGs) recognizes the central importance of peace to sustainable development (UNDGC 2019). A growing number of multilateral and bilateral organizations, as well as nongovernmental organizations, have developed guidance for conflict-sensitive project design and implementation generally and for conflict sensitivity in environmental projects specifically. According to the United Nations, “conflict sensitivity refers to the capacity of an organization to: (i) understand the context in which it operates; (ii) understand the interaction between the organization's interventions and the context; and (iii) act upon these understandings to avoid negative impacts (do no harm) and maximize positive impacts” (UNFPA 2020). Conflict-sensitive conservation improves the quality and sustainability of environmental outcomes in conflict-affected areas.<sup>2</sup> Well-planned environmental projects and programs that account for cooperation, equity, and institution building can improve conflict management, prevention, and recovery. They also build public support and cohesion, rather than provide a flashpoint for conflict.

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<sup>2</sup> For examples of conservation activities that help address conflict, see Hammill et al. (2009).



Guidance on conflict-sensitive programming variously addresses “conflict-affected,” “fragile,” and “violent” “situations” and “countries.” There are many dimensions to conflict-affected and fragile situations, and there are diverse articulations of conflict and fragility. This evaluation will follow well-established framings and definitions for the key terms (see [box A.1](#)).

The World Bank Group has a set of diagnostic tools such as risk and resilience assessments to assess the fragility, conflict, and violence context in a country/economy or region, and to help inform its strategy, programming, and enhance its engagements in those situations.<sup>3</sup> The African Development Bank has adopted two strategies that guide programming in fragile situations, including a flagship report related to natural resources (ADF 2008). Through these strategies, the African Development Bank has systematized the application of a “fragility lens” and a country/economy resilience and fragility assessment tool to integrate considerations of fragility into country strategy papers and Bank operations (AfDB 2018). The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Conflict Assessment Framework, updated in 2012, guides USAID staff, contractors, and other international development practitioners in analyzing and responding to the dynamics of violent conflict (USAID 2012a). The Trócaire Conflict Sensitivity Toolkit (Abozaglo 2011) aims to increase awareness of the organization’s staff regarding conflict dynamics in conflict-affected settings and ensure that Trócaire’s programs do not negatively affect those situations. The U.K. Department for International Development produced “Back to the Basics: A Compilation of Best Practices in Design, Monitoring & Evaluation in Fragile and Conflict-affected Environments” to highlight best practices

<sup>3</sup> World Bank webpage, “[Managing Fragility Risks and Forced Displacement in Middle-Income Countries: A Focus on Prevention to Build Resilience and Stability.](#)”

### Box A.1 Definitions of key terms

For purposes of this analysis, the following definitions are used unless otherwise indicated:

- **Conflict-affected** refers to situations that are experiencing or have experienced armed conflict, which is a “contested incompatibility with the use of organized armed force between two or more parties” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program website, [UCDP Definitions](#)).
- **Major armed conflict** is an armed conflict in which there is at least 1,000 battle-related deaths (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008).
- **Social conflict** is a process of contentious interaction between social actors and institutions which mobilize with different levels of organization and act collectively in order to improve conditions, defend existing situations, or advance new alternative social projects (UNDP 2011).
- **Fragility** is “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies” (OECD 2106).
- **Conflict sensitivity** refers to “the capacity of an organization to (i) understand the context in which it operates; (ii) understand the interaction between the organization’s interventions and the context; and (iii) act upon these understandings to avoid negative impacts (do no harm) and maximize positive impacts” (UNFPA 2020).
- **State** refers to a UN member state.
- **Situation** refers to a location, and may include a state, a subnational area, an area that includes portions of two or more states, or an area that includes multiple states.

throughout a development program's cycle (Corlazzoli and White 2013).

Leading conservation organizations have developed manuals providing guidance on conflict-sensitive conservation. "Conflict-Sensitive Conservation: Practitioners' Manual," by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, synthesizes lessons for environmental practitioners operating in conflict-affected settings (Hammill et al. 2009). Conservation International's "Environmental Peacebuilding Training Manual" outlines best practices in modules on peace and conservation, stakeholder engagement, conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, and consensus building (CI 2017). Both manuals are designed to apply directly to the practice of conservation, improving environmental outcomes through conflict-sensitive design and implementation.

For decades, the GEF has supported programming in situations where past and ongoing armed conflict present imminent and latent risks. The 2018 STAP report on environmental security noted that 77 countries, accounting for over half of GEF recipients, had experienced armed conflict since 1991. Over one-third of GEF project recipients have implemented projects during a period of conflict in their country/economy. As such, a substantial portion of the GEF portfolio is exposed to conflict-related risks. Moreover, conflict risks intersect with all of the GEF focal areas in diverse and varying ways:

- In the **biodiversity focal area**, projects are designed to mainstream biodiversity and address drivers that threaten habitats and species. Highly biodiverse areas have a substantial overlap with conflict hotspots (Hanson et al. 2009). Indeed, several of the national child projects of the GEF-funded Global Wildlife Program (Phase 1 and Phase 2) are in fragility, conflict, and violence situations as identified on the World Bank's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations.

Conservation schemes can exacerbate violence in surrounding communities, especially when communities are excluded from protected areas and when enforcement agents are militarized. Tensions can escalate when conservation activities compete with natural resource use on which people's livelihoods depend. For example, such tensions were observed throughout the course of Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains (GEF ID 1086) in Cambodia. The project took place in a former Khmer Rouge zone with existing conflicts over land appropriations, corruption, and illegal resource extraction. The project's terminal evaluation report noted that linkages were "not sufficiently addressed" (UNDP Cambodia 2007). The subsequent rivalry and lack of coordination between different enforcement authorities and gangs caused regular conflicts at the site, leading to several project delays, activity cancellations, and the deaths of two park rangers.

- **Forest-based interventions** have been a major focus of GEF strategy and programming, most recently through the Sustainable Forest Management Impact Program and the Food, Land Use, and Restoration Impact Program, particularly with the GEF's geographic focuses in the Amazon, drylands, the Congo Basin, and tropical forests—as both programs aim to reduce forest loss and land degradation. The programs are particularly vulnerable to conflict-related risks. Forest and forest resources are frequently a source of social conflict that can escalate to violence, can offer refuge to guerrilla groups, are often intentional targets and collateral damage during conflict, and provide assets for livelihoods and economic growth in postconflict recovery. Additionally, timber can serve as a source of financing for rebels. The many interactions between forests and conflict can complicate the design and implementation of forest-related interventions in conflict-affected situations.

- Interventions in the **international waters focal area** aim to establish and strengthen trans-boundary relationships and cooperation. Many international basins—including Lake Chad, the Jordan River, the Nile River, the Mano River, and the Sava River—span multiple countries affected by conflict or that are experiencing tension with one another. Experiences in these basins shows, though, that international waters can also be a source for cooperation and peacebuilding. The GEF also supports work in international marine waters that are affected by tensions and conflict. For example, a GEF IEO evaluation of the South China Sea identified conflict as a challenge to project implementation (GEF IEO 2012).
- Efforts to address **climate change** encompass both adaptation and mitigation measures that can result in winners and losers. As such, interventions may inadvertently lead to disputes over access to benefits (such as technology transfer) and burdens (such as large-scale land acquisitions necessary for biofuels). For example, a non-GEF REDD+ project in Uganda that created carbon offsets through forestry plantation projects sparked violent conflicts over land and resource use rights.<sup>4</sup> The land acquisition led to the eviction of indigenous communities that had relied on the land for their livelihoods and for which they were not compensated adequately (Wambi 2009). Their opposition to the project was met with violence by the police and security forces (Lyons, Richards, and Westoby 2014). In another example, a Clean Development Mechanism-registered hydroelectric dam project in Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, was at the center of a series of violent conflicts between 2010 and 2017 (Neslen 2015). The project, which took place in and near Mayan communities that

<sup>4</sup> REDD+: Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries

had been historically subject to state violence and involved in the civil war of the 1980s, did not include adequate community consultation and led to evictions and livelihood disruption for various communities. Police forces responded to community opposition with tear gas and occupation of the area. There were seven related deaths between 2010 and 2017, and the project developer was eventually forced to halt construction of the dam (Filzmoser 2017). There is also evidence that climate change may amplify the effects of conflict. Somalia, for example, experiences a “double exposure” to both climate-induced environmental impacts and protracted conflict, which together have caused the displacement of over 2.6 million people within the country (Krampe 2019).

- Interventions relating to **chemicals and waste management** may exacerbate existing inequalities if patterns of environmental discrimination are not taken into account. Small-scale gold mining, which represents the bulk of Minamata Convention-related GEF interventions, often occurs in contexts of extended social conflict, as well as in countries affected by major armed conflict, such as Colombia and Sudan. Conflict and backlash can result when waste disposal sites and stockpiles of oil, chemicals, or nuclear hazards overlap with human-inhabited zones in a postconflict situation. In the Niger Delta, for instance, what began as peaceful protests against the impacts of Shell’s polluting oil extraction turned to violent conflicts with the military (Smith 2011). In addition to violence, the protests taken by Ogoni communities severely delayed the projects and led to international outcry by environmental advocacy groups.<sup>5</sup>
- The projects and programs that address **land degradation** and combat desertification often occur in marginal areas in which access is

<sup>5</sup> Climate Diplomacy webpage, “[Livelihood Conflicts in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.](#)”

contested between user groups, such as agricultural and pastoral communities. As such, interventions that advance alternative land use schemes can contribute to heightened tensions in areas where resources are already scarce or disputed (GEF IEO 2018c). The sustainability of such projects may also be jeopardized by nearby conflict. Conflict between the Tuareg ethnic group and the government of Niger erupted while the GEF-funded Sustainable Co-Management of the Natural Resources of the Air-Ténéré Complex (GEF ID 2380) project was under implementation. Although land commissions had been put in place to improve governance and management of localized land-based tensions, no safeguards were in place to handle larger-scale armed conflict (Biao Koudenoukpo and Nignon 2013). As a result, project costs increased substantially, causing the project activities to be scaled back, weakening coordination between project stakeholders and reducing profits for local cooperatives as a result of free food distribution. Ultimately, questions were raised about the sustainability of project outcomes in an area affected by weak institutions and conflict (Morrow 2018).

Because of the GEF's mandate to improve global environmental benefits, the design, implementation, and M&E of its interventions primarily focus on environmental dimensions; in many cases, the conflict context may not be considered, let alone addressed. Experience with diverse conservation organizations suggests that managing conflict-related risks would make GEF interventions more effective in meeting their objectives.<sup>6</sup>

The GEF's general theory of change, which guides the theory of change for each focal area, lays out

the chain of causation linking GEF interventions to global environmental benefits, connects GEF activities to other activities and actors, and identifies constraints on further GEF contributions to progress toward global environmental benefits (GEF IEO 2013). Conflict can interact with projects both (1) through the impacts that the conflict context have on the project's implementation, and (2) through the effects the project may have on the conflict context. While the GEF recognizes that it is not possible to control all contextual factors such as conflict, the theory of change provides that programs are intentionally selected and "designed to support fundamental changes" and cause "a large-scale and sustainable impact, subject to the quality of implementation/execution and supportive contextual conditions" (GEF IEO 2018b). This analysis explores whether GEF interventions in conflict-affected and fragile situations can achieve fundamental changes and large-scale and sustainable impacts if the design and implementation of those interventions fail to manage the risks posed by the conflict context.

When conflict-related risks are not explicitly or deliberately managed, environmental projects can spark tension or conflict, creating risks to the outcomes, outputs, and impacts of a given project.<sup>7</sup> As a counterpoint to each of the examples above, the very same projects and programs also have the potential to create spaces in which to strengthen trust, communication, and cooperation among involved parties, generating additional long-term benefits. A conflict-sensitive lens can help ensure that opportunities to avoid conflict and the impacts of conflict (and, where appropriate, to build peace) are incorporated across the project cycle, including M&E. A conflict-sensitive project cycle helps manage the associated risks, enabling GEF

<sup>6</sup> See CI (2017); Hammill et al. (2009); see also UNICEF (2016).

<sup>7</sup> Dabelko et al. (2013); Morrow (2018) (noting GEF projects in conflict areas with problems ranging from severe delays to deaths of project stakeholders).

interventions to fulfill their mandate of delivering global environmental benefits and effect sustainable long-term change.

### A.3 Methodology

The relationship between environment and conflict encompasses both the effects of conflict on environmental dynamics and goals, and the impacts of environmental actions on conflict dynamics. Environmental projects can be deeply affected by their conflict context, and projects and programs that address the environment can in turn serve as drivers of conflict or as building blocks toward peace.

This analysis will focus primarily on the effects of conflict and fragility on the ability of GEF interventions to fulfill their stated goals of providing global environmental benefits. The study hypothesizes that those projects and programs in the GEF portfolio that have accounted for the conflict context in the planning phase, embedded these considerations into the design, and oriented the intervention to addressing conflict dynamics throughout its implementation will have—on balance—improved outcomes relative to those projects and programs that have not integrated conflict sensitivity. Given that areas that have experienced internal armed conflict are at higher risk for relapsing into conflict, this effect is likely be more pronounced in areas with a history of conflict and thus a more sustained period of fragility and conflict (Walter 2010).

The impacts of conflict and peace dynamics on project success will be considered at all stages of the project and program development process. The report will be structured around the key stages of the implementation cycle, including M&E, with different elements of conflict and peace dynamics interwoven as cross-cutting issues.

There are many ways that GEF-supported projects could be affected by conflict dynamics, particularly

regarding issues that might generate social grievances and conflict, which can rapidly escalate to violence in conflict-affected situations.

### KEY QUESTIONS

The evaluation will seek to understand how conflict sensitivity or lack thereof affects the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, results, and sustainability of GEF-supported projects and programs. The situation profiles of this evaluation will utilize a series of lines of inquiry. Many of these questions will be relevant to more than one of the five core evaluation criteria, and will highlight cross-cutting issues relevant across the project life cycle:

- Throughout the project cycle, including M&E, to what extent are conflict dynamics considered and addressed?
  - Is there any correlation between the degree of conflict sensitivity and certain project characteristics, for example, GEF focal area, region, or GEF Agency?
  - Are there any particular conflict-related considerations toward which GEF programming appears to be more sensitive?
  - Are there any phases of project development in which conflict risks are more likely to be considered? Why?
  - Which methods of integrating conflict sensitivity are most often employed? Why?
  - How do the interventions reflect national priorities considering the conflict or postconflict situation?
- In what way does conflict sensitivity (or lack thereof) help explain project and program outcomes and their sustainability?
  - How, if at all, did armed or social conflict affect the project, particularly the outcomes?

- To what extent were projects and programs discontinued, canceled, delayed, or altered due to conflict-related dynamics? Were the dynamics foreseeable?
- To what extent were conflict-related factors limitations to achieving the desired global environmental benefits, transformational change, or other according to the focal area's theory of change?
- What conflict-sensitive measures could the GEF adopt to improve performance and outcomes of its initiatives?
  - How do the SDGs, multilateral environmental agreements, their COPs, and related policies address conflict and conflict sensitivity?
  - What dimensions of conflict sensitivity are specifically relevant to GEF initiatives?
  - How do GEF Agencies manage risks associated with conflict and violence? Do any GEF Agencies have guidance on conflict-sensitive programming?
  - What conflict-sensitive measures have been implemented by other relevant institutions?

## APPROACH

The evaluation will adopt a mixed-methods approach combining desk research, portfolio analysis, literature review, field verifications, and online surveys and interviews with experts and stakeholders with case studies and geospatial analysis to address the questions outlined above. Four different levels will be further developed in the analysis:

- An **aggregate analysis of all GEF interventions**, from GEF-1 through GEF-7, comparing projects and programs in countries affected by major armed conflict and those in non-conflict countries. This analysis will focus on country/economy-level projects and may also

consider—depending on the available data—regional and global projects.

- **Analyses of all projects in at least six conflict-affected and fragile situations.** These situations may be countries/economies, regions with more than one country/economy, or areas spanning portions of more than one country/economy. The analysis for each situation will generate a profile that includes textual analysis of project documents for every project in that situation.
- **In-depth analyses of 8–10 projects in each situation**, drawing upon project documents, desk review, and interviews and field verifications with stakeholders (for projects in at least two situations).
- **Literature review** of both the academic and gray literature covering approaches and experiences from other organizations (including GEF Agencies and others), as well as mandates and statements from multilateral environmental agreements and interviews with key informants.

The bulk of the research will center on six situations identified below (to be validated, confirmed, and built upon as necessary). The report will also include anecdotes from other contexts, as applicable.

### Portfolio review and situation selection

GEF portfolios containing project details and terminal evaluation information were used as the source of information on project objectives, status, and evaluations.

The selection began by filtering the GEF's project database to countries that have experienced major armed conflicts (i.e., armed conflicts with more

than 1,000 battle deaths) since 1989.<sup>8</sup> This yielded 60 countries.

Using quantitative metrics included in the GEF data sets, including project delays, cancellation rates, and evaluation scores, projects in these 60 countries were then compared to projects in countries not affected by conflict, as recorded in the data set. This broader comparison seeks to identify general trends that may exist in conflict-affected situations in which the GEF operates relative to nonconflict-affected situations.

The initial filtering also provided the starting point for selecting a set of representative cases for which deeper analyses will be conducted. Six conflict-affected situations were selected for in-depth research. Projects in those countries were then filtered by decade (before 2000, 2000–10, 2011–18, and open). The designation “open” included ongoing projects, as well as projects for which an actual end date was not specified.

Countries were then examined in light of the following core selection criteria:

- **Regional diversity** (across continents)
- Country/situation experienced **major armed conflict** (armed conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths) since 1989 (end of the Cold War); in addition, consideration was given to inclusion on the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations
- **Geographic scope of the conflict**—that is, the conflict affected a substantial portion of the

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<sup>8</sup> This information is based on data from the UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict database, a global database of armed conflicts from 1946 to present, including both international armed conflicts and various non-international armed conflicts. It is the most comprehensive such database in existence, and is well-regarded and widely utilized. It includes all GEF countries in which there has been armed conflict since 1946.

country/economy (or selection focused on sub-national area affected by conflict)

- **Temporal aspects of the conflict**—to the extent that a conflict was a relatively recent outbreak, the design and implementation of most GEF projects to date may not be said to have been in a context affected by conflict; similarly, if a conflict was relatively far in the past, the country/economy may have been on a sustainable development footing more recently
- **Number of GEF projects and amount of GEF support** (aiming for countries/situations with a greater number)
- **Diversity of GEF projects** (how many different projects in different GEF focal areas are represented, in order to ascertain whether and to what extent different categories of projects consider the conflict context)
- Consideration of the **GEF-7 impact programs** (including the Food, Land Use and Restoration Impact Program; the Sustainable Cities Program; and the Sustainable Forest Management Program, especially in the Amazon, Congo Basin, and drylands)
- **Diversity of situation scales** (subnational, national, regional).

Based on the above criteria, the following six situations were initially selected as the focus of this research.

- **Albertine Rift (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia).** Most countries within the Albertine Rift have experience major armed conflict and all of the countries have high fragility index scores, making the region a compelling choice for this research. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania ranked 6th, 17th, 24th, 34th, and 64th, respectively, out of 178 countries included in the 2018 Fragile States Index. Two hundred and twenty GEF projects have taken place in the first three countries

since 2000. These projects represent all GEF focal areas, with the greatest number relating to climate change, biodiversity, and multifocal areas. This region is also relevant to GEF-7 impact areas, particularly the Sustainable Forest Management Impact Program in the Congo Basin.<sup>9</sup>

- **Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia).**

The Balkan region contains the greatest number of GEF projects in Europe (105 since 2000), which makes it the geography with the largest GEF presence in Europe. Some of these projects are national, some are transboundary, and some are subnational. Moreover, this situation highlights the relevance of the analysis to both developing and developed contexts. Although the Balkan countries rank in the bottom half of the 2018 Fragile States Index, the time frame of the research from 2000 to present covers the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars.

- **Cambodia.** Since 2000, 60 GEF projects have been developed in Cambodia. Of those, 20 are in the climate change focal area, 12 relate to biodiversity, and 9 are in multiple focal areas. Cambodia is proposed as a focal country instead of Asian countries where the GEF has had a larger presence—namely India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand—because the conflicts in those countries tend to be localized (e.g., Aceh and Mindanao). When looking at Mindanao, for example, there are very few GEF projects. Cambodia currently ranks 53rd out of the 178 countries in the 2018 Fragile States Index; but it previously was ranked much higher, especially as it was more recently emerged from conflict.
- **Colombia.** Since 2000, there have been 84 GEF projects in Colombia, which places it second

after Peru for GEF presence in Latin American states affected by major armed conflict. Colombia is proposed as a focus situation instead of Peru because of the broader geographic and temporal scope of the Colombian conflict relative to the guerrilla war carried out by the Shining Path in Peru, which effectively ended in 1992. The majority of GEF projects in Colombia relate to the biodiversity and climate change focal areas. This aligns with the concentration among focal areas of GEF projects globally, as about a third each of all GEF projects relate to the biodiversity and climate change focal areas.

- **Lebanon.** Out of the 178 countries included in the 2018 Fragile States Index, Lebanon ranked 44th. The country is proposed for inclusion in this research because 45 GEF projects have been implemented there, which is among the largest GEF presence in the Middle East and North Africa region.<sup>10</sup> GEF projects in Lebanon center around biodiversity, climate change, and land degradation.
- **Mali.** In the 2018 Fragile States Index, Mali ranked 27th out of 178 countries. Of the countries in Africa affected by major armed conflict, Mali is tied at 80 for the second-highest number of GEF projects since 2000. Senegal, which has had 87 GEF projects in that time period, is not proposed as a country of focus because of the more limited geographic extent of the Casamance conflict. The majority of the GEF projects in Mali have been related to climate change, but there is also a substantial number related to biodiversity and multiple focal areas.

Together, this selection of situations reflects the following:

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<sup>9</sup>It is expected that the 220 projects will be reduced when the list of projects is filtered to those that took place in the Albertine Rift and not in the countries of which the Albertine Rift is a part.

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<sup>10</sup>More projects have been implemented in Iran, but the country has not been affected as substantially by armed conflict as Lebanon since 2000.



- Has regional diversity, with two in Asia (including Southeast Asia and West Asia), one in Latin America, two in Africa (Central/East Africa and West Africa), and one in Europe
- Represents situations having experienced major armed conflict since 1989, some relatively recently (Mali and Colombia)
- Has relevant geographic and temporal scope of conflict to ensure its relevance to consider in GEF projects in the countries/situations
- Contains countries with the largest numbers of GEF projects in the region
- Represents a diversity of GEF projects across focal areas in each country/situation and collectively
- Represents a diversity of situations: one regional, one transnational (geographic region, if not political region), and national, with subnational projects included
- Considers the GEF-7 impact programs, especially the Congo Basin, but also the Amazon (portion of Colombia), drylands (Mali), and the Food Security, Land Use, and Restoration Impact Program.

It should be noted that this selection of countries and situations is provisional and subject to consultation to ensure that the final selection is representative of conflict sensitivity within the GEF portfolio. Other potential situations being considered are Afghanistan, Haiti, Myanmar, Nepal, the Okavango Delta, and parts of Kenya. Additional analysis and consideration may be made using, among other criteria, normalization of battle deaths by the country/economy's population (micromorts). The list will be finalized based on a review of terminal evaluations, program and project documentation, and feedback from GEF stakeholders (the GEF Secretariat, country focal points, Agencies, others) to ensure that the list of situations is representative.

## Literature and secondary data research

To complement the analyses of project documents for the selected interventions, the evaluation will review external coverage from news outlets, project implementers, and other sources. This will include a qualitative review of local and international news sources, in which researchers will look for mentions of the project or program to understand how external parties perceived the intervention and its relationship to the conflict context.

In addition to the situation-specific profiles, the evaluation methods will review the literature to assess the state of knowledge and best practices regarding conflict sensitivity in environmental programming. This research will characterize the scope, trends, and patterns of conflict-sensitive programming, especially in the environmental context. It will also review initiatives undertaken by other international bodies of relevance to the GEF's mandate, including environmental organizations, GEF Agencies, and convention guidance and policies. The organizations and individuals included in this comparative review will be selected based on their relevance to the GEF operations and mandate, as well as to reflect examples of best practice in this area. The analysis will also seek to draw upon experiences from M&E in environmental contexts and M&E in peacebuilding contexts. This knowledge will inform the evaluation of the design, implementation, outcomes, impact, and sustainability of GEF-funded initiatives in conflict-affected contexts.

In the literature and portfolio reviews, the evaluation team will also identify other case studies or projects carried out either by the GEF or other organizations that highlight the broader relevance of the findings or illustrate examples of best practice. These may include projects that engage in conflict-affected contexts, as defined here, as well as ones that have encountered social conflicts. This information will help draw links between common

challenges in environmental project implementation in conflict-prone contexts (broadly defined) and provide examples of effective approaches.

## Interviews

After most of the desk research and portfolio analysis has been completed, the evaluation team will conduct interviews with experts, stakeholders, and other key informants to assess qualitative aspects of conflict-sensitive programming in the six situations. This will supplement the review of project documents by exploring aspects that may not have been fully elaborated in project documents. Individuals in the following groups will be interviewed:

- Staff internal to GEF-funded projects, including in program offices and project evaluation personnel
- Individuals involved in the various in-depth projects from implementing and executing agency organizations, as available, and in-country partners and country focal points
- Individuals from communities, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders working with or affected by the GEF projects.

In addition, the team will conduct site visits for two of the six situations to conduct interviews. The sites of the two missions will be confirmed following consultation with the IEO and relevant stakeholders.

To support the identification of international best practices on conflict-sensitive environmental programming, the evaluation anticipates interviewing individuals working on conflict sensitivity, including those who have contributed to the development of toolkits and other guidance documents, for example from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, USAID, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, and Conservation International.

Questions will be tailored to the particular interviewee:

- For **interviewees involved in internal GEF processes**, questions will be designed to gain a broad understanding of attitudes toward and perceptions of conflict sensitivity in the organization's process of setting project objectives, working with the GEF Agencies as they design and implement projects, and evaluating the success of projects.
- For **those who were involved in a GEF-funded project on the ground**, questions will explore how projects were designed (and the appropriateness of the design), how they were implemented in practice, and relations between different actors involved in the project. The interviews will seek to verify and clarify (correct or fill in) conclusions and analysis in the project documentation. Illustrative questions include the following:
  - Could you characterize awareness of the project team during project selection, design, and implementation? Did this awareness influence how the project was selected, designed, or implemented?
  - What was the conflict and security context at, and near, the project site before the beginning of the project?
  - Throughout the implementation of the project, can you recall any instances of tension or conflict between or among project-affiliated parties? between or among parties not affiliated with the project? How were these addressed?
  - In hindsight, how well do you think the implementation accounted for the possibility of conflict related to this project? What could or should have been done differently?
- For **stakeholders and experts working in this field in different organizations**, the project team

will attempt to gain a broader understanding of the state of practice, approaches for mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity into programming, motivations for doing so (especially for conservation and development organizations), and determine how the GEF's approach aligns with or departs from general trends.

### Report compilation and review process

Based on the above situation-specific project analyses, the research team will create profiles of each of the six selected situations. These profiles will provide background information on the conflict context and an overview of GEF projects and activities there. Profiles will summarize the information gathered in the initial review phases, including the number of GEF projects, the number of GEF projects in each of the different GEF focal areas, the success of the projects in meeting their stated objectives, any co-benefits achieved and trade-offs encountered in the projects, and conclusions regarding the extent to which projects addressed the conflict context and the implications of addressing (or failing to address) the conflict context. It is anticipated that each situation profile will be produced as an informational document to accompany the full report.

The final project report will synthesize the findings of the situation profiles, selected examples from GEF projects in other countries, the review of international best practices, and interviews.

Consistent with the GEF IEO's quality assurance practice, two quality assurance measures will be adopted for this evaluation. The first is a **reference group** composed of representatives from the GEF Secretariat, the GEF Agencies, and the GEF STAP who will provide feedback and inputs throughout the evaluation process, and facilitate access to information and appropriate contacts. The second is a **peer review panel** consisting of selected evaluators from GEF Agency evaluation offices,

evaluation organizations, and recognized experts who will provide feedback on the draft report.

## A.4 Proposed outline of the report

Following is the proposed outline of the final report that synthesizes the broad review of GEF projects in conflict-affected countries, the situation profiles, the review of international best practices, and interviews:

- Executive summary (5 pages)
- Introduction
  - Background on conflict sensitivity in environmental programming (including definitions of key terms, literature review, and best practices)
  - Conflict in the GEF context (including programming strategy, focal area objectives, convention guidance, SDGs, national priorities, GEF partnership)
  - Methodology
- GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations
  - Project and program objectives, activities, and intervention types (aggregate from situations identified)
  - Geographic distribution of the interventions
  - Box with geospatial analysis
  - Project results to date (drawing from annual performance report data, terminal evaluation reports, additional sources)
- Findings: Analysis of GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations—this section will be synthesized from the findings of the in-depth analysis of the six situations/country profiles and other findings as applicable and will include illustrative case studies in boxes
  - Overall findings
    - Relevance
    - Coherence

- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Results (through the conflict lens—if the conflict situation had any effect)
- Sustainability
- By stage of intervention
  - Design
  - Implementation
  - M&E
- Cross-cutting issues
  - Gender
  - Marginalized populations
  - Additional issues (as relevant)
- Conclusions and way forward
- Annexes
  - Works cited
  - Situation profiles
  - List of interview subjects and questions

Not counting the annexes, it is anticipated that the main body of the report will be 40–60 pages in length.

[Table A.1](#) presents a proposed timeline for the evaluation.

## A.5 Team and skills

The evaluation will be conducted by the core team consisting of Geeta Batra, Chief Evaluation Officer; Anupam Anand, Evaluation Officer; and Malac Kabir, Research Analyst from the IEO; and Carl Bruch, Director of International Programs; Sierra Killian, Research Associate; and Avital Li, Research Associate; from ELI. The combination of skills required to conduct this evaluation includes evaluation experience and knowledge of IEO methods and practices; familiarity with the policies, procedures and operations of the GEF and its Agencies; knowledge of the conventions and their guidance; knowledge of the GEF and external information sources; and practical, policy, and/or academic expertise in key GEF focal areas. In addition, specific expertise and inputs in the area of conflict, conflict resolution, environmental law, governance and peacebuilding will be provided by the ELI experts.

**Table A.1 Proposed timeline**

Task	2019												2020								
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep		
<b>Approach paper</b>																					
Background research and reviewing the Portfolio																					
Preliminary design & scope of assessment, questions, timeline, portfolio																					
Approach paper draft																					
Approach paper																					
<b>Data collection and analysis</b>																					
Document review																					
Consultation with key informants and stakeholders																					
Review and analysis of targeted projects in the six countries and situations																					
Conduct interviews																					
<b>Preliminary findings</b>																					
Draft country and situation profiles																					
Internal reviews, identifying gaps, revisions and preliminary findings																					
<b>Report writing</b>																					
Progress report to the Council																					
Outlining key findings for report																					
Feedback and revisions																					
Draft full report																					
Due diligence and feedback																					
Final report																					
Presentation to Council in SAER																					
Edited report																					
Dissemination and outreach																					

# Evaluation matrix

Key question	Indicator/basic data/ what to look for	Source of information	Methodology	Project phase	Evaluation criteria
1. Throughout project cycle, including M&E, to what extent are conflict dynamics considered and addressed?	Is there any correlation between the degree of conflict sensitivity and certain project characteristics, e.g., GEF focal area, region, or Agency?	GEF project database	Portfolio analysis (statistical analysis)	Design	Relevance
	Are there any particular conflict-related considerations toward which GEF programming appears to be more sensitive?	GEF project database, project documents, stakeholders	Portfolio analysis, statistical analysis, document review, interviews, triangulation	Design, implementation	Relevance
	Are there any phases of project development in which conflict risks are more likely to be considered?	Project documents, stakeholders	Portfolio analysis, document review, interviews, triangulation	Design, implementation, M&E	Relevance
	Which approaches to integrating conflict sensitivity are most often employed by the GEF?	GEF project database, project documents, stakeholders	Portfolio analysis, document review, interviews, triangulation	Design, implementation, M&E	Relevance
	In what ways, if any, do the interventions reflect national priorities in relation to the conflict or postconflict situation?	Project documents, stakeholders	Literature review, interviews, triangulation	Design	Relevance

Key question	Indicator/basic data/ what to look for	Source of information	Methodology	Project phase	Evaluation criteria
2. In what way does conflict sensitivity (or lack thereof) help explain project and program outcomes and their sustainability?	How, if at all, did armed or social conflict affect the project, particularly the outcomes?	GEF project database, project documents, stakeholders, third-party sources	Portfolio analysis, document review, interviews, statistical analysis, triangulation, in-depth analysis (including field verifications)	Implementation	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results, sustainability
	To what extent were projects and programs discontinued, canceled, delayed, or altered due to the conflict-related dynamics? Were the dynamics foreseeable?	GEF project database, project documents, stakeholders	Portfolio analysis, document review, interviews, statistical analysis, triangulation, in-depth analysis (including field verifications)	Implementation	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results
	To what extent did conflict-related factors impede the conditions necessary to effect transformational change, according to the focal area's theory of change?	GEF project database, project documents, stakeholders	Portfolio analysis, document review, interviews, statistical analysis, triangulation, in-depth analysis (including field verifications)	Implementation	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results, sustainability
3. What conflict-sensitive measures could the GEF adopt to improve performance and outcomes?	How do the SDGs, multilateral environmental agreements, their COPs, and related policies address conflict and conflict sensitivity?	Articles, webpages, stakeholders	Literature review, interviews	Design, implementation, M&E	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results, sustainability
	What dimensions of conflict sensitivity are specifically relevant to GEF projects?	Articles, stakeholders	Literature review, interviews, triangulation	Design, implementation, M&E	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results, sustainability
	How do GEF Agencies engage in fragility, conflict, and violence situations? Do any have internal guidance on programming in fragility, conflict, and violence contexts?	Articles, stakeholders, Agency policies and guidance	Literature review, interviews, triangulation	Design, implementation, M&E	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results, sustainability
	What conflict-sensitive measures have been implemented by other relevant institutions?	Articles, stakeholders, institutional policies and guidance	Literature review, interviews	Design, implementation, M&E	Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, results, sustainability

In addition to the indicators set forth above, the analysis will evaluate specific projects taking into account the following conflict-related considerations:

- To what extent did the project/program design consider **areas of overlap between conservation hotspots and conflict hotspots** in selecting the project site(s)?
- To what extent were direct and indirect **beneficiaries** of the intervention—including those receiving direct benefits and benefits from staffing, procurement, infrastructure, and other decisions—identified in project and program documents? Did the design of the intervention preferentially benefit one group over another or others, whether inadvertently or intentionally?
- To what extent did the design documents consider or address **competition between different users** of natural resources in the same geographic area?
- In what context(s) were conflict dynamics mentioned in the **site selection**, if at all?
- To what extent did the intervention consider how **conflict, whether existing or potential**, could affect the intervention?
- To what extent did the intervention consider how **populations displaced by conflict and insecurity** might affect the intervention?
- To what extent did the intervention consider **how the project would affect access to natural resources and livelihoods**?
- To what extent did the intervention consider potential **spillover effects from conflicts outside** the immediate project area?
- To what extent did the project/program incorporate approaches that intentionally bring together divided groups to **cooperate around shared environmental interests**? If such approaches were incorporated, in what ways did they lay the foundation for more durable support for the intervention, insofar as durable support is discernible in project/program documents?
- In what ways, if any, were **early warning systems** put in place to identify and address disputes before they escalated to violence?
- To what extent did the intervention incorporate context-appropriate mechanisms to **peacefully resolve disputes**?
- To what extent did the **intervention cofinancing** (e.g., by the government, implementing agency, or other institutions) address conflict resolution, mediation, or other peacebuilding elements?



# Case study evaluation portfolio

GEF ID	Title	Country/economy	GEF Agency	Dates	Focal area
32	Mini-Hydropower Project	North Macedonia	WB	1999–2004	CC
197	Integrated Biodiversity Protection in the Sarstun-Motagua Region	Guatemala	UNDP	1995–2005	BD
216	Strengthening of National Capacity and Grassroots In-Situ Conservation for Sustainable Biodiversity Protection	Lebanon	UNDP	1995–2004	BD
398	Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika	Burundi, Congo, Dem. Rep., Tanzania, Zambia	UNDP	1991–2000	IW
534	Conservation and Management of Habitats and Species, and Sustainable Community Use of Biodiversity in Dinder National Park	Sudan	UNDP	1998–2004	BD
621	Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Pilot Project for the Virachey National Park	Cambodia	WB	1999–2007	BD
625	Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Western Slope of the Serrania del Baudo	Colombia	WB	1999–2002	BD
774	Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region	Colombia	WB	2000–08	BD
789	Implementation of the Strategic Action Programme (SAP) Toward Achievement of the Integrated Management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (LME)	Angola, Namibia, South Africa	UNDP	2002–08	IW
947	Integrated Silvo-Pastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management	Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica	WB	2002–08	BD, CC
1020	Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Matavén Forest	Colombia	WB	2001–04	BD
1043	Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains	Cambodia	UNDP	2004–12	BD

GEF ID	Title	Country/economy	GEF Agency	Dates	Focal area
1086	Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains	Cambodia	UNDP	2001–07	BD
1094	Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project, Tranche 1	Burundi, Congo, Dem. Rep., Egypt, Arab. Rep., Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda	WB	2003–10	IW
1152	Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Inner Niger Delta and its Transition Areas, Mopti Region	Mali	IFAD	2003–13	BD
1183	Tonle Sap Conservation Project	Cambodia	UNDP	2004–11	BD
1253	Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project	Mali	WB	2001–13	BD
1274	Household Energy and Universal Rural Access Project	Mali	WB	2002–10	CC
1475	Establishing the Basis for Biodiversity Conservation on Sapo National Park and in South-East Liberia	Liberia	WB	2005–10	BD
1907	Natural Resources and Poverty Alleviation Project	Afghanistan	ADB	2003–07	BD
2019	Integrated National Adaptation Plan: High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia's Caribbean Insular Areas and Human Health (INAP)	Colombia	WB	2005–12	CC
2100	Support to the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN)'s Program for the Rehabilitation of the DRC's National Parks Network	Congo, Dem. Rep.	WB	2006–18	BD
2130	Restoration, Protection and Sustainable Use of the Sistan Basin	Afghanistan, Iran	UNDP	2010–10	IW
2139	SIP: Transboundary Agro-Ecosystem Management Programme for the Kagera River Basin	Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda	FAO	2007–17	LD
2143	DBSB Water Quality Protection Project - under WB-GEF Strategic Partnership for Nutrient Reduction in the Danube River and Black Sea	Bosnia and Herzegovina	WB	2005–17	IW
2193	Enabling Sustainable Dryland Management Through Mobile Pastoral Custodianship	Argentina, Benin, Burkina Faso, Iran, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Tajikistan	UNDP	2005–13	LD
2357	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project	Burundi	WB	2004–12	LD
2380	Sustainable Co-Management of the Natural Resources of the Air-Ténéré Complex	Niger	UNDP	2006–12	LD
2551	Colombian National Protected Areas Conservation Trust Fund	Colombia	WB	2005–15	BD

GEF ID	Title	Country/economy	GEF Agency	Dates	Focal area
2584	Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (NTEAP), Phase II	Burundi, Congo, Dem. Rep., Eritrea, Egypt, Arab. Rep., Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda	UNDP	2007–09	IW
2888	Transboundary Conservation of the Greater Virunga Landscape	Congo, Dem. Rep., Uganda	WB	Dropped (2009)	BD
2929	Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin through Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme	Haiti, Dominican Republic	UNDP	2008–12	IW, LD
3028	SFM Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources	Lebanon	UNDP	2007–14	LD
3160	Preparation of the POPs National Implementation Plan under the Stockholm Convention	Congo, Dem. Rep.	UNDP	2007–11	POPs
3220	Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management	Afghanistan	UNDP	2007–10	LD
3284	Consolidation of Liberia's Protected Area Network	Liberia	WB	2008–12	BD
3389	SIP: Sustainable Land Management for Sustainable Livelihoods in the Toker Area of East Sudan	Sudan	UNDP	2008–11	LD
3418	Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Production Processes	Lebanon	UNDP	2009–13	BD
3430	Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change	Sudan	UNDP	2007–15	CC
3474	Yemen Geothermal Development Project	Yemen, Rep.	UNEP	2008–18	CC
3772	CBSP Forest and Nature Conservation Project	Congo, Dem. Rep.	WB	2008–15	BD
3828	LGGE Energy Efficiency Code in Buildings	Syria	UNDP	2010–13	CC
3837	SPWA-BD: Biodiversity Conservation through Expanding the Protected Area Network in Liberia (EXPAN)	Liberia	WB	2011–15	BD
3959	SPWA-CC: Promoting Renewable Energy Based Mini-grids for Rural Electrification and Productive Uses	Chad	UNIDO	2009–15	CC
4081	SPWA-BD: Strengthening the National Protected Area Network in Chad	Chad	UNDP	2010–13	BD
4108	PCB Management Project	Lebanon	WB	2010–	POPs
4124	Implementation of Phase I of a Comprehensive PCB Management System	Jordan	UNDP	2010–16	POPs
4133	SPWA-CC: Energy Efficiency Project	Burundi	WB	2010–15	CC
4201	Leopards and Landscapes: Using a Flagship Species to Strengthen Conservation in the Republic of Yemen	Yemen, Rep.	WB	2011–11	BD

GEF ID	Title	Country/economy	GEF Agency	Dates	Focal area
4227	Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	UNEP	2010–18	CC
4916	Conservation of Biodiversity in Landscapes Impacted by Mining in the Chocó Biogeographic Region	Colombia	UNDP	2014–19	BD
5017	Developing Core Capacity for Decentralized MEA Implementation and Natural Resources Management in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	UNEP	2012–	MF
5152	Delivering the Transition to Energy Efficient Lighting	Yemen, Rep.	UNEP	2013–17	CC, POPs
5202	Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options for Afghan Communities in Panjshir, Balkh, Uruzgan and Herat Provinces to Manage Climate Change-induced Disaster Risks	Afghanistan	UNDP	2013–	CC
5604	Technology Transfer for Climate Resilient Flood Management in Vrbas River Basin	Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNDP	2014–	CC
5723	West Balkans Drina River Basin Management Project	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia	WB	2014–	CC
5746	Scaling up and Replicating Successful Sustainable Land Management (SLM) and Agroforestry Practices in the Koulikoro Region of Mali	Mali	UNEP	2014–	BD, CC, LD
9056	Promotion of Small Hydro Power (SHP) for Productive Use and Energy Services	Burundi	UNIDO	2015–	CC
9090	Community-Based Forest Management for Biodiversity Conservation and Climate Change Mitigation in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	FAO	Dropped (2016)	BD, CCM, SFM
9103	Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia (S-RET)	Cambodia	IFAD	2015–	CC
9114	Capacity Development for Improved Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)	Serbia	UNDP	2016–	MF
9414	Preparation of the Republic of Moldova's Second Biennial Update Report to UNFCCC	Moldova	UNEP	2016–	CC
9441	Contributing to the Integrated Management of Biodiversity of the Pacific Region of Colombia to Build Peace	Colombia	FAO	2016–	BD, LD
9491	Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley / Red Sea Flyway (Tranche II of GEF ID 1028)	Djibouti, Egypt, Arab. Rep., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan	UNDP	2016–	BD
9515	The Restoration Initiative, DRC Child Project: Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-silvo-pastoral Resources in the Pilot Province of South-Kivu	Congo, Dem. Rep.	FAO	2016–	BD, CC, LD

GEF ID	Title	Country/economy	GEF Agency	Dates	Focal area
9539	Enhancing Sustainability of Protected Area Systems and Stabilizing Agro-production in Adjoining Areas through Improved IAS Management	Malawi	UNEP	2016–	BD
9578	Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia's Orinoquia Region	Colombia	WB	2017–	BD
9661	Mali: Community-based Natural Resource Management that Resolves Conflict, Improves Livelihoods and Restores Ecosystems throughout the Elephant Range	Mali	UNDP	2016–	BD, LD
9663	Colombia: Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon	Colombia	WB	2015–	BD, CC, LD
9670	Enhancing Regional Climate Change Adaptation in the Mediterranean Marine and Coastal Areas	Albania, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Montenegro, Tunisia	UNEP	2016–	CC

**Source:** GEF Portal.

**Note:** *GEF Agency:* ADB = Asian Development Bank, FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme, UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme, UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organization, WB = World Bank; *focal area:* BD = biodiversity, CC = climate change, CCM = climate change mitigation, IW = international waters, LD = land degradation, POPs = persistent organic pollutants, SFM = sustainable forest management, MF = multifocal. The dates cited for each project are from the GEF Portal. In a few instances, there are discrepancies between the dates in the database and in the respective terminal evaluation report; where discrepancies were identified, the terminal evaluation report dates were used as these data have been verified.

# Interviewees

## GEF SECRETARIAT

Steffen Hansen, Environmental Specialist (July 8, 2020)

Astrid Hillers, Senior Environmental Specialist for International Waters (April 17, 2020)

Fareeha Iqbal, Senior Climate Change Specialist (April 17 and July 16, 2020)

Katya Kuang-Idba, Climate Change Specialist (April 17 and July 16)

Sarah Wyatt, Environmental Specialist (April 17, 2020)

Mark Zimsky, Biodiversity Focal Area Coordinator (June 1, 2020)

## GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Maya Abboud, former Technical and Management Specialist, Water for Life Solutions, LLC; Consultant, Lebanon Ministry of Environment (July 10, 2020)

Dusan Dobricic, Head of the Group for Participation in Strategic Planning and Management, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management (December 23, 2019)

Bosko Kenjic, Head of Water Resources Department, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (December 16, 2019)

Hazima Hadzovic, Assistant Minister in the Water Sector at the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management and Forestry (June 30, 2020)

Mikio Ishiwatari, Senior Advisor on Disaster Management and Water Resource Management, Japan International Cooperation Agency (January 22, 2020)

Amer Kavazovic, Head of the Department of Water Protection, Sava River Basin District Agency (December 17, 2019)

Nikola Maravic, GEF Focal Point, Ministry of Environmental Protection (December 19, 2019)

Senad Oprasic, GEF Focal Point, Ministry of Trade and Economic Relations (December 18, 2019)

## CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Osama Al Nouri, Regional Flyway Facility Coordinator, BirdLife International (July 3, 2020)

Mujtaba Bashari, Training and Capacity Officer, Wildlife Conservation Society (July 28, 2020)

Amina Gabela, Junior Researcher, Forestry and Environmental Action (December 17, 2019)

Olivia Lazard, Mediation, Policy and European Relations, European Institute of Peace (October 2, 2019)

Qais Sahar, Afghanistan Operations Director, Wildlife Conservation Society (July 28, 2020)

Assad Serhal, Director General, Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon (July 24, 2020)

Garry Shea, Afghanistan Country Director, Wildlife Conservation Society (July 28, 2020)

Amanda Woomer, Associate Director for M&E, Habitat for Humanity; Chair of the M&E Interest Group, Environmental Peacebuilding Association (October 25, 2019)

## GEF AGENCIES

Paola Agostini, Lead Natural Resources Management Specialist, World Bank (May 1, 2020)

Guy Alaerts, Lead Water Resources Specialist, World Bank (June 29, 2020)

Ali Azimi, Former Senior Environmental Specialist, Asian Development Bank (July 27, 2020)

Christophe Besacier, Forestry Officer, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (June 23, 2020)

Roshan Cooke, Regional Environment and Climate Specialist, International Fund for Agricultural Development (July 8, 2020)

Christophe Crepin, Manager of ENB Global Practice for the South Asia Region, World Bank (May 22, 2020)

Raduska Cupac, Sector Leader Energy and Environment, United Nations Development Programme (December 16, 2019)

Richard Damania, Global Lead Economist, World Bank (May 6, 2020)

Garabed (Garo) Haroutunian, Area Manager for the Bekaa Region, United Nations Development Programme (June 26, 2020)

Juergen Hierold, Chief and GEF Coordinator, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (July 7, 2020)

Olivera Jordanovic, Senior Land Administration Specialist, World Bank (December 23, 2019)

Liza Leclerc, Lead Technical Specialist, International Fund for Agricultural Development (July 8, 2020)

Heng Liu, Senior Technical Advisor, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (July 7, 2020)

Kisa Mfalila, Lead Regional Environment and Climate Specialist, International Fund for Agricultural Development (July 8, 2020)

Darko Milutin, Disaster Risk Management Specialist, World Bank (December 23, 2019)

Maryam Niamir-Fuller, (former) Director, Division of Global Environment Facility Coordination, United Nations Environment Programme (July 14, 2020)

Jimena Puyana, Head of Sustainable Development Unit and Programme Specialist, United Nations Development Programme (July 2, 2020)

Juan Pablo Ruiz, (former) Natural Resources Specialist, World Bank (June 11, 2020)

Jihan Seoud, Environment Programme Analyst, United Nations Development Programme (June 24, 2020)

Karan Sehgal, Natural Resources and Environmental Management Expert, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; former Renewable Energy Technologies Portfolio Officer, International Fund for Agricultural Development (July 8, 2020)

Mirko Serkovic, Natural Resource Management Specialist, World Bank (April 30, 2020)

Penny Stock, Regional Technical Advisor for Ecosystems and Biodiversity, United Nations Development Programme (April 29, 2020)

Tracy Hart, Senior Environmental Specialist and Global Lead for Fragile and Conflict States, World Bank (July 12, 2020)

## SUBJECT EXPERTS

John Barrett, General Manager at Garamba National Park with African Parks (August 14, 2020)

Alexander Belyakov, Consultant, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (November 13, 2019)

Yue Cao, Senior Research Officer, Overseas Development Institute (December 16, 2019)

Carla de Chassy, Director of Member Affairs and Global Communications, SEEP Network (September 2019)

Alec Crawford, Senior Policy Advisor and Lead for Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, International Institute for Sustainable Development (October 2020)

Anne Hammill, Senior Director for Resilience, International Institute for Sustainable Development (July 2019)

Héctor Camilo Morales, PhD candidate, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (October 25, 2019)

Naftali Honig, Research and Development Director at Garamba National Park, African Parks (August 6, 2020)

Charles Kelly, Independent Consultant (April 30, 2019)

Julia LeMense, Principal Consultant, Legal & Disaster Management Consulting (February 21, 2020)

Bancy Mati, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Consultant and Professor at Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (June 29, 2020)

Nathan Morrow, Research Associate Professor, Tulane University (February 21, 2020)

Ada Sonnenfeld, Evaluation Specialist, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (April 3, 2020)

# Fragility of countries/ economies receiving GEF funding

This annex provides information on fragile countries and economies using two sources: The [List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) (produced by the World Bank) and the [Fragile States Index](#) (produced by the Fund for Peace), as of June 2020.

The World Bank has produced the List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations annually in some form since 2004. The main goal of the list is to identify at-risk countries/economies and provide information to the World Bank and its partners on how to best address such situations. By identifying these situations, the World Bank can change how it approaches projects and alert the broader community on the situations within these countries/economies. The list began as the Low-Income Countries Under Stress List (2004–08) and was only used internally; the 2006–08 lists were later released publicly. The list became published as the Fragile States Index with the same criteria from 2009–10. The next iteration was the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (2011–20). The list was “harmonized” because it took the scores of the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank and incorporated them into the final score (World Bank n.d.). It also includes countries/economies that have active United Nations or regional peacekeeping activities. While the list

has been published annually from 2006 to 2020, the methodology and classification system used to rank the states’ fragility has been through numerous changes over the years, making it difficult to compare rankings over time.

The Fragile States Index was created by the Fund for Peace in 2006 to track the instability of states and compare them globally. The methodology includes three different data streams: content analysis, quantitative data, and qualitative data. The three different streams are triangulated and reviewed by a team of researchers before publication. The finalized data factor into a series of internal trends within each state, allowing for a detailed comparison across states. The data set has been published annually since 2006. The index’s methodology has remained consistent since its first publication.

[Tables E.2](#) and [E.3](#) show the fragility designations for countries/economies that have received GEF funding, and [table E.1](#) provides a high-level comparison. By way of comparison, there is some overlap between the countries/economies included in the World Bank list and the Fragile States Index, particularly with respect to the most fragile states (i.e., those listed predominantly as alert



in the Fragile States Index). Twenty-four countries/economies are both listed by the World Bank and classified predominantly as alert in the Fragile States Index. Another 12 countries/economies are listed by the World Bank, but not listed predominantly as alert in the Fragile States Index (either

due to missing data or because they are listed predominantly as warning). And eight countries/economies are listed predominantly as alert in the Fragile States Index, but not included in the World Bank's list.

**Table E.1** Comparison of countries/economies in the List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations and the Fragile States Index

In both	In World Bank list, but not classified predominantly as alert in Fragile States Index	Classified predominantly as alert in Fragile States Index, but not in World Bank list
Afghanistan	Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire
Burundi	Comoros	Eritrea
Cameroon	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	Ethiopia
Central African Republic	Gambia, The	Guinea
Chad	Kiribati	Kenya
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Kosovo	Mauritania
Congo, Rep.	Lebanon	Pakistan
Guinea-Bissau	Marshall Islands	Uganda
Haiti	Papua New Guinea	
Iraq	Solomon Islands	
Liberia	Tuvalu	
Libya	West Bank and Gaza (territory)	
Mali		
Myanmar		
Niger		
Nigeria		
Somalia		
South Sudan		
Sudan		
Syrian Arab Republic		
Timor-Leste		
Venezuela, RB		
Yemen, Rep.		
Zimbabwe		

**Source:** Environmental Law Institute and GEF IEO based on the Fund for Peace. [Fragile States Index](#), accessed April 13, 2020; and the World Bank Group, [Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#), updated Feb 27, 2020.

**Table E.2 Fragility designations for countries/economies receiving GEF funding, as per the World Bank's List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, 2006–20**

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	S	S	Core	Core	Core	2.763	2.733	2.74	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.75	2.75	2.73	
Albania															
Algeria															
Angola	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.979	2.979	2.95							
Antigua & Barbuda															
Argentina															
Armenia															
Azerbaijan															
Bahamas															
Bahrain															
Bangladesh															
Barbados															
Belarus	MI	MI	MI												
Belize	MI	MI	MI												
Benin															
Bhutan															
Bolivia															
Bosnia and Herzegovina					MI	3.708	3.708	3.64	3.6						
Botswana															
Brazil															
Bulgaria															
Burkina Faso															
Burundi	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	3.038	3.029	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.15	3.04	3.01	
Cabo Verde															
Cambodia		M	M	M											
Cameroon				M	M										
Central African Republic	S	S	Core	Core	Core	2.775	2.85	2.84	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.42	2.45	2.48	
Chad	M	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.792	2.742	2.8	2.9	2.9	3	3.02	2.99	2.94	
Chile															
China															
Colombia															
Comoros	S	S	Core	Core		2.496		2.55	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.54	2.49	2.46	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.758	3.071	2.85	3	3.1	3.1	3.16	3.08	3.04	
Congo, Rep.	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	3.017	2.813	3.17	3.2				3.07	2.99	
Cook Islands															
Costa Rica															
Côte d'Ivoire	Core	S	Core	Core	Core	2.867	2.842	2.85	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.46	3.53	3.54	
Croatia															
Cuba															
Czech Republic															
Djibouti	Core	M	M	M	M							3.16	3.13	3.13	

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Dominica															
Dominican Republic	MI														
Ecuador		MI	MI												
Egypt, Arab. Rep.															
El Salvador															
Equatorial Guinea	MI	MI	MI												
Eritrea	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.283	2.271	2.15	2	2	2.1	2.02	1.99	1.99	
Estonia															
Eswatini															
Ethiopia															
Fiji															
Gabon	MI	MI	MI												
Gambia, The	M	M	M	M	M						3.2	3.02	2.93	2.95	
Georgia					MI	4.433	4.488								
Ghana															
Grenada															
Guatemala															
Guinea	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.979	3.05	3.08							
Guinea-Bissau	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.85	2.95	3.04	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.54	2.54	
Guyana															
Haiti	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.925	2.925	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.88	2.88	
Honduras															
Hungary															
India															
Indonesia															
Iran															
Iraq	MI	MI	MI												
Jamaica															
Jordan															
Kazakhstan															
Kenya															
Kiribati			M	M	Core	2.95	2.883	2.86	2.9	2.9	3	3	2.95	2.97	
Korea DPR															
Korea, Rep.															
Kosovo	Core	Core	Core	Core	3	3.433	3.433	3.43	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.53	3.57	3.57	
Kuwait															
Kyrgyz Republic															
Lao PDR	Core	Core	M	M											
Latvia															
Lebanon	MI	MI	MI												
Lesotho															
Liberia	S	S	Core	Core	Core	3.232	3.271	3.38	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.28	3.23	3.24	
Libya															
Lithuania															

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Madagascar									3.1	3.1	3.2	3.15			
Malawi									3.2						
Malaysia															
Maldives															
Mali									3.7	3.6	3.5	3.53	3.55	3.57	
Malta															
Marshall Islands	MI	MI	MI				2.742	2.75	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.75	2.74	2.74	
Mauritania		M													
Mauritius															
Mexico															
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.		MI	MI				2.729	2.72	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.86	2.82	2.82	
Moldova															
Mongolia															
Montenegro															
Morocco															
Mozambique													3.2	3.16	
Myanmar	S	S	Core	Core	Core					3	3.1	3.1	3.19	3	
Namibia															
Nauru														3.15	
Nepal					MI	3.663	3.646	3.69	3.7						
Nicaragua															
Nigeria	Core	M													
Niger															
Niue															
North Macedonia															
Oman															
Pakistan															
Palau															
Panama															
Papua New Guinea	M	M	M		MI							3.13	2.93	2.91	
Paraguay															
Peru															
Philippines															
Poland															
Romania															
Russian Federation															
Rwanda															
Samoa															
São Tomé & Príncipe	M	M	Core	Core	Core	3.154									
Saudi Arabia															
Senegal															
Serbia															
Seychelles			MI												
Sierra Leone	M	M	M	M	M	3.334	3.312	3.33	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.29	3.28		

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Slovak Republic															
Slovenia															
Solomon Islands	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.967	3.017	3.11	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.08	
Somalia	S	S	Core	Core	Core	1.217		1.13	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.11	1.47		
South Africa															
South Sudan									2.2	2.2	2.1	1.92	1.72	1.69	
Sri Lanka															
St. Kitts & Nevis															
St. Lucia															
St. Vincent & Grenadines															
Sudan	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.513	2.525	2.48	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.49	2.51	2.47	
Suriname															
Syrian Arab Republic			MI												
Tajikistan	M				M	3.309									
Tanzania															
Thailand															
Timor-Leste	Core	Core	S	Core	Core	2.933	2.958	3.16	3.2	3.2	3.2			3.15	
Togo	Core	S	Core	Core	Core	2.913	2.971	2.94	3.1	3	3.1	3.1	3.11	3.16	
Tokelau															
Tonga	Core	Core	S	Core	M										
Trinidad & Tobago			S												
Tunisia															
Turkey															
Turkmenistan	MI	MI	MI												
Tuvalu									2.9	2.9	2.9	2.92	2.94	2.96	
Uganda															
Ukraine															
Uruguay															
Uzbekistan	M	Core	Core	M											
Vanuatu	Core	M	M												
Venezuela, RB	MI	MI	MI												
Vietnam															
Yemen, Rep.				M	M	3.15	3.167	2.98	3	3	3	2.61	2.38	2.11	
Zambia															
Zimbabwe	S	S	Core	Core	Core	1.889	1.954	2.16	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.76	2.69	2.72	

**Sources:** World Bank Group, [Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#), updated Feb 27, 2020; World Bank n.d.

**Note:** MI = medium income; M = marginal; S = severe; □ not included in year's list; ■ high institutional and social fragility; ■ medium-intensity conflict; ■ high-intensity conflict. Not all countries on the list received GEF funding every year. Numbers provide the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. Core = fragile state with CPIA score of 3.0 or lower; marginal (M) = fragile state with CPIA score between 3.0 and 3.25; severe (S) = low-income country under stress with lowest CPIA ratings (not used after 2008). For more on the methodological and scoring changes over time, see [Historical Overview: The World Bank Group's Classification of Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations](#).

**Table E.3** Fragility designations for countries/economies receiving GEF funding as per the Fragile States Index, 2006–20

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Albania	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green
Algeria	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Angola	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Antigua & Barbuda	White	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Argentina	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Armenia	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green
Azerbaijan	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Bahamas	White	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Bahrain	White	Green	Green	Green	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Green
Bangladesh	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Barbados	White	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Belarus	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Belize	White	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Benin	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Bhutan	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Bolivia	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Botswana	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green
Brazil	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Bulgaria	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green
Burkina Faso	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Burundi	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Cabo Verde	White	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Cambodia	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Cameroon	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red
Central African Republic	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Chad	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Chile	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
China	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Colombia	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Comoros	White	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Congo, Rep.	White	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Cook Islands	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White
Costa Rica	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Côte d'Ivoire	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow
Croatia	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Cuba	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green
Czech Republic	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Djibouti	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Dominica															
Dominican Republic															
Ecuador															
Egypt, Arab. Rep.															
El Salvador															
Equatorial Guinea															
Eritrea															
Estonia															
Eswatini															
Ethiopia															
Fiji															
Gabon															
Gambia, The															
Georgia															
Ghana															
Grenada															
Guatemala															
Guinea															
Guinea-Bissau															
Guyana															
Haiti															
Honduras															
Hungary															
India															
Indonesia															
Iran															
Iraq															
Jamaica															
Jordan															
Kazakhstan															
Kenya															
Kiribati															
Korea, DPR															
Korea, Rep.															
Kosovo															
Kuwait															
Kyrgyz Republic															
Lao PDR															
Latvia															
Lebanon															
Lesotho															
Liberia															
Libya															
Lithuania															

Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Madagascar															
Malawi															
Malaysia															
Maldives															
Mali															
Malta															
Marshall Islands															
Mauritania															
Mauritius															
Mexico															
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.															
Moldova															
Mongolia															
Montenegro															
Morocco															
Mozambique															
Myanmar															
Namibia															
Nauru															
Nepal															
Nicaragua															
Nigeria															
Niger															
Niue															
North Macedonia															
Oman															
Pakistan															
Palau															
Panama															
Papau New Guinea															
Paraguay															
Peru															
Philippines															
Poland															
Romania															
Russian Federation															
Rwanda															
Samoa															
São Tomé & Príncipe															
Saudi Arabia															
Senegal															
Serbia															
Seychelles															
Sierra Leone															



Country/economy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Slovak Republic	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovenia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Solomon Islands	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Somalia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
South Africa	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
South Sudan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sri Lanka	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
St. Kitts & Nevis	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
St. Lucia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
St. Vincent & Grenadines	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sudan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Suriname	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Syrian Arab Republic	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tajikistan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tanzania	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Thailand	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Timor-Leste	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Togo	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tokelau	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tonga	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Trinidad & Tobago	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tunisia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Turkey	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Turkmenistan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tuvalu	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Uganda	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Ukraine	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Uruguay	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Uzbekistan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Vanuatu	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Venezuela, RB	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Vietnam	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Yemen, Rep.	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Zambia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Zimbabwe	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Sources: The Fund for Peace. [Fragile States Index](#), accessed April 13, 2020.

Note: □ not scored; ■ sustainable (very stable); ■ stable (mostly stable); ■ warning (of concern); ■ alert (very fragile).

# Conflict-related term usage by situations examined

As one measure of the extent to which GEF-supported projects considered the conflict context, the evaluation team tallied the frequency with which 16 terms appeared within the text of project documents—conflict, security, war, stabil\*, peace, crisis, arm/s/ed, dispute, violence, fragil\*, combat, tension, unrest, reconcil\*, rebel, and guerilla. (The \* indicates that the root is the search object; for example, searching for “fragil” to capture “fragile” and “fragility.”) [Table F.1](#) displays the total number of times each term appears in a relevant context in the project documents for a given situation.

Each of the seven situations affected by conflict and fragility was selected according to the methodology described in [section 1.1](#). For each situation, the team reviewed every project from the pilot

phase through May 2019. For each projects, the team examined every project-related document available (as of spring 2020) at [www.thegef.org/projects](http://www.thegef.org/projects), noting that not all project documents were available.

Each instance of each term’s appearance in a document was checked to ensure usage was in a conflict context. These counts were then compiled by document, and then by project, to find the overall number of times a given term was used in context in a given situation.

These data allow the reader to compare the frequency with which conflict-related topics were discussed within each situation and between situations.

**Table F.1** Conflict term usage in project documents by situation area

Term	Afghanistan	Albertine Rift	Balkans	Cambodia	Colombia	Lebanon	Mali
Conflict	315	1,005	236	626	324	217	965
Security	194	812	233	810	233	269	392
War	10	532	204	86	2	66	18
Stabil*	29	366	113	154	105	124	0
Arm/S/Ed	4	124	6	154	43	2	60
Dispute	5	45	26	113	27	66	41
Fragil*	21	68	10	25	119	3	9
Peace	19	286	32	32	81	6	50
Rebel	2	43	2	8	0	0	27
Reconcil*	0	37	10	26	10	1	12
Combat	13	14	2	113	68	0	0
Unrest	0	74	0	11	38	2	39
Violence	0	71	57	11	105	13	9
Tension	2	45	11	41	9	27	47
Crisis	5	180	10	40	144	16	19
Guerrilla	0	2	0	2	7	0	0
# of projects	30	303	134	99	27	72	85

# Risk identification and management in selected GEF projects

The following tables highlight whether the project documentation leading up to project approval included a discussion—either in the text or as a table—of risks, conflict-related risks, conflict mitigation measures, and measures to mitigate

conflict-related risks. Results are provided for illustrative projects in the seven situations affected by conflict and fragility selected as the focus of this evaluation.

**Table G.1** Afghanistan

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
1907	Natural Resources and Poverty Alleviation Project	BD	ADB	2003				
3220	Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management	LD	UNDP	2007				
2130	Restoration, Protection and Sustainable Use of the Sistan Basin	IW	UNDP	2008				
4227	Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan	CC	UNEP	2010				
5017	Developing Core Capacity for Decentralized MEA Implementation and Natural Resources Management in Afghanistan	MF	UNEP	2014				
5202	Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options for Afghan Communities in Panjshir, Balkh, Uruzgan and Herat Provinces to Manage Climate Change-induced Disaster Risks	CC	UNDP	2014				
9531	Conservation of Snow Leopards and their Critical Ecosystem in Afghanistan	BD, CC	UNDP	2018				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; CC = climate change; CW = chemicals and waste; IW = international waters; LD = land degradation; MF = multifocal. ADB = Asian Development Bank; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.

**Table G.2 Albertine Rift**

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
398	Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika	IW	UNDP	1992				
1094	Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project, Tranche 1	IW	WB	2002				
2357	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project	LD	WB	2004				
2888	Transboundary Conservation of the Greater Virunga Landscape	BD	WB	2005				
2100	Support to the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN)'s Program for the Rehabilitation of the DRC's National Parks Network	BD	WB	2007				
2139	SIP: Transboundary Agro-Ecosystem Management Programme for the Kagera River Basin	LD	FAO	2007				
2584	Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (NTEAP), Phase II	IW	UNDP	2008				
3772	CBSP Forest and Nature Conservation Project	BD	WB	2009				
4133	SPWA-CC: Energy Efficiency Project	CC	WB	2010				
4990	Community Disaster Risk Management in Burundi	CC	UNDP	2013				
9056	Promotion of Small Hydro Power (SHP) for Productive Use and Energy Services	CC	UNIDO	2016				
9515	The Restoration Initiative, DRC Child Project: Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-sylvo-pastoral Resources in the Pilot Province of South-Kivu	BD, CC, LD	FAO	2016				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; CC = climate change; IW = international waters; LD = land degradation. FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme; UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organization; WB = World Bank. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.

**Table G.3 The Balkans**

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
32	Mini-Hydropower Project	CC	WB	2000				
2141	DBSB Reduction of Enterprise Nutrient Discharges Project - RENDR - under WB-GEF Strategic Partnership for Nutrient Reduction in the Danube River and Black Sea	IW	WB	2005				
2143	DBSB Water Quality Protection Project - under WB-GEF Strategic Partnership for Nutrient Reduction in the Danube River and Black Sea	IW	WB	2005				
2372	Forest and Mountain Protected Areas Project	BD	WB	2006				
5604	Technology Transfer for Climate Resilient Flood Management in Vrbas River Basin	CC	UNDP	2014				
5723	West Balkans Drina River Basin Management Project	CC	WB	2014				
9114	Capacity Development for Improved Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements	MF	UNDP	2017				
9607	Mediterranean Sea Programme (MedProgramme): Enhancing Environmental Security	BD, IW, CW	UNEP	2017				
9670	Enhancing Regional Climate Change Adaptation in the Mediterranean Marine and Coastal Areas	CC	UNEP	2017				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; CC = climate change; CW = chemicals and waste; IW = international waters; MF = multifocal. UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme; WB = World Bank. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.

**Table G.4 Cambodia**

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
615	Mekong River Basin Water Utilization Project	IW	WB	1999				
621	Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Pilot Project for the Virachey National Park	BD	WB	1999				
885	Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand	IW	UNEP	2001				
1043	Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains	BD	UNDP	2004				
1086	Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains	BD	UNDP	2002				
1183	Tonle Sap Conservation Project	BD	UNDP	2003				
9103	Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia	CC	IFAD	2015				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; CC = climate change; IW = international waters. IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme; WB = World Bank. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.

**Table G.5 Colombia**

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
773	Caribbean Archipelago Biosphere Reserve: Regional Marine Protected Area System	BD	WB	2000				
774	Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region	BD	WB	2000				
794	Catalyzing Conservation Action in Latin America: Identifying Priority Sites and Best Management	BD	WB	2000				
947	Integrated Silvo-Pastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management	MF	WB	2001				
1020	Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Matavén Forest	BD	WB	2001				
2019	Integrated National Adaptation Plan: High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia's Caribbean Insular Areas and Human Health	CC	WB	2006				
2551	Colombian National Protected Areas Conservation Trust Fund	BD	WB	2006				
9663	Colombia: Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon	BD, CC, LD	WB	2016				
9441	Contributing to the Integrated Management of Biodiversity of the Pacific Region of Colombia to Build Peace	BD, LD	FAO	2017				
9578	Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia's Orinoquia Region	BD	WB	2018				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; CC = climate change; LD = land degradation; MF = multifocal. FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; WB = World Bank. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.

**Table G.6 Lebanon**

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
216	Strengthening of National Capacity and Grassroots In-Situ Conservation for Sustainable Biodiversity Protection	BD	UNDP	1995				
400	Conservation and Sustainable Use of Dryland Agro-Biodiversity of the Fertile Crescent	BD	UNDP	1998				
410	Conservation of Wetland and Coastal Ecosystems in the Mediterranean Region	BD	UNDP	1997				
1707	Integrated Management of Cedar Forests in Lebanon in Cooperation with other Mediterranean Countries	BD	UNEP	2003				
2600	Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean Large Marine Ecosystem-Regional Component	IW, POPs	UNEP	2007				
3028	SFM Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources	LD	UNDP	2008				
3418	Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Production Processes	BD	UNDP	2008				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; IW = international waters; LD = land degradation; POPs = persistent organic pollutants. UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.

**Table G.7 Mali**

GEF ID	Title	Focal area	GEF Agency	Year	Risk	Conflict	Risk mgmt	Conflict risk mgmt
1152	Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Inner Niger Delta and its Transition Areas, Mopti Region	BD	IFAD	2004				
1253	Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project	BD	WB	2002				
1348	Africa Stockpiles Program, P1	POPs	WB	2003				
2193	Enabling Sustainable Dryland Management Through Mobile Pastoral Custodianship	LD	UNDP	2005				
2469	Supporting Capacity Building for the Elaboration of National Reports and Country Profiles by African Parties to the UNCCD	LD	WB	2004				
3699	Promotion of the Use of Agrofuels from the Production and Use of Jatropha Oil in Mali	CC	UNDP	2010				
4569	Improve the Health and Environment of Artisanal and Small Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) Communities by Reducing Mercury Emissions and Promoting Sound Chemical Management	POPs	UNIDO	2012				
5535	Improving IWRM, Knowledge-based Management and Governance of the Niger Basin and the Iullemeden-Taoudeni/Tanezrouft Aquifer System	IW	UNDP	2014				
5746	Scaling up and Replicating Successful Sustainable Land Management (SLM) and Agroforestry Practices in the Koulikoro Region of Mali	BD, CC, LD	UNEP	2014				
9661	Community-based Natural Resource Management that Resolves Conflict, Improves Livelihoods and Restores Ecosystems throughout the Elephant Range	BD, LD	UNDP	2015				

**Note:** BD = biodiversity; CC = climate change; IW = international waters; LD = land degradation; POPs = persistent organic pollutants. IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme; UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organization; WB = World Bank. Year refers to year of project approval. Shading indicates that the topic was discussed in the project documentation.



# Results for GEF regional statistics

To understand the impacts of major armed conflict on GEF projects, a set of statistical tests were performed on country/economy-level data for GEF projects in four regions: Africa, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, to assess whether GEF project outcomes differed between countries/economies classified as conflict (i.e., affected by major armed conflict since 1989) and nonconflict (i.e., not affected by major armed conflict since 1989), a two-sample test of proportions was performed on terminal evaluation review binary scores and dropped or canceled projects data, and a two-sample t-test and a Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test were performed on project delays data.

This quantitative analysis features some limitations. Terminal evaluation reviews are available only for full-size projects, but not for most medium-size projects and for no enabling activities. Moreover, terminal evaluation reviews were not available for all full-size projects.

<sup>1</sup> Countries/economies in the Europe and Central Asia region reflect the World Bank's categorization; see [The World Bank in Europe and Central Asia](#) webpage.

Though the details vary for each region, the analysis of terminal evaluation review binary scores at the regional level reveals that major armed conflict can have a statistically significant effect (or almost statistically significant effect) on projects in five ways: sustainability, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design, M&E implementation, overall, and the likelihood that a project will be dropped or canceled.

- For the Africa and Asia regions, the analysis showed a statistically significant difference in terminal evaluation review sustainability binary scores between conflict and nonconflict countries/economies.
- For the Latin America and the Caribbean region, results showed terminal evaluation review M&E design and M&E implementation binary scores between conflict and nonconflict countries/economies were statistically significantly different.
- Although not technically statistically significant, for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean regions, terminal evaluation review overall and sustainability binary scores were close to being statistically significantly different between conflict and nonconflict countries/economies, respectively.

- No statistically significant difference was shown for terminal evaluation review binary scores for the Europe and Central Asia region.

Additionally, the Asia region exhibited a statistically significant difference in dropped or canceled projects between conflict and nonconflict countries/economies. In contrast to dropped and canceled projects, the analysis showed no statistically significant difference in project delays between conflict and nonconflict countries/economies. The Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test confirmed this conclusion.

To assess the relationship between a country/economy's conflict classification and project implementation and outcomes, a Pearson's chi-square test of independence was performed on terminal evaluation review binary scores and dropped or canceled projects data, and a logistic regression was performed on dropped or canceled projects data. Conclusions of significance from the Pearson's chi-square test of independence for terminal evaluation review binary scores and dropped and canceled projects mirrored those from the two-sample test of proportions, the two-sample t-test, and the Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test. Results from the logistic regression revealed a statistically significant relationship between a country/economy's conflict classification and dropped or canceled projects for the Asia region only.

The findings from the statistical analysis may be constrained by data limitations and challenges related to concentrating on major armed conflict. The analysis sometimes, but not always, found a statistically significant impact of major armed conflict on GEF projects. The data used for the analysis were limited by the availability of terminal evaluation review scores for projects within each region. First, the data from each region used for the statistical analysis included terminal evaluation review scores only for those full-size projects with

terminal evaluation reviews and excluded full-size projects without terminal evaluation reviews, as well as medium-size projects and enabling activities. Because of this data limitation, the results of the statistical analysis capture the relationship between conflict and project outcomes for a subset of projects. In principle, statistical analyses conducted on a larger and more representative sample size of GEF projects may reveal statistically significant relationships that were unable to be identified in this analysis.

Second, the results of the statistical analysis may be affected by its focus on major armed conflict (i.e., countries/economies experiencing more than 1,000 battle deaths). In many cases, "nonconflict" countries/economies receiving GEF funding experience armed conflict (with fewer than 1,000 battle deaths), social conflicts, and/or fragility. Indeed, most GEF countries/economies are fragile in any particular year (see [section 3.2](#)). As such, "conflict" and "nonconflict" countries/economies may not be as different vis-à-vis conflict and fragility as their designations suggest, and comparisons of project results may not indicate significant differences in outcomes.

Notwithstanding difficulties with limited data and definitional boundaries, there are statistically significant effects of major armed conflict on project outcomes for sustainability, M&E design, and M&E implementation, as well as project completion. Additional statistical analysis performed with a larger sample and broader definition of conflict may signal statistical significance for additional project outcomes.

**Table H.1 Terminal evaluation report results for the Africa region**

Variable	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Outcome	0.738	0.71	324	2-sample test of proportions	0.53	0.594	n.a.	Binary scores
Sustainability	0.542	0.389	311	2-sample test of proportions	2.57	0.01	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E design	0.602	0.513	314	2-sample test of proportions	1.52	0.127	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E implementation	0.54	0.533	294	2-sample test of proportions	0.1	0.917	n.a.	Binary scores
Implementation quality	0.719	0.726	284	2-sample test of proportions	-0.13	0.894	n.a.	Binary scores
Execution	0.76	0.733	288	2-sample test of proportions	0.49	0.621	n.a.	Binary scores
Overall	0.838	0.754	324	2-sample test of proportions	1.83	0.067	n.a.	Binary scores
Outcome	n.a.	n.a.	324	Pearson's chi-square	0.28	0.594	0.603	Binary scores
Sustainability	n.a.	n.a.	311	Pearson's chi-square	6.6	0.01	0.012	Binary scores
M&E design	n.a.	n.a.	314	Pearson's chi-square	2.32	0.127	0.154	Binary scores
M&E implementation	n.a.	n.a.	294	Pearson's chi-square	0.01	0.917	1	Binary scores
Implementation quality	n.a.	n.a.	284	Pearson's chi-square	0.02	0.894	1	Binary scores
Execution	n.a.	n.a.	288	Pearson's chi-square	0.24	0.621	0.672	Binary scores
Overall	n.a.	n.a.	324	Pearson's chi-square	3.35	0.067	0.077	Binary scores
Delays	1.95	2.55	459	T-Test with Equal Variances	-1.11	0.267		
Delays			459	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.367	0.544		

Note:   = significant at an alpha level of 0.05;   = close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05; n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

**Table H.2 Dropped/canceled project results for the Africa Region**

Variable	Significant	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Dropped/canceled	No	0.923	0.887	344	2-sample test of proportions	1.14	0.254	n.a.	
Dropped/canceled	No	n.a.	n.a.	344	Pearson's chi-square	1.3	0.254	0.267	

Note: n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

Logistic regressions on dropped/canceled projects	Sample size	Odds ratio	R2	z-Statistic	p-value	Significant
C (Africa region, country/economy projects)	344	0.719	0.006	-1.13	0.257	No

**Table H.3 Terminal evaluation review results for the Asia Region**

Variable	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Outcome	0.841	0.788	351	2-sample test of proportions	1.27	0.205	n.a.	Binary scores
Sustainability	0.726	0.577	335	2-sample test of proportions	2.85	0.004	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E design	0.679	0.646	331	2-sample test of proportions	0.64	0.525	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E implementation	0.629	0.627	304	2-sample test of proportions	0.05	0.964	n.a.	Binary scores
Implementation quality	0.835	0.832	301	2-sample test of proportions	0.07	0.94	n.a.	Binary scores
Execution	0.845	0.826	306	2-sample test of proportions	0.45	0.655	n.a.	Binary scores
Overall	0.872	0.867	353	2-sample test of proportions	0.13	0.896	n.a.	Binary scores
Outcome	n.a.	n.a.	351	Pearson's chi-square	1.61	0.205	0.214	Binary scores
Sustainability	n.a.	n.a.	335	Pearson's chi-square	8.14	0.004	0.005	Binary scores
M&E design	n.a.	n.a.	331	Pearson's chi-square	0.41	0.525	0.558	Binary scores
M&E implementation	n.a.	n.a.	304	Pearson's chi-square	0.002	0.964	1	Binary scores
Implementation quality	n.a.	n.a.	301	Pearson's chi-square	0.0056	0.94	1	Binary scores
Execution	n.a.	n.a.	306	Pearson's chi-square	0.2	0.655	0.755	Binary scores
Overall	n.a.	n.a.	353	Pearson's chi-square	0.17	0.896	1	Binary scores
Delays	1.81	2.17	385	T-Test with Equal Variances	-0.56	0.577		
Delays			385	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.473	0.491		

Note: □ = significant at an alpha level of 0.05; □ = close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05; n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

**Table H.4 Dropped/canceled project results for the Asia region**

Variable	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Dropped/canceled	0.947	0.84	350	2-sample test of proportions	2.96	0.003	n.a.	
Dropped/canceled	n.a.	n.a.	350	Pearson's chi-square	8.78	0.003	0.003	

Note: □ = significant at an alpha level of 0.05; □ = close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05; n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

Logistic regressions on dropped/canceled projects	Sample size	Odds ratio	R2	z-Statistic	p-value	Significant
C (Asia region, country/economy projects)	350	0.545	0.038	-2.82	0.005	Yes

**Table H.5** Terminal evaluation review results for the Europe and Central Asia region

Variable	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Outcome	0.841	0.802	239	2-sample test of proportions	0.77	0.439	n.a.	Binary scores
Sustainability	0.657	0.677	233	2-sample test of proportions	-0.32	0.749	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E design	0.711	0.687	234	2-sample test of proportions	0.4	0.689	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E implementation	0.775	0.796	213	2-sample test of proportions	-0.36	0.716	n.a.	Binary scores
Implementation quality	0.832	0.837	217	2-sample test of proportions	-0.1	0.923	n.a.	Binary scores
Execution	0.837	0.793	215	2-sample test of proportions	0.83	0.408	n.a.	Binary scores
Overall	0.914	0.931	241	2-sample test of proportions	-0.5	0.614	n.a.	Binary scores
Outcome	n.a.	n.a.	239	Pearson's chi-square	0.6	0.439	0.493	Binary scores
Sustainability	n.a.	n.a.	233	Pearson's chi-square	0.1	0.749	0.78	Binary scores
M&E design	n.a.	n.a.	234	Pearson's chi-square	0.16	0.689	0.773	Binary scores
M&E implementation	n.a.	n.a.	213	Pearson's chi-square	0.13	0.716	0.74	Binary scores
Implementation quality	n.a.	n.a.	217	Pearson's chi-square	0.01	0.923	1	Binary scores
Execution	n.a.	n.a.	215	Pearson's chi-square	0.68	0.408	0.475	Binary scores
Overall	n.a.	n.a.	241	Pearson's chi-square	0.25	0.614	0.81	Binary scores
Delays	1.41	1.43	283	T-Test with Equal Variances	-0.07	0.9414		
Delays			283	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.27	0.605		

**Note:** ■ = significant at an alpha level of 0.05; ■ = close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05; n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

**Table H.6** Dropped/canceled project results for the Europe and Central Asia region

Variable	Significant	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Dropped/canceled	No	0.88	0.938	213	2-sample test of proportions	-1.42	0.155	n.a.	
Dropped/canceled	No	n.a.	n.a.	213	Pearson's chi-square	2.02	0.155	0.237	

**Note:** n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

Logistic regressions on dropped/canceled projects	Sample size	Odds ratio	R2	z-Statistic	p-value	Significant
C (Central and East Asia region, country/economy projects)	213	1.428	0.0158	1.4	0.162	No

**Table H.7** Terminal evaluation review results for the Latin America and Caribbean region

Variable	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Outcome	0.78	0.797	273	2-sample test of proportions	-0.29	0.773	n.a.	Binary scores
Sustainability	0.703	0.587	258	2-sample test of proportions	1.7	0.09	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E design	0.662	0.864	257	2-sample test of proportions	-3.01	0.003	n.a.	Binary scores
M&E implementation	0.667	0.833	243	2-sample test of proportions	-2.46	0.014	n.a.	Binary scores
Implementation quality	0.797	0.868	230	2-sample test of proportions	-1.17	0.243	n.a.	Binary scores
Execution	0.799	0.873	234	2-sample test of proportions	-1.24	0.216	n.a.	Binary scores
Overall	0.773	0.8	276	2-sample test of proportions	-0.47	0.641	n.a.	Binary scores
Outcome	n.a.	n.a.	273	Pearson's chi-square	0.08	0.773	0.863	Binary scores
Sustainability	n.a.	n.a.	258	Pearson's chi-square	0.29	0.09	0.121	Binary scores
M&E design	n.a.	n.a.	257	Pearson's chi-square	9.05	0.003	0.003	Binary scores
M&E implementation	n.a.	n.a.	243	Pearson's chi-square	6.07	0.014	0.014	Binary scores
Implementation quality	n.a.	n.a.	230	Pearson's chi-square	1.36	0.243	0.316	Binary scores
Execution	n.a.	n.a.	234	Pearson's chi-square	1.53	0.216	0.24	Binary scores
Overall	n.a.	n.a.	276	Pearson's chi-square	0.22	0.641	0.734	Binary scores
Delays	2.139	1.856	319	T-Test with Equal Variances	0.61	0.539		
Delays			319	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.28	0.596		

**Note:**   = significant at an alpha level of 0.05;   = close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05; n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

**Table H.8** Dropped/canceled project results for the Latin America and the Caribbean region

Variable	Significant	Nonconflict average	Conflict average	Sample size	Statistical test performed	Test statistic	p-value	Fisher's exact	Notes
Dropped/canceled	No	0.912	0.837	242	2-sample test of proportions	1.54	0.123	n.a.	
Dropped/canceled	No	n.a.	n.a.	242	Pearson's chi-square	2.38	0.123	0.185	

**Note:** n.a. = not applicable. For all variables, level = country/economy.

# Conflict sensitivity in environmental programming

Sensitivity analysis is a way of evaluating risk. In international development, conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization or project to understand the context in which it is operating and to recognize how the intervention might interact with this context (Haider 2014). In this way, conflict-sensitive programming can avoid the potential negative impacts of a project while maximizing the project's benefits. Although the idea of conflict sensitivity originated in the humanitarian field, it has spread to others, including environmental programming and academic research. Conflict-sensitive environmental programming has since evolved in academic research and in practice in a number of ways. This annex surveys that evolution.

## I.1 A short history of conflict sensitivity

Conflict sensitivity first emerged in the humanitarian field as a way of helping actors achieve positive outcomes and understand the unintended consequences of aid (Haider 2014). The first well-known example of aid exacerbating conflict is from the 1994 Rwandan genocide: genocidaires exploited humanitarian relief to launch attacks,

and development agencies aggravated tensions between social groups by recruiting primarily Tutsi local staff. After this, international development agencies acknowledged that aid is not necessarily neutral. Aid interventions came to be understood as part of the context—and even, in certain circumstances, as part of the conflict (Haider 2014).

Goodhand (2006) describes three approaches taken by development agencies dealing with conflict:

- **Working around war**, which is seen as a conflict-blind approach that avoids conflict-affected areas and treats war as a barrier to development
- **Working in war**, which acknowledges war and tries to minimize potential negative effects of programs on armed conflict while also mitigating risks related to armed conflict
- **Working on war**, which explicitly focuses on human rights issues, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution during armed conflict.

Conflict-sensitive programming avoids the “working around war” approach and instead focuses on the working “in” and “on” war approaches.

Since the 1990s, three major conflict-sensitive approaches have emerged: do no harm, peace and conflict impact assessment, and aid for peace (Haider 2014). **Do no harm**, which connects issues and actors to address the underlying causes of conflict (rather than exacerbate it), was the most prominent approach in the field in the mid-1990s (Haider 2014). In 1998, Kenneth Bush developed **peace and conflict impact assessment**, a methodology for anticipating and evaluating the impacts of development projects similar in function to environmental and social impact assessments. These assessments seek to mainstream peace and conflict issues in development work (Bush 1998). Finally, the **aid for peace** approach, developed by Bush in 2003, builds on the model and focuses on the peacebuilding opportunities of the given context (Bush 2009).

## I.2 Conflict sensitivity in environmental programming

By the mid- to late 2000s, conflict sensitivity concepts had been widely adopted in the development field and championed by the peacebuilding community. Although research on the linkages between the environment and conflict has been developing since the end of the Cold War (Bruch et al. 2019), a major change in recent peacebuilding discourse has been the inclusion of environmental issues, particularly climate change (Hardt and Scheffran 2019). Since the late 20th century, international declarations and other soft law instruments such as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 2000 Earth Charter, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (adopted in 2015) have mainstreamed the linkages between environmental sustainability and peace.

In the early 2000s, the international community strengthened its commitments to prevent and reduce armed violence, particularly in the context of development. The United Nations established the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 (Lehtonen 2016), and states adopted the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2006 (USIP 2013). With this heightened interest in conflict prevention and environmental programming's strong connections to international development, environmental programming began to incorporate conflict sensitivity in a more deliberate and serious manner. By 2010, conflict-sensitive environmental programming was starting to be more broadly recognized and understood in the international environmental community. Initially, conflict-sensitive environmental programming focused on considering conflict-related risks in the design and implementation of environmental programming (Haider 2014). For example, a 2009 World Bank paper explored how a conflict-sensitive framework in project assessment and implementation could lead to sustainable development in the long term (Ruckstuhl 2009). The paper recognizes that renewable resources like forests, land, and water—in addition to nonrenewable resources—can be sources of conflict as well as conflict multipliers.

In the past decade, conservation programs and sustainable development have increasingly incorporated conflict-sensitive approaches. For example, the Wildlife Conservation Society and the International Institute for Sustainable Development carried out a two-year project on conflict-sensitive conservation in Rwanda's Nyungwe National Park. According to a subsequent report, a variety of conservation-related conflicts affected, or have the potential to affect, the park (Crawford 2012). The researchers selected three conflict types—resource access conflicts, wildlife-human conflicts, and buffer zone management conflicts—for further analysis based on discussions with stakeholders.



They found that the major drivers of **resource access conflicts** in the park were poverty, demand for bamboo products and traditional medicines, the need for food, and population pressures; and the results of these conflicts were biodiversity loss, tourism revenue declines, more poverty, increased risk of injury, and increased atmospheric pollution. Major drivers of **wildlife-human conflicts** included crop choice, population pressures, and crop raiding; while effects of these conflicts included decreased crop yields, increased poverty and food insecurity, negative attitudes toward the park, and injuries and deaths to park fauna and human populations. Finally, **buffer zone conflicts** were found to be primarily driven by the lack of community consultation in the decision-making process, unclear boundaries, disputes over land ownership, and illegal mining; the effects of such conflicts included illegal activities, a lack of community trust, loss of livelihoods, and environmental degradation. By delineating the causes and effects of conflict in the park, the report was able to highlight potential solutions and make monitoring recommendations, showing that incorporating conflict sensitivity leads to better programming outcomes.

Following the 2005 adoption of the Kyoto Protocol—an international agreement in which states pledged to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions—climate change became a more prevalent issue, not only in general environmental programming but also in development and peacebuilding efforts. In 2010, for example, Hammill and Matthew examined conflict sensitivity in the context of climate change adaptation. They present a systematic climate change adaptation scheme that factors peacebuilding into a series of possible responses to the adverse impacts of and opportunities resulting from climate change. They also note that peacebuilding has evolved over the past 20 years to promote sustainable development in conflict-affected places, with climate change being the most recent environmental issue linked to security (Hammill and Matthew 2010).

Climate-induced conflict does not always come from climate change directly; it can also come from how human beings themselves react to climate change (Babcicky 2013). For example, the transition to renewable energy in response to climate change could result in destabilization and social tensions in oil-dependent states, while water security adaptation measures that lack a conflict-sensitive approach could lead to an escalation of water conflicts (see, e.g., Dabelko et al. 2013). Babcicky argues that successful adaptation projects understand the context in which they operate and should use theories from conflict sensitivity, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution for conflict mitigation (Babcicky 2013). Conflict prevention measures include assessing the political, social, or economic situation of a country/economy; determining conflict causes; and identifying and implementing preventative measures that could contribute to conflict-sensitive responses to climate change. Conflict resolution consists of tackling underlying causes of conflict to achieve long-lasting peace. It is argued that these measures should be implemented across all phases of a project, rather than just in the design phase.

Conflict sensitivity in environmental research has been increasingly studied using a method called return on investment. In this type of economic cost-effectiveness analysis, conservation benefits and the probability of project success are weighed against project cost. Risks and uncertainties are often included in these analyses, because they can influence the probability of the success of the conservation intervention. Assessing strategies for protected area planning, Hammill et al. (2016) found that ignoring conflict risk resulted in the lowest return on investment, while choosing to completely avoid conflict-prone regions resulted in only limited improvements and could lead to species receiving no protection. Moreover, they found that in taking conflict into account by protecting additional areas to offset the impacts

of armed conflicts, the return on investment increased—although upfront conservation costs also increased. Taking conflict into account in volatile regions and using local-scale data would thus help achieve biodiversity targets but would require greater initial investment.

While conflict-sensitivity has become much more integrated into environmental programming, risk-sensitivity analyses in conservation and environmental programming do not always specifically include conflict, although they can indirectly allude to it. For example, Tear et al. (2014) present a return on investment approach to conservation priority setting for Africa. Their analysis combines conservation priorities that factored in biodiversity value, habitat quality, and conservation management investments in different types of environments across the African continent. Using their methodology, they identify seven regions with high return on investment values that would support future investment. When estimating the probability of conservation success, the study uses an index that covered the sociopolitical and economic context of the countries/economies. This index accounted for safety and rule of law, human rights and participation, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Thus, while they do consider risks, neither conflict nor conflict sensitivity is not directly taken into account.

In conclusion, conflict sensitivity has emerged as a concept in environmental programming, peacebuilding, and research, although there are still many cases in which it is ignored or not directly considered. It has been particularly prevalent in studies that compare management strategies for biodiversity conservation and climate change adaptation. Although it is clear that conflict sensitivity holds an important place in programming, it has not been consistently applied at the policy and organizational levels, throughout the project life cycle, and between agencies largely because of a lack of coordination between actors (Haider 2014). And, while research and programming plans allude to the importance of conflict-sensitive approaches, there can be difficulties in actually integrating findings into programming on the ground (Haider 2014). In short, conflict-sensitive environmental programming has come a long way since the 1990s, but it still has some way to go.

# Linkages between the SDGs and environmental peacebuilding

This annex summarizes linkages between the various goals and targets comprising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that (1) support environmental peacebuilding, and (2) are supported by environmental peacebuilding. “Environmental

peacebuilding” includes a range of activities to prevent, mitigate, end, and recover from conflict. Shading indicates linkages.

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
End poverty in all its forms everywhere	1			
By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day	1	1		
By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions	1	2		
Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable	1	3		
By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance	1	4		
By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters	1	5		
Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions	1	a		
Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions	1	b		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture	2			
By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round	2	1		
By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons	2	2		
By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment	2	3		
By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality	2	4		
By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional and international levels, and promote access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as internationally agreed	2	5		
Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries	2	a		
Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round	2	b		
Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility	2	c		
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	3			
By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births	3	1		
By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1,000 live births	3	2		
By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases	3	3		
By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being	3	4		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol	3	5		
By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents	3	6		
By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes	3	7		
Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all	3	8		
By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination	3	9		
Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate	3	a		
Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all	3	b		
Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States	3	c		
Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks	3	d		
Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all	4			
By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes	4	1		
By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education	4	2		
By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university	4	3		
By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship	4	4		
By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations	4	5		
By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy	4	6		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development	4	7		
Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender-sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all	4	a		
By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries	4	b		
By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing States	4	c		
Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	5			
End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere	5	1		
Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation	5	2		
Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation	5	3		
Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate	5	4		
Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life	5	5		
Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences	5	6	No	No
Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws	5	a	Yes	Yes
Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women	5	b	Yes	Yes
Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels	5	c	Yes	Yes
Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	6		Yes	Yes
By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all	6	1	Yes	Yes

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations	6	2		
By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally	6	3		
By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity	6	4		
By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate	6	5		
By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes	6	6		
By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies	6	a		
Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management	6	b		
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all	7			
By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services	7	1		
By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix	7	2		
By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency	7	3		
By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology	7	a		
By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States, and land-locked developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support	7	b		
Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	8			
Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries	8	1		
Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors	8	2		
Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-size enterprises, including through access to financial services	8	3		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in accordance with the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, with developed countries taking the lead	8	4		
By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value	8	5		
By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training	8	6		
Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms	8	7		
Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment	8	8		
By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products	8	9		
Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all	8	10		
Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries	8	a		
By 2020, develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the Global Jobs Pact of the International Labour Organization	8	b		
Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation	9			
Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all	9	1		
Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries	9	2		
Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets	9	3		
By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities	9	4		
Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending	9	5		
Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States	9	a		



Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities	9	b		
Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020	9	c		
Reduce inequality within and among countries	10			
By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average	10	1		
By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status	10	2		
Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard	10	3		
Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality	10	4		
Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations	10	5		
Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions	10	6		
Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	10	7		
Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements	10	a		
Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes	10	b		
By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent	10	c		
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	11			
By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums	11	1		
By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons	11	2		
By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries	11	3		
Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage	11	4		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations	11	5		
By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management	11	6		
By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities	11	7		
Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning	11	a		
By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels	11	b		
Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials	11	c		
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	12			
Implement the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries	12	1		
By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources	12	2		
By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains, including postharvest losses	12	3		
By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment	12	4		
By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse	12	5		
Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle	12	6		
Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities	12	7		
By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature	12	8		
Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production	12	a		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products	12	b		
Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities	12	c		
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	13			
Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries	13	1		
Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning	13	2		
Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning	13	3		
Implement the commitment undertaken by developed country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible	13	a		
Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities	13	b		
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development	14			
By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution	14	1		
By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans	14	2		
Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels	14	3		
By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics	14	4		
By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information	14	5		
By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation	14	6		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
By 2030, increase the economic benefits to Small Island Developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism	14	7		
Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, in particular small island developing States and least developed countries	14	a		
Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets	14	b		
Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in UNCLOS, which provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of The Future We Want	14	c		
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss	15			
By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements	15	1		
By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally	15	2		
By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world	15	3		
By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development	15	4		
Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species	15	5		
Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed	15	6		
Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products	15	7		
By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species	15	8		
By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts	15	9		
Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems	15	a		
Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation	15	b		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities	15	c		
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	16			
Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	16	1		
End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	16	2		
Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all	16	3		
By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime	16	4		
Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms	16	5		
Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	16	6		
Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	16	7		
Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance	16	8		
By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration	16	9		
Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements	16	10		
Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime	16	a		
Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development	16	b		
Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	17			
Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection	17	1		
Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries	17	2		
Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources	17	3		
Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress	17	4		
Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries	17	5		

Goal/target	Goal no.	Target no.	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism	17	6		
Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed	17	7		
Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology	17	8		
Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation	17	9		
Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda	17	10		
Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries' share of global exports by 2020	17	11		
Realize timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed countries, consistent with World Trade Organization decisions, including by ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from least developed countries are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access	17	12		
Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence	17	13		
Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development	17	14		
Respect each country's policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development	17	15		
Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries	17	16		
Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships	17	17		
By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts	17	18		
By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries	17	19		

**Source:** Developed by the Environmental Law Institute, drawing on staff experience, peer-reviewed literature, and gray literature.

**Note:** EP = environmental peacebuilding. Shading means the goal is supported.

# Options for recommendation implementation

This annex presents some ideas regarding ways the recommendations presented in [chapter 5](#) could be implemented, drawing upon the lessons learned from the evaluation. It focuses on the five key ways that the GEF could improve project success through conflict-sensitive programming:

1. The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks.
2. To improve conflict-sensitive programming while providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.
3. To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance.
4. The current GEF environmental and social safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.
5. The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported

projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

These five high-level recommendations supplement and reinforce the numerous discrete opportunities this evaluation has highlighted throughout for improving the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of GEF interventions in situations affected by conflict and fragility.

These recommendations emphasize risk management throughout the project life cycle. They provide institutional means that help the GEF, the GEF Agencies, and the project teams identify potential risks that conflict and fragility pose to achieving project objectives. Much emphasis is placed on conflict and context analysis<sup>1</sup> and on the design phase, but situations affected by conflict and fragility are dynamic and can change rapidly. Ongoing monitoring and adjustment are necessary. Similarly, GEF projects and Agencies continue to learn from the approaches they have innovated. Accordingly, it is critical to mainstream conflict sensitivity throughout the GEF project life cycle. These five

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<sup>1</sup>See [discussion](#) in chapter 4.

recommendations for the GEF Secretariat provide a strong foundation.

## RECOMMENDATION 1

*The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks.*

**In light of the many ways that conflict and fragility affect GEF projects, the irregular consideration of conflict-related risks in project screening and the almost nonexistent mention of fragility-related risks to GEF projects highlights the need for a more consistent approach to identifying potential conflict- and fragility-related risks.** The easiest approach would be to expand the existing risk management analysis (often in matrix format) in project identification forms (PIFs) to more consistently and systematically identify potential risks and propose mitigation measures.

**As part of the project review process, a combination of standardized and open-ended questions could be used to determine if the context is affected by conflict or fragility.** For example, it could ask whether the project will be in a country/economy that is affected by armed conflict within a particular period (e.g., in the past 10 years). This question could ask the project proponent to consult either the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](#), the [Peace Research Institute Oslo](#), or the [Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project database](#) in answering the question. The screening tool could also ask if the project will be in a situation affected by fragility. Again, this question could ask the project proponent to consult established indexes, such as the World Bank's [List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) and the Fund for Peace's [Fragile States Index](#)—recognizing that the latter provides a substantially more comprehensive list of countries/economies. For a comparison

of the two sets, see [annex E](#).<sup>2</sup> In addition to reference to standardized databases, the screening tool could also ask an open-ended question that encourages the project proponent to consider the possibility of localized risks related to conflict or fragility that may not be reflected in national-level indexes of conflict and fragility. If the answers to all these questions are no, this portion of the analysis ceases.

**The GEF Portal could tag or label projects as being in a fragile or conflict-affected situation.** This would prompt the undertaking of a careful risk assessment, adaptive management, monitoring, and evaluation.

**If the project is in an area affected by conflict or fragility, the review process could identify conflict- and fragility-related risks along five dimensions: physical security, social conflict, economic drivers, political fragility and weak governance, and coping strategies.** These dimensions represent the key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects (see [section 4.1](#)). That said, this is not necessarily an exhaustive list of conflict- and fragility-related risks, and project proponents should be able to identify other potential risks.

**In considering options for enhancing review of conflict- and fragility-related risks, the GEF should consider whether it is best to have a standardized process across all GEF Agencies.** That is

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<sup>2</sup> The quantitative analysis of the impacts of fragility on project performance contained in [chapter 3](#) highlights the fact that the most fragile situations (designated alert) have statistically significant impacts on multiple dimensions of project performance. Comparing the two lists, 24 states are on the World Bank's list and classified predominantly as alert in the Fragile States Index; 12 on the World Bank list are not classified predominantly as alert in the Fragile States Index; and 8 are classified as alert in the Fragile States Index, but are not included in the World Bank list.



to say, the GEF may articulate the broad framework and core elements, but allow the Agencies some flexibility to have the specific analytic approach reflect their specific practices.<sup>3</sup>

## RECOMMENDATION 2

*To improve conflict-sensitive programming while providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.*

Such guidance should address measures across the programming life cycle, from project design and review, to implementation and monitoring, to closure, to evaluation and learning.

**GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw on both the commonalities and innovations of guidance that has been developed by 10 GEF Agencies.** These Agencies are the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Conservation International, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the World Bank Group.<sup>4</sup> These guidelines, strategies, and toolkits—and experiences in applying them—provide a rich body of approaches upon which to draw in developing GEF guidance.

The conflict-sensitive guidelines and other documents developed by these 10 organizations reiterate three important facts:

- Most GEF Agencies have found guidance on conflict-sensitive programming to be valuable.
- Conflict-sensitive GEF programming is both possible and desirable
- Eight GEF Agencies lack guidance on conflict-sensitive programming.

Thus, notwithstanding the innovations and learning on conflict-sensitive programming, almost half of the GEF Agencies still lack any form of strategy, guidelines, or toolkits for how to develop, implement, close, and evaluate the GEF projects they implement.

**GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw on both the commonalities and innovations of existing Agency guidance.** GEF Agency guidance on programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility share some key elements, including understanding the local context (conflict analysis); collaboration; and stakeholder identification, analysis, and engagement. Existing guidance documents emphasize the importance of actions across the project life cycle. Guidance often provides an introductory section that defines key terms (such as conflict, peace, fragility, and resilience) and explains why conflict-sensitive programming is important (e.g., ADB 2013a; CI 2017).

**Most GEF Agency guidance documents on conflict-sensitive programming include context analysis or conflict analysis as a foundational step in project development.** This analysis seeks to understand the social, cultural, political, economic, and other dimensions of the local conflict, including the role of natural resources (e.g., FAO 2006, 2019a, 2019b; UNDG 2013). The approaches for analyzing the context, and the conflict in particular, vary from having a more generalized awareness of the severity of the conflict to providing specific conflict analysis tools.

**In addition to context and conflict analysis, GEF Agency guidance, training guides, and other**

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., the [Project Document PAD Revised](#) for Colombia: Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon (GEF ID 9663).

<sup>4</sup>See [box 2.1](#).

**documents highlight a range of complementary tools that can help project teams understand the context for the intervention.** These complementary tools include postconflict impact assessments (e.g., FAO 2019a), postconflict needs assessments (e.g., UNDG 2013), and strategic environmental assessments (e.g., World Bank 2005).

**Conflict-sensitive guidelines from GEF Agencies often draw on other guiding principles in framing measures to manage conflict-related risks.** For example, many Agencies incorporate or refer to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD DAC 2007) as guidance for managing conflict (e.g., ADB 2012; ADF 2008). The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (OHCHR 2011) were also used in different GEF Agency guidance tools (e.g., UNDG 2013).

**Perhaps the predominant guiding principle is an emphasis on inclusion and collaborative approaches throughout the life of the project.** Several Agencies recommend partnerships—national and international, private and public—to establish sustainable programming. Stakeholder engagement processes are included in most of the toolkits, manuals, and guidance documents. Provisions on stakeholder engagement processes tend to include recommendations on communication techniques (e.g., CI 2017), determining the need for and defining the role of facilitators (e.g., FAO 2012), and tips for navigating negotiations (e.g., FAO 2006).

**The GEF may consider developing indicators and/or guidance for monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.** If the GEF were to do this, monitoring could better track changes in conflict dynamics, project outcomes, and interactions between these two. Some other organizations taking on projects in such contexts have worked to revise their indicators and theories of change as situations evolve through frameworks, such

as CARE's Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Framework for Social Analysis & Action (CARE 2020). The introduction of standard indicators would provide project staff a more solid foundation for conflict preparedness and could serve as a jumping-off point for the development of more country/economy- or project-specific indicators.

### RECOMMENDATION 3

*To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance.*

**These platforms are designed to effectively foster learning and exchange, build capacity, and provide specialized assistance.** Since conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue, lessons learned should be exchanged on existing knowledge platforms supported through programs such as the integrated approach pilots, the impact programs, the Global Wildlife Program, and planetGOLD, among others, as well as the online GEF Portal.

**Exchanges of approaches, experiences, and learning can enable project coordinators to quickly and effectively improve their projects and project performance.** Project exchange can facilitate peer support and learning for teams that are implementing similar projects or facing similar challenges, allowing for network building and collaboration. These platforms also provide valuable services in surveying experiences—both across GEF projects and more broadly—to distill learning regarding best practices. Armed with this learning, the platforms then build capacity and provide technical assistance to new and ongoing projects. The platforms have proven particularly effective in addressing a discrete set of issues, such as international water management ([IW:LEARN](#)), illegal trade in wildlife (the [Global Wildlife Program](#)), and

climate change (the [Climate Technology Centre and Network](#)).

**Alternatively, a learning, exchange, and technical assistance platform could be established by GEF partners and supported by the GEF.**

Two examples of this approach are the Global Wildlife Program and the Climate Technology Centre and Network. A GEF-funded initiative managed by the World Bank, the Global Wildlife Program seeks to end illegal wildlife trade and protect endangered species (ELI 2017). In addition to 37 child projects across 32 countries/economies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, one component of this program seeks to enhance knowledge management across the projects. This includes organizing knowledge exchange events in which program participants can learn from experts and peers. For example, in 2017, the Global Wildlife Program brought together 75 participants from 20 countries/economies to discuss solutions to human-wildlife conflict in their home communities.<sup>5</sup> It also established a system to share documents with good practices and lessons from other projects. The goals of knowledge sharing are to accelerate learning, enhance collaboration between governments (especially in surveillance), strengthen partnerships between international organizations, and implement a monitoring and evaluation framework to track the progress of multiple projects within the program.

**A variant on the second approach is to have a platform for learning, exchange, and technical assistance that extends beyond the GEF portfolio.**

The Climate Technology Centre and Network is an example of this approach. The network was created in 2012 by the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and it is administered by a coalition led by the United

Nations Environment Programme.<sup>6</sup> It receives part of its funding from the GEF. Though not GEF-specific, the network operates similarly to platforms focusing on GEF projects. It focuses on technical assistance for climate programming by providing funding for technical projects, a platform for information exchange, network building for related project teams, and workshops for capacity building.

**In addition to the usual learning, exchange, capacity-building, and technical assistance activities, the platform could pay particular attention to learning from failure.**

Problematic project experiences are often not properly documented. Unsatisfactory outcomes may be noted in terminal evaluations, but the details are rarely fully elaborated—often in an attempt to avoid embarrassment. In an effort to learn from failures, a growing number of organizations and networks are holding “fail fairs” or “fail fests” to learn from projects that failed (Trucano 2011). Fail fests attempt to build a culture of sharing failures so as to maximize learning and generate new ideas for improvement. There are two types of fail fairs: internal and external. Internal fail fairs hold events solely for an organization’s failed projects, and they engage participants within that organization, rather than the public. By contrast, external fail fairs are open to the public to present or watch. When organizing a fail fair, there are a few key points to keep in mind (Fail Forward n.d.):

- It is important to focus on celebrating taking risks—and learning from experience.
- In addition to recruiting participants to speak about their risks, also recruit senior employees within the organization to speak. This can signal high-level support.
- Establish a code of conduct for participants to create a safe space (this is especially important

<sup>5</sup> World Bank, [Reducing Human-Wildlife Conflict and Enhancing Coexistence](#) webpage.

<sup>6</sup> GEF, [Technology Transfer](#) webpage.

if donors are in the room). This code of conduct can be short, but it is important to establish the rules of engagement.

- Be cautious about sharing the presentations online. It is important to have candid discussions, and broad dissemination can restrict candor.

## RECOMMENDATION 4

*The current GEF environmental and social safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.*

**The GEF has adopted environmental and social safeguards that apply to all GEF-funded projects so as to “avoid, minimize and mitigate any potentially adverse environmental and social impacts” (GEF 2018c).** These safeguards provide a set of nine standards for policies, procedures, systems, and capabilities that all GEF Agencies must demonstrate that they have in place. Additional safeguards tailored to address conflict and fragile situations could help ensure that GEF projects both cause no harm (e.g., by exacerbating tensions or generating conflict) and continue to meet the needs of local communities in the midst of situations affected by conflict and fragility. Moreover, enshrining conflict-sensitive measures in the environmental and social safeguards could help to reduce the impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects. As noted in [chapter 2](#), the current GEF Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards mentions conflict only once, and it lacks detail.

Safeguards could, for example, ensure that GEF project documents include an analysis of conflict- and fragility-related threats to natural resources upon which communities depend, the political economy of natural resource economies related to the project, competition for or conflict over natural resources, and access to (or lack thereof) of

marginalized communities to natural resources in and near the project area. Moreover, conflict sensitivity procedures, standards, and practices should extend throughout the project life cycle—not just during project design.

## RECOMMENDATION 5

*The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations.*

In particular, (1) the rules and procedures need to enable projects to make necessary programmatic adjustments if conflict flares up; (2) the rules governing financing of GEF projects should enable GEF Agencies to make the necessary adjustments to reflect sudden developments on the ground; and (3) the GEF Secretariat and the GEF Agencies may consider greater flexibility in accounting for project costs to reflect the greater time and resource demands associated with developing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

**The restrictions on adjusting projects arise from procedures ensuring that the GEF exercises oversight to ensure project funds are expended in appropriate ways.** Both the GEF Council and the GEF Secretariat have oversight responsibilities. The procedures could be amended to allow the GEF Secretariat to conduct the primary oversight of proposed revisions, and inform the Council as appropriate. This would allow for more nimble adjustments.

**In particular, the GEF might reconsider what constitutes a change in project objectives.** One of the primary concerns voiced by key informants was that when a project seeks to change its objectives, the GEF Council must review and approve those changes. Consider, for example, a project to improve biodiversity management in a country/

economy, particularly by training park rangers in a specific park with mountain gorillas. If rebels moved into the park and made on-the-ground work too dangerous, would efforts to train the rangers remotely be a change of objectives? Would policy work to empower the rangers? Would it be possible to move the project to another park with chimpanzees, or to a park with many endemic species but no primates? Presumably, shifting the project to another focal area would require Council review. But short of such a dramatic shift, it would be good to have guidance regarding what would constitute a change in project objectives—and to have that guidance sufficiently broad to enable projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations to adjust as necessary and to do so in a nimble manner.

**In addition, the GEF could consider amending the rules governing financing of GEF projects to enable the GEF Agencies to make the necessary adjustments to reflect sudden developments on the ground.** There are four key ways to do this: allowing for contingency costs, allowing for new budget lines, allowing a greater percentage of funds that a project may transfer from one budget line to another without seeking approval, and accounting for the additional costs of working in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Currently, the GEF does not allow project budgets to include a budget line for contingent costs, and new budget lines need to be approved by the Council.

**The GEF could allow for contingent costs, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.** A number of intergovernmental organizations allow contingency budgeting. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and others allow for contingency budgeting in their central budgets. More broadly, the growing interest in resilience—and funding for resilience—seems to be increasing interest in contingency reserves and contingent budgeting; this is discussed in [section 4.4](#).

**The GEF may consider allowing projects to add budget lines, with a measure of oversight.** A number of key informants reported that it was difficult, if not impossible, to add a new budget line to address needs that arose related to conflict that had not been foreseen. One staff member from a GEF Agency reported that the Agency had started including budget lines for possible expenses that might arise, and then allocated \$0 to those lines. This made it much easier to reallocate funds at a later date should that be required. This strategy is a good work-around, but it only works if the right budget lines are envisioned and included.

**The COVID-19 pandemic reinforces the need for substantively and financially adaptive approaches to GEF programming.** COVID-19 has not only halted current development efforts but is reversing decades of progress toward more sustainable development. According to the United Nations, the world will experience its first rise in poverty since 1998 with a predicted 71 million being forced into poverty in 2020 (UN 2020). Per capita income is expected to decrease by the largest fraction since 1870, forcing most countries/economies into a recession (World Bank 2020b). It is expected that the economic declines will lead to fiscal challenges, and together the economic and fiscal challenges are projected to increase state fragility (IMF 2020; OECD 2020a). More countries/economies will become fragile, and already fragile and conflict-affected areas will become more fragile (Nicola et al. 2020; UNIDO 2020). COVID-19 can undermine conflict resolution and crisis management mechanisms, erode the social order, and overwhelm already overextended public health systems (ICG 2020). It will aggravate other challenges. Inequalities may be exacerbated by the spread of COVID-19, placing more pressure on vulnerable groups (EUISS 2020).

**Reforming the GEF rules and procedures to allow for more flexible and adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations**

# Management response

*This annex presents the management response from the GEF Secretariat to the working document version of this report. It has been formatted but not edited, and all quotations refer to the working document, not the published report.*

## INTRODUCTION

1. This paper presents the GEF Secretariat's management [response] to...the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) [report] GEF/E/C.59/01: Evaluation of GEF Support in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.

## EVALUATION OF GEF SUPPORT IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS

2. The Secretariat welcomes the IEO's report on the Evaluation of GEF Support in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, and particularly appreciates its in-depth and data-oriented analyses. The Secretariat is in broad agreement with the report's conclusions and recommendations.

3. The Secretariat takes note of the findings that the majority of GEF projects are in fragile and conflict-affected situations, and the potential

impacts of these circumstances on project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

4. The Secretariat is pleased by the findings that a growing number of GEF projects have acknowledged the risks posed by conflict and fragility, and innovated adopted strategies to manage those risks. The Secretariat is also encouraged by the observation that many of these projects are learning from both their own experiences and from the experiences of other programming on these dimensions.

5. The Secretariat appreciates the extensive range of innovative guidances for fragile and conflict-affected circumstances that has been developed and is being practiced by many of the Implementing Agencies. The Secretariat will build upon these to develop jointly with Agencies GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming. This will provide a framework that all Agencies can adopt during project design and across the project life cycle.

6. The Secretariat takes note of the recommendation to leverage existing knowledge platforms to improve conflict-sensitivity. The Secretariat considers this recommendation as usefully related to

the present Knowledge Management evaluation, and will therefore address this through its coming advancements in Knowledge Management as per the recommendations of that report.

7. Finally, the Secretariat is confident that developments along all of these dimensions will facilitate and strengthen the incorporation of adaptive management into GEF programming, so as to enable further project adaptability and resilience in challenging implementation circumstances.

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